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Abstract 
One of the most controversial wars in contemporary history, both in terms of the 
ideological powers behind it and its continued struggle for over 60 years, is the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The most recent outburst of the conflict, commonly known as 
the Gaza War, has attracted extensive global media coverage. Employing an 
interdisciplinary approach, the thesis incorporates an extensive content analysis, to chart 
patterns and regularities within a large corpus of four broadcast media (namely BBC 
Arabic, BBC World, Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al-Jazeera English). It then integrates a more 
interpretative discourse analysis, to investigate the cultural ideas evoked linguistically 
and, to a lesser extent, visually throughout the coverage. Assuming a qualitative stance, it 
also draws upon focus groups conducted in Jordan and England to examine the public’s 
knowledge and understandings of the events on the ground, in addition to their 
evaluation of both organisations’ levels of objectivity and impartiality. To allow for a 
comparative dimension, the thesis develops two ‘frames’ of analysis that systematically 
looks at two recurring themes and scrutinises their discursive strategies and functions in 
the construction of meaning and ideology. These include Provocation, which examines 
questions of responsibility and culpability; and Proportionality which embraces matters of 
legitimacy and authority in relation to the humanitarian aspect of the war. The findings 
indicate that the actions of a protagonist may be deemed legitimate with regard to 
provocation, but illegitimate with regard to their proportionality. The peculiar 
circumstances of the war pushed the media in the direction of greater separation from 
the predominant ideologies ensued by the Israeli Army. It suggests that both networks 
lack a coherent discursive strategy at the level of the lexical in their reporting of Gaza. 
The empirical findings also confirm that meanings devised by viewers are pertinent to 
their behaviours, attitudes and beliefs. This conceptualisation formulated three ‘readings’ 
shaped by political, cultural and social formations: an oppositional (counter-hegemonic) 
reading, a dominant reading and a subliminal (sub-conscious) reading.     
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Introduction: the Battle for Cross-Cultural Audiences 
  
The last two decades have seen a litany of agonising news stories from many parts of the 
Middle East –a region undergoing constant war and chaos. These include the 1991 Gulf 
War, the Invasion of Iraq, the 2006 Lebanon War, the on-going Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
and sparks of Arab Revolutions in various parts of the Middle East and North Africa. In the 
Gulf region, ‘many Arabs are caught between a crumbling Iraq and the rising influence of 
Iran and have focused on Shiite-Sunni sectarianism—while at the same time enjoying 
economic vibrancy driven by high oil prices and domestic investments’ (Telhami 2008: 5). 
The 2011-2012 so-called ‘Arab Spring’, especially, has been on the forefront of news, 
resulting in regional crisis. ‘Egyptians and other Arabs are hurting from rising food prices’ 
(ibid.), corruption and repression to which millions of Egyptian protesters from a variety 
of socio-economic and religious backgrounds demanded the overthrow of the regime of 
the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, following the Tunisian Revolutions that also 
resulted in ousting their long-term Tunisian President. As a result, a revolutionary wave of 
demonstrations and protests erupted in various parts of the Middle East and North 
Africa, forcing the rulers of Libya and Yemen out; and ensuing major protests in Algeria, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco, to name a few, while the tragedy in Syria continues to 
grab attention. Despite all this, the Palestinian- Israeli conflict remains a centre stage 
matter for most Arabs’ concerns.  
We live in an era of ‘news wars’, essentially developed and transformed by the end of the 
Cold War, the triumph of neo-liberalism, and the mounting growth of globalisation. 
Therefore, the act of war itself is undergoing vital transformation; increasingly being 
advanced with what one might call Information War (Webster 2003: 57). Whether such 
modern conflicts are to be defined as ‘simulacra’, ‘information warfare’ (Webster 2003) 
or ‘spectacle’ (Kellner 2004), examining the mediation or indeed the mediatisation (Cottle 
2006) of conflict is assumed to be central to the way we process and assimilate war –its 
‘justifications, conduct, reconstruction [and even] remembrance’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 
2010:3); that media presentation of conflict has become just as significant as the fighting 
itself. In this milieu, the media play a primary role both in the conduct and the instigation 
of war (Webster 2003: 57).  
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For a better understanding of the empirical finings of this thesis, it is crucial to provide a 
brief overview of some of the major news players in the region. Before outlining the foci 
of attention of the current study as well as presenting an overall structure of the thesis, 
this chapter offers a contextual orientation of the news networks under examination, by 
identifying their significance and implication to wider socio-political and cultural 
formations of a global society.   
In this light, the Arab mediascape of the 21st century is undergoing major 
transformations, putting an end to decades of state media monopoly (what Rinnawi 
(2006) calls tribal media) marked by propagandist, censored and state-regulated mass 
media (Zayani and Sahraoui 2007). The 1991 Gulf war was a major trigger in this respect. 
The September 11 2001 suicide attacks on US targets and the later US-led campaigns 
against ‘so-called rogue states in a context of a symmetric conflict’ (Hahn 2007: 13), have 
witnessed a constructional realignment in media communications, manifested by the 
emergence of pan-Arab transnational satellite television. Such new pan-Arab media 
outlets have come to compete with leading Western networks –namely BBC World and 
CNN International –who have previously dominated the Arab market. These channels, 
which include Al-Arabyia in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) and Al-Jazeera satellite channel 
in Doha (Qatar), have encouraged public debate and promoted dialogue, with Al-
Jazeera’s slogan asserting that it presents  (رخلأا يأرلا و يأرلا ) "Al-Ra’ai wal Ra’ai Al-Akhar” 
(the Opinion and the Other Opinion), covering the conflict-ridden Middle East with 
accounts and images very different from those provided by the Western media (Sreberny 
2007: 19). Ever since, Western news organisations have rose to acknowledge ‘some of 
the young generation of Arab satellite broadcasters', by broadcasting their footage, and 
continually referencing them in their news (Hahn 2007: 13). As a result, such 
broadcasters have come to be seen as worldwide reliable and credible external sources 
(ibid.).   
No other media outlet has shaped such a name for itself, caught the eyes of so many 
Arab viewers, created fury among Arab and Western officials, constantly endured with 
unrest or obtained international recognition, all at once, in recent history as Al-Jazeera. 
Almost two decades from its inception, Al-Jazeera has managed to perform as a media 
player in times when the Middle East has been a region of conflict scene for so many 
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crises. By challenging viewers with uncensored political coverage, and breaking 
embedded taboos, Al-Jazeera has drawn so much attention and opened up a new culture 
of public engagement which, until only recently, were unattainable in Arab states (Zayani 
and Sahraoui 2007: 13; Rinnawi 2006: 38).  
The War in Afghanistan facilitated Al-Jazeera’s international prominence in the Western 
world. Its on-the-ground coverage of the war, being the only broadcast network 
permitted in Kabul in September 2001, with only two Al-Jazeera correspondents 
remaining on site ‘turned Al-Jazeera into an overnight sensation and made it a household 
name’ (ibid: 162). As a result, BBC signed a news gathering exchange contract with Al-
Jazeera (BBC Jan 15 2003 cited in Zayani and Sahraoui 2007: 31-2) and CNN temporarily 
collaborated with Al-Jazeera in an agreement to use its exclusive material (ibid.). 
Consequently, Al-Jazeera felt it had to adhere to international values of reporting, by 
enhancing their standards of accuracy, impartiality, independence, responsibility and 
especially placing public interest to the top of their agenda. In July 2003, Al-Jazeera put 
together its code of ethics (Barkho 2006: 9; Rushing 2007: 123) – a document which was 
the first of its kind in the Arab World and which, according to Khanfar Al-Jazeera’s 
managing director, became a “constitution” (Khanfar 2006: 391-7 cited in Zayani et al. 
2007: 151).  
 
However, Al-Jazeera’s pan-Arab claim has been, more than anything else, attributed to 
the Qatari network for its constant and far-reaching coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. The network’s instant coverage of the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada, which 
erupted in September 2000, has helped capitalise the significance of the Palestinian 
question, presenting itself as a ‘forum for those involved in the uprising and a window for 
those outside’ (Miles 2005: 68). ‘Airing raw footage and images which shed gruesome 
light on the practices of Israel in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and capture the 
brutality of the Israeli war machine in ways which have never been seen before’ (Zayani 
and Sahraoui 2007: 30), Al-Jazeera has made an impact on Arab viewers by augmenting 
Arab empathy for the Palestinian cause and increasing Arab refutation toward Israeli 
leaders and their policies. Ironically, more than any other channel, Al-Jazeera has not 
shied away from presenting Israeli viewpoints, often working in Israel’s favour. For 
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instance, the network was the first to broadcast footage of Palestinians firing at Israeli 
districts (el-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002: 167-8), an unusual image to most Arab viewers.  
 
The recent 2008-09 Gaza war has also significantly contributed in capitalising the impact 
of the channel, not only on audiences, but also on rival networks, political activists, film 
producers and so on. The network was dominated by ‘heart-wrenching close-ups of dead 
and horribly maimed infants and young children’ (Pintak 2009: 2). Al-Jazeera’s news chief 
Ahmed Sheikh, in an interview with Pintak, explained that the channel’s main aim was to 
get its coverage closer to ‘the people’. And while he insisted the channel was ‘impartial’ 
in giving airtime to Israeli officials, he made clear that Al-Jazeera ‘[is] not neutral when it 
comes to innocent people being killed like this.  The camera picks up what happens in 
reality and reality cannot be neutral’ (Pintak 2009: 2-3). He added that the reason Al-
Jazeera showed graphic images was to turn public opinion against the war. To him, ‘The 
goal of covering any war is to reveal the atrocities that are carried out’ (ibid.). It is in this 
respect that Al-Jazeera is often criticised for sensationalism, covering funerals, reporting 
live from sites of conflict, showing dead bodies and presenting far more graphic images 
than both rival Arab and Anglo-European media (Rinnawi 2006: 124).  
Al-Jazeera’s pan-Arab nature, despite strong competition from rival Arab countries, is 
most apparent in the manner in which it dominated the market share in the Middle East 
and North Africa. A May 2004 public opinion poll conducted jointly by Zogby International 
and the University of Maryland, has found that 51.7% of viewers in the Arab world 
consider Al-Jazeera as their primary source of information, the Saudi sponsored, Al-
Arabiya – Al-Jazeera’s nearest rival –shows only 8.4%, leaving the US-funded Al-Hurra as 
barely registered as a secondary source of information (Barkho 2006: 2; Zayani et al. 
2007: 44). Seen from an International point of view, a 2006 survey by BrandChannel.com 
placed Al-Jazeera 19th among other brands with the most global impact. To put this into 
perspective, Josh Rushing, an Al-Jazeera English journalist, explains: ‘McDonald’s, which 
boasts over 31,000 restaurants and employs more than 1.5 million people worldwide, 
placed 22nd. Considering BBC and CNN –the only other news media on the list –finished 
27th and 43rd respectively’, Al-Jazeera, then, can arguably be considered a trailblazer in 
the industry –a news brand highly influential across the world (Rushing 2007: 161). 
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Today, the Qatari all-news network reaches viewers in more than 20 Arab nations, with 
an estimated 35 million Arabic-speaking audience (Rinnawi 2006: 105; Miladi 2003: 150). 
Al-Jazeera had not only been able to revolutionise Middle Eastern satellite television, but 
was also able to leave an impact on Western news organisations. Their long-established 
supremacy of the media in the Middle East –BBC’s ‘radio superiority’ in the field of Arabic 
and Persian language broadcasting for example – had come to an end, and they soon 
realised the development of new strategies to ‘win Arabs’ hearts and minds’ were at 
greatest need. It was claimed that the ‘BBC functioned as an arm of British Government 
information policy and cultural diplomacy’ and was assumed to act as ‘a political 
propagandist and a vehicle for the ‘projection’ of British culture and values in the Middle 
East’ (Vaughan 2008: 499).  
In February 2004 the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), an independent entity 
responsible for all U.S. Government and government-sponsored non-military, 
international broadcasting, launched a satellite television channel called Al-Hurra 
(English: The Free One). Like Radio Sawa –also funded by the BBG -Al-Hurra is an attempt 
by the US administration to counter anti-Americanism in the Middle East and perhaps to 
challenge Al-Jazeera (Schwartz 2006: 183-203 cited in Zayani et al. 2007: 20). Yet, as has 
been shown, only few Arab viewers have regarded Al-Hurra as a credible source of 
information. The Washington Post, questioning who the audience were supposed to be, 
went even further to criticise the network of having the chance ‘of turning out to be one 
of this country’s most ill-convinced and wasteful experiments ever in public diplomacy’ 
(Khouri 2003: A21 cited in Miles 2005: 375).  
But the Bush administration is not alone in this. In the UK, the market still seemed very 
attractive for the BBC, after its short-lived experiment with an all-news Arabic-language 
broadcast; the BBC has revived its service. Interestingly enough, it was out of the ashes of 
the failed London-based Saudi media venture, that Al-Jazeera was formed. Almost, fifteen 
years ago the BBC Arabic Service, widely acknowledged in the Arab world, known for its 
World Service Radio network, complemented itself by establishing a television joint 
venture with Orbit Communications, a Saudi Company with close connections to the royal 
family also financed by the Saudi Arabian investor Mawarid Group. A year and a half into 
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the corporation, in 1996, following a dispute between the British broadcaster and the 
Saudi financier the deal foundered over the BBC’s insistence upon editorial independence 
together with Saudi‘s sensitivity over certain aired programmes and figures (Zayani et al. 
2007: 28; Hahn 2007: 15). As a result, the broadcaster was forced to shut down. 
For Qatar –at the time seriously considering an elite satellite news channel –this turn of 
events could not have been any better. Al-Jazeera’s founders took hold of this 
opportunity and adopted a hand full of ex-BBC journalists, editors, broadcasters, 
engineers and administrators; of course all with Arabic backgrounds, to shape the staff 
that would form the newly launched Al-Jazeera. This also meant that the BBC-trained 
recruits passed on the BBC’s traditions of work ethics and standards: being fully 
acquainted with objectivity, accuracy, speed in reporting and above all, bringing along a 
new media culture, characterised by an exceptional freedom of expression (Zayani et al. 
2007: 28).  
In 2008, the BBC launched its new Arabic channel, with the aim of reinstating its influence 
in a region it long dominated –with claims reaching 12 million radio listeners, and 1.2 
million online users a month (Barkho 2008: 282), but has been taken over by satellite 
television channels (Readon, 2008). The broadcaster, funded by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, reaches anyone with a satellite or cable connection for free. This, 
however, also meant that cutbacks were required elsewhere. The BBC World Service 
cancelled a number of radio services in Eastern Europe and Thailand, in line with 
reallocating its resources in developing their newly launched Arabic Service and Persian 
television (Sreberny 2007: 19). More recently, in 2011, the British government cut 
funding to the BBC forcing the BBC World Service to further shut down its services in five 
languages, however, the BBC simultaneously received increased funding by the 
government to ‘assist the BBC Arabic Service to continue their valuable work in the 
region’ (William Hague cited in BBC 2011b).   
The launch of this new service attracted criticism from some quarters. Rather than being 
deemed as a beacon of BBC impartiality, the channel was claimed to come ‘with baggage 
on board’ (Jarrah 2008: 2). This, it is assumed, is due to the political atmosphere 
surrounding its inauguration –for the most part, being proposed by the British 
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government and consequently funded by the Foreign Office. Given the UK’s close 
identification with U.S. policy in the Middle East, many have questioned the BBC’s 
motives for such an attempt. Several Arab commentators have, too, found it hard to 
anticipate the BBC’s intention in this regard. To many, the channel runs the risk of being 
perceived as a substitute of Al-Hurra, a failed attempt on Washington’s part to penetrate 
the world of Arab satellite (Hahn 2007: 15; Jarrah 2008: 2; Pintak 2007: 5). The channel’s 
first day on air, however, suggested otherwise. It broadcast a BBC poll illustrating 
worldwide public opposition to a ‘confrontational U.S. stance against Iran’. On the one 
hand, the channel could be demonstrating, from its early days, that it is no mouthpiece 
(Jarrah 2008: 3), on the other hand, the broadcaster could be following its long-cherished 
online and radio services’ way of reporting: strictly marked by neutrality and credibility. It 
could, also, according to its journalists, simply be presenting ‘the only major international 
news provider in the Middle East offering a service in Arabic across television, radio and 
online’ (Negm cited in BBC Press Office 2006). Calling it a “multimedia platform”, El-
Sukkari (Head of BBC’s Arabic Service at the time) interviewed by Pintak explains, ‘We 
realised back in 1994 that this is the medium of choice in the Middle East. And we wanted 
to be available in vision for our audience there’ (cited in Pintak 2007: 1). Being a sole 
news provider serving audiences ‘wherever they are’ in ‘whatever they do’ (ibid: 3), El-
Sukkari is sure that ‘it is going to be a unique experience’ (ibid: 9). 
While various global channels continue to compete for Arab audiences, Arab channels 
have also shifted their scope and begun to look outwards. In 2006 Al-Jazeera set-up its 
English-language television channel, seeking ‘to put an end to the Western monopoly on 
both the global production of news and the global dissemination of information’ (Ibish 
and Abunimah cited in Zayani 2005: 29). 
The aim of Al-Jazeera English (henceforth AJE) – broadcasting from East to West, a 
reversal of what is normally the case– is not so much to mirror images its Arabic-language 
sister, nor is it merely an English translation of the original channel’s news, 
commentaries, and current affairs programmes. It is an English channel, de facto, 
managed by a Western team, and brought about, solely, by native English speakers for 
the on-air jobs. It mainly aims to cater for an international audience, or in the words of 
Al-Jazeera’s director of distribution, the audience AJE wishes to report to is ‘anyone, 
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anywhere, who speaks English as a first, second or third language’ (Rushing 2006: 205). 
Operating in accordance with Al-Jazeera’s code of ethics, AJE’s main purpose is to 
produce global news accounts, stories and perspectives which have been neglected by 
Western media for so many years, as well as providing a Middle Eastern perspective 
(Zayani and Sahraoui 2007: 166; Powers and el-Nawawy 2009: 269). 
Early research into the content, discursive strategies and ideological underpinnings of AJE 
indicate that its approach in reporting and production of news is significantly different 
from other major transnational media outlets such as BBC World and CNN International 
(Powers and el-Nawawy 2009: 270). Studies have shown that AJE distinguished itself by 
repeatedly and thoroughly producing programmes that are essentially characterised by 
more depth and analysis than most contemporary televised news, as well as an agenda 
that highlights issues and stories focused outside post-industrialised Western economies 
(Schatz 2007 cited in ibid.).       
As expected, Al-Jazeera’s success, operating in a language other than Arabic has been a 
concern for so many –particularly, when it has always catered to a niche of Arab viewers. 
Some fears that the way AJE sends its messages across to the world in a ‘non-Arab voice 
by non-Arabs’ (Zayani and Sahraoui 2007: 167) may, adopting Edward Said’s Orientalism 
theory, hinder the ‘orient’ of possibly representing itself (Said 1978: 21). And as a result, 
it may not work so well in introducing a Middle Eastern stance in reporting, thereby 
contributing in nothing but number to the world of Western television satellite news 
channels. Nonetheless, Adel Iskandar perceives the network with some optimism. To him 
‘You can see the idea in Al-Jazeera English that journalists are human beings and they are 
going to reverse the angle on the news by giving the voice to the people. It might sound 
clichéd but if they could do it in the Arab world, then they could do it elsewhere’ (Rushing 
2007: 140).  
Above all, Al-Jazeera English has been given the advantage of having on-the-ground 
journalists prior to the start of the Gaza war; with its anchors continuously reminding its 
viewers at the beginning of each news segment: ‘the network is the only international 
broadcaster with reporters on both sides of the boarder, in Israel and Gaza’. And since 
late December 2008 until mid February 2009, it has been ‘all Gaza, all the time’ (Pintak 
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2009: 4), essentially dedicating its efforts and reports to the coverage of the conflict 
(ibid.). Its diverse correspondents, with Arabic and Western backgrounds, news 
executives from various parts of the world, and its ‘access to the regional infrastructure 
and expertise of Al-Jazeera Arabic’, AJE was conceived as ‘a channel born to cover this 
conflict’ (ibid.).  
Ayman Mohyeldin and Sherine Tadros were AJE’s two correspondents in Gaza when 
Israel sealed the border in mid-December. And while their reporting has been nothing 
short of courageous, it is the wide-ranging nature of the coverage, that gave the network 
such high prominence not only by bringing viewers into the hub of the conflict, but also 
by placing the war into its ‘political, geographic and historical context’ (Pintak 2009: 5). 
Furthermore, standouts such as ‘Sami Zeidan’s take-no-prisoners interviews with IDF 
spokespeople, Kamal Santa Maria’s touching conversation with the secretary general of 
the Swedish Red Cross on the human toll, and “Gaza: The Road to War,” a special that 
took viewers back sixty years’ (ibid.), established an impartial yet sensitive account of the 
war –what el-Nawawy and Iskander term ‘contextual objectivity’ (Iskandar and el-
Nawawy 2004: 321).   
The theory of contextual objectivity –the need of television and media to present stories 
in a fashion that is impartial yet sensitive to local sensibilities –suggests that the ‘truth’ is 
the product of ‘multiple conglomerated subjectivities’ (ibid: 322). By investing time and 
efforts in making the news comprehensive and placing news accounts within a contextual 
historical account, the inclusion of analysis and evaluation ‘almost inevitably leads to the 
encroachment of opinion’ (Iskandar and El- Nawawy 2004: 322). Such attempt by Al-
Jazeera to communicate the strengths of both context and objectivity represents an 
‘experiment that redefines modern journalism’ (Iskandar and El- Nawawy 2004: 322). 
Power and el-Nawawy (2009) argue that scholars have, in the past, speculated whether 
the global news media are capable of creating a global public sphere, in which 
geographically and culturally diverse audiences can foster an international conversation 
(p. 263). Sadly, they anticipate, such promised ideal of new media technologies providing 
a cross-cultural engagement, although desired, is non-existent; rather the proliferation of 
satellite news broadcasters has led to ‘the balkanization of the global news’, whereby 
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global audiences ‘are increasingly turning to broadcasters for information that they find 
to fit within their pre-existing world views’ (Powers and el-Nawawy 2009: 263-4). 
Volkmer’s belief that CNN International have contributed to the formulation of a global 
public sphere that provides a ‘homogenous global shape to divers news events’ (p. 6 cited 
in Power and el-Nawawy 2009: 264), has been dismissed by Gitlin (1998) who argues that 
rather than creating a collective global public sphere, the global news media have 
resulted in a plethora of ‘public sphericules’. By this he meant audiences across the globe 
with similar mindsets and understandings of the world communicate and collaborate 
with one another, but ‘rarely engage with competing communicative spheres of 
information’ (Powers and el-Nawawy 2009: 265). In short, the global news media are 
incapable of fostering and creating a collective engagement between geographically 
distant and culturally diverse publics; but rather audiences are more likely to turn to the 
news media most aligned with their pre-existing ideological understandings of the world.     
As such, this thesis argues that a cross-cultural analysis of war reporting deserves to be at 
the forefront of investigation into how certain realities, narratives and ideologies are 
produced and contested in varying news discourses across and within national borders. 
The significant and vital role of the media during times of war suggests that war reporting 
is particularly worthy of serious study. The emergence of a ‘global civil society’ (Volkmer 
1999: 222) was assumed to potentially help audiences create a collective understanding 
of the world. But what this study seeks to unravel is the extent to which news 
organisations’ interpretations and evaluations of a specific event converge or diverge. It 
also seeks to assess the degree to which balkanisation is evident, where the global news 
media itself cannot be treated as a bloc –whereby different transnational news networks 
construct individualistic truths and narratives of the real world surrounding us. One of the 
most controversial wars in contemporary history, both in terms of the ideological powers 
behind it and its continued struggle for over 60 years, is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
The Gaza War of 2008-09 – the most recent conflict in a series of continuous clashes 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians – is exceptionally significant in terms of the 
extensive media representation of a distant conflict involving armed combatants and 
civilians. 
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Employing an interdisciplinary approach, the present study, first, integrates content and 
discourse analysis with semiotic methods in order to examine an ideological, institutional 
and a political understanding of this conflict. The quantitative aspect of the textual 
analysis follows from an assumption about the nature of the media content: that the 
variation of prominence and portrayal of actors and events across broadcast journalism 
reveals something significant about the routines, priorities and values of news producers. 
This approach is also valuable, as it allows for observation of patterns across time and 
media, enabling an examination of war reporting presented on a day-to-day basis during 
times of conflict rather than a selection of iconic texts whose revered status or assumed 
impact is never politically neutral. It also provides us with an expansive view of news 
content; it enables us to deal with the massness of the mass media (to paraphrase 
Gerbner, 1958). It gives us a schematic map of how much an event was covered over time 
and what issues where emphasised and whose actions and opinions gained greatest 
prominence. From this, it is also hoped to identify the most prominent themes across the 
examined networks for further analysis. The thesis then adopts the method of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) with the purpose of discursively and semantically analysing two 
of the most prominent themes, identified in the content analysis, which in the case of this 
thesis, look at the Provocation and Proportionality of the war. Put simply, Provocation 
looks at issues of culpability and responsibility hoping to provide a clear picture of the 
media coverage of some crucial aspects of the war: who started it; who provoked it; and 
finally whose fault it was. Secondly, through ratios of victim proportionality and 
humanitarian crises, Proportionality examines the extent to which violent acts are 
represented as being justified and/or understood as necessary, and it also accounts for 
war crime accusations. In short, my methodology incorporates both a substantive 
content analysis, to chart patterns within a large corpus of news from four different 
networks and a more interpretative discourse analysis, to investigate the cultural ideas 
evoked linguistically and, to a lesser extent, visually throughout the coverage. In this way 
both the range of an institution’s discursive and semantic strategies and practices as well 
as their potential ability to offer ‘preferred readings’ (Hall 1999 [1980]) can be 
interrogated. Specific research questions are detailed in Chapter 3, however at the heart 
of the study is an enquiry into the diversity of the subjects, themes and lexicon selected 
of depicting war in Western and Arab media. 
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In addition to the primary content and discourse analysis undertaken for this project, the 
study is supported by focus groups with the purpose of providing an audience 
perspective to the core of the thesis, as well as complementing and enriching the 
content-specific study. This method also adds a cross-cultural analysis to media reception 
studies by examining and comparing Jordanian and British audiences’ perceptions and 
understandings of the war. The aim is not investigate media power or ‘effect’ on 
audiences, but to examine media reception and consumption.    
This thesis, then, draws its theoretical framework and methodology primarily from the 
fields of global journalism, international and transnational communication and Critical 
Discourse Analysis. Useful insight is also gained from diverse fields of global news media 
including the political economic, news cultural and news discursive standpoints. 
Primarily, the aim of this study is to provide a detailed comparative empirical study of 
news reporting during wartime, while developing and employing an innovative method of 
comparative analysis. With these subjects at the heart of the thesis, the review of the 
literature in the next two chapters will be drawn primarily from material relevant to 
journalism studies, foreign correspondence, war reporting and literature on the media 
coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While the study is informed by the literature 
on the media’s role during wartime, the aim here is not to replicate the debates 
surrounding media objectivity, media management strategies or media power; but hopes 
to fill an essential gap in current research on comparative studies focusing on Arab and 
British news broadcasting, particularly covering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which has 
previously been dominated by academic research on the American and Israeli media 
(such as Alimi, 2007; Dor, 2004; Dunsky, 2001; Enderlin 2003; Everton 2005; First, 1998, 
2004; Korn, 2004; Lowstedt and Madhoun, 2003; Mandelzis, 2003; Nir and Roeh, 1992; 
Qaymari 2003; Rinnawi, 2007; Wolfsfeld et al. 2008; Zelizer et al., 2002, among others). 
Nearly, all previous studies reveal an imbalance in reporting favouring the Israeli 
perspective, therefore one aim of this study is to gauge how much this is the case here, or 
whether the British media publish a much more varied and multi-contested coverage of 
the conflict than identified in scholarship from the US and Israel.  
In summary, the present project places itself clearly within the area of media 
communications research and offers a detailed content and discourse analysis of war 
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reporting. I hope to contribute significant knowledge and understanding to the discipline 
of war journalism and to provide perceptive input into Palestinian-Israeli literature. By 
exclusively looking at the Gaza conflict, the study aims to provide a novel contribution to 
the array of Palestinian-Israeli literature; particularly since it is the latest large-scale 
conflict in a series of an on-going struggle in which very few studies have examined the 
media coverage of the attack (Philo and Berry 2011; Barkho 2011), let alone provided a 
thorough analysis placing comparisons between Arab and British media. Also, since BBC 
Arabic is still in its early stages, only limited scholarly research has studied its media 
content or audience reception. While some authors suggest that BBC Arabic acts as an 
alternative to Al-Hurra, no one has provided any evidence to support such hypotheses. 
This thesis will particularly be fruitful in examining a cross-cultural analysis of media 
organisations’ strategies in obtaining audiences. Given both BBC Arabic and AJE have 
penetrated media markets beyond the scope of their own cultural and linguistic arenas; it 
is worth examining the extent to which they succeeded in their missions. Taking the Gaza 
Conflict as a case study, the thesis aims to provide perceptive conclusions to key concerns 
as: how ‘objective’ or ‘impartial’ are the BBC and Al-Jazeera in their reporting of the 
truth; do the narratives produced by such channels indicate a collective global public 
sphere in understanding reality, or are such narratives distinctive constituting individual 
‘public sphericules’ of the world around us; is Al-Jazeera Arabic still the number one 
channel amongst Arab audiences; to what extent does the discursive and semantic 
strategies of the examined networks differ in covering the same conflict; to what degree 
is the visual representation of the war consistent across the varying broadcasters; do 
Israeli voices dominate BBC’s coverage as suggested by previous scholars, and if so, does 
this also apply to BBC Arabic, and so on? Below, I present a guide to the overall structure 
of the thesis, summarising the focus of attention for each chapter. The arrangement of 
the chapters follows a logical and traditional structure of a thesis which progresses from 
theory to methodological practice, and culminate in findings and conclusions.                          
 
The thesis is organised into 8 chapters. The first two chapters provide the foundation for 
what follows, and many of the literature and debates introduced in them are then picked 
up and developed in relation to specific subjects and case studies in the remainder of the 
thesis. Chapter 1 brings together theoretical analysis from the profession of journalism, 
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the practices of journalistic impartiality during wartime, and the essence of foreign 
corresponding. In order to provide a critical understanding of the field of television 
journalism or the ‘televisuality’ of conflict, the chapter looks at the role media imagery 
have during wartime. It introduces some prominent literature on news values and 
cognitions, placing the notion of objectivity within a contextual understanding of 
professionalism. Finally, it examines the so-called ‘media effect’ element by questioning 
the extent to which audiences’ perceptions and understandings of the world around 
them are constructed and contested by the media. 
Chapter 2 turns its attention and briefly discusses the historical background surrounding 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict dating back to 1947. My primary aim here is not to outline 
a descriptive contextual framework of the past six decades of the war, but rather to 
present an overview of specific incidents pertaining to the subject matter of this thesis. 
The chapter discusses the events leading up to the 1948 War, the 1967 War, the first and 
second Intifadas (uprisings), the progression of events that instigated the 2008-09 Gaza 
War and the Gaza War itself. The second part of the chapter provides a detailed review of 
some of the most prominent scholarly work that examines the media coverage of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Chapter 3 continues with the methodological focus, moving on to assess the quantitative 
content analysis and the qualitative discourse and semiotic analysis in relation to war 
reporting. This chapter sets out the methodological framework and questions, details the 
duration and scope of the sample of the news texts examined, and presents the 
qualification criteria most suitable for this study, in which the unit of analysis is identified. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by detailing the method and approach in which exploratory 
focus groups are conducted to tape participants’ perceptions and understandings of 
media messages focused on the Gaza War. 
Chapter 4 presents the aggregate results from a systematic content analysis of BBC and 
Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Gaza conflict of 2008-09. It provides an overall profile of the 
coverage which consists of a thorough assessment of patterns and regularities in the text, 
quantifies the broadcaster’s textual features and provides some grounded findings that 
invite further interpretations and analysis.  
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The fifth and sixth chapters present findings from two major themes drawn from the 
content analysis. Chapter 5 focuses on a particularly dominant subject from the Gaza 
conflict across all broadcasters – that of provocation. The chapter aims to discursively and 
semantically analyse the ways that motivations and rationale behind the war were 
reported. It focuses on the role of language in the construction of social reality, 
particularly in understanding the embedded ideologies surrounding the formation of the 
prominent themes presented in this domain. The method of Critical Discourse Analysis is 
employed to chart a comparative study in order to provide inter and intra references and 
comparisons with regards to Al-Jazeera and the BBC.      
Chapter 6 turns towards the human cost of war –which is referred to as Proportionality in 
this thesis. It offers a multi-modal approach to Critical Discourse Analysis by incorporating 
some visual and semiotic analysis of news reporting. It details the visual and textual 
depiction of the proportionality of casualties, the humanitarian condition and accusations 
of war crimes. The empirical findings, as well as the textual anchoring of imagery within 
the contours of discourse, examine the extent to which the actions of the protagonists 
are justified, rationalised and legitimised and whether or not such actions are portrayed 
as proportionate.     
Chapter 7 departs from the main content and discourse focus to present the results 
accumulated from a supporting focus group study conducted in Jordan and the UK. The 
chapter provides valuable data on the way Jordanian and British participants perceive 
and understand the conflict. Adopting Morley’s ‘hypothetical positions’ with minor 
adaptations, the chapter makes clear that different participants implemented varying 
readings of news texts, which includes an oppositional reading, a dominant reading 
(Morley, 1981) and, what  I refer to as, a subliminal reading.   
The final concluding chapter of the thesis draws together the issues raised in light of the 
research findings. It is within its comparative dimension, where, perhaps, the most 
significant contribution of this thesis resides. This expansive and more inclusive study of 
the media coverage of the Gaza conflict allows us to account for ways in which outlining 
and evaluating key themes and actors across varying media outlets are continuously 
being renewed and developed. A quantitative understanding of war depiction, per se, is 
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limiting and a pro or anti stance perspective is only conclusive in relation to specific 
themes and context. What is justifiable and deemed appropriate with regards to 
provocation, motivation and rationale of war, for example, is not always consistent with 
the humanitarian cost of war. This approach to understanding war reporting advocates 
even necessitates, change –it requires a need to look beyond an overview analysis in 
search of comprehensive context-related evaluations. It invites us to unravel some 
political, cultural and social ideologies embedded in an institutional culture of war 
reporting. It is my hope that this thesis does so in an original and concise manner.             
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Chapter 1 
 The Sociology of News: a Brief Introduction to the Culture of War Reporting 
 
Introduction 
The role news media have played in the past few centuries or so, is seen to be integral to 
major developments of modern societies. Such developments include the ‘emergence of 
nation-states and conceptions of national identity; ideas of citizenship, democracy and 
associated human freedoms; the development of political culture and the public sphere; 
[and] the growth of capitalist commercial enterprises’ (Flew 2007: 1). The media have 
become the central means by which people around the world are informed, entertained, 
and made to construct an understanding of their local, national and global social, political 
and cultural surroundings. In fact, news media have played a crucial role in the rise and 
fall of empires, in diplomacy, in the spread of languages and cultural norms and to the 
processes of, what has come to be known as, globalisation and modernity (ibid.). Equally 
significant, is the manner in which the news media have come to assume a central 
significance in periods of war – in terms of war reporting on the one hand, and the build-
up and progression of war itself on the other (Webster 2003: 57). In this sense, the ideal 
conception of the media’s role should stand as ‘reporter-reflector-indicator of an 
objective reality’ of the world ‘out there’ (Molotch and Lester 1997: 198). Any departure 
from this ideal tends to be treated as ‘bias’ manipulation or distortion of the actual 
events on the ground.  
This review chapter provides general contextualisation on the profession of journalism, 
the practices of journalistic impartiality during wartime, and the essence of foreign 
correspondence. First, it introduces some literature on news values and news cognitions, 
objectivity in news reporting and the field of television journalism. Second, it sketches a 
brief conceptualisation of influential models pertaining to the production and ideology of 
news. Such models include Hall at al.’s (1987) ‘Primary definers’ conception, Herman and 
Chomsky’s propaganda Model (1988), Daniel Hallin’s (1986) concept of the three spheres, 
Bennett’s (1990) notion of ‘Indexing’ and Schlesinger’s work on the sociology of sources. 
Third, it presents an overview of foreign correspondence as a particular genre, and 
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addresses the manner in which the news media constructs distant events and 
encapsulates certain cultural proximities in reporting foreign affairs –that is, the role a 
foreign correspondent plays in moving a news story from inception to publication. Crucial 
to the discussion, is the extent to which journalists’ ‘attitudes, values, cognition, 
demographic characteristics, and the like influence what they report and write’ (Ettema, 
Whitney and Wackman 1997: 39), as opposed to the adaptations required of a journalist 
to the cultural, political and historical orientations of the foreign countries at stake. 
Fourth, the chapter looks at the role of media imagery during wartime, exploring key 
issues of the cultural and national sensibilities of representing graphic images in the 
media and that of taste and decency in depicting images of death and suffering. Finally, 
the notion of ‘media effect’ is examined by questioning the extent to which audiences’ 
perceptions and understandings of the world around them are mediated. 
 
Journalistic Impartiality - Journalistic values and norms 
Much of the essential information required in life comes from the news media. 
Governments, economies and societies would have trouble functioning without a flow of 
reliable news and information (Hachten and Scotton 2002: 9). It is, however, problematic 
to assume that the news media per se is a reliable operational system. News is the 
product of bureaucratically structured organisations (Ettema, Whitney and Wackman 
1997: 37). The culture of news organisations includes a set of organisational meanings 
(e.g. professionalism, objectivity, fairness, justice, democratic significance and avoidance 
of bias and harm) that are consistent with journalistic professional norms (Bantz 1997: 
129). Far more “news” is available at a given moment in time than most organisations can 
hope to reproduce and broadcast as “their” news. Therefore, as sociological research into 
news reporting reminds us, that ‘reality construction is an inevitable facet of journalists’ 
work’, that constructs rather than relays ‘reality’ (Deacon 2008: 8). As Gilles Gautheir 
remarks, 
The realist theory proposed here is not to say that the world viewed by news 
journalism –which is essentially a social world –is a given. On the contrary, this 
realism readily admits that journalistic reality, and more importantly, social 
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reality, are constructed realities. This perspective simply attempts to demonstrate 
how this construction depends on a reality that is not constructed (2005: 59 cited 
in Deacon 2008: 8). 
The reason for this is that the very business of gathering, assembling, and selecting news 
is in effect a selective process and thus the end result is invariably subjective (Taylor 
1997: 18). Further, Deacon argues that research has shown that structural and cultural 
factors are more likely to leave an impact on the construction process than would the 
deliberate political ‘bias’ –that is ‘the tendency to privilege people, issues and 
perspectives because they fit more effectively into the cycles and demands of the news 
industries, because they have greater cultural significance and proximity and because 
they do not confound broadly accepted normative values’ (2008: 8). Moreover, in times 
of uncertainty, organisations must make a priori decisions and predictions about the 
likelihood of events occurring (Ettema et al. 1997: 38), in terms of place, time and 
significance. Essentially, fast and critical decisions have to be made when sudden news 
arises in unexpected places (e.g. accidents, disasters, conflict) –such decisions include the 
reallocation of staff resources and focus. Organisations are likely to counter such 
uncertainties by methods of routinization which include ‘typifications, reliance on routine 
sources, allocation of personnel to places where news is most likely, and adherence to 
organizational policy’ (Ettema, Whitney and Wackman 1997: 38). 
Although many journalists continue to think of journalism in terms of freedom of the 
press, objectivity, balance, impartiality, fairness, the reflection of reality, accepting a clear 
distinction between fact and opinion and so on (Halloran 1974: 14-15 cited in Bird and 
Dardenne1997: 333), it is important to note that news accounts are traditionally known 
as news stories, which by definition are culturally constructed narratives (Bird and 
Dardenne1997: 333). This suggests that the very quality of such narratives are what 
needs to be untangled here, indicating a complicated relationship between notions of 
news and story which should be, constantly, treated with suspicion (ibid.). 
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Objectivity –‘Can the media tell the Truth?’ 
Journalism as a profession is claimed to be an honourable one, regardless of the fact that 
many of those who should cherish it and care for it – often including its very own 
professionals – have acted otherwise (Belsey and Chadwick 1992: 1). Governments have 
either managed to censor and control it, or have actively succeeded in employing PR 
tactics to manage media opinion, often for their own political gains. Owners, it is argued, 
have exploited it in order to satisfy their ‘quest for power and wealth, not to mention 
megalomania’ (ibid.). Even journalists, have time and time again proven to dishonour the 
profession, as Belsey and Chadwick (1992: 1) remind us, journalists ‘do not even need to 
be bribed to behave unethically’.  
The notion of professionalism – or the question of whether journalism is a bona fide 
profession (Soloski 1997: 138) – is central to understanding the process by which events 
are selected for presentation as news. For journalists, objectivity is one of the most 
important professional norm, and from it follows more specific features of news 
professionalism including ‘news judgement, the selection of sources and the structure of 
news beats’ (ibid: 143). In recent years, however, journalists have indicated that it has 
become increasingly hard to maintain a wholly ‘objective’ mode of reporting, instead 
they ‘have fallen back to more defensible standards, like “accuracy”, “balance”, and 
“fairness”’ (Reese 1997: 424). Objectivity then becomes, in Tuchman’s (1972) terms, a 
“strategic ritual” by which journalists accused of bias or distortion adopt certain 
strategies to defend their profession by demonstrating that such news accounts are 
essentially authentic, that they contain no unjustified connotations or adjectives and 
adverbs and that statements of opinion are strictly associated with news sources (Ettema 
et al. 1997: 39). Alternatively, journalists may also attempt to defy questioned news 
reports by highlighting their individual expertise, talent or ability of reporting (ibid.)      
Therefore, objectivity does not necessarily mean that journalists should act as impartial 
observers of events but that they are required to seek out the facts and report them in an 
unbiased balanced manner (Soloski 1997: 143; Bird and Dardenne1997: 333). The 
underlying principle of objectivity specifies that the truth should be implicitly equated 
with facts and differentiated from value judgements and opinions (Ettema et al. 1997: 35; 
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Schudson 2001; Schudson 1978; Tumber 2004: 201), in which the interference of value 
with the presentation of facts threatens the essence of objectivity (Reese 1997: 424). In a 
similar manner, objectivity also resides in the attitudes and cognitions of the journalist; 
therefore by adhering to the professional procedures of good journalism, personal 
opinion becomes of little significance. Hackett’s (1984: 251) observation quoted by Reese 
(1997: 424) presents this argument in simple terms; he explains that traditional studies of 
objectivity and bias in the news media assume that,  
[…] news can and ought to be objective, balanced and a reflection of social reality 
[and that] the political attitudes of journalists or editorial decision-makers are a 
major determinant of news bias. 
It is, therefore, assumed that the typical conceptions of producing the news – or the very 
process of ‘newsgathering’ – must in a way construct an image of reality. Although news 
accounts can easily record what is “out there”, this by no means implies that news is a 
reflection – or a distortion – of reality. In this light, Fishman (1997: 211) among others 
indicates that ‘News stories, if they reflect anything, reflect the practices of the workers 
in the organizations that produce news’.  
Moreover, gatekeeping studies have most often looked at processes of news selection 
within the mass media. It is, however, too simplistic to assume that the process of 
gatekeeping only involves selection. Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien (1972) have explained 
that gatekeeping is a more complex process of information control that not only includes 
selection but pertains to the ‘withholding, transmission, shaping, display, repetition, and 
timing of information as it goes from the sender to the receiver’ (cited in Shoemaker 
1997: 57). Gatekeeping may also involve analysts providing interpretation and 
highlighting some aspects of news while marginalising others (Shoemaker 1997: 57). It is 
important to note that the news elements selected are examined and evaluated at 
various levels and that those surviving the gatekeeping process are then ‘transmitted to 
boundary-role gatekeepers for final shaping, selection and transmission directly to the 
audience or to another communication organization’ (ibid.: 62). Like objectivity, the 
journalist’s –or gatekeeper’s, for that matter –individual characteristics and psychological 
practices can have an effect on the process of gatekeeping, including ‘cognitive heuristics, 
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models of thinking, socialization, second-guessing, values, attitudes, decision-making 
strategies, role conceptions, and type of job’ (Shoemaker 1997: 62). Such characteristics 
are embedded in social systems of ideology and culture; communication routines; and 
the individual’s life experiences (ibid.). Nonetheless, several studies have confirmed that 
decision-making within television news organisations is the outcome of a group process 
and is not simply made by individual gatekeepers (Tuchman, 1978; Berkowitz 1997: 82).             
Far from the journalistic routines implemented in an organisational culture, there exists a 
growing sense that getting it first has increasingly become more important than getting it 
right. Subsequently this has resulted in a loss of public trust in the news media (Hachten 
and Scotton 2002: xiv). This brings to mind the concept of truthfulness in news reporting. 
The question of the extent to which –or whether at all –journalism embodies truth has 
been the focus of many scholarly work (e.g. Ettema et al. 1997; Hall 1977; Murdock, 
1982), whom regard the medium of mass communication as ‘a means for legitimation 
and maintenance of socioeconomic stratification’ (Ettema et al. 1997: 34). Knowing and 
reporting the truth are the main corresponding goals in journalism. Practitioners and 
critics alike constantly assert that questioning truth through journalism implies that 
journalism does seek ‘truth –partial, superficial, occasion-and celebrity-centred truth, but 
truth nevertheless” (Gitlin 1979: 263). In simple terms, this suggests that ‘as a practical 
matter there is truth to be known and told’ (Ettema, Whitney and Wackman 1997: 34; 
emphasis in original). Given that Western standards of news reporting rely on the 
assumption that ‘there is a reality out-there-to-be-described’, any effort in denying this 
premise is termed “propaganda” (Molotch and Lester 1997: 199). Thus, the dividing line 
between news and propaganda lies in the intention behind the assemblers’ work: those 
intending to put across a certain ideological message produce propaganda whereas those 
whose only aim is to reflect a veridical picture of reality produce news (ibid.).    
In regards to ideology, Tuchman (1983: 33) endorsing a materialistic approach, argues 
that the ‘production of culture’ is part and parcel of an organisational sociology that 
through contemporary capitalism ‘obscures the historicity of cultural products’ and thus 
helps implicate ‘the creation of ideology’ (cited in Ettema et al. 1997: 32). In that she 
encourages attention towards an understanding of ideology as an embedded practice in 
an organisational process (ibid.). This is evident when common grounds are detected 
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between ‘the ruling ideology’ at a given time and the media content available (Murdock 
and Golding, 1977 cited in Ettema et al., 1997: 32). Hall (1973), also, suggests that: ‘News 
values appear as a set of neutral, routine practices: but we need also to see formal news 
values as an ideological structure –to examine these rules as the formalisation and 
operationalisation of an ideology of news’ (p. 77 cited in Eldridge 1995: 49-50).    
 
Ideology –Theorising five influential models in the production of news 
A further objection to ‘objective journalism’ centres on its heavy reliance on official 
sources of information. The interrelation between sources and news media is a focal 
point in understanding the sociology of journalism (Schlesinger 1989). Media research in 
Western capitalist societies is ‘inextricably bound up with central social institutions that 
seek to manage the flow of information’ (ibid: 283). Therefore, the practices of ‘the 
machinery of state’ and those of broader political class have dominated much scholarly 
research (ibid.). 
Schlesinger (1989) argues that the problem with the sociology of sources is that it tends 
to be ‘media-centric’, often devaluing the standpoint of the sources themselves. He 
provides a critical assessment of Hall et al.’s (1987) ‘Marxist-structuralist’ conception of 
‘primary definers’. The role of official sources in Hall et al.’s conception, he argues, is 
integral to a theory of ‘ideological power which draws upon a Gramscian conception of 
the struggle for hegemony between dominant and subordinate classes in capitalist 
societies’ (Schlesinger 1990: 65). Thus, official sources are assumed prominence and 
therefore affording them a ‘primary defining’ role (Schlesinger 1989: 284). One criticism 
of this standpoint rests on the sociological question of how sources organise media 
strategies and compete with various others, which is seen to be completely neglected: in 
that ‘Primary definition, which ought to be an empirically ascertainable outcome is held 
to be a priori effect of privileged access’ (Schlesinger 1989: 284). The problem with such 
conception is that ‘if it is equated with simply following official, elite sources, [it] 
undermines journalism’s democratic role’ (Calcutt and Hammond 2011: 101). Which also 
suggests that rather than viewing the news media as ‘agenda-setters’, elite sources act as 
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‘primary definers’, thereby orienting journalists towards particular ‘definitions of social 
reality’ (ibid.). 
A somewhat similar case is Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model (PM), developed 
in 1988, which by attempting to explain the mass media’s behaviour in the United States, 
found that it constantly served the interests of corporate and state power (Mullen 2010: 
673). The debate concerning the role of the mass media in society is the key focus of the 
PM. Like other approaches within the Marxist-radical tradition, PM sought to explore ‘the 
relationship between ideology, communicative power and social class interests’ (Mullen 
and Klaehn 2010: 217). Primarily, it suggests that ‘structural, political-economic elements 
influence overall patterns of media performance’ (ibid.). In contrast to commonly held 
notions of media liberty (including its dedication to public interest), the PM suggests that 
the ‘structural context in which news discourses are produced are such that media 
themselves are predisposed to serve propaganda functions within capitalist, liberal-
democratic societies’ (ibid: 217-8). 
Like many other theories, the reception of the PM within the field is best explained as a 
paradox (Mullen and Klaehn 2010: 215). The model has received waves of criticisms 
targeted at it, most notably in the late 1980s, following the publication of the first book, 
and in the early 2000s following the publication of the book’s second edition. Mullen and 
Klaehn (2010) provided a summary of the main criticisms levelled at Herman and 
Chomsky’s model. They anticipated that during the first wave of criticism (in the late 
1980s, early 1990s), the PM received negative responses from scholars and critics of 
various political fronts. Some accused the model of overstating the power of the 
‘propaganda system’ and deemphasising the authority of popular opposition (LeFeber 
1988 cited in Mullen and Klaehn 2010: 219); others saw the PM as presenting a 
‘conspiratorial’ view of the media (Lemann 1989; Entman 1990a,b; Nelson 1990 cited in 
ibid.); it was also charged with comprising a woolly mechanism for analysis (Schudson 
1989 cited in ibid.); considered to be merely ‘political’ (Salmon 1989 cited in ibid.); 
described as ‘deterministic’, ‘functionalist’ and ‘simplistic’ (Schlesinger 1989; Golding and 
Murdock 1991; Eldridge 1993 cited in ibid.); and finally, thought to have ignored practices 
of journalistic professionalism (Goodwin 1994; Hallin 1994 cited in ibid.).  
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The second wave of criticism is highly significant given that it formulated a number of 
heated debates between scholars. Indeed, one of the criticisms targeted at the PM 
questioned whether it ‘could be applied in countries with very different media systems 
and political structures’, given it was originally developed in the United States (Corner 
2003: 367). In addition, Cohen argues that ‘much of the literature of European media 
enquiry over the last 30 years has turned around the assessment of state and market 
dynamics, attempting to explore their scale, operation and consequence, the varying 
strength and consistency of their sway within institutions and processes of mediation and 
to gauge the possibilities for change’ (2003: 369). In which, he explains, there is very little 
theoretical insight that the propaganda model can add to research (2003: 367). The 
argument that the PM is too simplistic was further raised by Cohen who explains that 
Chomsky’s emphasis that, ‘propaganda campaigns are often planned’ raises questions to 
the role media practitioners play – in terms of their awareness of its operation and 
effects – in this propaganda system. He asserts that the model’s own terminology 
suggests that ‘media managers, editors and journalists will strongly disagree that their 
efforts are essentially in the service of the rich and powerful and systematically against 
democratic values’ (Corner 2003: 372).     
Schlesinger (1990: 69) argues that such models are ‘blind to the question of source 
competition’, in which other sources that are dismissively lumped together as 
‘alternative’ are of practically no interest at all. However, empirical research, he claims, 
demonstrates that ‘alternative’ views and opinions may be incorporated ‘pre-emptively 
into so-called ‘primary definers’ definitions’, thereby both modifying them and at the 
same time indicating that the boundaries between sources are not always as 
impermeable as the charmed circle conception of primacy would imply’ (ibid.). It is 
assumed that generating a nuanced, two- way understanding of the direction of influence 
between media and the state/power elites is a key issue for the sociology of producing 
the news. 
A familiar articulation of this paradigm is Daniel Hallin’s (1986) seminal study of the 
Vietnam War. Examining the claim that during the War the news media played an 
oppositional role to official US policy, Hallin founds that critical media coverage occurred 
only after a section of political elites in Washington turned against the war. After 1968, 
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scepticism about the war began to be evident in US television due to changes in political 
context. This included divisions in the administration, deteriorating military morale, and a 
rise in anti-war movements into mainstream politics (Schlesinger 1989: 290). Hallin 
argues that ‘the change seems best explained as a reflection of and a response to a 
collapse of consensus –especially of elite consensus –on foreign policy (Hallin 1984: 20; 
emphasis in original). Yet a limited forum ‘remained open primarily to official 
Washington, despite the rise in political protest’ (1986: 201). Drawing upon these 
findings, Hallin developed the concept of the three spheres: consensus, legitimate 
controversy and deviance; but explains that these exist with regards to any given political 
issue. In that Hallin argues that critical journalism is unlikely to surface with respect to 
issues that fall within the sphere of consensus. However, in situations where there exists 
elite dissensus with respect to an issue (like post 1968 in Vietnam), news media reflects 
such debate. The latter falls under the sphere of legitimate controversy, in which a 
variety of critical and supportive news media coverage is expected to be shown. Robinson 
argues that ‘It is in this scenario that news media has the potential, at least, to start to 
play a more active and influential role in policy debate and formulation’ given the 
possibility ‘for news media coverage to actually take sides in the elite debate’ (2001: 531). 
Hallin’s work received further conceptual clarification through Lance Bennett’s (1990) 
influential notion of indexing. He argues that ‘Mass media news professionals, from the 
boardroom to the beat, tend to “index” the range of voices and viewpoints in both news 
and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government 
debate about a given topic’ (Bennett 1990: 106). His work received ample support from 
subsequent research most notably in the fields of foreign policy and war intervention, 
whereby following an official line become of particular significance (Calcutt and 
Hammond 2011: 101).               
In varying ways, Schlesinger (1989) observes that such studies suggest that the relative 
freedom and restrain of media systems is very much dependent on divisions within the 
political class. The PM and Hall et al.’s concept of ‘primary definers’ assume a taken-for-
granted approach of an ‘elite consensus’, that is simply imposed on the public as a whole. 
Also, Hallin and Bennett’s conceptions of the production of news only accounts for 
‘alternative’ voices when political elites become divided over an issue, with critical news 
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media coverage being merely a reflection of such divisions. Schlesinger adds that such 
conceptions, although influential, fail to address important queries:   
[…] what if there is no single elite capable of establishing a consensus amongst its 
members, but rather several competing factions of a political class without 
common terms of reference? And what if the public is not unitary but also 
fractured into major groupings, each of which has its own interpretative 
frameworks? (Schlesinger 1989: 302) 
It is worth adding some queries about periods of crisis, when senior-policy makers and 
governments are compelled to respond to emotive images of suffering in the media, for 
example. This, and similar instances, provide some evidence that in times of war and 
humanitarian crises, the media, often conceived as secondary, can act as ‘primary 
definers’ towards a particular definition of social reality. In the case of foreign news, 
especially, ‘source-competition’ and media power prove to be somewhat paradoxical 
matters.    
Foreign correspondence  
Foreign news is a particularly eminent genre of news. It not only brings home to viewers 
news from afar but it also possesses global significance. For example, the revolutionary 
wave of demonstrations and protests occurring in many parts of the Middle East and 
North Africa today –the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ – continues to occupy the attention of 
many people around the world. It has been long held that important information from 
overseas should be treated seriously and professionally by media practitioners, giving it a 
degree of thorough analysis and appointing capable journalists to do the job. 
Nonetheless, in an era of intense globalisation, news from abroad has been gradually 
shrinking (Hannerz 2004: 23). It has increasingly been shown that the role and presence 
of foreign correspondence has been considerably diminished in recent history. It is 
problematic to assume then, that with the extensive intensification of globalisation, 
foreign news reporting will accordingly follow suit. Rather, we should acknowledge that 
the latter is ‘vulnerable to contemporary pressure’ (ibid: 26). In essence, we live in an era 
where the media landscape is in itself being readjusted to fit within the lines of new 
technological advancements. According to Moore (2010: 5), the percentage of 
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international news in the British press has dropped from 20 percent in 1979 to 11 percent 
in 2009. Many of the changes in reporting international news are said to be structural: 
lacking a clear contextual framework, deprived of editorial resources, growing availability 
of international news online and competing alternative media sources (ibid: 52). The 
internet is increasingly proving to be an influential medium providing an array of 
specialised and varied information, easily accessible worldwide. Returning to the ‘Arab 
Spring’, a new study by Philip Howard, argues that ‘social media carried a cascade of 
messages about freedom and democracy across North Africa and the Middle East, and 
helped raise expectations for the success of political uprising’ (cited in Taylor 2011). He 
concludes that the Arab uprisings were mostly fuelled by social media (e.g. Twitter, 
Facebook, YouTube and blogs). One could argue, then, that we are now ‘moving from an 
era of foreign correspondents to one of foreign correspondence, in which people will pick 
up international news from multiple sources, in multiple ways’ (Moore 2010: 47). 
In fact, some scholars and media practitioners have disputed whether a global journalism 
still exists. Television foreign news is under constant threat of being replaced by ‘soft 
news, infotainment or popular journalism’ (Altmappen 2010: 567). Such developments 
act as structural forces in altering the nature of television and journalism. The present 
crisis in foreign correspondence reveals that such forces corresponds with a globally 
changing media structure that ultimately results in a gradual disappearance of foreign 
news from television (ibid: 568). Today, there are less professional foreign 
correspondents working for mainstream organisations, less foreign reporters to ‘bear 
witness’, increasing reliance by many news organisation on a small number of agency on-
the-ground reporters, and less effort to emphasise the significance of international news 
to a wide audience (Moore, 2010: 47-50). Foreign news reporting is being primarily 
transformed by the process of economisation, whereby editorial decisions are becoming 
more and more dependent on economic factors rather than professional standards of 
news reporting. News organisations can no longer afford to maintain expensive overseas 
bureaus to report international developments, most of which are of little concern to local 
audiences (Livingstone and Asmolov 2010: 746-7). Indeed, public apathy to foreign affairs 
and its high cost are among the main reasons in the diminishing presence and role of 
foreign correspondence (Robinson, 2007 cited in Livingstone and Asmolov 2010: 746-7). 
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Although the BBC is believed to provide the vast majority of professional international 
reportage in the UK, having maintained, in the past, its international coverage despite 
economic and structural pressures (Moore 2010: 37); it is now undergoing ‘immense’ cuts 
that are at risk of compromising impartiality (Halliday 2011). The organisation plans to 
replace foreign correspondents in areas such as Baghdad, Islamabad, Gaza and Lebanon 
with locally-recruited reporters (ibid.). This, corporation insiders reveal, is ‘“uniquely 
exposed” to pressure from authoritarian regimes’ (ibid.). Such plans to retrench BBC 
foreign coverage are likely to close 44 jobs in its World operation, which amounts to 25% 
of the total headcount of 170, promising to replace half of them with local reporters 
(ibid.). However, given it is a matter of intense debate within the BBC, the organisation 
still employs reporters in 50 international television news bureaus; similarly, Al-Jazeera 
English have 69 news bureaux scattered around the world (Livingstone and Asmolov, 
2010).  
The following sub-sections first examine the practices of war reporting in Western 
societies and subsequently trace the manner in which the news media constructs distant 
events.    
 
Reporting of conflict 
Attempting to understand the media as a set of relationships –text, producers, audiences, 
governments –the cultural and cognitive shaping of war is contained through a process of 
semiotic interaction (Lewis 2005: 31), essentially defined through the notion of 
‘representation’ –that is, the processes in which lived events are transformed through 
media texts (discourse, image and language). For the past century or so, there has been a 
growing critical alarm regarding the influence of the media on views of the world 
generally and on the demeanour of foreign affairs especially. The Vietnam War –what 
became known as a “living-room” war –was the first meticulously televised war (Hannerz 
2004: 2004). From it grew a sense of media management and access to, and/or control 
over areas of war and conflict. The 1991 Gulf War stands out as a major example in this 
regard. It became increasingly associated with the notion of the ‘global village’ in which 
the entire world was able to view a military operation as it unfolds through international 
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satellite and cable networks (Kellner 2004: 136). The Bush administration and the 
Pentagon were able to successfully exploit the media to mobilise the support for the war. 
News media, in the US and elsewhere, were seen to ‘be compliant vehicle[s] for the 
government strategy to manipulate the public, imperilling democracy which requires 
informed citizens, checks, and balances against excessive government power, and a free 
and vigorous critical media’ (ibid.). The fact that news media, particularly CCN reported 
from inside Baghdad and were able to transmit images of bombs as they fell, marked the 
emergence of a new media landscape: one that acts as a vehicle in handling world affairs 
and managing the global media spectacle during the War (Hannerz 2004: 27; Kellner 
2004: 136).  
War reporting is a context in which questions of journalistic impartiality become even 
more increasingly significant. This assumption lies behind the argument that covering ‘the 
often harrowing nature of battle constitutes a higher order of journalism’ (Allan and 
Zelizer 2004: 3). War journalists, it is argued, are assumed to acquire the same duty 
capabilities all journalists do, but are expected to act in ‘a more heightened, vibrantly 
important fashion’ (ibid.). Allan and Zelizer (2004: 3) explain that war correspondents are 
faced with a range of problems associated with ‘allegiance, responsibility, truth and 
balance’. The practice of wartime journalism, therefore, poses challenges and raises 
questions about the possibility of a ‘normative professional ideal of Anglo-American 
journalism’ (Deacon 2008: 58). In other words, it tests journalists’ ‘commitment to 
objectivity, neutrality and unprejudiced witness’ (ibid.).   
The assumption that war reporters “do journalism” better than other kinds of reporters 
(Allan and Zielzer, 2004) rests on the fact that foreign correspondents are also called 
upon to produce reports of ‘unexpected events’ (including all types of disasters) on a 
‘routine basis’ (Tuchman 1997: 174). In this sense, Tuchman (1997: 174) quotes Helen 
Hughes’s (1940: 25) claim that a disaster’s “Quickening urgency” is in effect the “essence 
of news”. However, what is worth noting here is that live footage of sudden events is 
mostly live footage of ‘the aftermath of an unexpected event’ (van Ginneken 1998: 112). 
This of course is reliant on time, place, access and coordination; nevertheless such 
instances are somewhat extremely predictable: ‘it is like mechanically going through a 
script which was written long before, and had already been used dozens of times’ (ibid.). 
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But, what about live coverage of world events as they unfold: Is it a mechanism of 
recording history, or is such ambition an illusion? Is the aim of being the first and fastest 
with the news a process that leads to serious distortion? Martin Bell (2003) describes the 
journalist’s responsibilities working in a 24-hour news environment. He believes that the 
nature of foreign correspondence requires journalists to be ‘fearful, feverish, frenzied, 
frantic, frail, false and fallible’ but he also acknowledges that mistakes are bound to 
happen as reporters seek to unravel the ‘truth in the fog of breaking news’ (p. 71). 
Similarly implicit here is Allan and Zelizer’s (2004) ideal of professional war journalism. 
They describe journalists’ intricate function during war:   
To be present enough to respond to what is happening, yet absent enough to stay 
safe; to be sufficiently authoritative so as to provide reliable information, yet open 
to cracks and fissures in the complicated truth-claims that unfold; to remain 
passionate about the undermining of human dignity that accompanies war, yet 
impartial and distanced enough to see the strategies that attach themselves to 
circumstances with always more than one side. In these and related ways, then 
war reporting reveals its investment in sustaining a certain discursive authority –
namely that of being an “eye witness” (p. 4-5). 
The very notion of an “eye witness” is invariably connected to truth-telling. This belief is 
inevitably entrenched in a ‘cultural politics of legitimacy; its authority resting on 
presence, on the moral duty to bear witness by being there’ (Allan and Zelizer 2004: 5; 
Webster 2003: 58). Needless to mention, such urgent desires of ‘being there’ elicit 
political, economical, technological and militaristic limitations, which can severely restrict 
any effort of trying to achieve this desire (ibid.). In order to attain what Schudson (2001) 
refers to as an ‘occupational culture’ –laying the foundation for the adoption of 
professional norms, including objectivity – journalists are expected to report factual 
‘news’ and refrain from adding any commentary or interpretation to it (p. 150). In the 
1930’s, however, leading journalists maintained that as the world has become a more 
complex place, the media’s role has had to focus more on explaining events rather than 
just merely reporting them. In essence, this reflects what has come to be known as 
‘interpretive journalism’ (Schudson 2001: 164). Therefore the role foreign journalists play, 
as interpretive and evaluative agents, is not necessarily a violation of objective norms 
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(Deacon 2008: 65); for foreign journalists have long been accredited with more freedom 
and autonomy than domestic journalists (Schudson 2001 cited in Deacon 2008: 65):      
Foreign correspondents are treated more as independent experts, free to make 
judgments, less as dependent and supervisable employees. In truth, they cannot 
be supervised nor do editors very often have the knowledge to second-guess 
them. For that matter, readers do not normally have the background to fill in a 
context to make bare facts comprehensible (Schudson 2001: 164). 
Furthermore, it seems that as soon as objectivity received recognition as a general norm 
in the profession, critics and journalism educators started to highlight its limitations. 
Schudson (1987) explained that by the 1930s, even journalists ‘committed to objectivity 
acknowledged that objective reporting was ultimately a goal beyond reach –the perils of 
subjectivity were well recognised’ (p. 155). Routines of professionalism –including 
‘facticity, neutrality, [and] balancing’ (Deacon 2008: 65) –have been dishonoured as a 
result of favouring highly influential sources over others, thereby producing a highly 
structured ideological view of the world (ibid.). Deacon quotes Rosen’s claim that 
‘journalism shows us that often balance is a flight from truth rather than an avenue into 
truth’ (1993: 49 cited in Deacon 2008: 65). 
 
How news constructs distant events 
It is widely accepted that journalism is ethnocentric, giving more prominence and time to 
domestic news than foreign news (Schudson 2001; van Ginneken 1998). As discussed 
earlier, the act of reporting itself, places limitations with the ability to report the whole 
known truth, for the truth is endless and seamless. Therefore, the constraints of time, 
resources and pertinence obligate some selection to be made from the potentially 
infinite number of news stories available in a day. The veteran reporter Martin Bell 
(1995), for instance, noted in his memoirs that the BBC forced him to recap the Bosnian 
War in less than two minutes per night (cited in van Ginneken 1998: 159). He explained it 
as a ‘reduction ad absurdum’ of an extremely complex conflict to which he insists requires 
more commentary and interpretation (ibid.). Like Bosnia, Altheide concluded that the Iran 
hostage crisis ‘was reduced to one story –the freeing of the hostages –rather than 
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coverage of its background and context, of the complexities of Iran, of alternative 
American policies, and of contemporary parochial policies in a world dominated by 
superpowers’, even though it was covered extensively by the media for one year (p.15 
cited in van Ginneken 1998: 209). Van Ginneken (1998: 115) notes that we are 
continuously been made to forget the amount of military conflicts happening in many of 
the key areas in the developing World. Each bringing with it a tally of killings and 
atrocities, with only a few making it to the front pages of the press and the evening news 
bulletins in the developed World. Some are, even, hardly ever reported (van Ginneken 
1998: 115; Golan 2006: 324). Taylor (1997: 3), on the other hand, quotes Jean Baudrillard, 
the doyen of post-modernist thinking, in which he explains that ‘there is more and more 
information and less and less meaning’ (1983: 95). The media’s selectivity, its promiscuity 
and limited attention in such instances, make audiences ‘voyeurs of the suffering of 
others, tourists amidst their landscapes of anguish’ (Ignatieff 1998: 10 in Cohen 2001: 
169). 
It does not necessarily follow from this that journalists do not play a key role in 
formulating global news. As to whether foreign correspondents base themselves as 
neutral observers and eyewitnesses of event and developments is not always clear. A key 
question here revolves around the extent to which sources interviewed on the news 
reflect a balanced and objective account of the actual current state of the world. Do the 
nature of up-to-date news reporting and the significance of getting it first, compel 
correspondents to continuously depend upon the same institutional sources and 
subsequently limit the scope of variation a news story may entail? What about the 
construction of, what Kitzinger (2000) terms, ‘media templates’? Van Ginneken puts 
forward some primary questions; he asserts,             
[…] do they systematically favour certain patterns over other which may originally 
have been just as prominent and coherent? Do the Western media mediate the 
world to us in a particular way, which is consonant with the presuppositions of 
both key media professionals and major media audiences? Do the collective ego 
and the collective narcissism of these groups play a role? Is the ‘positive’ role of 
the ‘First’ world emphasized out of proportion, and is its ‘negative’ role in past 
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and present blotted out? What does this mean for images which reach the 
‘Second’ and the ‘Third’ world (1998: 17)? 
He also speaks of a ‘Eurocentric language’ which is a geographic denotation that often 
associates ‘the East’ or ‘the Orient’ with negative connotations and positions them as 
irrational, terroristic, depraved, uncivilised, backward and especially “different”; in 
contrast to ‘the West’ –also known as ‘The Occident’ – which is represented as rational, 
human, democratic, virtuous, progressive and most importantly “normal” (Said 1985: 40, 
58; Moore-Gilbert 1997: 39; van Ginneken 1998: 9). In this respect, van Ginneken argues 
that ‘‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’ have become highly ideological notions’ (1998: 9). 
Such racist and imperialist views have been articulated and maintained using 
representations and language ‘by journalists, artists, novelists, travel writers, historians, 
advertising copywriters, cartoonists and songwriters, as well as by scientists and 
intellectuals’ (Pickering 2001: 126). Focusing on the ‘ugly Muslim’, for example, the media 
and popular culture, as hegemonic instruments, have contributed in the formation of an 
evil Arab stereotype providing ‘a framework of symbols, concepts and images through 
which we understand, interpret and represent aspects of our ‘racial’ existence’ (Omi 
1989: 114 cited in Richardson 2004: 50) but are largely composed from collective 
memory rather than from direct experience (Jackson, 1996: 65 cited in Merskin 2004: 
158). 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict presents an illustration of how the media are capable of 
producing and reinforcing racial discriminations. Bernard Lewis, asserts that when Arab 
Palestinians responds to Israeli settlements’ occupation of their lands, it is always at 
worst ‘the return of Islam’, or at best, the ‘Islamic opposition to non-Islamic peoples’ 
(1976: 39-49 cited in Said 1985: 107). To Said (1985), the Palestinian suffering remains a 
potent example. Despite the fact that it is a cultural resistance by an entire people, the 
patent injustice it entails, the frantically imbalanced nature of the weapons and forces 
used against one another, and most importantly the routine in which the resistance is 
portrayed by the mass media –commodified, in Said’s terms –for the Western audience 
to consume: ‘the widespread, if not wholesale, resistance of a people’ is merely ‘reduced 
to isolated acts of stone-throwing or bombing (the delinquent or the mindlessly 
terroristic)’ (Childs and Williams 1997: 110). Those patterns are neither new nor unique in 
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journalism. Lind and Danowski’s examination of ABC, CNN, and PBS’s TV content serves 
as a good example. In their exhaustive three-year study (1993-1996), they concluded that 
coverage of the conflict in the news rarely touched upon Arabs, let alone Arab culture 
(1998). They also found that when this was the case Arabs where overwhelmingly 
associated with war, violence, aggression and threats portrayed primarily in terms of 
their relations with Israel (1998: 165 cited in Merskin 2004: 165). Needless to mention, 
the post-September 11 era has strengthened such claims and made them more relevant 
today than ever.   
In the case of ‘continuing news’, –like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict –the media are often 
accused of reporting stories as isolated events. Philo and Berry (2004) found that the 
British media provided minimal understanding of the historical background and the 
contextual framework of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They even quoted one BBC 
correspondent who explained that when the viewer is given no background knowledge of 
the topic in question news items can look ‘dreadful’: it takes ‘a lot of knowledge for 
granted on the part of the viewer’ (2004: 290). Romano (1987) quoted Niebuhr (1963) in 
this regard: 
Facts consist of hardly more than names and dates. There are events in history, 
and these events cannot be understood except in relation to a whole stream of 
previous causes. Every record of events is therefore also an interpretation of this 
stream of causes. In the strict sense, there is therefore no unbiased account of 
either past or contemporary history (cited in van Ginneken 1998: 110). 
What emerges as a result, are discrepancies in the extent to which ‘the world news 
media’ get emotional on some occasions rather than others. Van Ginneken proposes the 
following questions in examining the way media messages are constructed: 
…why are some’ tragic deaths’ emphatically brought to our attention? Why are 
we made to sympathize with them, to feel sorry for them, to suffer with them, to 
feel that something must be done, here and now, on the spot and at once? On the 
other hand, we are made to feel that others are victims of fate, that nothing can 
be done about it, that things have always been like that and will always remain so 
(van Ginneken 1998: 24). 
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Such questions, along with processes of gatekeeping, agenda-setting, ideology and 
hierarchies of organisational culture, bring us back to the very question of news 
construction. One way to understand the manner in which realty is constructed and 
ideology is prevailed in television news is through examining the relationship between 
the text and the visual. The following section provides general contextualisation on the 
essence of the visual in television reporting, before it reflects on issues of cultural and 
national sensibilities of reporting graphic images in times of war.   
 
Photojournalism: Television reporting and graphic representations of war imagery 
Television reporting –the importance of the visual 
Scholars have long argued that the outbreak of World War II notably improved the role of 
news photography (Goldberg 1993; Moeller 1989; Taylor 1991 cited in Zelizer 1995: 81; 
Griffin 2004: 381; Price et al. 2000: 18). By the year 1943, it was argued that, 
photography has become ‘a matter of paramount importance…Implicit in these war years 
in the final arrival of the photo as a message media as powerful as words. Perhaps [even] 
more powerful’ (Maloney 1943: 11 cited in Zelizer 1995: 81-2). Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that by the end of the war, news photography had emerged as a legitimate 
ground of journalism: promoting ‘news presentations as unproblematic reflections of 
events occurring beyond viewers’ direct experience’ (Griffin 2004: 381). With the 
invention of the camera the promise of an objective, mechanical means of representation 
was born. Or to use Berger’s terms, ‘Positivism and the camera…grew up together’ 
(Berger and Mohr 1982: 99). Television’s seemingly transparent nature and its presumed 
objectivity make it a medium well-worth exploring. 
Today the ideal of objective journalism is no longer rooted with the notion of 
photographic realism. The end of the negative and increased malleability of the image 
has created some form of an epistemic crisis regarding the truth of visual evidence. What 
became known as the crisis of digitalisation has fuelled a dramatic evolution in the quality 
and reliability of media content available to the audience.  
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In terms of news content, the visual nature of television is considered to be ‘more 
devoted to conflict and negativity than newspaper news’ (Robinson 1976 cited in Ettema 
et al. 1997: 36). The combination of ‘natural-seeming sight and sound’ entails ‘a sensual 
immersion, more of a feeling of “being there”’ (Hannerz 2004: 30). The very fact that 
broadcast media can communicate with audiences instantly necessitates journalists to 
constantly work under pressure in order to produce “direct” and “in real time” news 
(Bourdieu 2005: 53). Television reporters are continuously expected to produce “up-to-
date” news and are required to make rapid decisions about which portions of ‘the 
uninterrupted flux of images […] they will use and produce instant commentary for’ 
(ibid.). In this sense, Tuchman (1969) argues that although television and newspapers, 
alike, share a sincere logic of “objectivity”, the two medium differ noticeably in news 
handling (Ettema et al. 1997: 36).  
Compared to the print media, fewer stories are given prominence on television news; 
some are not mentioned at all, whilst others are partially altered to fit the agendas of 
certain ideological leanings. Scholarly attention has, recently, begun to view the medium 
with scepticism. It is important to reiterate the obvious here: cameras can only capture 
what is in front of the camera lens (Taylor 1997: 89; Deacon et al. 1999: 186). Taylor 
(1997: 89) argues that television cameras ‘provide, at best, mere snapshots of reality and, 
at worst, illusions of reality. For we are dealing with what is primarily a picture-driven 
medium that requires certain fundamental preconditions for it to operate effectively and 
simultaneously’. Although, in periods of war for example, journalists and media 
practitioners had, time and again, issued claims about ‘bringing the war home’ to viewers 
(Griffin 2004: 386), the coverage of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, and the Gulf War before it, 
have increasingly obscured images of the destruction and suffering of Iraqi civilians 
caused by American and British military action. Such images along with the Iraqi point of 
view were significantly absent in the coverage (Griffin 2004: 397). In a similar light, Elihu 
Katz, explained that the reporting of Desert Storm, 
…mobilized huge audiences for a live television war . . . But the fact is that we 
didn’t see a war at all. . . . We saw portraits of the technology …but we rarely, if 
ever, saw them in action. Indeed, it was as if there was no other side (Katz, 1992: 
8 cited in ibid.). 
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Alternatively, some television footage is left unexplained. Take an image of an Afghan 
man with weapons, for example; the picture in itself ‘reduces the man to the image of 
the terrorist when, his life, and his reasons for taking up arms are probably more 
complex’ than that (Cloud 2004: 290). Whether such instances are the product of tight 
control over media coverage by certain powerful institutions – like the military, as was 
evident in the  Vietnam War and that of Britain’s successful attempt in the Falklands War 
(Campbell 1989: 51) – is uncertain (Griffin 2004: 397). What is clear, however, is that the 
television news media are capable of employing processes of censorship, propaganda and 
limitations in an effort to protect those powerful institutions in ‘fear of documenting 
realism’, at a time when the information itself is a weapon (Taylor 1991 cited in Holland 
1997). But what about documenting the cost of war? Where do we draw the line 
between the presentation of graphic images of the dead and wounded as a way 
‘documenting reality’ and the essence and practices of ethical journalism?              
 
Taste and decency – national/cultural sensibilities  
This brief section cannot hope to do justice to the exemplary work of historians in the 
area of photography and photojournalism generally, and images of war reporting and 
combat photographers more specifically. However, the following focuses attention on 
one of the most crucial ongoing concerns of war photography today: graphic versus 
ennobling imagery. Therefore it, by no means, aims to be a fully inclusive history, in 
which primary concerns of manipulation and/or staging and technological developments, 
will not be discussed.     
A number of studies have examined the representation of death in international news 
reporting (Hanusch 2008; Taylor 1991; Moeller 1999). The question of whether graphic 
imagery is to be incorporated in war reporting is at the forefront of ethical journalism. It 
is assumed that in times of ‘propaganda wars’, graphic imagery can fuel anti-war 
sentiments. This has lead to tighter restrictions and highly controlled ‘pooling systems’ 
for journalists. Such a manipulative approach to war reporting undermines the morality 
and integrity of the profession itself. Having said that, the absence of certain images in 
the media, and television in particular, is not always borne out of propagandistic media 
control, but may also be omitted on grounds of ‘taste and decency’ (Taylor 1997: 89; 
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Campbell 2004). For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, close-up imagery of the fatally 
burnt remains of Iraqi women and children – killed as a result of the shelling of the Al 
Firdos installation in the Al-Amiriya suburb of Baghdad – were widely absent from the 
coverage of some Western broadcasters for reasons of taste and decency (Taylor 1997: 
89). In other words, ‘the shock value of horrific television pictures is reduced by a 
broadcasting tradition which is keen to avoid offending or upsetting its audience’ (ibid.). 
This means that media organisations have special guidelines for reporting pictures of the 
dead and injured in brutal war. Martin Bell (2003) notes that television, at least in its BBC 
variety, ‘is most likely to give a misleadingly restrained, sanitized view of real-world 
violence. The guidelines say there should be no blood before 9:00 P.M., as children are 
likely to be watching’ (p. 212-20 cited in Hannerz 2004: 28). In this regard, Schlesinger 
(1987) agrees, that ‘the doings of the world are tamed to meet the needs of a production 
system in many respects bureaucratically organised’ (Schlesinger 1987: 47). 
Petley (2003) argues that different nationalities have different sensibilities about showing 
death in the media. He recounts a revealing anecdote about the aftermath of a mortar 
shell landing in a Sarajevo street, narrated by a British journalist. The event was filmed by 
the camera crew of a news agency, and journalists from different countries had rather 
different preferences in selecting parts of the footage for their reports:     
The Italians used almost all of them: the brains, the intestines, the gutter literally 
running with blood in the rain. The French used the gutter and the bodies. The 
Americans used the gutter. We used none of these things: just the covered bodies 
being put into the ambulances, the empty pram, the abandoned shoes (cited in 
Petley, 2003: 73). 
However, scholars have questioned such concerns in photojournalism (see for example, 
Moeller 1999; Campbell 2004; Taylor 1998), arguing that the audience is denied real 
knowledge of the events on the ground. Howarth (2007) argues that the ‘denial of death 
might more properly be identified as a neglect of marginal experiences and practices 
surrounding death and dying’ (p. 39). In the same way, Hanusch (2008) found that a 
number of journalists at The Australian newspaper preferred to present death in their 
coverage, ‘believing that not doing so would be an interference with reality’ (p. 308). 
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Taylor (1998) similarly agrees that ‘the absence of horror in the representation of real 
events indicates not propriety so much as a potentially dangerous poverty of knowledge 
among news readers’ (p. 11 cited in Hanusch 2008: 315). Hannerz also speaks of a 
‘compassionate cosmopolitanism’ (2004: 27), or what he also describes as an ‘electronic 
empathy’ (1996: 121 cited in Hannerz 2004: 27): whereby, for example, audiences 
express mounting sympathy and compassion with certain populations after watching 
children and women dying on their television screens. Conversely, scholars have argued 
that it does not necessarily follow that the saturation of television with graphic imagery 
of other human beings’ suffering will immediately result in feelings of empathy amongst 
culturally detached audiences. It is also assumed that the daily omnipresence of death 
and suffering as ‘infotainment’ is capable of distorting and gradually lessening the 
compassion effect amongst audiences over time (Arthur and Kleinman 1996 cited in 
Hannerz 2004: 28). This phenomenon has come to be known as ‘compassion fatigue’ (see 
Moeller 1999).   
It remains to be seen that although death as a subject is quite present in the media today, 
the presence or ‘visualisation of death’ is somehow lacking. Campbell, in this respect, 
argues that ‘we have witnessed a disappearance of the dead in contemporary coverage’ 
(2004: 70). Examining the ‘media’s blindness’ in relation to the crimes committed in 
Sudan, Campbell (2004) highlights the importance of context, which in relationship to 
images, constructs three defining dimensions: ‘the economy of indifference to others 
(especially others who are culturally, racially and spatially foreign), the economy of “taste 
and decency” whereby the media itself regulates the representation of death and 
atrocity, and the economy of display’ (2004: 70), which help facilitate the decision-making 
behind the selection process of war imagery.           
 
Media Reception 
But what about media reception; do these media messages have any effect at all? Within 
media theory it has become increasingly passé to question media effects (Kitzinger 1999: 
3). This so-called naïve assumption of media power dismisses the hypothesis that 
‘ordinary people’ are ‘cultural dopes’ (ibid.). The array of scholarship on media power has 
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been replaced by celebrations of ‘audience creativity’ (ibid.) –in short, the notion of the 
active audience has replaced that of the passive audience. Such assertions stem from the 
oft-cited claim that ‘our minds are not simply tabulae rasae or empty vessels to be filled 
with a preferred viewpoint’ (cited in Philo 1990: 133). 
Active vs. passive audiences - Encoding and decoding media messages 
In contemporary public discourse, it is widely assumed that the media exercises influence 
(Zelizer 1997: 24). The Frankfurt School for example, ‘blames’ the media for ‘reinforcing 
and encouraging general world views and specific beliefs which help secure the positions 
of those groups already in power’ (Press 1990: 158). It is this belief that lies behind their 
determination of what gains status and what is left in the shadows, what is incorporated 
and what is expelled. In essence it provides what James Curran (2002: 163) likes to call, 
‘windows on the world’ presenting selective viewpoints and marginalising others. He 
explains that the media not only ‘signify and interpret’; they also furnish clear 
frameworks of reason, besides implicit understandings based on relations of ‘ideas, 
evocative images’ and ‘natural chains of thought’. They also tag and categorise possessing 
stereotypes and distinguishing between the ‘normal and the deviant, the natural and 
unnatural’. Put simply, the media both writes the script of social world and helps shape 
its workings. 
Such evidence encourages the talk of ‘media influence’, but rejects notions of circulation 
and reception. Power, says Foucault,  
[…] must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which 
only functions in the form of a chain […]. Power is employed and exercised 
through a net like organisation […] individuals are the vehicles of power, not its 
point of application (1980a: 98 cited in McHoul and Grace 1993: 89). 
With the continuous expansion of cable television and satellites, there is a wider range of 
choice available to television audiences, and by selecting what programmes to follow and 
which ones to ignore audiences exercise power over the media, which subsequently 
influences the manner in which media agencies act in deciding what counts as news and 
how politics is to be covered (Curran 2002: 150). 
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During the 1950s, however, research into media power reflected on the idea that 
audiences’ behaviours, beliefs and opinions are a product of one’s own social background 
rather than a persuasive appeal that the mass media aims to deliver (McQuail 1997: 8) –
that is messages from the mass media can be ‘read’ or ‘decoded’ differently by various 
cultural and social groups, regardless of their originators’ intention (ibid: 19). The rise of 
decoding research into the general topic of media cultural studies in the 1980s, made the 
Cultural Tradition and Reception school of research also persuaded researchers to reject 
the all-too-powerful texts or messages model, but went even further to suggest that most 
media messages are “polysemic” (i.e., having multiple meanings) (Philo 2008: 537). 
Similarly, Lindlof accentuates the study of audience as ‘interpretive communities’ 
(Lindlof, 1988 cited in ibid.) –where means of reception, often arise out of collective 
social practices (McQuail 1997: 19).  Such initiatives helped create perceptions that 
interpret media messages as ‘essentially open to several possible interpretations’ clear to 
predict, yet very hard to attest (Liebes & Kartz, 1986, 1989, 1990 cited in ibid.). 
In modern cultural studies, reception analysis has become a crucial method of audience 
research. It helps define the reader’s role in ‘decoding’ media messages and aims to 
establish the extent of power audiences acquire in resisting or subverting ‘dominant or 
hegemonic’ readings offered by the mass media (McQuail 1997: 19). Van Ginneken 
(1998) argues that media messages are not the sole determinant of audiences’ 
understanding of the world. He urges attention to a clear and careful distinction between 
the ‘overt/explicit/intended’ readings of media texts, and the 
‘covert/implicit/unintended’ ones (p. 192). In doing so, he also points to a careful 
comparison between the preferred readings intended by the sender and the ones 
perceived and understood by the receiver (ibid). Such readings, van Ginneken adds ‘do 
not necessarily coincide; often, in fact, they do not coincide at all’ (ibid.). For example, no 
scholarly research (or study for that matter) has simply provided evidence to support the 
claim that ‘managed’ television coverage –no matter how premeditated – is capable of 
altering public opinion ‘en masse’ from a pro-war to an anti-war stance (Taylor 1997: 91).  
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Cultural proximity: looking at the social, cognitive and political contexts of public 
understanding. 
In order to understand media reception in its broadest sense, it is crucial to consider the 
relationship between media and culture (Flew 2007: 4; emphasis in original). This 
highlights the extent to which culture is increasingly ‘mediated’: that is that the 
distribution of informational and symbolic content is a distanced process (in terms of 
space and time), and that the reception of such content is similarly a complex process 
occurring in private as well as public contexts. Understanding the relationship between 
culture and the media also involves recognising the extent to which culture ‘can act as a 
mitigating factor upon the potential for global communication arising from the 
development of seemingly ‘borderless’ information and communications technologies 
(ICTs)’ (Flew 2007: 3-4). The repertoire of potential codes and readings is determined by 
the culture of both. Within the same culture, or subculture, mass audiences consist of 
individuals. Thus, whereas the general picture may be common to all, an individual’s 
gender group, nationality, class, language system, sensibilities, perceptions and 
prejudices, can have an effect on that individual’s perceptions (Taylor 1997: 90; Philo 
1990: 148-9), which often means that the same group members may constantly assume 
alternative readings of the same media text, or might even have an entirely oppositional 
reading (van Ginneken 1998: 193). Fiske (1987), shares Morley’s (1980) approach in that 
media texts are interpreted differently by differently situated audiences. He writes, 
Textual studies of television now have to stop treating it as a closed text, that is, 
as one where the dominant ideology exerts considerable, if not total, influence 
over its ideological structure and therefore over its reader. Analysis has to pay less 
attention to the textual strategies of preference or closure and more to the gaps 
and spaces that open television up to meanings not preferred by textual structure, 
but result from the social experience of the reader (1987: 64 cited in Philo 1990: 
191)  
Taylor describes it as a ‘twin process of cognitive dissonance’ that takes place amongst 
media professionals first and then by the audience (1997: 90). While we accept that news 
is processed by people in different ways, such cognitive processing involves selection and 
integration (van Ginneken 1998: 195). The nature of audience exposure is in itself 
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selective which also suggests that audiences are selective in perceiving media messages. 
Similarly, the act of remembering news accounts is rather selective just like the process of 
retrieving and rendering information (ibid.). Rice (1980), touched upon earlier work by 
Bartlett (1932) which found that differently situated individuals retell stories in ‘different 
culturally determined ways’ (Bird and Dardenne 1997: 341). This brings to light the notion 
of ‘interpretive communities’. Hymes definition of ‘speech communities’ distinguishes 
groups as ones with shared interpretations of reality (1980: 2 cited in Zelizer 1997: 27). 
Zelizer (1997) reiterates what scholars have termed ‘communities of memory’, in which 
group members construct shared interpretations of events over time (p. 27). This 
suggests that a sense of community arises ‘through patterns of association derived from 
the communication of shared interpretation’ (ibid.). 
To this end, the very nature of media reception is a paradox. The extent to which media 
messages are powerful and influential, or the degree to which our views of the world are 
highly mediated are complex questions to comprehend, let alone attest.   
 
Conclusion: States of Denial 
War and violence are key and defining qualities in contemporary televisual culture. 
However, just about everything written about war journalism, especially on television 
news reporting contends with its rather problematic nature. The claim for credibility, 
truthfulness, impartiality, and transparency are balanced with alternative assertions of 
bias, ideology, construction and deceit. One proposed facet is always argued against by 
another and we are left puzzled, unable to contend to the realities provided to us. Such 
narratives apparently invest in television news’s ability to claim status as an eyewitness 
while simultaneously recognising our loss of innocence in its alleged objectivity –for 
television is a cultural artefact, a pattern of socially manufactured messages which hold 
many of the culturally dominant suppositions of the world we live in.  
In wartime, especially, the notion of objective journalism can be held in two distinct 
forms. In the first instance, objectivity is conceived as an impossible goal. Objective 
reporting is associated with fairness, disinterestedness, factuality and non-partisanship. It 
reflects ‘objective’ ways of gathering news and reproducing them in a detached, 
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impersonal manner surpassing any kind of value judgement. The sociologist Michael 
Schudson argues that ‘the belief in objectivity is a faith in 'facts,' a distrust in 'values,' and 
a commitment to their segregation’ (1987). He refers to the prevailing ideology of 
newsgathering and reporting as symbols of ‘eyewitness’ accounts of events. 
Nevertheless, scholars argue that the nature of journalism itself encompasses all of these 
qualities. Tumber (2004) argues that the act of reporting is, in itself, restricting, placing 
limitations on the ability to report the whole known truth (p. 21). It, therefore, suggests 
that the ‘necessity of selection and the hierarchal organization of a story, suggests more 
of a subjective rather than objective outcome’ (ibid.). 
Secondly, objectivity is employed as a strategic ritual, allowing journalists to act as 
defenders of the profession (Tuchman 1972). Tumber, sharing Tuchman’s view, writes, 
The procedure of the verification of facts, the separating of “facts” from 
“analysis”, the presenting of conflicting possibilities and supporting evidence, the 
judicious use of quotation marks, the structuring of information in an appropriate 
sequence and the criterion of common sense in assessing news content while 
enabling the claim to objectivity (which functions as a shield from criticism), do 
not guarantee objectivity. Instead, they only allow an operational view of 
objectivity (2004: 201). 
By simply accepting the given downfalls of journalism, can the media stand as a reflection 
of Cohen’s (2001) ‘States of Denial’? Cohen is mostly alarmed with the process of 
transmitting information about atrocities and suffering to a larger audience (Hamm 2003: 
177). He examines whether “acknowledgment” can be perceived as the contrary of denial 
and if so where does the acknowledgment of atrocity and suffering take us (Cohen 2001). 
To him, states of denial (both government and individual) of killing and agony come 
under several rational claims that ‘something did not happen, does not exist, is not true 
or is not known about’ (Hamm 2003: 177). Such claims bring along three possible 
realities. First, Cohen asserts that, sometimes, they are, in effect, accurate and truthful –
where justification by governments or individuals in arguing that an event did not take 
place is true (ibid.). 
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The second reality concerns conscious denial through ‘deliberate deception’ –that is, by 
lying (Cohen 2001: 4). Even when facts about wars and atrocities are markedly known by 
the people behind these sufferings, the victims of its carnage and witnesses, for 
ideological purposes (either personal or political), these facts are still obscured. Means of 
deception can include ‘elaborate forms of disinformation, misinformation, propaganda, 
whitewash, spin, and cover-up’ (Hamm 2003: 178). And because none of us can live in a 
permanent ‘state of awareness’ about all the misfortunate happenings in the world (from 
starving people in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda, the shocking reality of AIDS in Africa and 
the continuous chaos of war in the Middle East, etc.) our reception process –let alone 
attention process –“switch off” to the source of such information (Cohen 2001: 4). 
Cohen’s last proposition of reality is the most valuable. Denial, he implies ‘may be neither 
a matter of telling the truth nor intentionally telling a lie’ (ibid.), but rather solely 
institutionalised by humans. He also explains that sometimes we are unaware of the 
‘switching off’ or ‘blocking out’ that we do (2001: 5). 
But if the news media decides to display a country’s aggression as merely ‘another 
episode in a centuries-long Darwinian struggle for power, as a twist in an endless cycle of 
retaliation which is beyond any imaginable solution, then bystander ‘passivity’ is hardly 
surprising’ (Cohen 2001: 177). If victims –no matter how heart-wrenching they appear –
are not revealed as utterly innocent, then again indulgence and sympathy on the 
audiences’ part is far from visible (ibid.). From a psychoanalytic theory of genocide, 
political massacres, disappearances, and torture, Cohen stresses, ‘that denials of crimes 
against humanity are not to be considered private states of mind. Rather, they are deeply 
embedded in popular culture, banal language codes, and state-encouraged legitimations’ 
(Hamm 2003: 178). With public knowledge in mind, Cohen notes that perception ‘varies 
according to political setting, length of conflict, control over mass media, visibility, 
geographical spread, proportion of population involved, and much else’ (2001: 78). This is 
especially the case, when such images of struggle and violence hardly ever suggest a 
conduit for action, but are rather ‘random texts about random horrors’ (Cohen 2001: 
250).  
What does all this tell us about the relationship between war and the media? In the 
words of Stanley Cohen, ‘worse than torture not being in the news’, is an instance of 
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denial when the issue is no longer considered news (2001: xi) –an unspoken scheme 
which overlooks the matter as a whole. It is important to remember that media texts do 
not produce or determine media effects, rather the process of ‘representing’ the events 
themselves as lived experiences transforms them into mediated texts. This process, 
argues Lewis (2005) contributes to evolvement of political consciousness through the 
public sphere to what has been termed as the media sphere (p. 53). Such a media sphere 
entails media organisations and professional journalists to work within a context of 
semiotic and financial deficits (ibid.)  
This chapter has explored the practices of objective journalism as a genre and war 
reporting as a sub-genre, highlighting the role of foreign correspondence in the 
formulation of news reporting. It also examined the role of war imagery in the 
construction of reality and briefly considered the ‘effects’ framed ideological narratives 
may have on television audience. The next chapter shifts the focus and looks directly into 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a case study. It first provides a brief history of the 
contextual background of the war and then examines the relevant literature of previously 
conducted studies in this domain.         
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Chapter 2 
Putting the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Context 
 
The conflict in which “those people have been fighting for thousands of years” really goes 
back about as far as the film Miracle on 34th Street, and the first airing of the children’s 
television show Kukla, Fran and Ollie; if you were born before 1948, you’re older than Israel  
             (Harms and Ferry 2008: 87). 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict dating back to 1947. 
Providing a full descriptive contextual framework of the 64 year old conflict is beyond the 
scope of this study; therefore only incidents pertaining to the analysis of this thesis are 
underlined. In this sense, it is worth noting that the historical background presented here 
is by no means comprehensive, let alone representative. Leaving aside the historical 
political context in which these events occurred, the chapter discusses the events leading 
up to the 1948 War, the 1967 War, the first and second Intifadas (uprisings), the 
progression of events that instigated the 2008-09 Gaza War and the Gaza War itself. It 
also outlines controversial acts and actors to help situate the conflict in place, taking 
account of the Hamas Movement, the ideology behind the notion of a suicide bomber, 
refugees, and Israeli settlements. The second part of this chapter reviews some of the 
most prominent studies examining the media coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict.           
 
Part I: History 
Pre-1948-1967 –conflict, partition, Israeli statehood/Palestinian Catastrophe and the Six-
day War 
The Palestinian Israeli conflict is essentially a conflict over land and dates back to World 
War I. For centuries before 1948, what is known as Israel today had always been referred 
to as Palestine. Palestinians and Jews alike have lived in the region for thousands of years. 
The nineteenth century, however, saw the rise of a nationalist movement called Zionism 
among European Jews, who by founding a Jewish nation-state aimed to escape decades 
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of European discrimination (Mast, Bevis and Palestine Information Project 2003: 14). This 
coincided with a period where Palestinians had fully established their national existence 
in a society commonly recognised by other Arabs as unique to Palestine. Given that the 
Zionist plan took no account of the majority of the population in Palestine, both 
Palestinian Arabs and Jews in the region rejected the colonial aspect of the Zionist 
ideology (ibid.). 
As a result of the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1917, Palestine became a mandate 
territory of Britain. Tensions increased when Britain’s foreign minister, Lord Arthur 
Balfour, made conflicting commitments to the Arabs for the incorporation of Palestine 
into a regional Arab state and announced his support for the establishment of ‘a Jewish 
national home in Palestine’ (ibid.). At that time, there was a majority of approximately 
600,000 Palestinian Arabs and 60,000 Jews in the territory, but the number of ‘Jewish 
settlers in Palestine grew by a factor of ten, accelerated by the rise of the Nazis and the 
Holocaust’ (ibid.). 
The 1947 United Nations Partition plan for Palestine (Resolution 181) recommended the 
creation of two states, one Jewish and the other Arab; the latter established on less than 
half of the land it possessed prior (Roy 2007: 322). While the Jews accepted it, the Arabs 
were furious at the UN’s vote. They could not tolerate what ‘essentially amounted to 
Europe and the US giving 56 percent of Palestine to a foreign population that only made 
up slightly over 30 percent of the whole’ (Harms and Ferry 2008: 92), which eventually 
led to the war of 1948 (often referred to as al-Naqaba or catastrophe by Palestinians). On 
May 14, 1948, when Great Britain officially declared the end of three decades of British 
colonial presence, Zionist leaders also declared the ‘establishment of the Jewish State in 
Palestine, to be called Medinath Yisrael (the state of Israel)’ (Laqueur and Rubin p.80 
cited in Harms and Ferry 2008: 94).  
By the end of the war, Israeli forces conquered 78 per cent of Palestine, with Jordan 
taking control of the West Bank and Egypt taking control of Gaza. The 44 percent allotted 
to Palestine by the UN was cut in half, leaving 22 percent to the Palestinians (see figure 
2.1) –historic Palestine was replaced with the new state of Israel on the map of the world. 
The Israeli historian Benny Morris has documented that 369 Palestinian villages were 
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abolished and at least 234 villages were destroyed by direct Israeli military action (cited in 
Mast et al. 2003: 15). This also meant that 80-85 percent of the existing Palestinian 
population in the conquered area either fled or were forced from their homes and into 
Arab-held Palestine or the surrounding Arab countries (Roy 2007: 322). As a result, the 
UN set up refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Today, over a million Palestinian 
refugees still live in refugee camps. Morris (2007) argues that ‘the refugee problem was 
caused by attacks by Jewish forces on Arab villages and towns and by the inhabitants’ 
fear of such attacks, compounded by expulsions, atrocities, and rumours of atrocities –
and by the crucial Israeli Cabinet decision in June 1948 to bar a refugee return’ (Morris 
2007: 38).                          
 
Figure 2.1: United Nations Partition Plan (UN resolution 181) 1947/Rhodes Armistice Line, 1949 (Map 
adapted from PASSIA, 2007) 
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The response of Arabic neighbouring countries to the creation of the state of Israel was 
part and parcel of the events that took place in 1967. In June of that year, Israel launched 
an attack on Egypt taking control of the Gaza Strip and eventually the Sinai Peninsula. 
Later, Israel defeated Jordan and Syria when they joined the conflict taking control of the 
West Bank and the Golan Heights. As a consequence an additional 320,000 Palestinian 
refugees were forced out during the war (Mast et al. 2003: 16). This has come to be 
known as the June 1967 War, or the “Six-Day War”. The 1967 War also saw the growth of 
Israeli settlements (accelerating through to the present day). In this process, the Israeli 
government gave Israeli Jewish citizens financial incentives to move to “settlements” in 
the Occupied Territories. ‘Palestinian farmland and homes are routinely confiscated and 
demolished to make room for new Israeli-only settlements, along with Israeli-only 
highways to connect settlements to each other and to Israel proper’ (Mast et al. 2003: 
16). Although the Fourth Geneva Convention condemns settlements in occupied 
territory, the Israeli government continues to subsidise settlement building, which some 
scholars argue are placed deliberately to segregate, disperse, and even eradicate areas of 
Palestinian residence (Mast et al. 2003: 16; Makdisi 2010).      
In the aftermath of the 1967 War, the remaining 22 percent of Historic Palestine was 
occupied. The whole of pre-1948 Palestine and its 1.1 million Palestinians inhabitants 
came under Israeli control (Harms and Ferry 2008: 111). As in the 1948 War, homes and 
villages of fleeing Palestinians were routinely demolished. Harms and Ferry (2008: 112) 
document one example in the Maghrabi Quarter facing the Western Wall in the Old City 
of Jerusalem in which 135 homes were bulldozed and 650 people were dispossessed from 
the area in order to make room for a plaza for Jewish prayer in front of the wall. This type 
of action, they assert, became the norm throughout the occupied territories.   
 
The first Intifada: 1987-1993 
Open revolt broke out in early December 1987 after an Israeli military vehicle crashed 
into a truck in Gaza carrying Palestinians home from work, killing four of them and 
wounding seven. Thousands of Palestinians attended the funerals of the deceased 
workers which immediately evolved into angry protest and subsequently spread 
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throughout the Occupied Territories. Palestinians were unarmed (BBC, 2008) thus the 
revolt was widely described as nonviolent. Life in the territories, was depicted to feature 
‘stone throwing, Molotov cocktails, strikes, demonstrations, [and] refusal to pay taxes’, 
while enduring ‘large-scale arrests, imprisonment without trial, deportations, punitive 
destruction of home and property, beating, and the use of tear gas and live ammunition 
against crowds’ (Pretez 1990: 4 cited in Harms and Ferry 2008: 142). The uprising 
continued until 1993. The Israeli human rights group B’Tselem, indicated that in the 
period of the first Intifada, Palestinians killed a total of 100 Israeli civilians. During the 
same period Israeli military forces and settlers killed more than 1,160 Palestinian civilians 
(cited in Abunimah 2003: 59) –more than 11 Palestinians for every Israeli. According to 
the BBC (2008) Israeli settlements continued to spread out across the territories occupied 
in 1967. ‘Some were settled by visionaries quoting Biblical justification, some by families 
wanting less expensive housing and some by those who wanted Israel to keep a buffer 
zone west of the River Jordan’ (BBC, 2008).  
As the first-Intifada began to lose momentum, undisclosed talks between the Israelis and 
the PLO took place in January 1993. Over a period of eight months, what became known 
as the ‘Oslo Accords’, were finally signed in the US in the presence of Bill Clinton as a 
master of ceremonies. It was the first direct face-to-face agreement between the Israeli 
government and the PLO: ‘a breakthrough of major historic significance had been 
achieved’ (Harms and Ferry 2008: 153). This achievement was conceived to be 
momentous given it not only facilitated talks between the two parties, but also produced 
a framework that they both agreed upon. However, much of it was left undone. The 
extreme ambiguity of the language of the accord meant that both parties provided their 
own versions of interpretation that suited their actual desires and/or needs:  
The PLO saw a path toward statehood, and Israel viewed it as retention of the 
territories without the burden of having to administer them. (Harms and Ferry 
2008: 154). 
Despite its historic significance, it quickly became clear that the Oslo agreements brought 
with it less freedom than the previous form of occupation (ibid: 159). 
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The Second Intifada –al-Aqsa Intifada: 2000 - 2004    
On September 28, 2000, the Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon along with 1,000 
armed police made an inflammatory visit to the Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem. According to him, he was going to send ‘a message for peace’, but to most of 
the rest of the world, visiting Islam’s third holiest site, seemed to be a gesture to 
emphasise Israeli sovereignty over the whole of Jerusalem. His visit built up riots and 
protests which spread from Temple Mount across the entire West Bank and Gaza, and 
amid Arabs in Israel. It soon became a full-scale uprising known as al-Aqsa Intifada (Lowe 
2005: 256). Chomsky (2003: 218) argues that Sharon is the ‘very symbol of Israeli state 
terror and aggression, with a rich record of atrocities going back to 1953’. He also argued 
that Sharon’s visit was not the only factor that initiated the uprising, but also the massive 
police and military presence that Barak introduced the following day, the day of Muslim 
prayers (ibid.). Palestinians protested and threw stones at the soldiers; the soldiers 
responded by firing live ammunition leaving four Palestinians dead and more than 200 
wounded (Mast et al.  2003: 17; Chomsky 2003: 218). What is particularly interesting is 
how fast the situation escalated. In fact, it was claimed that ‘almost every act of 
oppression, or logistic plan that had been carried out against Palestinians during the 
second Intifada was already visible in October 2000. All the themes that presently define 
Israeli political discourse and propaganda were also shaped right at the start’ (Reinhart 
2002: 95). 
Since October 6, 2000, Israel has forced a full “closure” of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Any movement in or out of the sealed areas, was prevented by the Israeli army. People 
getting shot on their way to work in the fields have also been reported. Some described it 
as a ‘matrix of control’ (Halper cited in Philo and Berry 2004: 86), others such as Dr. 
Mustafa Barghouthi went even further to describe the situation as a ‘humanitarian crisis’ 
(The Palestinian Monitor Dec. 19, 2001 cited in Reinhart, 2002: 127-8). Economically, 
Palestinians in the occupied territories, in which conditions’ deteriorated severely during 
the Oslo years, have slumped to a disastrous level in the course of the new uprising. 
Unemployment rates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip reached 57% (Said 2003: 53), 
including not only people who had lost their jobs in Israel, but also those whose 
54 
 
movements are restricted because of closures and roadblocks, along with the sufferers of 
businesses that collapsed or closed (Reinhart 2002: 118). 
For forty years, confiscation of agricultural lands and uprooting of olive trees to build 
illegal settlements have all threatened Palestine’s agricultural profits. Since the beginning 
of the second intifada until the year 2006, about half a million olive trees have been uprooted 
or destroyed by Israeli forces (World YWCA Oct. 27, 2006). Fifty three percent of 
Palestinians were living below the poverty line of less than $2 a day (ibid: 119; Enderlin 
2003: 3). Chomsky (2002: 172) states that settler leaders claim that the settler population 
doubled to 210,000 since Oslo and ‘the construction in the settlement in the year 2000 
was reported to be 3 times as high as in Tel Aviv and more than 10 times as high as in 
Jerusalem’. As Shlaim suggests, these settlements are not simply building houses and 
farms, they are part of a systematic policy of exercising strategic and military control 
(2000: 582). Philo and Berry add that settlement building is crucial in exploiting some 
essential reserves of water in the occupied territories (Philo et al. 2004: 135).  
In June of 2002, the Israeli military began constructing a physical wall, (referred to as the 
‘separation wall’ –see Image 2.1) starting at the north end of the West Bank loosely 
tracing the border heading south. The barrier is mostly built within the Palestinian 
boundary of the Green Line1, fencing Palestinians from wells and farmland and claiming 
large portions of land (Harms and Ferry 2008: 176; Mast et al. 2003: 18). Today, the 
barrier remains a controversial matter, attracting a lot of international attention and 
attributing a symbolic struggle in the conflict.  
                                                          
1
 Green Line refers to the demarcation lines set out in the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and 
its neighbours (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) after the1948 Arab-Israeli War. It is also used to mark the 
line between Israel and the territories captured in the Six-Day War. 
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Image 2.1: the separation wall (Source: B’Tselem November 5
th
 2010)  
The unarmed 1987 Intifada was escalated into a more violent approach. The adaptation 
of implements exercised in the First Intifada –such as stone throwing, bottles, and 
burning tires –were very quickly replaced with the exchange of automatic-weapon fire 
between the Israeli army and Palestinians (police, and more so, paramilitary groups) 
(Harms and Ferry 2008:171). It is indicated that suicide bombings ‘became firmly 
integrated into the provocation-reprisal pattern characterizing the Second Intifada’ (ibid: 
174). Abunimah states that it has continuously been claimed that suicide attacks have 
become ‘the “weapon of choice” for Palestinians (2003: 58). He argues, however, that the 
fact that Palestinians have no access to weapons in order to reasonably defend 
themselves against the Israeli army, means that suicide bombings in Israeli cities ‘have 
become a weapon of last resort –an illegitimate and immoral response to an illegitimate 
and immoral occupation’ (Abunimah 2003: 58). Seen as a brutal act of aggression or a 
‘symptom of the violence and despair of life under occupation’ (ibid.), suicide bombing 
qualifies as a crime against humanity (Human Rights Watch, 2009). In response, the 
Israeli military adopted methods of “targeted killings”, or assassinations, of prominent 
leaders and members of organisations responsible for suicide bombing (Harms and Ferry 
2008: 174). The homes of individuals suspected of involvement in “terrorist activities” 
were targeted for demolition, most commonly bulldozed to rubble (ibid.). Such policy was 
discontinued in 1997, but was renewed in October 2001. Between its reinstatement and 
early 2005, Israel destroyed 668 homes in the occupied territories. Israeli punishment 
acts were continuously condemned by human rights organisations, the International 
community and the UN (Bickerton and Klausner 2007: 278; Smith 2004: 462 cited in 
Harms and Ferry 2008: 174). 
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In September 2003, the Intifada reached the end of its third year. The death tally stood at 
775 Israelis (100 minors) and 2,235 Palestinians (409 minors) (Philo and Berry 2004: 90; 
Rashid 2003: 7). 
 
Gaza 2005 – Disengagement Plan: the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza  
In early August 2005, Israeli troops entered Gaza in an attempt to ‘forcibly’ remove Israeli 
settlers who had refused to evacuate the strip voluntarily and accept the government’s 
compensation package. Within days, Israeli settlers were removed from the Gaza Strip 
causing no serious damage or bloodshed (Philo and Berry 2011: 118). Gaza’s 
disengagement plan was received with wide controversy. The British and the American 
governments saw it as a promising step towards peace (ibid.). President Bush said it 
provides an opportunity for the establishment of a ‘democratic state in the Gaza’ and the 
possibility of opening the door for democracy in the Middle East (cited in Roy 2007: 311). 
The International Community, led by the United States, believed that Israel’s withdrawal 
from Gaza is the first initiative in creating a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel (Roy 
2007: 317). Rooted in such statements is the belief that ‘Palestinians will be free to build 
their own democracy, that Israel will eventually cede the West Bank (or at least consider 
the possibility), that Israel’s “withdrawal” will strengthen the Palestinian position in 
negotiations over the West Bank, and the occupation will end or become increasingly 
irrelevant, that the gross asymmetries between the two sides will be redressed’ (Roy 
2007: 311). It follows that the Gaza Disengagement Plan –if implemented ‘properly’ –
provides the first step for ending the conflict and creating a Palestinian state (ibid).  
What people failed to acknowledge was that although the word ‘occupation’ has been 
removed from the political lexicon, the Plan gives Israel ‘exclusive authority’ over Gaza’s 
airspace and territorial waters, restricting the movement of people and goods into and 
out of the Strip (Roy 2007: 314):  
Israel will continue, for full price, to supply electricity, water, gas and petrol to the 
Palestinians, in accordance with current arrangements. Israel will also continue to 
collect customs duties on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli shekel 
will remain the local currency. Further, the Israeli government is building a new 
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terminal at the point where Gaza, Israel and Egypt meet that would require 
Palestinian labour and goods to go through Israeli territory. Israel’s interior 
ministry retains full control over the issuing of Palestinian identity cards and all 
population data –births, deaths, marriages –and all Palestinians must continue to 
be registered with the ministry (Roy 2007: 314-5). 
 
2006: Hamas wins the Palestinian legislative election 
Hamas –an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement –was established in the first 
Palestinian Intifada. Hamas embodies a nationalist approach directed in religious 
discourse. Its aims and goals have shifted throughout the years. Hamas’s key documents, 
a charter, political memoranda and communiqués calls for ‘the liberation of Palestine 
from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River’ (Roy 2007: 296) –which is often referred to 
as racist and dogmatic. Later, particularly since the mid-1990s Hamas’s documentation 
depicts the ‘struggle as a form of resistance to an occupying power –as a struggle over 
land and its usurpation, and over how to end the occupation’ (ibid.). Recent statements 
issued by Hamas officials maintain ‘that their goals are Israel’s withdrawal from lands 
occupied in the 1967 war, the end of Israeli occupation, the establishment of a 
Palestinian state, and a solution to the refugee issue’ (ibid.). 
In 2006, Palestinian politics took a somewhat surprising turn. Parliamentary elections at 
the end of January resulted in the triumph victory of Hamas over Fatah –for the first time 
–by gaining a majority of seats (76 of the 132 legislature’s seats). Hamas’s leader at the 
time of its inception, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (assassinated by Israel in 2004), hoped to 
transform any victory ‘as a platform to defend the resistance and to confront those who 
try to tamper with the rights of the Palestinian people, mainly the right to resist the 
occupation’ (Erlanger 2006 cited in Harms and Ferry 2007: 187). This victory received 
negative reactions from the US and Europe, given that Hamas is viewed by the US and 
Israel as a terrorist entity and an unacceptable interlocutor (Harms and Ferry 2007: 188). 
Immediately after the elections the US, along with the European Union, suspended direct 
aid to Hamas and ‘diplomatically isolate[ed] the organisation’ (Philo and Berry 2011: 122).      
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In June 2006, Palestinian fighters emerging from tunnels built below the fence separating 
Israel and Gaza, killed two Israeli soldiers and captured an Israeli corporal, Gilad Shalit, 
who was taken across the borders into Gaza. Three days after the raid, following several 
requests by the Israeli army for the unconditional release of Shalit, Israel launched its first 
ground incursion into Gaza since its withdrawal from the strip a year earlier (BBC, 2011). 
Multiple incursions and airstrikes were carried out and 64 Hamas officials in the West 
Bank were detained. Israel explained its actions were necessary to free Corporal Shalit –
whom later was promoted to Sergeant –and to prevent the rocket fire from Gaza into 
Southern Israel. During a month of military raid, an Israeli soldier was killed as opposed to 
more than 100 Palestinians (BBC, 2011).   
In February 2007 inter-political clashes between the two Palestinian factions –Fatah and 
Hamas – were significantly mounting. In June 2007, after 8 days of prolonged fighting, 
Hamas defeated Fatah and took control of the Gaza Strip. Eighteen months of fierce 
fighting left 349 Palestinians dead (B’Tselem, 2010d cited in Philo and Berry 2011: 131).   
 
Israel-Hamas ceasefire 
Throughout 2007 and into 2008 Palestinian groups continued to launch rockets into 
Israeli towns whilst simultaneously Israel continued to siege and bombard the Gaza Strip 
with heavy artillery and missile strikes. On 19 June 2008, a six-month Egyptian-mediated 
ceasefire was finally agreed between Israel and Hamas. Since the capture of Gilad Shalit 
in June 2006 until the 2008 ceasefire 47 Israelis (four minors) and 1,288 Palestinians (239 
minors) were killed in violent attacks (B’Tselem 2010a cited in Philo and Berry 2011: 135). 
During that period the humanitarian conditions in Gaza worsened severely.  
Today, there are more than 1.6 million Palestinians living in the Strip. Gaza has the 
highest birth rate in the region –5.5 to 6 children per woman which translates into 3 to 5 
percent population growth per annum (Roy 2007: 311). The majority of the population is 
under 50 years old; 50 percent of which are under the age of 15. In the Jabalya refugee 
camp alone, there are 74,000 people per square kilometre, constituting one of the 
highest densities in the world (Roy 2007: 311-2). 
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According to the World Bank, Israel’s prolonged restrictions and blockade have 
dramatically reduced Gaza’s levels of trade and employability in Israel, causing 
Palestinians to experience the worst economic conditions in modern history (Roy 2007: 
312). As a result unemployment levels reached 35 to 40 percent, with almost 65 to 75 
percent impoverished Palestinians (compared to 30 percent in 2000); many more are 
hungry (ibid.). The World Food Programme (WEP) claims that approximately 42 percent 
of Gaza’s population is ‘food insecure’ –that is, lacking access to adequate amounts of 
healthy and nutritious food; the figure exceeds 50 percent in certain parts of Gaza (cited 
in Roy 2007: 312). An extra 30 per cent of the population is under the threat of becoming 
food insecure or malnourished –what the WEP terms ‘food vulnerable’ (ibid.). A  UN 
official alleged that Gaza is undergoing acute malnutrition, currently experiencing a 
worsened level only visible in the poorest nations in the Southern Sahara, with more than 
50 percent of Gazan families surviving on one meal a day (Washington Post, 8 January 
2009 cited in Philo and Berry 2011: 135). Although Israeli settlements were evacuated 
from the Gaza Strip, the Strip remains a large prison, ‘completely sealed off from the 
outside world’ (Reinhart 2006: 3), with access to food, water, health care, fuel, electricity 
and other life prerequisites are all restricted by the Israeli army. Philo and Berry indicates 
that the humanitarian conditions in Gaza would have been worse had it not been for the 
establishment of hundreds of tunnels beneath the border between Gaza and Egypt. 
These were ‘reportedly used to bring in food, fuel, white goods, livestock and weapons’ 
(2011: 135). 
 
Image 2.2: Gazan’s daily life (Source: picture taken by a friend) 
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In November 2008, the ceasefire agreement came under threat when Israel killed six 
members of Hamas’ military wing in an incursion into Gaza (Philo and Berry 2011: 137; 
Shlaim 2009). By December 19, Hamas refused to renew the ceasefire accusing Israel of 
dishonouring the agreement’s key commitments which include opening the crossings and 
refraining from military actions in Gaza (Ha’aretz, 19 December 2008 cited in. Philo and 
Berry 2011: 137), but Israel rejected Hamas’s conditions of ending its siege and ceasing 
further attacks on Gaza (Philo and Berry 2011: 140). Tzipi Livni, Israel’s foreign minister, 
indicated that in the period after the end of the ceasefire on the 19th of December the 
number of rockets launched at Israel from Gaza increased to an average of 21 missiles per 
day (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, 2009 cited in ibid.). On December 25, 
the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert threatened Hamas of launching a full-scale 
military offensive unless it stops its rocket attacks from Gaza (Scotsman, 26 December 
2008 in Philo and Berry 2011: 141).    
 
2008-2009 Gaza War –Operation Cast Lead 
Despite the warnings, the timing and scale of the assaults on Gaza came as a surprise to 
many of its residents. On December 27 2008 at 11.30 a.m. Israel launched dozens of air 
raids across Gaza ‘using F-16 fighter jets, apache helicopters and unmanned drones’ 
(Philo and Berry 2011: 141). The timing of this operation, codenamed ‘Operation Cast 
Lead’, was severely criticised given the most intense phase of the air-raids took place 
mid-morning which meant many official buildings and schools were full (Percival 2008). 
As part of the Israel’s assaults, it quickly sealed off all crossing points to Gaza preventing 
journalists, humanitarian aid workers and human rights monitories from entry (Philo and 
Berry 2011: 141). The first day, which was referred to as ‘one of the bloodiest days for 
decades in the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ (Percival 2008), saw at least 225 
Gazans killed and more than 700 wounded, with reports indicating that ‘some of the 
missiles struck densely populated areas as children were leaving school. Parents rushed 
into the streets to search for them’ (ibid.). The attacks, led to immediate responses from 
the International community, some, such as the European Union, called for a pressing 
ceasefire and to the ‘reopening of all checkpoints and the immediate resumption of fuel 
and humanitarian aid deliveries’ (European Jewish Press, 28 December 2008 cited in Philo 
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and Berry 2011: 141), others such as the United States and Great Britain refused to call 
for a ceasefire but condemned Hamas and urged Israel to avoid civilian casualties (The 
Times 28 December 2008 cited in Philo and Berry 2011: 141). The following three weeks 
saw Israel attacking large areas of Gaza, mainly targeting, 
The parliament building, the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Labour, Housing and 
Construction, Finance and Justice, UN food and medicine compounds, civilian 
apartment blocks, a university, television stations, newspaper offices, a prison, 
police stations. mosques, schools, kindergartens, hospitals, ambulances, water 
treatment plants, water wells, sewage works, factories, markets, workshops, food 
processing plants, orchards, a fish farm, agricultural corps, farm animals and 
greenhouses (Amnesty International 2009; United Nations , 2009a cited in Philo 
and Berry 2011: 142).  
One week into the war, John Ging, the head of the UN relief agency in Gaza (UNRWA), 
expressed that the situation is ‘inhuman’ stating that ‘the whole infrastructure of the 
future state of Palestine is being destroyed’ (Guardian, 5 January 2009 cited in Philo and 
Berry 2011: 142). 
Hamas, on the other hand, continued to launch rockets from Gaza into the Southern 
parts of Israel. Using Chinese-manufactured WS-1E rockets, which have a range of more 
than 40 km, Palestinian rockets were able, for the first time, to reach cities such as 
Ashdod, Beersheba and Gedera (Globalsecurity, 2009 cited in Philo and Berry 2011: 142).   
During the 22-day Israeli offensive on Gaza, three Israeli civilians were killed and four 
others were seriously wounded; ten Israeli soldiers were also killed, four of whom were 
reported to have died in ‘friendly fire’ incidents, and at least 100 were wounded (Philo 
and Berry 2011: 142). Far more Palestinians including women and children were killed but 
the exact figures have been disputed. The number of Palestinians killed ranged from 
1,166 according to the Israeli army (89 minors) (Jerusalem Post, 26 March 2009 in ibid.), 
1,385 according to B’Tselem (313 minors) (2009b in Philo and Berry 2011: 142), and 1, 
314 according to the Ministry of Health in Gaza (412 minors) (Bell, 2009). 
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Israel has consistently argued that it undertook its military operation to emphasise the 
primacy of its security, demanding the end of rocket attacks on the Southern part of the 
country and efficient measures to be undertaken against arms smuggling from Egypt into 
Gaza. In addition, Israel also hoped to unconditionally release Sgt. Shalit from Hamas 
prisons, captured in 2006. However, historian Avi Shlaim has suggested that Israel’s 
‘decision to go to war, and its timing was driven by a different set of strategic 
calculations’ (Philo and Berry 2011: 144):    
The declared aim of the war is to weaken Hamas and to intensify the pressure 
until its leaders agree to a new ceasefire on Israel's terms. The undeclared aim is 
to ensure that the Palestinians in Gaza are seen by the world simply as a 
humanitarian problem and thus to derail their struggle for independence and 
statehood. (Shlaim, 2009). 
Meanwhile, Hamas continued to call for the opening of all crossing into and out of Gaza 
with Egypt and Israel and of course the end of 40 years of occupation. Israel had 
maintained the blockade on Gaza after the ceasefire agreement came into effect, 
preventing exports and drastically limiting the number of imported goods into the Strip. 
In the words of Shlaim, ‘It is difficult to see how starving and freezing the civilians of Gaza 
could protect the people on the Israeli side of the border. But even if it did, it would still 
be immoral, a form of collective punishment that is strictly forbidden by international 
humanitarian law’ (2009). 
Human rights groups accused both parties of violating International Humanitarian Law. 
Amnesty International criticised the way the war was conducted by Israel and Palestinian 
groups. It accused Palestinians of launching rocket attacks at Israeli civilians in the line of 
fire and widening the circle of fear amongst Israelis. In terms of its conduct in 
endangering Palestinian civilians, the organisation accused Palestinian groups of rocket 
launching, fighting and storing weapons in residential areas. Hamas and other Palestinian 
groups were also held responsible for the safety of Gaza’s population (Amnesty 
International 2009). It was highlighted by a number of human rights organisations, 
including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, that the majority of violations 
of international law throughout the conflict were conducted by Israel. Practices which 
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qualified as war crimes included targeted air-strikes against building and people and 
targeting ‘anything that moves’; the indiscriminate use of heavy artillery in densely 
populated urban area; indiscriminate attacks using mortar shells, white phosphorus and 
flechettes; attacking and obstructing medical workers; the targeting of persons trying to 
convey civilian status using white flags; and denying humanitarian access and ruining a 
fragile economy. It was also documented that members of the Israeli army used 
Palestinians, including Palestinian children, as ‘human shields’ (Amnesty International 
2009). 
 
Gaza today – 2009 onwards  
Most of what we’re seeing in the news today raises large, looming questions about the 
future of Palestine and Israel. After more than four years of tight restrictions (since 2007), 
even after Israel eased its sanctions on non-military goods in 2011, the blockade on Gaza, 
often referred to as ‘collective punishment’ (BBC News, 2010; Amnesty International 
2010), continues to take a heavy toll on Gaza's civilian population, with many vital and 
basic goods prevented from being exported or imported. Rampant levels of poverty and 
an intolerable unemployment rate in Gaza has led more than 70 percent of the 
population to depend on human aid (Amnesty International 2010). According to the UN, 
more than 30 percent of Gaza's ‘arable land and about 85 per cent of its fishing waters 
are totally or partially inaccessible due to the Israeli blockade’ (Al-Jazeera, 2011). As a 
result underground tunnels have been, and still are, Gaza's main lifeline to Egypt and the 
rest of the world (Al-Jazeera 2011).  
The aftermath of a devastating Israeli raid on the Gaza flotilla in May 2010, in which nine 
Turkish activists were killed by Israeli commandos on the Mavi Marmara, Israel was forced 
to ease some of its restrictions (Poort 2011). The truth is, however, fairly little has 
changed. Although Israel currently issues about 3,000 permits per month to people who 
want to leave Gaza, this translates into a ‘little over half of one per cent of the number of 
people who crossed the border at Erez in September 2000’ (ibid.). Gaza has not only been 
under siege by land, Israel has also maintained its naval cordon, demonstrated by the 
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manner in which attempts by flotillas to break the siege have been continuously halted in 
international waters. 
In October 2011, Israel and Hamas have agreed a deal for the release of Sgt Gilad Shalit in 
exchange of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners (BBC News 2011). The prisoner exchange 
has instigated some hope that the blockade on Gaza could finally be lifted, given Israeli 
politicians’ increased mentions of Shalit’s case as a reason for maintaining the blockade. 
Such spark of hope was quickly silenced by a recent flare-up of violence, in which ‘11 
Palestinians and one Israeli were killed in a fresh spate of tit-for-tat rocket attacks and 
Israeli air strikes’ (Poort 2011). 
The second part of this chapter will now address the manner in which the media 
coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been analysed by previous scholarly work, 
as well as the controversies surrounding those analyses. A special attention will be 
directed towards BBC, ITV and Al-Jazeera. 
 
Part II: Media coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
Just like the historical background of the Arab-Israeli conflict, its media coverage has 
been a matter of extreme controversy and sensitivity, most noticeably with regards to 
international broadcasters and media academics. In fact, an array of scholarly literature 
exists which attempts to examine media bias for or against one side of the conflict or the 
other. It should be noted that most previous research into the representation of the 
Palestinians and Israelis in the media, the contextual framework of the conflict, the use of 
sources and the labelling of acts and actors, focused primarily on Israeli, Palestinian and 
American media (such as Alimi, 2007; Dor, 2004; Dunsky, 2001; Enderlin 2003; Everton 
2005; First, 1998, 2004; Korn, 2004; Lowstedt and Madhoun, 2003; Mandelzis, 2003; Nir 
and Roeh, 1992; Qaymari 2003; Rinnawi, 2007; Wolfsfeld et al. 2008; Zelizer et al., 2002, 
among others). In recent years, however, scholarly research conducted in European 
countries, such as Britain, examining the media coverage of the conflict has received 
considerable attention (e.g. Barkho 2010, 2011; Barkho and Richardson 2010; Gaber, 
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Seymour and Thomas 2009; Loughborough University Communications Research Centre, 
2006; Philo and Berry, 2004, 2006, 2011; Richardson, 2004; Richardson and Barkho 2009). 
The remaining paragraphs of this chapter attempts to review the latter literature with a 
particular focus directed at BBC, ITV and Al-Jazeera.    
Empirical research into the media content of the conflict demonstrates varied 
discrepancies in manner in which the Palestinians and the Israelis are depicted in the 
news. Generally speaking, nearly all studies reveal an imbalance in reporting favouring 
the Israeli perspective. Most prominent in this regard are Philo and Berry’s extensive 
studies (2004, 2011) of TV news coverage of the Al-Aqsa Palestinian Intifada and later the 
2008-09 Gaza offensive. Between September 2000 and April 2002, the Glasgow Media 
Group collected and analysed nearly two-hundred news bulletins from BBC and ITV news 
and interviewed almost eight-hundred individuals in Britain, Germany and the United 
States to examine their levels of knowledge and understanding of the conflict. One of the 
most significant findings that emerged from the study, suggest that in the period of the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada, ‘the coverage as a whole was permeated with images, descriptions and 
references to conflict and violence incusing riots, mobs, stone-throwing, stabbing, 
shooting, kidnapping, protests and military attacks’ (Philo and Berry 2004: 102). The 
findings further indicate that many of the focus group participants were confused about 
the history, origins and underlying political dimensions of the conflict (Philo and Berry 
2006: 199). In this regard, the authors strongly propose that ‘the gaps in public 
knowledge’ are directly related ‘to a lack of context and explanation of key issues in news 
bulletins’ (Philo and Berry 2006: 199). The conflict’s history constituted only 17 lines of 
the 3,500 lines of transcribed news texts (ibid: 200). As a result, only a few of the focus 
group participants were able to name any of the region’s previous wars and less than fifth 
were aware that Palestinian refugees were displaced during the establishment of the 
state of Israel in 1948 (ibid.). In the words of Philo and Berry,   
Without the discussion of wider origins and causes, we are left with accounts on 
the news of day-today events, in which it can appear that the ‘normal’ world is 
disrupted only when the Palestinians riot or bomb. This is of course the view of 
the Israeli Government and the news has tended to oscillate between this and the 
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view that violence was perpetrated by both sides in a ‘cycle’ of ‘tit for tat’ killings 
(2004: 143).          
Another crucial finding to emerge from the study indicates that Israeli voices were heard 
twice as many times as Palestinians. The Israeli perspectives on the conflict were featured 
more prominently than those of the Palestinians (Philo and Berry 2006: 202). The Israeli 
military perspective, for example, that Israel is fighting a ‘War on Terror’ was heavily 
featured, while the Palestinian viewpoint that they are ‘resisting an illegal military 
occupation’ was almost continuously excluded from the coverage (ibid.). They also found 
very few references to the military nature of the occupation, its social consequences on 
the Palestinians, the exploitation of Palestinian land and water resources, the strategic 
role of Israeli settlements, or explanations about how the Palestinians became refugees 
(ibid: 202-3). Also, the large number of United Nations resolutions condemning the 
occupation was rarely touched upon (ibid: 202). Finally, the authors depicted large 
disparities in the language used to label acts and actors from both sides. Phrases such as 
‘mass murder’, ‘atrocity’, ‘brutal murder’, ‘lynching’, and ‘savage cold blooded killing’ 
were only used to describe Israeli casualties perpetrated by Palestinian ‘terrorists’. 
Israelis, trying to bomb a Palestinian school, were referred to as ‘extremists’ or 
‘vigilantes’ (ibid: 204). Overall, Israelis were continuously presented as ‘retaliating’ or 
‘responding’ to trouble and violence ‘initiated’ by Palestinians (ibid: 203-04).           
Building on this research, the second edition of the seminal Bad News from Israel, titled 
More Bad News from Israel, includes studies on television news coverage of the Israeli 
attack on Gaza in December 2008 and on the Gaza flotilla in 2010. Like the previous 
study, the authors focused on news featuring the origins of the conflict, the motivations 
and rationales of both sides and the representation of casualties. It extends to study 
reception processes, mainly examining the extent to which media texts are accepted 
and/or rejected as well as the manner in which news texts were interpreted by audiences 
(Philo and Berry 2011: 336).  
In terms of motivations and rationale, Philo and Berry (2011) argue that, the Israeli 
narrative dominated the news during the Gaza conflict. The Israeli position, that they 
were forced to respond to unwarranted rocket attacks by Hamas, often excluded Hamas’s 
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reasons for the conflict, which are mostly to resist an illegitimate military occupation by 
Israel since 1967. Instead, the Israeli narrative that began in 2005, when Israel withdrew 
its Jewish settlements from Gaza, depicted Palestinians as unwilling to reconcile and build 
a new state, but are rather more interested in killing Jews (ibid: 336-7). Themes such 
‘ending the rockets’, the ‘need for security’, an end to ‘the smuggling of weapons’, the 
need to ‘hit Hamas’ dominated the news content. Explanatory statements issued by 
Palestinians/Hamas constituted a much lower total (ibid: 341). Philo and Berry add that 
such practice in reporting, risks legitimising Israeli actions. Essentially, ‘these explanations 
then act as organising principles for the structuring of coverage –they become 
explanatory themes’ (Philo and Berry 2011: 341). Like the previous edition, Israeli actions 
are still represented as ‘responses’ to violence perpetrated by the Palestinians (ibid: 342). 
One of the most significant findings of the study suggested that the Israeli perspective 
assumed in BBC and ITV’s headlines and commentaries, depicted the Israeli attack as 
being directed only at Hamas and not the Palestinian civilian population (ibid: 343). 
Overall, the authors found a ‘perpetuated one-sided view of the cause of the conflict’, 
underlining the issue of the rockets without reporting Hamas’s offer to halt rocket fire in 
exchange for lifting the blockade (which Israel has rejected) and by omitting the 
alternative Palestinian rationale on the main purpose of the attack (ibid: 344). In effect, 
the Israeli account was simply stated as fact, repeated by journalists with force and 
clarity, unlike the Palestinian viewpoint which was not endorsed in the same way (ibid: 
345). The view that ‘the Palestinians are a people in a war of national liberation, trying to 
throw off an occupying force’ was largely absent from the coverage (ibid: 346). Although 
Palestinian accounts on the breaking of the ceasefire and the blockade received 
confused, scattered and oblique references, Hamas and other Palestinian groups were 
almost continuously documented as the responsible provocative force behind the conflict 
(ibid: 355).  
In terms of casualties, the study suggested that there was a disproportionate 
representation of Israeli casualties, totalling one-fifth of the airtime given to those of the 
Palestinian. But since the number of Palestinians killed was around 100 times that of the 
Israelis, the amount of coverage dedicated to the Israeli side is not proportional to the 
harm inflicted (ibid: 363). Furthermore, while journalists were ‘very critical and quite 
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outspoken in relation to […] Israel’s actions in the attack on Gaza, such criticisms, when 
they appeared, were normally accompanied by defences of Israel and/or the Israeli 
account of the causes of the conflict’ (Philo and Berry 2011: 366). Given that Israel is 
almost constantly shown as ‘responding’ to ‘Palestinian armed groups’, an argument 
develops into whether such response is ‘disproportionate’ or ‘excessive’ (ibid: 367). By 
that the British media implies a balance between the reasons for Israel’s attack on the 
one hand, and its terrible consequences for the Palestinian civilian population on the 
other (ibid: 367-8) –the latter being explained and justified as a result of a conflict which 
the Palestinians have started.  
The publication of this research attracted a corpus of scholarly attention. Wolfsfeld 
(2006) in his review of Bad News from Israel, for example, described the study as ‘highly 
suspect’ (p. 476). He argues that for a research project to be ‘convincing’ in this area ‘it 
would have to employ extremely meticulous methods in order to overcome any 
suspicions that the authors simply found what they were looking for’ (ibid.). The content 
analysis employed in the study, he affirms, consists, for the most part, of ‘choosing 
examples from the coverage that illustrates the authors’ points’ (ibid.). Quoting Evens-
Prichard’s (2003) poll, Wolfsfeld explained that 60 percent of the British public cited Israel 
as the greatest threat to world peace. Given this state of opinion, he argues, we are only 
able to accept the results of this study if, 
(a) The British news media are biased in favour of Israel but totally out of touch 
with the general mood in Britain, and (b) the pro-Israeli media in Britain have little 
or no influence on British opinion concerning such topics (2006: 476). 
Conversely, John Pilger and Tim Llewellyn, alike, suggested the book demonstrated the 
need for journalists to overcome economic and political power. They spoke about the 
power journalists should acquire in standing up against, what is termed as ‘spin doctors 
and media bullies’ (Philo and Berry 2006: 207). The journalist and academic Roy 
Greenslade, also, suggested that the research highlighted ‘serious questions’ about the 
responsibility broadcasters hold in informing the public (ibid.).    
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The BBC, however, has been subject to intense scrutiny in its coverage of the conflict, 
with mounting studies accusing the Corporation of being more favourable to Israel. In 
2005, the BBC Board of Governors visibly engaged with such critical assessment, assigned 
an independent panel to evaluate these claims. The panel commissioned scholars from 
Loughborough University to undertake an extensive content analysis of the BBC’s 
coverage of the conflict over a six-month period (Loughborough University 
Communications Research Centre, 2006). Although the report refrains from making any 
normative claims about the degree of impartiality of the coverage, it provides similar 
findings to that of Philo and Berry (2004). The report concluded that the majority of news 
reports lacked sufficient historical context, rarely touched upon the ongoing annexation 
of land in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and was imbalanced in its reporting of 
fatalities –with Israeli deaths attracting more coverage than Palestinian ones. Finally, 
there were also ‘significant differences across BBC news programmes and services in the 
allocation of talk time and appearances of actors’ but the overall coverage tended to 
favour the Israelis (Loughborough University, 2006: 87). It is worth noting, however, that 
these imbalances were more attenuated in non-BBC coverage. They conclude that 
although the coverage was inadequate, it was not as bad as SKY TV and ITN for example 
(ibid.).  
Richardson and Barkho (2009) propose that decades of covering the same conflict has 
had an impact on BBC’s reporting. What they term ‘the Middle East culture’ obligates 
journalists and editors to follow a strict guideline of facts and terminology recommended 
by the BBC Governor’s independent panel report on the impartiality of BBC’s coverage of 
the conflict (BBC, 2006 cited in Barkho 2008: 281). Such journalists’ guide, publicised in 
October 2006, consists of only 24 words and expressions of a long list of phrases only 
made known to the organisation (ibid.). This Middle East culture, also, includes the BBC’s 
College of Journalism’s online-module –Israel and the Palestinians – specially designed for 
journalists who intend to cover the region. Only those who manage to pass the module, 
complying with BBC’s rules and principles, are able to report the region. Finally, 
Richardson and Barkho state, that ‘This culture has deep roots in the organisation to the 
extent that at least four senior editors – called ‘the four wise men’ in the corridors of the 
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Bush House in London – have to agree before a new ‘softer’ or ‘harsher’ lexical item can 
be used’ (Richardson and Barkho 2009: 619).      
The choice of vocabulary risks generating an imbalance in the social relations of power, 
and has the potential of characterising people in different ways (Barkho and Richardson 
2010). The management of vocabulary, it is assumed, is capable of ‘lexicalizing’ and even 
‘standardizing’ the social world (ibid.). BBC editors, such as Jeremy Bowen (Middle 
Eastern editor), maintain that the Middle East is ‘the most complex and newsworthy 
place in the world’ (Independent, 11 Dec 2006 cited in Barkho 2008: 282). Yet, when 
these discursive strategies are put into practice in avoiding the use of ‘”emotional” or 
“judgmental” words such as “TERRORISTS” (unless attributed), the guidelines are shown 
to be inconsistent as they allow the use of lexical items which are no less excessive; 
operating, for the most part, in Israel’s favour (Barkho and Richardson 2010). The 
authors, making clear that editors position themselves in trying to avoid the use of 
terminology favoured by one side of the dispute, give the example of, ‘militants’, 
‘extremists’, ‘Islamists’ and ‘fundamentalists’: harsh phrases used to describe 
Palestinians; as opposed to phrases as ‘settlements, settlers, Jerusalem and territories’: 
both praised by Israelis and rejected by Palestinians (Barkho and Richardson 2010). The 
Palestinians, it is argued are discursively and socially disadvantaged in BBC’s reporting. 
The authors, examining the ‘visual and verbal rhetoric of BBC journalism’ vis-à-vis the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, conclude that such measures are the basis of BBC’s ‘inequality’ 
in reporting the conflict. This is especially true, they claim, given the glossary, the on-line 
module, and ‘the four wise men’ are only in place when the Middle East conflict is up 
next (ibid.).        
Barkho (2010) explains that, according to BBC journalists, the abbreviated version of facts 
and terminology has only complicated editorial tensions with regards to the coverage (p. 
140). On the level of language, Barkho concludes, that the BBC culture insists on a 
structural difference evidenced in the varying relations of ‘power, geography, ideology, 
media control, and technology’ between the protagonists (2010: 141). Analysing the 
BBC’s choice of vocabulary on the lexical and syntactic levels, across the BBC’s Arabic and 
English Services, Barkho demonstrates that there is an unequal division of power, control 
and status separating the protagonists (p. 140). On the lexical level, only one side (the 
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Palestinian) is subjected to re-lexicalisation and over-lexicalisation. From a syntactic point 
of view, the corporation’s Arabic Service demonstrates patterns ‘which trivialize both the 
Palestinian and Israeli casualties while the English service opts for patterns that 
undermine Palestinian casualties’ (ibid.). 
Barkho (2011), in a later publication, assesses the discursive and social paradigms 
adopted by Al-Jazeera English (AJE) in its coverage of the 2008-09 Gaza Conflict, and 
places comparative references to that of the BBC. Proclaiming that both AJE and BBC 
broadcast in English, Barkho, nonetheless, suggests that they provide two versions of the 
truth (2011: 25). Linguistically, both channels pursue completely varying strategies in 
reporting the conflict. The choice of discourse often led to the emergence of two 
conflicting narratives of the truth. Barkho gives the example of AJE’s ‘Gaza fighters’, as 
opposed BBC’s ‘Gaza militants’: ‘Palestinian rockets’/ ‘militant rockets’ and so on (ibid: 
32). Re-lexicalising and over-lexicalising Palestinian actors, with regards to the BBC, were 
almost continuously accompanied with negative connotations and labels to remind the 
audience of their ‘militancy’ (Barkho 2010: 132). Such varying narratives of reality, argues 
Barkho, are the product of internal guidelines and ideologically intensive training, and not 
the work of journalists on the ground –‘imposing a specific cultural depiction of one voice 
and a different one for the other’ (ibid: 31). By doing so, journalists are made to adopt 
and resemble an ‘organisational ideology’ (ibid: 34) –while BBC represents an ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ way of reporting, AJE ‘places some Arabic and Islamic indexicals within a context 
that are akin to Arabs and Islamic culture and “alien” to what is the norm in the West’ 
(ibid: 33). 
While various authors continue to criticise the BBC’s reporting of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, Kalb and Saivetz (2007), examining the global media coverage of the 2006 
Israeli–Hezbollah war, found that Israel was ‘victimized by its own openness’, while 
Hezbollah, as ‘a closed sect’, was capable of retaining ‘almost total control of the daily 
message of journalism and propaganda’ (2007: 43 cited in Gaber, Seymour and Thomas 
2009: 240). Similarly, Gaber, et al. (2009), in their study of BBC and ITV’s coverage of the 
2006 Lebanon War, concluded that ‘both BBC and ITV News acquitted themselves well in 
their reporting of the 2006 Israeli–Hezbollah war’ (p. 257).  
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In terms of voices, Gaber et al. found a pro-Israeli bias on the part of both BBC and ITV 
(2009: 245). Even when various ‘allies’ of the two protagonists are added to the analysis, 
i.e. US and UK government voices on the Israeli side, and other Arab and Iranian voices, 
and the UN on the Lebanese side, the overall balance of both broadcasters still favoured 
an Israeli perspective (ibid.). With regards to news frames, the authors argue that the 
reporting demonstrates a pro-Israeli bias (ibid: 246). Although the analysis reveals that 
the direct impact of war on Lebanon and its population was the most prominent theme 
on both BBC and ITV, the authors indicate that considering the disparity in casualties –‘a 
rough ratio of 10 Lebanese casualties to every Israeli casualty’ –there was in fact an 
imbalance in reporting, favouring the Israeli side (ibid.). Like all previous studies, Gaber et 
al. found that the contextual framework and historical background of the conflict was 
almost absent from the coverage–less so with the BBC, however (ibid: 249). Of which, 
only half of the amount of contextual material provided was devoted to the background 
of the immediate conflict and the nature of its combatants (ibid.). According to Gaber and 
colleagues, such claimed lack of context, which is often a key criticism directed at 
broadcasters from both sides in the conflict, relates to the very nature of television news, 
which is a highly competitive environment, that strives to provide the ‘most up-to-date ‘it 
happened today’ coverage’ (ibid: 256). Such claims are especially valid when it comes to 
international news, which is believed to be of less interest to domestic audiences. Lack of 
contextual material, they claim, is a common finding usually attributed to the coverage of 
any world event, be it the war in Bosnia, or Afghanistan or wherever (ibid.).             
Although the coverage focused on the humanitarian aspect of the conflict, emphasising 
for the most part the terrible consequence both civilian populations were enduring, ‘the 
key message that came across was that Lebanese civilians were paying the heaviest price 
of war’ (ibid: 252). Images presented on television (especially so with ITV), tended to 
personalise the conflict, focusing on hospital scenes depicting injured children. While 
images of Lebanese civilians were portrayed as ‘desperate, distraught […] isolated’, 
‘bewildered or hopeless’ those of the Israelis were usually ‘defiant, strong or resistant’ –
‘getting on with life whilst living in bunkers’ (ibid.). Whereas Philo and Berry’s (2011) 
study on the 2008-09 Gaza conflict found that BBC and ITV’s coverage supported the 
Israeli claim that the conflict was a war on Hamas and not the civilian population, Gaber 
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et al.’s study showed that both broadcasters supported the Lebanese claim that it was a 
‘war on civilians’ (Gaber et al. 2009: 252). Despite such circumstances, the authors 
conclude that ‘given the complexities of the issue, the pressures of time and space and 
the sheer difficulties of reporting from hostile environments’, both BBC and ITV managed 
to put across a reasonable account of the 2006 Israeli–Hezbollah war (ibid: 257). 
In recent years, studies have also focused on the BBC’s decision to deny a request to air a 
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) charitable appeal for Gaza in January 2009, as a 
result of the large-scale civilian casualties and infrastructural damage caused by Israel’s 
‘Operation Cast Lead’. The BBC argued that airing the appeal would threaten its 
impartiality. Engelbert and McCurdy (2011) argue that such claim is considered ‘flawed’ 
given the ‘apolitical’ nature of the appeal and criticised the corporation for ‘privileging 
the BBC’s reputation’ above Gaza’s ‘humanitarian suffering’. In doing so, the BBC was also 
accused of being inconsistent having previously aired DEC appeals which raises concerns 
to why the Palestinians are treated differently. Finally, it was critiqued for being pro-
Israeli or at least anti-Palestinian (ibid.). 
Engelbert and McCurdy (2011) add that in response to such claims, the BBC commenced 
a media offensive featuring BBC’s Chief Operating Officer, Caroline Thomson, and BBC’s 
Director General, Mark Thompson, whom appeared on a series of BBC programmes 
across radio and television platforms to provide justifications and reasons to its refusal of 
airing the appeal. The authors, in their exploration of this media offensive, attempted to 
reconstruct what the definition of impartiality is inferred to by the BBC’s rationale behind 
not airing the appeal. The authors strongly suggest that the BBC executives, in defending 
their decision, ‘capitalise on the semantic plasticity of impartiality’ (2011: 3; emphasis in 
original). In that, they argue, Mark Thompson and Caroline Thomson exploit ‘the dynamic 
and fluid nature and history of the concept [of impartiality] and strategically use it to 
legitimate a controversial institutional decision’ (ibid.). The authors infer that the BBC 
executives identified four key interrelated themes that helped them justify their decision, 
refute such accusations and legitimate their claims (ibid: 16). These themes include the 
audience, presented as highly active but needing protection against understandable 
confusion (ibid: 5-8); the very act of airing the report causing major concessions for the 
BBC and being held accountable of it (ibid: 8-11); the BBC in its relation to others, 
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presented as a reasonable partner but still fundamentally independent (ibid: 11-14); and 
the nature of the crisis in Gaza being a ‘part of a two-sided, controversial and ‘ongoing’ 
conflict’ (ibid: 14-16). The authors conclude that the BBC executives lack a coherent and 
consistent frame in their definitions of impartiality (ibid: 16). 
This leaves us with key questions regarding the impartiality of the BBC, or any other 
major journalistic institution for that matter: does the term ‘impartiality’ endows a 
rhetorical flexibility, subject to change in relation to public controversy, which acts as the 
product of an institutional discourse organised around a certain news story; or is 
impartiality a given value defined and identified under a certain organisation’s guidelines 
and discursive practices?    
This chapter has presented two unified yet distinct parts that focuses on the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. First, it briefly introduced the historical background and origins of the 
conflict, by providing a contextual framework of the events that led to the 1948 War, the 
1967 Six-Day War, the first and the second Intifadas, the 2005 Gaza disengagement plan, 
and finally the lead-up and progression of the 2008-09 Gaza offensive. It also identified 
key factors that characterise such occurrences including Hamas, Israeli settlements, 
suicide-bombings, Palestinian refugees, and the Siege on Gaza. The second part, reviewed 
some prominent empirical studies that focused on the media coverage of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict attempting to demonstrate media bias for one side or the other. The next chapter 
introduces the preferred methodological framework, justifying and explaining the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches employed in this study, after 
outlining the specific research questions.                
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology –Putting research questions and coding practice in 
frame 
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research methodology employed in this study and the 
methodological support for this choice. Employing a two-dimensional study of content 
and media reception of news messages about the coverage of the Gaza conflict, the 
chapter first outlines the methodological framework of this project detailing the main 
research questions, the scope and duration of the sample, the ‘unit of analysis’ used as 
the basis of the research and the qualifying criteria to which the analysed texts were 
selected. Second, it explores the relevant literature instructive for devising a systematic 
content analysis. The methodological framework then integrates analytical tools 
associated with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and semiotics in visual analysis, where 
the production of meaning is considered in conjunction with the manifest and the latent 
components of the news. Finally, along with such ‘content representation’ approach in 
studying the media (Seale, 2003); the chapter incorporates reception studies which 
focuses on audiences and the manner in which they perceive and understand media 
messages.   
This study aims to examine the extent to which ‘conceptual labels placed on discrete 
happenings, events, and other instances of phenomena’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 61) are 
the outcome of strategic practices or rituals of a given news organisation. Furthermore 
the study explores whether such labels or frames of thought differ from one broadcaster 
to another; and if so, in what ways, why and how it matters. First, I outline the specific 
research questions for the project, present details of the sample and explain the chosen 
timeframe for the study period. Second, I present the strengths and weaknesses of the 
selected research methods and explain how they serve to establish a structured research 
design in analysing television. By exploring the theoretical assumptions underlying the 
selected methodology, the research objectives are located within the foci and scope of 
the current study. The three primary methods of this study are introduced and discussed 
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in a consistent format, providing: a descriptive account of the method; an evaluation to 
why it produces valuable results; and how it was applied in this particular study.        
Research Questions  
 
Media coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an endless struggle with complicated 
historical twists, increasingly changing realities, and a global significance, is often used as 
a symbol for the crisis of journalistic values. For this reason the study collates quantitative 
results on frequency, prominence and intensity of news messages with complementary 
qualitative examination of the data. It explores the degree to which certain patterns of 
representation extend across varying media outlets in hope of understanding the 
dominant meanings derived from textual and visual features. Such dominant messages 
are subsequently interpreted and situated within the context in which they occur. The 
following presents a summary of the main research questions for the analysis: 
1. How much coverage is dedicated to the Gaza War during the course of the conflict 
across the examined channels?  
2. What are the most prominent themes, actors and lexicons used in the media 
coverage of the Gaza conflict? 
3. To what extent does the coverage differ from one broadcaster to another? Is it an 
organisational struggle between Al-Jazeera and the BBC? Or is it a cultural one 
across Arab and Western media networks? And if so, can we make that 
distinction?  
More specific questions concern particular elements of the textual features of the news 
which are made more explicit when examining texts in their original context. This study is 
also concerned with the media construction of reality –when realities are portrayed as a 
‘given’, presenting information simply as ‘the way things are’ (Cameron 2001: 123). One 
of the most transparent ways to critically examine texts is through the analysis of 
language and through word choice, which help to propose ‘an interpretation of the 
pattern, an account of its meaning and ideological significance’ (Cameron 2001: 137). In a 
study on the ‘construction of Palestinian political violence in US news,’ Ismail argues that 
media messages, and its use of certain labels to describe certain parties, are responsible 
for audiences’ perceptions. With regard to the Palestine/Israel conflict, he explains, the 
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media engage in a ‘semantic war over labelling acts and actors as part of a larger 
ideological battle to institute certain value judgments on political violence’ (Ismail 2008: 
256). In this manner the study begs for a more critical eye, aiming to examine the 
following research questions: 
4. To what extent does an organisation’s discursive practices and strategies have an 
effect on the way news is reported   
5. How are media messages determined by the linguistic context of the news? To 
what extent do the media messages that are embedded conform to dominant 
frames and culturally established meanings in their linguistic and semantic 
encoding of news texts?    
6. Finally, how are visual portrayals of the Gaza War representative of the events on 
the ground?  
The questions posed here act as secondary matters for further interrogation to the 
dominant themes of the collated data, once the major themes in the coverage have been 
identified. In general terms, such questions are designed to guide the focus of the 
analysis instead of establishing distinct hypotheses to be examined. Along with examining 
the discrepancies in the selected news channels, the thesis also intends to take a 
qualitative stance and draw on audience study, aiming to examine the public’s knowledge 
and understandings of the events on the ground, their different modi- operandi in 
viewing BBC and/or Al-Jazeera in addition to their evaluation of both channels’ levels of 
objectivity and impartiality pertaining to the onslaught. It hopes to do so by employing a 
pattern of word associations, a model journalistic practice, and watching samples of news 
reports with pre-and-post discussions. On a more specific level, the thesis aims to 
establish:                   
7. The extent to which audiences’ cultural proximities play a role in the manner in 
which they perceive and understand media texts?    
The research questions posed here necessitate a mixed-method approach in selecting, 
developing and implementing the methods of data collection and analysis. Such 
approach, combing both quantitative and qualitative methods, proves to be substantive 
given it provides strengths that counterbalance the weaknesses of one another, and 
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helps answer questions that cannot be answered by implementing a single method per se 
(Creswell and Plano Clark 2007: 9). As Titscher et al. (2000) have noted ‘the routes to be 
followed in empirical research will be decided initially by the general research questions –
and these are to a certain extent, determined by the theoretical approach one has 
decided to follow’ (p. 6). The methods employed to satisfy the above research questions 
will be introduced and discussed, after I present a methodological framework of the 
duration and scope of the sample, the unit of analysis and the qualifying criteria.   
 
Methodological framework and Sample  
This research project employs a cross-cultural approach in analysing the media coverage 
of the Gaza conflict of 2008-09 across Al-Jazeera and BBC. Through quantifying certain 
texts in the news media and by discursively, semantically and visually analysing media 
messages, as well as qualitatively examining varying audiences’ perceptions and 
reception of the war, the thesis adopts a multi-method approach combing quantitative 
and qualitative research methods. One reason for this is, is to overcome the complexity 
research questions calls for in answering questions ‘beyond simple numbers in a 
quantitative sense or words in a qualitative sense’ (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007: 13). 
Therefore, a combination of both forms of data can provide a well-rounded approach to 
the analysis. It is also believed that quantitative and qualitative researchers alike 
recognise the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches and the manner in which 
they function towards one another in facilitating increased sophistication in research 
(ibid.) –thereby providing a synergy, merging both ends of the methodological spectrum. 
Mixed methods approach is essentially useful in this research as it addresses the 
intricacies present in implementing either method, it provides a discourse analytic 
methodology and gathers multiple forms of data to simultaneously examine media 
content and reception.          
Another valuable insight into this research is its comparative contribution. Comparative 
analysis highlights variation and similarity thereby making it possible to distinguish 
imperative findings that otherwise would not have been conceptualised. Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) argue that most of the literature on the media is ethnocentric focusing on 
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one country, but conceived in general terms ‘as though the models prevailed in that 
country were universal’ (p. 2). It follows, that in countries with less developed traditions 
of media research, scholars often borrow Anglo-American and French literature, and 
treat it as if it simply applies anywhere (ibid.). Therefore, as Bendix puts it, comparative 
analysis ‘provides an important check on the generalisation implicit’ and forces one to 
clarify the limits of their research (1969: 535 cited in Hallin and Mancini 2004: 3).       
The Sample –Sample size and identification 
1. Content -BBC and Al-Jazeera 
Television news media were chosen as the object of this research. The news networks 
monitored are the Arabic and English language services of two worldwide renowned 
media outlets –namely BBC and Al-Jazeera. What follows is a brief description of the 
services: 
 BBC World: it is the BBC’s international and foreign affairs television channel. It 
has the largest audience of any BBC channel. Launched in 1991 as BBC World 
Service Television, by its parent corporation BBC, it broadcasts for 24 hours with 
programmes ranging from news bulletins, documentaries, lifestyle programmes 
and interviews. It employs more than 250 correspondents and reporters 
worldwide in its many international bureaus. It is one of the world's most watched 
news channels. 
 BBC Arabic: it is the new British government-funded network that the BBC World 
Service launched in March 2008. It is the first BBC TV channel in a foreign 
language that is publicly funded. This is the BBC’s second attempt in the Middle 
East television market, after it failed in 1996 in disagreements with the Saudi 
Arabian royal family.  
 Al-Jazeera: founded in 1996 by the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer al-
Thani, it quickly became Arabs most watched news channel. Initially launched as 
an Arabic news and current affairs satellite channel, it expanded into a network 
with several outlets, broadcasting in many parts of the world. 
 Al-Jazeera English (AJE): launched in 2006, it is the sister-channel of the Arabic-
language Al-Jazeera. AJE is the world’s first English-language news channel 
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headquartered in the Middle East. With broadcasting centres in Doha, Kuala 
Lumpur, London and Washington DC and supporting bureaux worldwide, the 
station broadcasts news, current affairs, features, analysis, documentaries, live 
debates, entertainment, business and sport.    
These networks enjoy similar traits which are crucial for the purpose of the analysis in 
this comparative study. Both services are all-news channels with parent-corporations that 
have established a reputation in the news world. Both networks entered regions that 
they were culturally and linguistically unfamiliar with (BBC World broadcasting to a solely 
Arabic-speaking audience, as well as Al-Jazeera English broadcasting to an English-
speaking audience). Using discourse analytic methodology to analyse the coverage of the 
Gaza conflict will allow comparisons on many fronts both within and across the networks. 
Adopting Deacon et al.’s (1999) two ’vectors’ approach in identifying the sample size, one 
needs to identify the length of the elements (television) of the population; and the dates 
of the sample. Given the current research explicitly looks at the media coverage of the 
Gaza Conflict, the latter (the dates of the sample) was fully dependent on the duration of 
the war. However, it is important to note that the chosen timeframe for the study 
requires some explanation. While the War erupted on the 27th of December 2008 and 
ended on the 18th of January 2009, the collated data only includes dates staring from the 
1st of January 2009. The exclusion the first four days of the war is not deliberate. Initially, 
the thesis intended to randomly select two months of coverage throughout the year of 
2009 –in which March and April were chosen given the circumstances of me being in 
Jordan, hence easy access to the Arabic-language television stations. However, during my 
stay in Jordan around Christmas time, the outcry of the Gaza conflict made me keen to 
record and later code the news. Yet for technical reasons I was only able to do so 4 days 
into the war. Thus, the thesis highlights the ground incursion, which commenced on the 
3rd of January, and provides minimal coverage of the air bombardment. In total, the data 
consists of 18 days of war coverage across four news channels. Second, in terms of the 
extensity of the coverage examined, the evening news of all four channels were recorded 
throughout the duration of the conflict. These included: 
1. Al-Jazeera English’s NewsHour – 18.00-17.30 GMT    
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2. Al-Jazeera Arabic’s Hasad al-Youm (English: the harvest of the day) – 20.00-22.00 
GMT 
3. BBC World’s BBC World Evening News – 19.00-20.00 GMT 
4. BBC Arabic al-Sa’aa al-Ikhbaryeh (English: the News Hour) – 18.00-19.00 GMT  
The sample produced almost 50 hours of news coverage, which proved to be extensive 
enough to be representative, yet small enough to be controllable given the limits of time 
and resources with which the research is to be completed. While not a large sample, it 
proved a valid timescale, in essence, Berelson has argued that,  
For most purposes, analysis of a small, carefully chosen sample of the relevant 
content  will produce just as valid results as the analysis of a great deal more  – 
and with the  expenditure of much less time and effort (1971: 174) 
In practice about 800 items (or cases) were generated across the 18-day period of 
television news coverage, developing an adequate dataset across almost 9 months of full-
time coding. In short, the study followed a ‘systematic sampling’ approach recording and 
coding the evening news of four television networks of the last consecutive 18 days of 
the war.      
Unit of Analysis 
One of the most basic decisions in empirical research is selecting the unit of analysis. In 
media research the unit of analysis typically refers to the object identified as a single 
‘item’ or ‘case’ to be examined. Most scholarly research classifies a unit of analysis in 
terms of individuals, organisations, aggregates and social artefacts. This study defines a 
unit of analysis as a ‘news item’. News items usually lasted between 2-6 minutes 
depending on the programme and the intensity of the coverage. Such unit of analysis was 
taken to be a single report including (if any) studio introductions with the anchor. An item 
begins the moment an anchor introduces any discussion related to the topic, mostly this 
then lead into a filed report from a journalist or an interview. The news item ends when 
the programme returns to the reader or presenter after the conclusion of the filed report 
or the interview. Reports were distinctly identified by a separate authorial piece or when 
presenters move on to report on new topics/news stories; these are essentially 
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demarcated when the camera returns to the studio. Such items include packaged reports, 
studio and non-studio interviews, two-way discussion between anchor and 
correspondent, commentary pieces and hard news reporting. In some cases two of the 
above units were merged as one ‘news item’. Therefore, when for example, a number of 
news items reported the same event on the same evening news, if they were discretely 
distinguished as separate because of poses, or ‘returning to the studio’, they were 
regarded as individual ‘units’ of analysis. However, when no such ‘separable’ formats 
were visible news items were coded as one (for example treating two consecutive 
interviews on the same topic as one). 
The code sheet (see Appendix A) developed for this research intended to record ‘verbal’ 
representation only. As shall be shown later, visual representations were not treated 
quantitatively, but their form, content and function within the context of the news was 
examined qualitatively using multi-modal/visual analysis.                
Qualification Criteria 
What follows is a qualifying criterion to systematically identify which units qualify under 
the remit of this study. Broadly speaking a news item is recorded, coded and analysed if it 
reports on the events of the war in Gaza. Unlike generalised research, the specificity of 
the study meant that identifying a ‘Gaza war’ item was straightforward. However, 
establishing an identifying criterion was also very significant. A report was identified, 
coded and analysed if the amount of space of discussion fitted a 20-second time frame of 
reporting the events on the war. Any reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole was 
also recorded. All aspects of the Gaza war were analysed, be it ceasefire agreements, the 
role of the International Community, the events of the war itself, humanitarian conditions 
and aid, condemnations and threats and the role of Arab and Western countries. News 
items were recorded if the Gaza war featured in the leader (headline or sub-headline); in 
the studio introduction; or throughout the whole report. Passing references to the war 
were intentionally excluded in an attempt to give prominence to more specific, 
comprehensive, detailed, or ‘in-depth’ reporting.  
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2. Reception –focus group participants 
Diversity is an important aspect here. For this reason focus groups were held in Jordan 
and in the UK. Such research objectives necessitated the use of in-depth work and take 
into account the social, cognitive and political contexts of public understandings 
(Kitzinger 1999: 13). For the purpose of this study and for what it aims to achieve, it 
appeared more fruitful to employ a random selection of participants within the groups, 
which in turn highlighted potential differences in perceptions caused by factors such as 
class, education and cultural background, than to bring together an artificial group of 
individuals selected on criteria such as age, sex, or ethnicity (See Figure 3.1). As Philo 
points out, ‘[T]his is not the sort of group in which people usually meet or talk about 
television programmes’ (Philo 1990: 22-3). Yet such selection of groups still holds 
constant some key variables such as nationality, class and cultural backgrounds (Philo 
1990: 23). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Theoretical sampling of focus group participants 
Media audiences are often classified in compliance with the social relations they exhibit 
in –the extent to which they consider themselves detached or attached from the 
situation in hand; or, the degree of social group characteristics –that is the level of 
endurance or cohesiveness audiences entail. Figure 3.1 above presents the theoretical 
sampling adopted by this study in selecting the research participants for the focus group 
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data. The horizontal axes of the diagram indicates the level of mediation proximity the 
participants exercise in interpreting media messages relating to the Gaza offensive as 
opposed to class which is demonstrated by the vertical axes in the figure above. It is 
hypothesised that the groups enjoy varying degrees of mediation in the manner in which 
they digest, understand and reproduce media messages. Such ‘groupness’ relates to 
audiences’ ‘shared characteristics, relative homogeneity and stability of composition’ 
which in turn possess some group-like qualities in the audience (McQuail 1997: 28). 
Proximity, in this manner, examined the level of direct experience the participants 
acquired vis-à-vis the events of the war and the extent to which audiences’ 
understandings of the world are mediated –in a way, it explores whether audiences 
should be looked at as individuals or social groups. Class, along with nationality, play a 
defining role in this equation for the purpose of sustaining consistency in the analysis. 
In terms of sample size, 10 focus groups were conducted in total; each comprising around 
6 research participants. Six research groups were conducted in Jordan and the remaining 
4 were conducted in England. The selected groups include: 
- Jordan: 
1- A group of 9 university students from the Gaza Refugee camp in Jordan 
(Jerash) 
2- A group of 6 local citizens at the Gaza Refugee camp in Jordan (Age 35+) 
(Jerash) 
3- A group of 5 cleaning staff working at Ruwaad Foundation (Jabal Al-Nathief) 
4- A group of 7 lower-class university students (Jabal Al-Nathief) 
5- A group of 6 upper/middle-class university students (Amman) 
6- A group of 5 school teachers (Amman) 
- United Kingdom: 
1- A group of 5 members from the JAZ (Jews against Zionism) organisation 
2- A group of 6 Loughborough University students, members the Jewish 
society 
3- A group of 6 Loughborough University students 
4- A group of 6-7 cleaning staff  
The constructed sample is therefore framed in relation to the ambitions of the project, 
allowing me to analyse a large sample of news coverage and yet retain the focus on 
language use; to make substantive observations regarding the construction of meaning 
between texts –when comparing the reports produced by different broadcasters –as well 
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as within texts –when variations are made within the same institution; and finally, it 
places comparisons between and within cultural and national borders.    
 
The Methods 
1. Content Analysis 
One of the main purposes of this study is to chart news content from the Gaza War 
broadcasted on Al-Jazeera and BBC. The most applicable method in answering questions 
relating to issues of quantifying the various themes, sources and lexicons employed in 
media texts is a systematic content analysis. Content analysis, in the words of Berelson 
(1952), ‘is a research technique for the objective systematic and quantitative description 
of the manifest content of communication’ (p. 263). This method allows for the analysis 
of ‘key characteristics of large bodies of texts’ (Hansen, Cottle et al. 1998: 123), uses a 
‘set of procedures to make valid inferences from text’ (Weber 1990: 9) with ‘sampling 
and operational or measurement procedures that reduce communications phenomena to 
manageable data (e.g. numbers) from which inferences can be drawn about the 
phenomena themselves’ (Riffe, Lacy and Fico 2005: 23). It is also a ‘research technique for 
making replicative and valid inferences from data to their context’ (Krippendorff 1980: 
21). 
Although content analysis originally referred to the method of ‘counting’ clear  
quantifiable aspects of text content, it has since been developed and expanded to include 
methods that incorporate the study of syntactic, semantic or pragmatic classifications, as 
well as alternative means of content analysis that attempt to examine texts by means of 
categories (Titscher, et al.  2000: 55).  This expansion of the methodology brought with it 
a qualitative approach of content analysis, one that has developed and oriented itself 
with a relative proximity towards the methods of ethnography and grounded theory 
(ibid.). 
Content analysis is a research method that has been popular since the 1940s in studying 
the content of communication. It allows researchers to evaluate media output in a 
systematic, objective and reliable fashion through the measurement of content and 
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format of text or broadcast material –regardless of the volume of the data sample. ‘The 
method enables quantitative measurement of differences between media outputs by 
systematically identifying and recording their properties; from formal criteria (length of 
articles, number of photos, use of sound bites) to frequencies of words or actors and 
presence and character of topics’ (Spurk et al. 2006 in BBC World Service Trust 2008: 2). 
In 1941, Laswekk described the objectives of content analysis as serving two fronts: the 
‘influence’ of media content on audiences, and the impact of control upon that impact 
(cited in Riffe Lacy and Fico 2005: 24). A decade or so later, Berelson (1952) advocated a 
quantitative method of content analysis that is ‘objective’ and persistent in measuring 
frequencies. His often cited definition as a classic description of quantitative content 
analysis (cited above) includes the important specification of the process as being 
objective, systematic and focusing on the content’s ‘manifest (or denotative or shared) 
meaning (as opposed to connotative or latent “between-the-lines” meaning)’ (Riffe, Lacy 
and Fico 2005: 24). He provides an explicit description of the ‘content’ to which such 
objective and systematic content of communication should be focused upon:    
[…] content analysis is ordinarily limited to the manifest content of the 
communication and is not normally done directly in terms of the latent intentions 
which the content may express nor the latent responses which it may elicit. 
Strictly speaking, content analysis proceeds in terms of what-is-said, and not in 
terms of why-the-content-is-like-that (e.g. ‘motives’) or how-people-react (e.g. 
‘appeals’ or ‘responses’) (p. 262 in Richardson 2007: 16) 
The development of the method, especially Kracauer’s (1952) devised method of 
qualitative content analysis (cited in Titscher et al. 2000: 62), allowed our understanding 
of the method to expand. Kracauer’s stipulation towards Berelson’s conception, that it 
overlooks imperatives features of qualitative and semantic purpose of the text thereby 
neglecting meaning, encouraged scholars to account for varied features in analysing 
texts. According to Deacon, Pickering, Golding and Murdock (1999), 
The purpose of content analysis is to quantify salient and manifest features of a 
large number of texts, and the statistics are used to make broader inferences 
about the processes and politics of representation (1999: 116). 
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This is why content analysis is perhaps conceived as an ideal method for ‘delineating 
trends, patterns and absences over large aggregates of texts’ (ibid.117). In a similar way, 
Winston argues that,  
Content analysis remains the only available tool for establishing maps, however 
faulty, of television output…Without ‘the map’, no case can be sustained as to any 
kind of cultural skewdness except on the basis of one-off examples of 
misrepresentation or libel (which are not the norm).  And if no case can be made, 
then there is none to answer (1990: 62).   
However, problems exist with this methodology. Although, as already established, the 
emphasis on objective ‘manifest’ content analysis may raise concerns here, texts, in all of 
its forms, can arguably contain both levels of communication –the manifest and the 
latent. Therefore, I argue it is not the limitations of the materials that are at stake here, 
but the limitations of the method itself that needs to be addressed. Berelson critically 
states that content analysis ‘is often [merely] made to reveal the purposes, motives and 
other characteristics of the communicators as they are (presumably) ‘reflected’ in the 
content; or to identify the (presumable) effects of the content upon the attention, 
attitudes or acts of readers and listeners’ (1952: 264). In addition, it assumes that the 
‘study of manifest content is meaningful’, in that content analysts ‘assumes that the 
‘meanings’ intended by the communicator and/or understood by the audience’ (Berelson 
1952: 264). Finally, it is also assumed that the ‘frequency of occurrence of various 
characteristics of the content is itself an important factor in the communication process’ 
(Berelson 1952: 265 cited in Richardson 2007: 17). However, Richardson argues that 
frequency is perhaps not as important as the agency of which a ‘negative’ terms or topics 
are present in news items about Islam, for example (2007: 18). He questions the agency 
behind such negative terms and argues that the frequency of lexicon alone is not 
sufficient. Take this thesis for example, the inclusion of the words ‘aggression’ or 
‘extremism’, for instance, does not imply who is being referred to as an aggressor or as an 
extremist. In other words: who are the aggressors, the Palestinians or the Israelis? Or if 
the word ‘aggressor’ is to be mentioned 100 times, are all mentions employed to describe 
Palestinians, Israelis or perhaps both? Frequency, in this respect is by no means an 
indicator of agency; thus holds minimal interpretations and/or connotations to the 
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source, actors, themes and lexicons incorporated in a news item. In this sense, it is 
problematic to establish ‘‘how’ words, phrases, concepts and arguments are employed in 
texts’ (Richardson, 2007: 19). In part, this problem can be alleviated through detailed 
coding or through the correlation of variables together, but this in turn can produce 
complexity, in which detailing exactly how texts are employed becomes extremely 
difficult to account for.        
Second, Richardson adds, although Garbner has introduced the method of critical content 
analysis which serves as ‘shorthand devices to label, separate, compile and organise data’ 
(Charmz, 1983: 111 cited in Richardson 2007: 19), the recording of the manifest content 
of the news must still ignore some textual absences. Deacon et al. (1999) explains that 
the most contentious aspect of content analysis is that the method itself is directive (p. 
117) in that the coded variables are strictly constructed and selected by the researcher(s). 
The categories accounted for are the process of an evaluative procedure dependable on 
what the researcher deems as valuable and worth examining. In the words of Deacon et 
al. (1999: 117), content analysis only ‘gives answers to the questions you pose’. 
Richardson finally explains, that content analysis ignores the very idea of ‘the context that 
surround[s] the formation of content’ (p. 20; emphasis in original). It is the idea that what 
is said is essentially dependable on the context in which it is situated. Therefore, it is 
crucial to supplement this study with an additional methodological technique that is 
suitable to dealing with interpretation and meaning. One way of going about this is 
through the method of Critical Discourse Analysis, in which analysts,  
[…] offer interpretations of the meanings of texts rather than just quantifying 
textual features and deriving meaning from this; situate what is written or said in 
the context in which it occurs, rather than just summarising patterns or 
regularities in texts; and argue that textual meaning is constructed through an 
interaction between producer, text and consumer rather than simply being ‘read 
off’ the page by all readers in exactly the same way (Richardson 2007: 15).  
Given content analysis allows for inferences to be made, it can then be upheld using 
other methods of data collection. As Garbner (1958) argues, there are further questions 
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that need to be asked of the complied data. This, as termed by Neuendorf, is an 
‘Integrative model of content analysis’. She explains 
The integrative message calls for the collation of content analysis message –level 
data with other available empirical information regarding source, receiver, 
channel or other contextual states…it provides us with a clear picture of what 
components contribute to our understanding of the message of interest, as well 
as, the nature of the links between message variables and extra message variables 
(2002: 61). 
Therefore, while no research method can be value free, content analysis is well suited to 
provide a comprehensive and clear examination of the most prominent themes, actors 
and lexicon presented throughout the coverage of the Gaza conflict. Indeed, it allows us 
to discern macro trends in the coverage; it explores processes and representations; and 
maps series of continuation and termination of media interest of the successive events of 
the war. In fact it explores patterns, and seeks to discover, and reveal, the positioning of 
Gaza in news coverage generally. The trends and patterns revealed, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 4, allow us to draw inferences about the very nature of the broadcast 
networks examined, in turn contributing, empirically, to debates about cross-cultural 
comparative approaches of studying the media. For this reason and for a systematic 
evaluation of the media portrait of the Gaza conflict, content analysis will be employed as 
a first research method. 
Content Analysis in relation to the current study 
This research is informed by the view that content analysis is best approached as a tool 
for testing relationships within a basic communication model (Neuendorf 2002: 52). 
Berelson (1952) proposed five purposes for content analysis: (a) to provide descriptive 
substance characteristics of message content; (b) to provide descriptive form 
characteristics of message content; (c) to make inferences to producers of content; (d) to 
make inferences to audiences of content; (e) to examine the effects of content on the 
audience. In a similar way, Shannon and Weaver’s (1998) model of content analysis 
provides the raw framework of ‘source, message, channel and receiver’ (cited in 
Neuendorf 2002: 52; emphasis in original). Neuendorf (2002) argues, however, that 
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making conclusions about source and receiver on the basis of content analysis alone is in 
effect inappropriate. Instead, she adopts Carney’s (1971) conceptualisation, assuming the 
method of content analysis as serving one of three purposes: Descriptive, hypothesis 
testing and facilitating inference (ibid.). 
Assuming all three approaches (descriptive, hypothesis testing and facilitating inference) 
to content analysis, the study aims to assess the themes covered in broadcast media that 
appeared throughout the period of the conflict (1st Jan. 2009 – 18th Jan. 2009), the 
lexicons used in news reports, key events mentioned, visuals displayed and references 
made to fatalities and casualties by different types of media outlets. The media sample 
was quantitatively analysed using a computerised coding frame, designed to establish a 
clear picture of coverage trends in Arab media as opposed to Western media, noting 
similarities and differences within and across national borders.  
The most fundamental issue for the researcher in designing a content analysis is the 
choice or development of an analytical framework. In doing so the researcher identifies 
the first step by establishing ‘a framework defining the dimensions of analysis’ (Henri 
1991: 123). Essentially, the decisions made by the researcher on what and how to record 
and count variables, form the basis of a systematic content analysis. For such decisions 
dictates the findings of the research. Adopting a ‘grounded theory approach’ to content 
analysis, the coded variables, in this research, emerged from the data under 
investigation. According to Lindoff (1995) the variables selected for coding should arise 
from ‘preliminary’ and later ‘purposeful’ readings of the data analysed (p. 219). In other 
words, prior knowledge of the sampled data is necessary before selecting the variables to 
be coded when developing a coding schedule. 
With regards to the current study, establishing a priori knowledge of possible events did 
not result in developing a new framework of analysis, but rather in modifying an existing 
one. The choice of coded variables was, first and foremost, influenced by the objectives 
of this research. However due to the availability of a suitable coding schedule developed 
by Loughborough University Communication Research Centre (2006) for the purposes of 
devising a content analysis of BBC’s coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the 
current study have modified this framework but added an interpersonal dimension to 
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suffice the aims of this project. The original coding schedule devised by scholars at 
Loughborough University was updated and adapted by adding further categories. As 
suggested above, one of the weaknesses of the method is that it is ‘extremely directive’ 
(Deacon et al. 1999: 117), therefore the questions posed and variables selected at the 
start should be designed to cater for the validity of the results produced. Given the Gaza 
conflict erupted 3 years after the report, it is very likely that circumstances surrounding 
the Palestinian-Israeli war have undergone considerable changes as well as the codes and 
variables established by scholars from Loughborough University. For that reason it was 
imperative to devise a pilot study of three programmes of each channel to tap ‘holes’ and 
shortfalls in both specific codes and complete variables. 
As a result, the coding schedule and the approach to coding were slightly altered. First, 
given the intensity in fighting and the steady nature of change in events, the codes of 
some variables were expanded significantly to enclose as many themes, sources and 
lexicon as possible. For example, emerging themes that were not present during the 
sample period were added, others were modified to fit the objectives of this study and 
some were completely deleted. In relation to the historical background of the conflict, 
the variables were expanded to account for events that took place following the year of 
2006. Sources were also modified to account for new rulers within the Israel cabinet and 
to highlight the role of Hamas in the Palestinian struggle. In doing so, the pilot study 
facilitated the inclusion of specific themes, sources, historical context and lexicon that 
otherwise would not have been accounted for. 
For the reasons above, it was decided that such expansion of codes and variables should 
be allowed to continue throughout the duration of the study. This was especially 
important in accounting for any emergent or unexpected themes and developments in 
the sampled data. One significant example, is the term ‘resistance’; coding such term 
within the variables developed for the lexicon category only became salient after coding 
news items produced by Al-Jazeera. The intensive use of the term, as well as its symbolic 
connotation and iconic reference to Hamas, necessitated the researcher to incorporate it 
to the analysis. This also meant that some of the coded material had to be re-coded in 
order to attain a valid and reliable assessment of the lexicon used across the examined 
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channels. The final coding schedule developed and applied across the sampled data is 
provided in Appendix B. 
It is worth going back to Neuendorf’s (2002) insight that content analysis per se falls short 
in making conclusions about source and receiver. Similarly, Shoemaker and Reese (1990) 
observed that most content analysis studies are not linked ‘in any systematic way to 
either the forces that created the content or its effects’ (p. 649). Such claims along with 
question of ‘how’ and ‘why’ is the news content the way it is necessitates the 
employment of further methodology to fill in the gaps and provide explanations that 
content analysis alone is incapable of achieving. For that reason, the thesis then adopts 
the method of Critical Discourse Analysis.                          
 
2. Critical Discourse Analysis 
As suggested above, a qualitative method of analysis to examine media texts more 
critically is required to produce a better understanding of the role of context in text and 
talk –by providing a full account of the context and implications of the words, sentences 
and arguments used in the sampled data. The best way to go about this is to adopt the 
method of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA), which is designed to supplement 
the thematic coverage of the war and facilitate ‘in-depth examination of the episodic 
news framing’ (Iyengar, 1991). In this sense, ‘meaning’ and ‘doing’ are situated within the 
context of its usage. In the words of Richardson ‘in order to properly understand 
discourse we need to do more than analyse the inter-relations of sentences and how they 
hang together as a cohesive and coherent text. To properly interpret, for example, a 
press release, or a newspaper report or an advert, we need to work out what the speaker 
or writer is doing through discourse and how this ‘doing’ is linked to wider inter-personal, 
institutional, socio-cultural and material contexts’ (Richardson 2007: 24). Discourse in this 
context is interested in ‘what and how language communicates when it is used 
purposefully in particular instances and contexts’ (Cameron 2001: 13).  
Discourse analysis is a broad and complex interdisciplinary field (Fairclough and Wodak 
1997; Wodak and Meyer 2001) which differ in theory, methodology and the types and 
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prominence of research issues. It incorporates fairly diverse theoretical and 
methodological developments from linguistics, anthropology, sociology and semiotic 
analysis.  All approaches to discourse, however, share a commitment to studying the use 
of language in its context. Critical discourse analysis, which is the prime focus of this 
study, also subsumes a variety of approaches in studying ‘what people do with talk and 
text’ (Richardson, 2007: 25). The method of CDA entails some form of in-depth textual 
analysis. In particular terms, it includes ‘a combination of interdiscursive analysis of texts 
(i.e. of how different genres, discourses and styles are articulated together) and linguistic 
and other forms of semiotic analysis’ (Fairclough 1993: 8). Consider, Titscher et al. (2000) 
summary of Fairclough’s approach to CDA, 
[It is] the analysis of relationships between concrete language use and the wider 
social cultural structures. […] [Fairclough] attributes three dimensions to every 
discursive event. It is simultaneously text, discursive practice –which also includes 
the production and interpretation of texts –and social practice. The analysis is 
conducted according to these three dimensions (p. 149-150 cited in Richardson 
2007: 37) 
As already established, limiting the scope of the research to the method of content 
analysis is analytically inadequate in examining the ‘role that journalism plays in 
maintaining and/or transforming social inequalities’ (Richardson 2007: 38). Therefore, a 
more critical textual analysis is required to examine the text ‘in terms of what is present 
and what could have been but is not present’ (ibid.). Critical discourse analysts assume 
that textual contents, in all of its forms, are not born out of thin air but are rather a 
constructed reality resulted from ‘choice’: the choice of giving news access to one actor 
over another, the choice of selecting one way of discursively and semantically structuring 
a sentence over another; and the choice of consciously or subconsciously highlighting one 
argument or statement and marginalising others (Fairclough 2003). As Richardson argues, 
‘Language is used to mean things and to do things that relate not only to the immediate 
context of speaker-text-audience but also to the wider socio-political, cultural and 
historic contexts which bound the communicative act’ (2007: 25). In a similar manner, 
Gerbner (1958) explains that such crude elements of vocabulary, grammar, semantics 
and so on, should not be treated as reflective and insightful in themselves; rather the 
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very idea that the function of which such elements serve when put to play is of great 
significance –whether such elements act to reproduce or resist systems of ideology and 
social power. 
Despite its capacity in analysing ‘textual organisation above the sentence, including the 
ways in which the sentences are connected together (‘cohesion’) and things like the 
organisation of turn-taking in interviews or the overall structure of a newspaper article’ 
(Fairclough, 1995: 57), CDA still attracts a great number of critics. In general terms, such 
criticism concerns one fundamental question: ‘Does CDA produce valid knowledge’ (Haig 
2004: 133)? One philosophical approach in criticising CDA comes from Hammersley 
(1997) whom indicates that CDA’s ‘most damaging feature’ is ‘the extraordinary ambition 
of the task that it sets itself. It aims to achieve a very great deal more than other kinds of 
discourse analysis. Not only does it claim to offer an understanding of discursive 
processes, but also of society as a whole, of what is wrong with it, and of how it can and 
should be changed,’ (p. 252). In this light, Haig (2004) argues that although with the 
maturity of the method there has come a measure of realism, locality and pragmatism in 
achieving such ambitions there is a tendency that this might result in over interpretation 
of data. Which results in making conclusions ‘according to their political implications as 
much if not more than their validity,’ (Hammersley 1997: 253). Thus the question of the 
validity of the method remains at the forefront of the argument. Other criticisms target 
the critical approaches to discourse analysis. Widdowson (1995) argues that CDA reflects 
an analysis held merely by belief and not in support of theory. This he explains, results in 
analysts being ideologically biased producing readings into the text and not 
interpretations from the text. Such biases are further compounded with more bias on 
behalf of the researcher, in which analysts only select texts that will further confirm their 
beliefs on a given issue.  
CDA in relation to the current study 
In their introductory chapter of Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, Wodak and Meyer 
(2009) focus their attention on three central and constitutive concepts: power, ideology 
and critique; in which, they argue, form the common ground understanding of CDA 
amongst its most prominent scholars (p. 1). The ‘critical’ aspect of CDA, they explain, can 
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be traced back to the ‘influence of the Frankfurt School and Jurgen Habermas’ (p. 6). 
Although the term ‘critical’ was first used to characterise a ‘critical linguistic’ approach to 
studying language, its use have been conventionally used in broader terms (ibid.). The 
‘critique’ is understood as ‘essentially making visible the interconnectedness of things’ 
(ibid.). The critical impetus of CDA also aims at ‘revealing structures of power and 
unmasking ideologies’ (ibid.). It does so, by studying ‘both power in discourse and power 
over discourse’, and by helping unmask ideological connotations present in language use 
through investigating their interpretation, reception and social effects (Wodak, 1996: 17-
20, cited in Titscher et al. 2000: 146). Wodak and Meyer summarised the ‘new 
fields/paradigms/linguistic sub-disciplines’ of discourse studies as having seven 
dimensions in common, four of which I wish to share here:  
 An interest in the properties of ‘naturally occurring’ language use by real language 
users (instead of a study of abstract language systems and invented examples) 
 A focus on large units than isolated words and sentences and, hence, new basic units 
if analysis: texts, discourses, conversations, speech acts, or communicative events 
 The extension of linguistics beyond sentence grammar towards a study of action and 
interaction 
 The extension of non-verbal (semiotic, multimodal, visual) aspects of interaction and 
communication: gestures, images, film, the internet, and multimedia (p.3) 
The final point turns attention to ‘semiotic devices in discourse other than linguistic ones’ 
(Wodak and Meyer 2009: 15; emphasis in original). The theory put forward by Kress and 
van Leeuwen (1996), in particular, ‘provides a useful framework for considering the 
communicative potential of visual devices in the media’ (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 15). In 
the words of van Leeuween: 
[c]ritical discourse analysis has also moved beyond language, taking on board that 
discourses are often multimodally realized, not only through text and talk, but 
also through other modes of communication such as images […] Overall, then, 
critical discourse analysis has moved towards more explicit dialogue between 
social theory and practice, richer contextualization, greater interdisciplinary and 
greater attention to the multimodality of discourse (2006: 292 cited in ibid.). 
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Similarly, Machin (2007), in a study examining the visual discourse of war, shows how 
discourses of war have been altered over time, indicating that the visual has a particularly 
important role in analysing media discourses. This, he explains, is to do with the less 
denotative and more symbolic nature of the photograph in comparison to that of the text 
or talk. For the reasons above, I feel that the dimensions, principles and purposes of CDA 
are particularly suited for the objectives of the current study. 
Methodologically, CDA does not have a well-defined empirical approach or a definitive 
way of gathering data. In fact, the process of data collection does not require a specific 
phase that must be completed before analysis begins: ‘it is a matter of indicators for 
particular concepts, expanding concepts into categories and, on the basis of these results, 
collecting further data (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 27).  
Drawing on the results obtained from the statistical content analysis, I was able to 
identify the predominant themes reported by the broadcasters, which, as a result, were 
selected to form the headlines of the following discourse analysis chapters (chapters 5 
and 6). The first theme, which I term Provocation, looks at how issues of culpability and 
responsibility for the war were reported in the conflict. The second theme identified, 
which I term Proportionality, examines the extent to which the actions of the 
protagonists were portrayed as being justified, proportionate and legitimate. From this 
systematic sampling approach, the study adopted two theoretical approaches in 
analysing media discourse presented in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. Chapter 5 follows 
Fairclough’s approach in doing CDA by answering four proposed questions: 
1. How is the text designed, why is it deigned in this way, and how else could it have been 
designed? 
2. How are texts of this sort produced, and in what ways are they likely to be interpreted 
and used? 
3. What does the text indicate about the media ‘order of discourse’ [Foucault]? 
4. What wider sociocultural processes is this text a part of, what are its wider social 
conditions, and what are its likely effects? (1995: 202) 
These questioned formed the basis of the discursive approach adopted in chapter 5 to 
provide an interpretative analysis in identifying meaning in the context of provocation. 
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Chapter 6 was informed by a multi-modal approach of CDA. Drawing on argumentation 
theory, it presents a visual and linguistic analysis of three prominent news stories or 
three ‘critical discourse moments’. Gamson (1992: 26) argues that critical discourse 
moments are especially significant in studying media texts. With continuing issues, 
‘journalists look for ‘pegs’ –that is, topical events that provide an opportunity for 
broader, more long-term coverage and commentary’ (ibid.). Regarding the events of the 
Gaza war, these pegs provided me with a way of identifying three prominent news stories 
within the field of proportionality when commentary was expected to be dense. Although 
Gamson’s framework of critical discourse moments examines prolonged periods of time 
(in which the Gaza war, as a whole, could be identified as one), I feel that it provides a 
suitable framework for this research in which to base analysis. Like chapter 5, chapter 6 
follows a theoretical approach to CDA, however in this case, it took a Foucauldian 
approach and framed the visual and linguistic analysis in line with the following 
questions: 
1. What is valid knowledge at a certain place and a certain time? 
2. How does this knowledge arise and how is it passed on? 
3. What functions does it have for constituting subjects? 
4. What consequences does it have for the overall shaping and development of 
society? (Jager and Maier 2009: 34) 
These questions provided a firm base for analysis but were then expanded to examine 
Fairclough’s (1995) three components to analysis: description, interpretation and 
explanation. The first component describes the linguistic properties of texts are (text 
analysis); the second examines the relationship between the productive and 
interpretative processes of discursive practice and the texts; and the third evaluates the 
relationship between discursive practice and social practice (Fairclough, 1995). 
On the whole, one unjustifiable weakness of CDA concerns the very fact that audiences –
a whole side of the equation –are simply excluded from the analysis (Widdowson 1995 
cited in Haig 2004: 142). This argument is also echoed by Richardson (2007) in which he 
clarifies that the dominant approach to CDA separates language use from its users –
thereby treating ‘discourse as a thing that in itself can include or exclude, reproduce 
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social inequalities or effect social change’ (p. 28, emphasis in original). Text messages, he 
explains, are often taken as definitive in shaping the understandings of the readers, which 
in turn have formed the critique of media power (ibid: 41). However, reading (or to use 
Hall’s terminology ‘decoding’) media messages is an active process whereby audiences 
with differing perspectives, agendas and background knowledge have varying encodings 
of the same media text. As a result, media consumers ‘may resist, subtly counter or 
directly misunderstand the encoded meaning of [a given] report’ (ibid.). To this end, 
language use –regardless of how powerful it can be –is in itself incapable of altering the 
course of society (Richardson 2007: 29).  
 
3. Focus groups 
In addition to the primary content and discourse analysis undertaken for this project, the 
current study is supported by focus groups conducted in the UK and Jordan with the 
purpose of complementing and enriching the content-specific study. The reason focus 
groups were incorporated to the analysis is essentially reliant on the fact that media texts 
cannot by completely understood by merely analysing their codes, however vibrantly. It is 
of great necessity to bring to sight the reception process of such message encodings 
(Neveu, 2005). 
Focus groups, as the term implies, are group discussions designed to explore people’s 
perceptions and understandings of a specific set of issues (Kitzinger, 1994). The 1970’s 
and 80’s have seen an increased popularity of focus group analysis as a method of data 
collection. Although it is naïve to assume that the method can easily tap into people’s 
‘biographies or minutia of decision making during intimate moments’, it is capable of 
exploring the manner in which knowledge and evocative ideas are structured, developed 
and operated within a group in a given cultural context (Kitzinger 1994: 116). Thus it 
facilitates in ‘filling in the gaps’ of crucial aspects in media studies. In a sense it reaches 
‘the parts that other methods cannot reach’, ‘revealing dimensions of understanding that 
often remain untapped by the more conventional one-to-one interview or questionnaire’ 
(Kitzinger 1994: 109).  
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However, it is important to remember that group settings of a focus group is by no means 
a ‘natural’ occurrence, in the sense that participants of a given study would not have had 
such an encounter without having been assembled for this purpose –that is focus groups 
are, in effect, ‘artificially set up situations’ (Kitzinger 1994: 106). On the contrary, focus 
groups are capable of encouraging participants ‘to engage with one another, verbally 
formulate their ideas and draw out the cognitive structures which previously have been 
unarticulated’ (ibid.). Such claim is especially significant given the nature of participants 
within a singular group, in which they enjoy individual characteristics and varying 
opinions. Regardless of their theoretical sampling, research participants rarely ever 
plainly agree with one another, but tend to ‘misunderstand one another, question one 
another, try to persuade each other of the justice of their own point of view and 
sometimes they vehemently disagree’ (Kitzinger 1994: 113).              
Focus groups in relation to this study 
The final phase in this chain of analysis is media reception. Focus groups were adopted to 
examine the effect element in this equation - to look at the way media texts are 
processed by audiences and how understandings of the Gaza conflict are constructed. 
The aim is not only to explore what people knew or thought about the conflict but why 
they thought as they did (Kitzinger 1994: 104 cited in Kitzinger 1999: 11).         
Each group consisted of, on average, 6 research participants and discussions lasted 
approximately 90 minutes and were video recorded. All participants completed individual 
questionnaires (see Appendix C). The sample covered a wide range of different 
'populations' in the UK and Jordan and the groups were selected in order to explore 
diversity, and to establish a degree of 'representativeness'. The sample included so-called 
'general population' groups such as five school teachers, a group of medicine university 
students, and a team of voluntary students in under-privileged areas. However, some 
groups were highly representative, such as the Jews against Zionism group (London), 
Loughborough University Jewish Society (UK) and members of the Gaza Refugee Camp in 
Jordan (Jerash). The current audience study follows techniques and procedures 
developed by the Glasgow Media group of conducting focus groups (Kitzinger 1999; Philo 
et al. 2004). 
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Initially, the focus groups incorporated general discussions on the participants’ familiarity 
of the Gaza conflict, its history, population or any other relevant events they recalled on 
this matter. Then topics of the humanitarian crisis, the use of illegal weapons, refugees, 
the tunnels issue, Hamas and the role of the UN in the Strip were examined. Following 
this the discussion narrowed down to discuss the role the media played in covering these 
incidents and emphasised the role the BBC and Al-Jazeera played throughout the 
duration of conflict. Generally, the focus group discussions revolved around the following 
questions:   
1. Familiarity with the Gaza Strip –Its history, its population, anything peculiar about it? 
2. Humanitarian crisis: - is there a humanitarian crisis? 
3. The use of illegal weapons (particularly white phosphorous)? 
4. Refugees –who are the refugees; why were they made refugees, etc? 
5. The tunnel issue - Why were they built in the first place; How are they related to the 
Gaza war? 
6. Hamas –who are they; what’s their role in Gaza; what’s their role in the war and 
Palestine generally?  
7. The Israeli attack on UN properties –are participants familiar with the events; their 
thoughts about it, etc.?  
8. The accessibility of news on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict provided to people in the 
UK  
9. Did the news on the war provided to participants leave an impression on them?  
Adopting the Glasgow Media Group’s strategy in conducting focus groups, this study then 
asked groups to write down their own news reports on the UNRWA school incident 
(discussed in full in Chapter 6). This, the Glasgow Media Group, suggest would show the 
extent to which audiences understood the events of the conflict (Philo 1990). While Philo 
et al. asked participants to imagine they were ‘individual’ journalists writing short news 
reports on a given issue, participants in this study were asked re-enact news reports 
produced by the BBC or Al-Jazeera in which they were made to produce short news items 
on the events of the school. Of course depending on the region (and hence language) in 
which the study took place participants were asked to imagine themselves journalists 
working for the fitting service –for example participants in Jordan were made to write 
items for BBC Arabic and Al-Jazeera Arabic and in a similar manner those in the UK were 
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asked to produce news reports for BBC World and Al-Jazeera English. Since participants 
had to work under the networks’ guidelines and strategies, the intention was to examine 
what perspectives and analysis the participants’ would select to produce their news 
stories, which consequently identified the participants’ perceptions on the examined 
networks impartiality and news values. From this it is also possible to compare the news 
items produced by the participants with what they truly deem as factual and to 
investigate why they either accepted or rejected media accounts (Philo 1990). Finally, the 
participants were made to watch these broadcasts which encouraged further discussions 
on the accurateness and representativeness of their reports to those of the original news 
reports.           
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Chapter 4 
Analysing Media Messages: a Content Analysis 
  The case of Gaza, Al-Jazeera and the BBC 
 
 
This chapter explores broadcast news reporting of the Gaza conflict by providing findings 
from a systematic content analysis of BBC and Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Gaza War of 
2008-09, to map areas of difference and continuity in these organisations’ general 
mediation of the conflict. Quantitative results are presented here to provide an overall 
profile of the coverage which consists of a thorough assessment of the themes, actors, 
language and contextual frameworks and historical background of a succession of news 
reports across Al-Jazeera (its Arabic and English networks) and BBC (BBC World and BBC 
Arabic). The intention is to examine how key themes surface in news reporting and were 
further used to form and construct news stories. From this it is possible to pinpoint the 
dominant and preferred readings and understandings of the Gaza War in news accounts 
and to ‘make some predictions about audience understanding and the power of different 
messages’ (Philo et al. 1999: 214).   
Quantitative results are displayed in tables and graphs, with data drawn from 
summarised frequencies produced by coding the content of the sampled items.  
General Reporting  
The frequencies of the reports published by the broadcasters across the eighteen days 
period of the war are shown in figure 4.1 below. It shows that 760 items were dedicated 
to covering the Gaza war, by the four broadcasters, across the sampled period. 
Distributed throughout 18 days of reporting, this amounted to an average of 42.2 items 
per day and a mean value of 11 items per news channel.  
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Figure 4.1: Number of news items related to the Gaza Conflict/ Broadcaster 
 
 
Looking at the mean values in Table 4.1, it is clear that both Al-Jazeera networks had a 
greater number of items relating to the conflict per day, especially so with Al-Jazeera 
Arabic (23 items compared to 11 items). BBC World had an average of only 6 items per 
day, considerably lower than the total sample mean. Finally, BBC Arabic had a fairly 
comparable mean value of 10 items on Gaza per news hour. 
Table 4.1: Average number of Items per day, by broadcaster 
Broadcaster Mean value Frequency (n) 
Al-Jazeera English 14 227 
Al-Jazeera Arabic 23 299 
BBC World 6 89 
BBC Arabic 10 145 
Total 11 760 
 
Almost 30 percent of the items dedicated to the conflict belonged to Al-Jazeera English 
and 39 percent belonged to Al-Jazeera Arabic, added together Al-Jazeera networks 
constituted 69% of the items alone. BBC World comprised 12 percent of the items and 
BBC Arabic formed the remaining 19 percent. In terms of length, as Figure 4.2 indicates, 
this also translates into 15 hours of news on AJE, 18 on Al-Jazeera Arabic, less than 5 
hours on BBC World and just over 12 hours on BBC Arabic. 
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Figure 4.2: average length of news items per broadcaster 
 
 
The average length of news items in relation to television channels are given in Table 4.2. 
The results reveal that BBC Arabic dedicated lengthy news items averaging almost 5 
minutes (307 seconds) per report, higher than the total mean value (239 seconds). 
Strikingly, items on BBC World had fairly shorter reports of an average of almost 3 
minutes per item (181 seconds). In regards to Al-Jazeera, both networks had a 
comparatively similar average to one another, with a mean value of almost 4 minutes on 
Al-Jazeera English and 3.7 minutes on Al-Jazeera Arabic.  
  
Table 4.2: Average length time of news items in seconds 
Broadcaster    Mean Standard deviation 
Al-Jazeera English 239 124 
Al-Jazeera 223 112 
BBC World  181 90 
BBC Arabic 307 186 
Total 239 136 
 
BBC Arabic had the highest average length of items of all examined channels, but this 
mean figure has been elevated by several outlying values. Not only did items of three 
minutes or less feature rarely, but also those of 9 minutes or more were the most 
prominent on BBC Arabic (a point demonstrated by the highest standard deviation found 
for the channel, which indicates the greater dispersion in item lengths). The majority of 
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BBC World’s items, however, fell under 5 minutes of reporting, with zero items lasting for 
9 minutes or more. And although both Al-Jazeera reports had a similar spread within their 
items, AJE were more likely to broadcast longer reports.          
 
Figure 4.3: length of news items per broadcaster  
 
 
Figure 4.4 below shows the total distribution of reports on Gaza across the 18-day sample 
period. As shown in the figure, these formed a fluctuating line identifying three critical 
discursive moments. The first starts on the onset of the sample and peaks on the 3rd of 
Jan 2009 with 64 items. This coincides with the start of Israel’s ground incursion dubbed 
‘Second Stage’ in its ‘Operation Cast Lead’ campaign. The 9th of Jan 2009 with a total of 
63 items saw the next rise in reporting where Israeli attacks continued soon after passing 
a UN resolution with a series of explosions and gunfire. Lastly, reports reach their final 
peak on the 14th of Jan 2009 when Venezuela and Bolivia severed diplomatic ties with 
Israel, calling the onslaught on Gaza a “Holocaust”, and Bolivia pledging to get Israeli 
officials charged in the International Criminal Court with committing what they described 
as “genocide”.       
 
 
 
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic 
more than 9 mins 
7-9 mins 
5-7 mins 
3-5 mins 
Less than 3 mins 
106 
 
Figure 4.4: Number of News items by date  
 
 
Figure 4.5 breaks down this analysis of the daily number of items by news channels. The 
Arabic language channels (Al-Jazeera Arabic and BBC Arabic) had a more or less 
consistent spread within their reporting, suggesting that the war retained news value 
throughout the sample period. The English language channels (Al-Jazeera English and BBC 
World), however, had a varying distribution of items throughout their coverage, treating 
the incursion in a more episodic way, giving it great prominence at times but making only 
passing references at others (hence the several peaks and troughs).    
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Figure 4.5: Number of items per day per broadcaster 
 
 
Figure 4.5 offers a clear analysis of the reporting across the sample, thereby helping us 
locate newsworthy accounts and narratives in relation to each of the selected television 
station. It charts the extent to which these narratives dominated the reporting over the 
examined dates across Al-Jazeera and BBC. At first, the networks seem to peak and fall 
simultaneously, but then arrive at a point, on the 6th of January, where Al-Jazeera reaches 
a clear peak and BBC starts to decline, albeit more distinctly on the 7th of January. 
Interestingly, as will be shown in Chapter 6, this reveals Al-Jazeera’s exhaustive reporting 
of the Israeli attacks on the UN-run school in Gaza. Another striking divergence among 
the channels is Al-Jazeera English’s dramatic increase in items on the 11th of January, in 
contrast to a reduction in the remaining news coverage. The use of white phosphorus 
was a centre stage matter with AJE’s reporting; in fact it was the first channel to dedicate 
an entire report explaining the dangers its chemicals carry on board. This weapon with a 
highly incendiary effect, AJE stipulates, lands on skin burning deeply through muscle and 
into the bone, continuing to burn until deprived of oxygen. This, however, is followed by 
a steep incline which suggests that reports on the use of illegal weapons by the Israeli 
Army were featured on later dates by the other broadcasters. Finally, although the 15th of 
January witnessed the most eventful and intense day of violence, only Al-Jazeera Arabic 
gave it eminence consideration, with items reaching more than 25 on a single day.         
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Reporting locations 
These general figures about the scale and length of the coverage give some indication to 
the substantial yet changing news value of events in Gaza. This section looks at the 
geographic distribution of news coverage, in terms of the locations from which reports 
were dispatched. This provides an insight into the comprehensiveness of the different 
news agencies in reporting war and the extent to which the spatial location of their 
coverage differed. The specific locations from where the news reports were broadcast 
were categorised as follows (Table 4.3)  
1. Palestinian locations    
2. Israeli locations 
3. Regional locations 
4. Other International locations 
It is logical to assume that spatial locations of journalists in times of conflict –the areas in 
which journalists are located – have implications for the way conflicts are constructed 
visually and discursively. For example, there was considerable commentary during the 
first Gulf War (Desert Storm) about how images taken from the vantage point of 
attacking aircraft and missiles produced sanitised high-tech view of the war that obscured 
their power, destructiveness and (occasional) inaccuracy. What has been termed the first 
“television war” or “CNN’s war” was covered, for the first time in the history of warfare, 
by journalists from coalition countries who were able to ‘transmit live instantaneous 
reports from an enemy capital under fire’ (Taylor 1992: 10). Yet, only those narratives 
deemed acceptable ‘by the warring partners’ were allowed across but, the presence of 
western journalists in Baghdad created ‘the illusion […] that war was being fought out in 
full view of a global audience’ (ibid: 278). However, ‘the absence of cameras in Kuwait or 
at the Iraqi front line meant that neither the main reason for the war, nor the battlefields 
where it was mainly won and lost, were being seen’ (ibid). Therefore, geographical 
distribution of journalists has a great impact on the way conflict is reported and 
narratives are constructed.  
The analysis of the reporting of the Gaza conflict shows that of Al-Jazeera English’s 228 
items, 18 percent came from Israeli areas and 38 percent from Palestinian areas. 
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However, considering that Gaza was the main ‘theatre of war’, such an imbalance, in 
terms of ‘newsworthiness’ is justified. For Al-Jazeera Arabic, the proportions were 5 
percent and 29 percent, demonstrating a greater preponderance towards Gaza. BBC 
World had a different share, 32 percent of items came from Israeli terrains and only 21 
percent from Palestinian terrains. The Israeli Government’s decision to ban foreign 
journalists from entering Gaza, during the war, would have been a major reason behind 
these findings, leaving journalists with no option but to report from Israeli terrains. BBC 
Arabic also gave Palestinian locations greater prominence; however added together 
Palestinian and Israeli territories constituted 23 percent of the coverage –very few 
considering these came from the hub of the war. In terms of other locations, the Arabic-
language channels had an immense proportion of their reports transmitted from regional 
and international countries. In relation to regional countries, the ratio is consistent with 
notions of cultural proximity thus is understandable, given the organisations intent in 
catering for an Arab audience –hence BBC World and AJE’s figures (8% and 5% in 
comparison to the total mean value of 18%). In general terms, over 30 percent of reports 
were transmitted from outside the region. 
Table 4.3: BBC and Al-Jazeera reporting locations 
Location Al-Jazeera 
English  
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic Total  
Israeli Areas      
West Jerusalem 2 2 15 3 22 (3%) 
Tel-Aviv 6 0 2 2 10 (1%) 
Haifa  1 0 0 1 2 (0%) 
Be’er Sheva 1 0 0 0 1 (0%) 
Netanya 0 0 1 0 1 (0%) 
Ashkelon 1 2 1 0 4 (1%) 
Sderot 1 0 1 0 2 (0%) 
Other Israeli Territory 10 2 0 1 13 (2%) 
Israeli-Gaza Border 20 8 8 1 37 (5%) 
Total 42 (18%) 14 (5%) 28 (32%) 8 (6%) 92 (12%) 
Palestinian Areas      
East Jerusalem 3 0 0 2 5 (1%) 
Nablus 0 1 0 0 1 (0%) 
Ramallah  6 16 6 2 30 (4%) 
West Bank –area not specified 4 4 0 2 10 (1%) 
Gaza City 33 26 6 0 65 (9%) 
Khan Yunis 2 0 0 0 2 (0%) 
Rafah 3 1 0 0 4 (1%) 
Beit Hanon 0 1 0 0 1 (0%) 
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Gaza –other  35 38 9 19 101 (13%) 
Total 86 (38%) 87 (29%) 21 (24%) 25 (17%) 219 (29%) 
Regional Countries      
Lebanon 2 10 0 6 18 (2%) 
Syria 0 5 2 2 9 (1%) 
Jordan 5 7 0 2 14 (2%) 
Egypt 5 29 2 10 46 (6%) 
Qatar 3 4 0 3 10 (1%) 
Saudi Arabia 1 2 0 0 3 (0%) 
Iraq 0 7 0 0 7 (1%) 
Other Middle-Eastern/Muslim Country 2 13 0 11 26 (4%) 
Total 18 (8%) 77 (26%) 4 (5%) 34 (24%) 133 (18%) 
Other Countries      
UK 3 9 7 3 22 (3%) 
USA 24 3 8 6 41 (5%) 
Canada 1 0 0 0 1 (0%) 
European Country 3 8 2 1 13 (2%) 
Brazil 1 0 0 0 1 (0%) 
Venezuela 1 1 0 0 2 (0%) 
Bolivia 2 0 0 0 2 (0%) 
Other/not clear 42 93 14 39 188 (25%) 
Total 77 (36%) 114 (38%) 30 (34%) 49 (34%) 268 (35%) 
Mixed Gaza, West Bank and Israel 5 6 5 28 44 (6%) 
Total 228 298 89 144 756 (100%) 
 
The presence and access of news sources 
Identifying reporting locations is just one dimension in which one can classify variations in 
the way different broadcast media constructed and framed the war. Even more 
significant is the issue of who is reported upon in the conflict and particularly whose 
voices are heard, repeated and emphasised. Table 4.4 addresses what can be termed as 
the Who dimension of reporting, which is also important in providing some measure to 
the extent of which Israeli and Palestinian actors are given access and presence in the 
news.  
In his analysis of the British news media’s coverage of the Spanish Civil War, Deacon 
(2008: 124-5) provides a clear distinction between news presence and news access. He 
explains that ‘News presence and news access are two linked but distinct phenomena’, in 
which ‘news presence concerns the frequency with which the actions and opinions of 
individuals and organisations (‘news sources’) are the subject of editorial discussion’ and 
‘news access addresses the extent to which particular sources interact directly with 
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journalists to provide information and convey their opinions’. He then explicates that 
news access often depends on matters of ‘opportunity and availability’ but can also be a 
‘measure of sources’ influence and credibility’, as there is an unspoken process of 
accreditation by which journalists base their decisions about who they talk to. Deacon 
finally offers a contemporary example of the considerable amount of news presence 
terrorist organisations receive through their threats and actions but are rarely given any 
news access to directly defend their actions, explain their demands and so on (ibid.). Such 
practices reflect the social power of journalism, which lies precisely in the ‘inclusion of 
certain voices in normative social discourse and the exclusion of others’ (Durham 2003: 
125).  
Comparing which sources gain momentum and which are sidelined or ignored makes 
notions of news presence and access a straightforward matter to evaluate. It is, 
therefore, important to differentiate between news access, and news presence, given 
‘the frequency with which sources are directly quoted in the coverage does provide a 
telling, if imperfect, indicator of the availability and/or perceived credibility of news 
sources by journalists’ (Deacon 2008: 125). The degree of airtime allocated to actors 
during conflict is a continual concern as it offers the most basic yet obvious measure of 
reporting conflict –that is who is given access to speak, who is neglected and who is 
marginalised. Throughout the war, Al-Jazeera English ran a total of 978 mentions, direct 
quotations, paraphrased quotations, appearances, and interviews with various actors. 
The number was 1248 for Al-Jazeera Arabic, 385 for BBC World and 666 for BBC Arabic. It 
is important to note here that the content analysis coded up to 15 actors, however the 
analysis in Table 4.4 accounts for the five most prominently mentioned and/or quoted 
sources. The main reason behind this is the danger that the use of all 15 categories might 
cause the over-flooding of data in which the inclusion of all actors, even minor 
participants, might disguise those who had greater prominence. 
Overall, Palestinian voices received the most airtime (32%), followed by Israeli voices 
(29%). Interestingly, while both Al-Jazeera networks dedicated more airtime to quote and 
reference Palestinian actors, BBC outlets favoured Israeli voices. On AJE, Israeli voices 
took up 33 percent of all types of speech and Palestinian/Hamas voices took up 35 
percent. Unlike AJE, AJA’s figures had a more obvious disparity: 22 percent Israeli voice 
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and 34 Palestinian/Hamas voices. In a similar vein, BBC World News was more reliant on 
Israeli perspectives on the conflict, with a discrepancy of 11 percent. In terms of other 
voices, the Arabic-language networks dedicated a significant amount of airtime to 
regional sources, most significantly to Egyptian sources (4%) and Arab citizens (3%). These 
constituted 26 percent and 21 percent of AJA and BBC Arabic’s reporting respectively. 
BBC Networks also gave the International Community some priority, which formed 
almost 14% of BBC Arabic’s coverage and 13 percent of BBC World’s, considerably higher 
than the total average of 9%.      
Table 4.4: First 5 sources mentioned by broadcaster  
Actors Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic Total 
British source 17 37 21 18 93 
% within Media 2% 3% 6% 3% 3% 
Israeli source  324 270 155 191 940 
% within Media 33% 22% 40% 29% 29% 
Palestinian source 345 422 113 173 1053 
% within Media 35% 34% 29% 26% 32% 
Regional source 77 323 16 140 556 
% within Media 8% 26% 4% 21% 17% 
American source 79 15 17 20 131 
% within Media 8% 1% 4% 3% 4% 
International community source 91 62 48 96 297 
% within Media 9% 5% 13% 14% 9% 
International experts 21 63 5 7 96 
% within Media 2% 5% 1% 1% 3% 
International other 24 56 10 21 111 
% within Media 3% 5% 3% 3% 3% 
Total 978 1248 385 666 3277 
Note: All percentages are column percentages. These figures relate to all references made to sources including direct quotations, 
interviews, mere mentions, paraphrased quotations and appearances. Up to 15 actors were coded but only the first 5 are accounted 
for in this table, for reasons of prominence. Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding.    
 
Table 4.5 examines the extent to which Israeli, Palestinian and other sources were 
directly quoted (news access) in news coverage and reveals greater discrepancies 
between the two sides (Only on BBC Arabic coverage, and to a lesser extent on AJE, did 
the conflicting parties achieve comparable levels of quotations). Similarly, as with news 
presence, AJ networks dedicated more direct quotations to Palestinian sources and BBC 
networks were more inclined to directly quote Israeli sources. This higher prevalence of 
quotation is indicative of greater news access, and is even seen to bring significant 
definitional advantages on board. Most interesting are AJA’s and BBC World’s allocation 
of sources. The amount of direct speech dedicated to Palestinian voices on AJA was more 
than three times higher than the amount given to Israeli voices. Alternatively, Israeli 
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voices received almost twice the amount of direct speech on BBC World in comparison to 
Palestinian voices. Table 4.5 also compares the extent to which the same sources were 
mentioned and paraphrased. Paraphrased quotations, although less obvious, are 
considered to be as dominant as direct quotations as they too have the power to create 
an impact on audiences perceptions of the news. They are simply restatements of the 
quotations offered to news agencies but are presented in the words of the journalist. 
Although most channels offer comparable figures when paraphrasing quotations, the 
table below demonstrates that BBC World reveals a further gap in reporting actors by 
highlighting the Israeli narrative.  
Breaking down these figures further, it is useful to note that, of the Israeli voices heard, 
the Israeli Government accounted for more than 54 percent; and almost 36 percent came 
from the Israeli Army. Combined together, these figures alone amounted to 90 percent of 
all Israeli voices, giving the remaining sources only a slight chance to make their voices 
heard. Israeli civilians were rarely mentioned, let alone quoted. For the Palestinians, the 
figures were exactly reversed, with civilian voices making up 43 percent of all voices 
whilst Palestinian officials, such as the PLO, accounted for 12 percent. On the other hand, 
Hamas received a significant share of voices amounting to almost 35 percent of all 
Palestinian voices. Table 4.6 summarises these findings across the sampled television 
stations. Examining the channels successively, the figures display similar trends, with a 
few exceptions: unlike the majority of the sample, Israeli Army received more than 50 
percent of all types of Israeli speech on Al-Jazeera Arabic. This increased supremacy was 
also evident in the remaining channels but were more likely to give Israeli officials further 
precedence, with figures reaching more than 60 percent on BBC World and AJE. In terms 
of Palestinian voices, Palestinian civilians took up more than 50 percent of AJE’s content, 
but were also notably dominant on AJA and BBC World (46% and 46% respectively). 
Hamas voices also attracted an increased amount of coverage in all channels accounting 
for 46% and 43% of Palestinian speech on BBC World and BBC Arabic correspondingly. 
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Table 4.5: News presence and news access by broadcaster   
 
Note: These figures are similar to table 4.4 but the variables are split into three categories: News presence (P; mentioned only), News Access (A; directly quoted) and Paraphrased quotations (Par). News presence 
includes general mentions and appearances with no quotation. News Access includes direct quotations, interviews, and voice only. Finally Paraphrased includes paraphrased quotations. Figures may not add up to 
100 due to rounding. 
 
 
 
 
Actors Al-Jazeera English Al-Jazeera Arabic BBC World BBC Arabic Total 
P A Par P A Par P A Par P A Par P A Par 
British 
Sources 
2% 3% 1% 2% 3% 1% 3% 6% 2% 3% 4% 1% 3% 3% 1% 
Israeli 
Sources 
33% 30% 34% 22% 11% 27% 40% 32% 43% 31% 25% 39% 30% 23% 36% 
Palestinian 
Sources 
36% 35% 36% 36% 35% 33% 29% 18% 31% 29% 25% 33% 33% 30% 34% 
Regional 
Sources 
8% 7% 6% 27% 37% 27% 7% 21% 2% 18% 26% 10% 17% 23% 13% 
American 
Sources 
8% 11% 9% 2% 2% 2% 4% 2% 5% 3% 3% 2% 4% 5% 4% 
International 
Community 
9% 8% 11% 5% 4% 4% 13% 17% 11% 12% 13% 12% 9% 9% 9% 
International 
Experts 
2% 4% 1% 2% 3% 1% 2% 4% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2% 3% 1% 
International 
Other 
2% 2% 2% 4% 6% 4% 2% 1% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Total (10883) 
100% 
(3835) 
100% 
(1667) 
100% 
(12814) 
100% 
(4164) 
100% 
(2220) 
100% 
(5944) 
100% 
(1391) 
100% 
(1503) 
100% 
(10149) 
100% 
(3482) 
100% 
(1713) 
100% 
(39790) 
100% 
(12872) 
100% 
(6927) 
100% 
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Table 4.6: Breakdown of Israeli and Palestinian sources by broadcaster 
Note: These 
figures relate 
solely to 
Israeli and 
Palestinian 
sources and 
percentages 
are 
calculated in 
relation to 
one another 
and not to 
the whole 
sample. Thus 
Israeli voices 
alone add up 
to 100 and 
Palestinian 
voices alone 
add up to 
100. 
P: News 
Presence; A: 
News Access; 
Par: 
Paraphrased   
 
 
 
Israeli Actors Al-Jazeera English Al-Jazeera Arabic BBC World BBC Arabic Total 
P A Par P A Par P A Par P A Par P A Par 
Israeli 
Government 
64% 59% 67% 41% 52% 39% 61% 70% 62% 51% 39% 51% 54% 54% 55% 
Israeli Army 
 
25% 30% 27% 51% 35% 51% 31% 23% 32% 37% 43% 38% 36% 33% 37% 
Israel 
Security 
Forces 
8% 10% 5% 5% 10% 3% 8% 7% 7% 4% 6% 4% 6% 8% 5% 
Israeli Media 
 
0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 2% 1% 2% 1% 
Settlers 
 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
B’Teslem 
 
1% 0% 0% 2% 0% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
Israeli –Other 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 0% 0% 0% 4% 8% 3% 2% 3% 2% 
Total (3554) 
100% 
(1157) 
100% 
(572) 
100% 
(2858) 
100% 
(438) 
100% 
(601) 
100% 
(2359) 
100% 
(440) 
100% 
(644) 
100% 
(3156) 
100% 
(867) 
100% 
(667) 
100% 
(11927) 
100% 
(2902) 
100% 
(2484) 
100% 
Palestinian  P A Par P A Par P A Par P A Par P A Par 
Palestinian 
Factions 
3% 1% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 
PLO/Fatah 
 
15% 14% 17% 11% 9% 14% 4% 16% 3% 4% 16% 3% 12% 13% 12% 
Palestinian 
Fighters 
2% 2% 2% 8% 3% 18% 2% 0% 3% 2% 0% 3% 7% 5% 9% 
Hamas 
 
26% 17% 24% 34% 28% 42% 46% 34% 52% 46% 34% 52% 35% 28% 42% 
Hezbollah 
 
1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 7% 6% 6% 2% 2% 2% 
Academics-
Media 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Palestinian 
Civilians 
55% 65% 52% 46% 59% 25% 46% 47% 42% 22% 15% 21% 43% 51% 34% 
Total (3744) 
100% 
(1295) 
100% 
(586) 
100% 
(4519) 
100% 
(1570) 
100% 
(721) 
100% 
(1724) 
100% 
(238) 
100% 
(470) 
100% 
(2865) 
100% 
(896) 
100% 
(524) 
100% 
(12852) 
100% 
(3999) 
100% 
(2301) 
100% 
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In terms of news access, 93 percent of Israeli direct speech on BBC World came from 
Israeli Government and Army. To a lesser extent, the remaining channels had a similar 
spread in reporting Israeli sources shown in Table 4.6 below. Interestingly, when all other 
channels dedicated an extensive amount of airtime to Palestinian civilians, BBC Arabic 
gave it a mere significance of 15 percent. Both Al-Jazeera networks were seen to have 
devoted more efforts in quoting Palestinian civilians with figures reaching 65 percent on 
AJE. In terms of news access, BBC networks, especially BBC Arabic, proved to have 
dedicated the greatest amount of airspace to quote Hamas sources. More airtime was 
given to Hamas sources than the PLO across the examined networks.   
Table 4.7 presents a more thorough breakdown of actors and the frequencies of which 
they appeared in relation to BBC and Al-Jazeera. Although Hamas sources were given 
almost 13 percent of BBC World’s airtime (46% of Palestinian voices), on very few 
occasions did they attain direct speech and/or interviews; and almost 59 percent of 
airtime dedicated to Hamas sources were merely brief mentions of their acts and actors. 
Of the remaining 41 percent, only 10 of which were direct quotations and/or interviews, 
the rest were paraphrased excerpts. Hamas sources received 11 percent of BBC Arabic’s 
news (43% of Palestinian voices) but were given a fair amount of direct speech and/or 
interviews in comparison to other networks (17% in relation to 8% on AJE and 14% on 
AJA). Although more references were made to Hamas sources on AJ networks than on 
BBC, AJE had the lowest percentage in terms of news access.   
There are a number of possible explanations for this disparity in reporting Hamas: firstly, 
given Hamas fighters and officials intentionally kept themselves away from the camera, 
the broadcaster had little option but to interview civilians. Secondly, Israel is a more 
stable country and access to official military and political spokespeople is comparatively 
easy to arrange. Such access in Gaza was problematic; bearing in mind Palestinian 
political and military leaders were not always seen to speak on behalf of the protagonist 
(Hamas). Put another way, broadcasters would not have considered a statement from a 
Palestinian minister as a direct counterbalance to a statement from an Israeli government 
spokesperson. Third, Hamas in Palestine had been categorised as a terrorist group by 
Israel, the US and their allies, regardless of its authenticity as a democratically elected 
government (Atawneh 2009: 266), thus to interview a potential “terrorist” would be 
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regarded as an inept act on BBC’s behalf. Finally, Philo and Berry explained that since 
9/11 Israel has capitalised upon its role as part of the ‘war against terror’ and by doing so, 
they assert, Israel has presented itself as one part of the Western Alliance (Philo and 
Berry 2004: 249). They argue that this shares parallels with BBC’s reporting; especially 
apparent when news practices such as featuring Israeli government officials (‘our’ side of 
the story) and reporting whatever they say as facts are employed. 
 
Despite the authenticity behind this, journalists from Al-Jazeera Arabic and BBC Arabic 
were able to gain access to Hamas officials. Pertinently, more than half of the times 
Hamas statements were broadcasted on BBC Arabic they were either directly quoted or 
paraphrased. In this respect, it is reasonable to suggest that BBC World had the same 
opportunities but chose not to exploit them. In effect, it creates a certain ambivalence on 
behalf of the journalist regarding the topic of ‘who gains status in Gaza’. BBC World’s 
marginalised reporting of Palestinian officials  raises questions on the disputable 
controversy surrounding the expression of ‘the stateless condition of the Palestinians’; 
neither Hamas nor Fatah are recognised as sources of power or authority in the 
Palestinian state. By ignoring Hamas official’s right to defend their acts, the dominant 
Western narrative that the Israelis are struggling to defend their own existence and the 
Palestinians are simply militants always at fault will continue to prevail.  
 
However, is also important to note that AJE had minimal references to Hamas sources (8 
percent, see Table 4.21) –even slighter than BBC World. Beside the reasons suggested 
above, this can be viewed as a relational trend which involves the apparent construal that 
Hamas’s news presence was not as frequent as those of the Israeli Government in 
International news organisations –BBC World and AJE in the case of this study. As one 
might suggest this relates to the organisations’ internal editorial polices and strategies, 
acknowledging that different audiences have varied acceptances and recognitions of 
Hamas as a movement; externally (far away from the organisations’ journalistic practices) 
it also relates to the small number of Hamas officials who are able to transmit their 
messages across in English confidently. Also, given that foreign journalists were banned 
from entering Gaza throughout the duration of the war, acquiring an interview with 
Hamas members was almost very tough to achieve.             
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Figure 4.6: Top 5 actors referenced by broadcaster 
Al-Jazeera English 
1- Palestinian Civilians (20%) 
2- Israeli Government (20%) 
3- Hamas (8%) 
4- Israeli Army (8%) 
5- American Government (6%) 
Al-Jazeera English 
 
1- Palestinian Civilians (15%) 
2- Hamas (12%) 
3- Israeli Army (11%) 
4- Israeli Government (8%) 
5- Regional –other Arab countries (7%) 
BBC World 
1- Israeli Government (24%) 
2- Palestinian Civilians (13%) 
3- Hamas (13%) 
4- Israeli Army (12%) 
5- UN (8%) 
BBC Arabic 
 
1- Israeli Government (15%) 
2- Hamas (11%) 
3- Israeli Army (11%) 
4- Egypt (7%) 
5- Palestinian Civilians (7%) 
 
Table 4.7: a breakdown of all actors by broadcaster 
Actors Al-Jazeera 
English 
(%) 
Al-Jazeera BBC 
World 
BBC 
Arabic 
Total 
British source –government  1% 0% 2% 1% 1% 
Solidarity groups –UK  1% 2% 0% 1% 1% 
Human right groups/Think tanks –UK  0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Other –UK  0% 0%  0% 2% 1% 
Israeli Government 20% 9% 24% 15% 15% 
Israeli Army 8% 11% 12% 11% 10% 
Israeli security forces 3% 1% 3% 1% 2% 
Israeli Media 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Settlers 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Peace now/Rabbis for Human Rights/B’teslem 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other –Israel 0% 0% 0% 2% 1% 
Palestinian Factions 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
PLO 5% 4% 3% 4% 4% 
Palestinian fighters 1% 3% 1% 3% 2% 
Hamas 8% 12% 13% 11% 11% 
Hezbollah 0% 0% 1% 2% 1% 
Academics/Media –Palestinian  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Palestinian civilians 20% 15% 13% 7% 15% 
Other –Palestinian 1% 0% 1% 2% 1% 
Arab citizens 1% 6% 1% 2% 3% 
Syria 0% 1% 4% 2% 2% 
Jordan 1% 2% 0% 1% 1% 
Lebanon 0% 1% 0% 2% 1% 
Egypt 1% 6% 0% 7% 4% 
Iran 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Al-Qaida 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 
Turkey  0% 2% 0%  0% 1% 
Qatar 0% 2% 0% 1% 1% 
Other –regional 3% 7% 0% 3% 4% 
American government 6% 7% 4% 2% 3% 
Other –US  1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
EU 1% 1% 1% 0% 1%  
UN 6% 2% 8% 6% 5% 
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Human Rights 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
International Lawyers 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Weapons Experts 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Arab League 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 
Media/Experts (International) 1% 3% 2% 1% 2% 
International leaders 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 
Western citizens 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Relief Agencies 1% 1% 3% 2% 2% 
Other –International  2% 3% 0% 1% 1% 
Total 1396 1701 634 1103 4834 
 
Palestinian civilians were frequently mentioned on all 4 channels. However, the figures 
were much more prominent on Al-Jazeera, with its English-language channel giving it up 
to 20% of its air time (amounting to almost 55% of Palestinian voices), less frequent was 
AJA, in which Palestinian civilians took up 15 percent of its airspace (reaching 44% of 
Palestinian voices). Of the air space allowed to Palestinian civilians on Al-Jazeera, 56 
percent were of direct speech and interviews on AJE and 47% on AJA. BBC Arabic was the 
least likely to mention Palestinian civilians on their screens (7%), and featured, in a similar 
light, the least amount of direct speech and interviews with Palestinian civilians (6%). 
References to ‘Israeli Government’ were more prominent on the English-language 
channels, giving it almost 20 percent of airtime on AJE and just over 24 percent on BBC 
World (Table 4.7). Figures on the Arabic language channels were 9 percent on AJA and 15 
percent on BBC Arabic. This is also true with direct speech and interviews. ‘Israeli 
Government’ took up only 9 percent of AJA’s sources, 17 percent of which were of direct 
speech and/or interview. References to ‘Israeli Army’ were almost equally distributed 
among the four networks. However, just like ‘Israeli Government’, BBC World gave ‘Israeli 
Army’ more magnitude than did the remaining channels. BBC networks had more direct 
references and interviews to ‘Israeli Army’ than did AJ. Ultimately, only 5 percent of the 
references made to ‘Israeli Army’ on AJA were direct speeches and/or interviews.  
Finally, the English-language networks granted the United Nations a significant amount of 
airtime. Mostly, UN members or statements were directly quoted, interviewed or 
paraphrased
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Table 4.8: a breakdown of all actors by broadcaster 
 
Actors Al-Jazeera English Al-Jazeera Arabic BBC World BBC Arabic Total 
P A Par P A Par P A Par P A Par P A Par 
Israeli 
Government 
26% 23% 28% 12% 7% 15% 31% 37% 32% 24% 15% 27% 22% 17% 25% 
Israeli Army 
 
10% 11% 11% 15% 5% 20% 16% 12% 16% 17% 17% 20% 14% 11% 17% 
Hamas 
 
11% 8% 10% 16% 14% 20% 17% 10% 20% 18% 17% 21% 15% 12% 18% 
Palestinian 
Civilians 
23% 28% 22% 22% 30% 12% 17% 14% 16% 9% 6% 9% 19% 22% 15% 
PLO 
 
6% 6% 7% 5% 4% 6% 1% 5% 1% 6% 8% 5% 5% 6% 5% 
Arab Citizens 
 
1% 1% 1% 9% 13% 5% 1% 2% 0% 2% 2% 0% 4% 5% 2% 
Regional -
Other 
2% 2% 2% 7% 8% 10% 0% 0% 0% 11% 19% 7% 5% 8% 5% 
Egypt 
 
3% 3% 2% 9% 15% 6% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 2% 5% 7% 3% 
US 
Government 
9% 11% 9% 2% 2% 3% 5% 3% 6% 3% 2% 2% 5% 5% 5% 
United 
Nations 
7% 7% 7% 3% 2% 3% 11% 19% 9% 8% 9% 6% 7% 7% 6% 
Total (8732) 
100% 
(3010) 
100% 
(1377) 
100% 
(9489) 
100% 
(3115) 
100% 
(1541) 
100% 
(4610) 
100% 
(834) 
100% 
(1241) 
100% 
(6709) 
100% 
(2202) 
100% 
(1274) 
100% 
(29540) 
100% 
(9161) 
100% 
(5433) 
100% 
Note: These figures are similar to table 4.4 but the variables are split into three categories: News presence (P; mentioned only), News Access (A; Directly quoted) and Paraphrased quotations (Par). News presence 
includes general mentions and appearances with no quotation. News Access includes direct quotations, interviews, and voice only. Finally Paraphrased includes paraphrased quotations. Figures may not add up to 
100 due to rounding
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After considering the above analysis, Tables 4.9 and 4.10 chart an evaluation of the 
extent to which preferences or avoidances of some actors constituted statistically 
significant variances. The results presented in the tables below relate to news presence 
only and does not differentiate between references and quotations. It is interesting to 
note that Israeli sources were more prominent in the English language channels 
compared to the Arabic ones. Most notably, as shown in Table 4.9, 81 percent of BBC 
World’s items featured at least one Israeli actor; such disparity was proven to be 
statistically significant (0.000). Palestinian actors, on the other hand, were mentioned in 
69 percent of BBC World’s items but had a comparable distribution throughout the 
sample. As mentioned above, Regional sources were exhaustively mentioned on the 
Arabic-language stations and were referenced in more than 30 percent of the items, also 
demonstrated to be statically consequential. Finally, both BBC services gave actors from 
the International Community more airtime than did Al-Jazeera.        
 
Table 4.9: Chi-square testing of sources by broadcaster 
 Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic Significance 
testing (Chi-
square test) 
British Sources 4% 
9 
4% 
12 
9% 
8 
6% 
9 
0.208 
Israeli Sources 58% 
132 
41% 
122 
81% 
72 
55% 
80 
0.000 
Palestinian 
Sources 
60% 
136 
56% 
167 
69% 
61 
53% 
77 
0.094 
Regional Sources 21% 
47 
35% 
104 
8% 
7 
30% 
44 
0.000 
American 
Sources 
12% 
28 
3% 
10 
11% 
10 
7% 
10 
0.001 
International 
Community 
23% 
51 
11% 
33 
30% 
27 
30% 
43 
0.000 
International 
Experts/Media 
4% 
8 
8% 
23 
5% 
4 
3% 
4 
0.072 
International –
other  
8% 
17 
9% 
26 
10% 
9 
8% 
11 
0.864 
Note: Percentages: the number of items that mentioned a source divided by the number of items that mentioned any of the sources 
multiplied by 100. All percentages are rounded and totals may therefore either exceed or not add up to 100. The first 15 actors were 
coded in a single item.  
 
Table 4.10 demonstrates that most variations in reporting actors are of statistical 
significance. These values provide striking results; predictably, of all items relevant to 
Gaza, BBC World dedicated a considerable amount of airtime to report on Israeli 
Government (mentioned in 62% of items) and Israeli Army (mentioned in 43% of items). 
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Again, BBC World featured Hamas members in 42% of its items –but as has already been 
established these were only mere mentions and hardly ever direct quotations. Although 
BBC World dedicated minimal airtime to quote Palestinian civilians, they were mentioned 
in 37 percent of its items –constituting the highest figure among the sample –followed by 
AJE forming 35 percent of items. The analysis, so far, reveals that regional locations and 
sources received more attention from the Arabic language channels, especially the case 
with BBC Arabic. Yet, although 10 percent of AJA’s items incorporated Arab citizens’ 
voices, such voices were prevalent in simply 4 percent of BBC Arabic’s items.       
 
Table 4.10: Chi-square testing by broadcaster 
 Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic Significance 
testing (Chi-
square test) 
Israeli 
Government 
45% 
101 
24% 
71 
62% 
55 
39% 
57 
0.000 
Israeli Army 24% 
55 
25% 
74 
43% 
38 
28% 
40 
0.005 
Hamas 21% 
47 
28% 
85 
42% 
37 
26% 
37 
0.002 
Palestinian 
civilians 
35% 
79 
27% 
82 
37% 
33 
19% 
27 
0.002 
PLO 12% 
27 
9% 
27 
9% 
8 
8% 
12 
0.619 
Arab citizens 4% 
8 
10% 
31 
2% 
2 
4% 
6 
0.002 
Note: Percentages: the number of items that mentioned a source divided by the number of items that mentioned any of the sources 
multiplied by 100. All percentages are rounded and totals may therefore either exceed or not add up to 100. The first 15 actors were 
coded in a single item. 
 
Themes 
The climax or end of the story comes first. Given a schedule of facts to arrange in 
the form of a newspaper article, the writer selects the most important fact or 
climax of the story and puts it at the beginning. The second most important fact 
comes second, the third most important fact third and so on (MacDougall 1987 
cited in Thomson et al. 2010: 62). 
News anchors and correspondents employ news frames to classify, prioritise and map the 
narrative flow of events. They entail key concepts, discursive lexicons and stereotyped 
images to draw and uphold common threads of interpreting developments. The act of 
selection by highlighting some facts, events or developments, and leaving others in the 
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shadows in order to promote a certain line of thought is at the heart of journalistic 
objectivity. ‘Reporters can 'tell it like it is' within 60 seconds, rapidly sorting key events 
from surrounding trivia, by drawing on reservoirs of familiar stories to cue readers. New 
developments are understood within regular patterns’ (Norris 1995: 2). To this end, one 
of the most contentious aspects of the coverage of any war is the way in which the 
narrative is constructed through selected themes that define the reporting. 
In terms of themes, the analysis reveals that the reporting of Gaza was dominated by 
conflict and military action (see Table 4.11). Thirty one percent of items specifically 
reported Israeli military action as a primary theme, followed by Diplomatic/political 
efforts by the International Community (27%). Also prominent, but less notable, is 
Palestinian/Hamas experiences and conditions which focused on the direct impact of the 
war on Gaza and its population, this featured in nearly 14 percent of the items. Coverage 
of the direct impact of the war on Israel and its civilians constituted 3 percent of the 
content. This might appear to represent a disparity in coverage favouring the Palestinian 
side but, when the disparity in casualties is taken into account –a ratio of 100 Gazan 
casualties to every Israeli casualty –the figures suggest an increased emphasis on Israeli 
victims. 
Table 4.11: A summary of themes/News frames by broadcaster 
Themes Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC 
World 
BBC 
Arabic 
Total 
Israeli/IDF Military Agency 304 314 155 182 955 
% within Media 35% 30% 35% 26% 31% 
Palestinian/Hamas Military Agency  29 59 38 40 166 
% within Media 3% 6% 9% 6% 5% 
Israeli/IDF political Agency 6 8 2 11 27 
% within Media 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 
Palestinian/Hamas Political Agency 50 107 14 25 196 
% within Media 6% 10% 3% 4% 6% 
Israeli/IDF experiences/conditions 27 19 22 26 94 
% within Media 3% 2% 5% 4% 3% 
Palestinian/Hamas experiences/conditions 139 137 65 90 431 
% within Media 16% 13% 15% 13% 14% 
International community –Military 2 7 0 6 15 
% within Media 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
International community –diplomatic/political 210 296 106 206 818 
% within Media 24% 28% 24% 30% 27% 
International community –Humanitarian 22 28 8 18 76 
% within Media 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 
Other theme 85 79 30 90 284 
% within Media 10% 8% 7% 13% 9% 
Total 874 1054 440 694 3062 
Note: these are general themes and act as headings. All sub- themes falling under one of the headings above were counted. Figures 
may not add up to 100 due to rounding. These include the first 8 themes mentioned in a single news item 
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Within the Arabic and English services, the figures were similar. Israeli military action, 
diplomatic/political efforts and Palestinian/Hamas conditions and experiences were the 
three primary mentioned themes on all channels; however comparisons are more 
obvious across cultural and national boundaries (i.e. between the Arabic-language 
channels and the English-languages ones). Table 4.11 gives a detailed examination of 
these themes in relation to Al-Jazeera and BBC. Israeli military action was given great 
prominence by all channels, more apparent on the English language networks. BBC Arabic 
gave it less airtime and focused on diplomatic/political efforts by the International 
Community (30%). Predictably, Palestinian military agency was given some significance by 
BBC networks –albeit less dramatically on BBC Arabic. Al-Jazeera Arabic also gave it some 
priority (6%). In terms of Palestinian experiences and conditions, the figures were high for 
all 4 channels, especially so with AJE and BBC World (16% and 15% respectively). Finally, 
BBC networks gave Israeli experiences and conditions more coverage than did Al-Jazeera 
but were overall given significantly low prominence.       
Another way of testing significance is the running order. The last indicator of editorial 
priority concerns the order in which stories are reported and what is given headline 
treatment. 'Headlines' in this study are defined by the first three themes mentioned in a 
news story. This is especially true since prototypically, news organisations employ what is 
referred to as the “inverted pyramid” structure, an arrangement in which the ‘most 
important information’ is in the lead and progressively ‘less important information’ 
follows after. It is frequently held that ‘authorial neutrality and the inverted pyramid 
structure are key factors in the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the modern hard news 
report as text type’ (Thomson et al. 2010: 61). Having said that, Table 4.12 illustrates that 
the distribution of items display very similar patterns over time and that what is 
considered breaking news is afterwards elaborated upon. In the words of Rich,   
The most common type of lead on hard-news story is called a “summary lead” 
because it summarizes the main points about what happened. It answers the 
questions who, what, when, where, why and how. The rest of the story elaborates 
on the what, why, and how (Rich 2000: 35 cited in Thomson et al. 2010: 62). 
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Table 4.12: First 3 themes mentioned by broadcaster 
Themes Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic 
Israeli/IDF Military Agency 207 228 89 86 
% within Media 36% 30% 36% 22% 
Palestinian/Hamas Military Agency  19 33 17 20 
% within Media 3% 4% 7% 5% 
Israeli/IDF political Agency 4 5 2 5 
% within Media 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Palestinian/Hamas Political Agency 40 81 8 16 
% within Media 7% 11% 3% 4% 
Israeli/IDF experiences/conditions 19 10 14 13 
% within Media 3% 1% 6% 3% 
Palestinian/Hamas experiences/conditions 92 97 29 51 
% within Media 16% 13% 12% 13% 
International community –Military 1 5 0 4 
% within Media 0% 1% 0% 1% 
International community –diplomatic/political 138 213 72 137 
% within Media 24% 28% 29% 35% 
International community –Humanitarian 11 21 4 10 
% within Media 2% 3% 2% 3% 
Other theme 51 56 16 49 
% within Media 9% 8% 6% 13% 
Total 582 749 251 391 
Note: these are general themes and act as headings. All sub- themes falling under one of the headings above were counted. Figures 
may not add up to 100 due to rounding. These include the first 3 themes mentioned in a news item. 
 
 
Table 4.14 offers a breakdown of the themes and allows us to grasp a better 
understanding of the selected themes as they unfold on the news. It presents a detailed 
list of the themes covered during the sampled war period. These can be categorised 
under three main headings, two of which will be the focus of the following two analysis 
chapters (Chapters 5 and 6). These are: Provocation, Proportionality and Peace (Table 
4.13).  
Table 4.13: the three P’s: Provocation, Proportionality and Peace by broadcaster 
News Frames Al-Jazeera E Al-Jazeera A BBC World BBC Arabic Total 
Provocation 9% 8% 9% 9% 9% 
Proportionality 49% 46% 51% 42% 48% 
Peace 28% 27% 28% 32% 29% 
Other 14% 19% 12% 17 16% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Provocation looks at how issues of culpability and responsibility for the war were 
reported in the conflict (see Chapter 5). Put simply, it seeks to assess which side was seen 
as most culpable for precipitating the war. Proportionality examines the extent to which 
the actions of the protagonists were portrayed as being justified, proportionate and 
legitimate (see Chapter 6). It may well be the case that, in some instances, the actions of 
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a protagonist may be deemed legitimate with regard to provocation, but illegitimate with 
regard to their proportionality.  Finally, Peace focuses on debates about conflict 
resolution issues, and what is required to achieve an effective and just settlement 
between the warring parties. This stage too can involve considerable debate and 
contestation, with different views taken as to what is required to achieve equilibrium, 
ranging from the simple requirement that each desist from dispatching ordinance into 
either or each others’ territories, through to calls for a comprehensive agreement on 
Palestinian demands for nationhood.        
Themes related to Provocation were marginalised in the items sampled, constituting only 
9 percent of the coverage. Such finding can be partly explained by the missing data from 
the first 4 days of the war in the sample. Under provocation, Hamas’s role in Gaza 
received a considerable amount of coverage by all channels. On the basis of statistical 
analysis alone, it is only possible to speculate as to the reasons for this as it does not 
allow us to delve deeper into the analysis to produce more qualitative examination of 
how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ the role of Hamas was portrayed in the sample. The right of return of 
Palestinian refugees constituted 1 percent of the content of news and was mentioned 
only once on BBC World throughout the 18 days sample period.   
In terms of the humanitarian situation, casualties conflicted on both sides, and 
accusations of war crimes, which we term here Proportionality, the English-language 
channels (AJE and BBC World) gave greater prominence to such attributes than did their 
sister Arabic-language networks (Al-Jazeera Arabic and BBC Arabic). Most significantly 
was BBC World’s coverage which dedicated more than 50% of its coverage to war 
violence and casualties. The overall percentage of proportionality is 48 percent.   
The ground incursion and general attacks on Gaza, non-Hamas properties and Palestinian 
civilians were the most prominent on all 4 channels. Although Al-Jazeera networks had 
greater references to these issues, constituting 36 percent of AJE’s coverage and 41 
percent of AJA’s coverage, BBC networks also gave them some significance (29 percent 
and 28 percent on BBC World and BBC Arabic respectively). Israeli attacks against UN 
properties and specifically schools were the focus of AJE, being referred to in more the 7 
percent of its items. It also gave great significance to illegal use of weapons, interviewed 
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experts on its legitimacy and risks and constructed very informative reports on the 
dangerous hazards white phosphorus produce. Such reports made up 6 percent of AJE’s 
reporting in comparison to just over 3 percent on BBC World (which gave it the least 
amount of coverage). 
Al-Jazeera networks (both Arabic and English) featured more reports on Palestinian 
casualties than did the BBC (12% on AJE, and 11% on AJA in comparison to 7% on BBC 
World and 9% on BBC Arabic). These were also accompanied with graphic and gruesome 
images of the dead and wounded; more horrific on Al-Jazeera Arabic (see Chapter 6). 
Gaza’s humanitarian crisis was featured more prominently on the English-language 
channels (9% on AJE and 11% on BBC World). Validations by Israeli officials during the 
war with Hamas were of great significance, these included: 1) Israel wants to counter the 
rocket attack from Gaza and stop it once and for all for the security of its citizens, 2) 
Hamas uses civilian infrastructure to fire rockets at Israeli towns, and 3) Israel is doing its 
utmost best to avoid civilian casualties. Table 4.7 shows that BBC World was the only 
channel to highlight these objectives. On the 3rd of January alone, such statements were 
mentioned at least 10 times by presenters and correspondents explaining Israel’s 
decision to carry out a ground incursion. Such themes made up 9 percent of BBC World’s 
coverage.  
Finally, Peace made up 34 percent of the content of news during the Gaza War. The main 
news story referred to here was: Diplomatic efforts which, overall, attracted the most 
media coverage in the sample (8%), and were consistently imperative in all 4 channels 
especially so with the Arabic-language networks (9% and 11% on AJA and BBC Arabic 
respectively). Followed by ceasefire agreements/truces/end of fighting/Israeli Army pull-
outs, which made up 6 percent of the content of news, and were particularly dominant 
on the English-language channels (7% on AJE and an increase to 9% on BBC World). The 
other main story frames mentioned in this section were as follows: Palestinian 
humanitarian aid which was also evenly significant across BBC and Al-Jazeera; and anti-
war demonstrations which were shown to be very ‘newsworthy’ on AJA forming 8 
percent of the coverage, considerably higher than the total average of 5%. Al-Jazeera’s 
international coverage of anti-war demonstrations was an everyday ritual covering as 
many regional and international countries as possible.      
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The following two chapters will discursively and semantically examine provocation and 
proportionality in more depth. Regardless of the percentage of items allocated to each 
category, the themes were selected with accordance to their proximity to the actual 
events on the ground. Provocation forms the basis for the analysis as it sets the 
foundations for interpreting and understanding the media frames adopted by the 
examined networks in relation to the protagonists, the events of the war and the manner 
in which they are portrayed and formulated. It follows that proportionality evaluates the 
legitimacy and authenticity of such media frames, thereby providing a schematic 
representation for comparison. Even though peace is equally imperative to the 
understanding of war reporting and although it constitutes a large proportion of items, 
external factors as such, are beyond the scope of this thesis and what it hopes to achieve. 
Table 4.14: a breakdown of all News Frames by broadcaster 
Themes Al-Jazeera 
English 
(%) 
Al-Jazeera BBC 
World 
BBC 
Arabic 
Total 
Diplomatic efforts 7% 9% 5% 11% 8% 
Ceasefire/truces/End of fighting/pull-outs 7% 4% 9% 5% 6% 
Right of return of Palestinian refugees 2% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
Blockades/Siege/barriers – 
IDF restrictions on movement 
2% 3% 1% 2% 2% 
IDF against Schools/universities – 
UN property 
3% 1% 3% 2% 2% 
IDF against Hamas private property/person 1% 2% 2% 1% 2%  
IDF against mosque/Media centre/hospital 
Heath centre/private property 
5% 3% 2% 2% 3% 
IDF against Gaza general 4% 3% 4%  4% 4% 
IDF against person/civilian 4% 3% 2% 1% 3%  
IDF propaganda war 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Hamas against public property/civilians 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Hamas against government property 2% 4% 4% 2% 3% 
Hamas against property/other/all attacks on 
Property 
0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
Hamas against persons/soldier 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Hamas against propaganda war 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Bombs/Mortar attacks in Israel 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
Intra-Israeli politics 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Intra-Israeli violence 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Intra-Palestinian politics 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Intra-Palestinian violence 2% 1% 3% 2% 2% 
Role of US/US backing Israel 1% 4% 2% 2% 2% 
Role of Others 3% 1% 2% 3% 2% 
Role of UN 2% 3% 1% 3% 2% 
Role of Arab league 1% 1% 0% 2% 1% 
Historical background to present conflict 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 
Boycott Israel 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
Role of Media 3% 3% 2%  3% 3% 
Humanitarian aid: Palestinians 4% 3% 5% 3% 4% 
Humanitarian crisis: Palestinians 3% 1% 1% 2% 2% 
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IDF use of weapons 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 
Tunnel issue 1% 0% 2% 2% 1% 
Funeral: ordinary Palestinian citizens 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Funeral: Hamas officials 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 
Funeral: Israeli soldiers 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Ground Incursion/street fighting/air-strikes 7% 10% 8% 5% 8% 
Demonstrations: pro-war 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Demonstrations: anti-war 4% 8% 3% 2% 5% 
Hospitals conditions in Gaza/ambulance 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 
Israeli public opinion 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
Palestinian public opinion 1% 0% 0% (0% 0% 
Israeli casualties 1% 2% 2% 3% 2% 
Palestinians casualties 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Security –Israel   1% 0% 2% 1% 1% 
Palestinian resistance 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Israel –Stop rockets from Gaza 
Counter Hamas (retaliation) 
1% 1% 4% 1% 1% 
Role of Arab countries 1% 4% 1% 3% 2% 
Hamas’s role in Gaza 2% 3% 2% 1% 2% 
Hamas using civilian infrastructure to fire 
rockets at Israel 
1% 0% 2% 1% 1% 
Israel avoids Hamas casualties 0% 0% 3% 0% 1% 
War crimes 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
3 hour corridor/flyers/international troops 
on borders 
2% 1% 3% 3% 2% 
3
rd
 Stage 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Jihad 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Other themes 8% 7% 6% 11% 8% 
Total 874 1054 440 694 3062 
 
As with voices, Table 4.15 below offers a comparative analysis of the percentages to 
which basic news frames surfaced in news items, in conjunction with significance testing. 
The purpose of this is to test the extent to which the emergence, marginalisation and 
avoidance of news frames are statistically significant. Given Israeli Military Action was the 
dominant theme in all 4 channels, the figures below illustrate that the English-language 
services reported on Israeli actions in more than 60 percent of their items. Another 
statistically significant disparity is Palestinian Political Action; but as one might anticipate, 
these were mentioned in 23 percent of AJA’s items –9% higher than on AJE, which came 
in next. While Palestinian Experiences/conditions were expressed deeply in the sample, 
Israeli Experiences/Conditions featured less prominently. However, Table 4.15 explicates 
that Israeli Experiences/conditions featured in 14 percent of BBC World’s items and in 
only 3 percent of AJA’s items. Such discrepancies in figures were proven to be statistically 
significant. An interesting observation is BBC Arabic’s comprehensive reporting of 
Political frames of the International Community; over 50 percent of its items mentioned 
diplomatic efforts and/or ceasefire agreements.  
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Table 4.15: Chi-square testing by broadcaster 
 Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic Significance 
testing (Chi-
square test) 
Israeli Military Action 
 
60% 
135 
51% 
151 
63% 
56 
45% 
65 
0.008 
Palestinian Military 
Action 
8% 
19 
11% 
32 
18% 
16 
12% 
18 
0.101 
Israeli Political Action 2% 
4 
2% 
5 
2% 
2 
3% 
5 
0.642 
Palestinian Political 
Action 
14% 
32 
23% 
69 
9% 
13 
10% 
15 
0.000 
Israeli 
Experiences/Conditions 
8% 
18 
3% 
10 
14% 
12 
9% 
13 
0.004 
Palestinian 
Experiences/Conditions 
35% 
79 
28% 
84 
32% 
28 
29% 
42 
0.395 
International 
Community – Military 
0% 
1 
2% 
5 
0% 
0 
3% 
4 
0.162 
International 
Community – Political 
42% 
95 
45% 
133 
48% 
43 
56% 
81 
0.053 
International 
Community – 
Humanitarian 
5% 
11 
7% 
21 
5% 
4 
7% 
10 
0.651 
Other 20% 
46 
17% 
51 
15% 
14 
30.% 
44 
0.007 
Note: Percentages: the number of items which contained a given theme divided by the number of items multiplied by 100. All 
percentages are rounded and totals may therefore either exceed or not add up to 100. Only the top 8 themes found for each 
broadcaster are presented.  
 
Use of language 
Fowler (1991: 209) argues that the manner in which language is put to use in news 
practices is ‘inevitably a structured process’ which, if investigated correctly, should reveal 
the ideologies, values and ‘implicit propositions’ showing that ‘the discourse is always a 
representation from a certain point of view’ (Barkho 2010: 127). The choice of words and 
labels when reporting the Middle East conflict is crucial. Therefore, ‘to capture the 
language is essential to both sides in the conflict (and their allies), as idiosyncratic 
language can significantly influence the ways in which viewers interpret the conflict’ 
(Gaber et al. 2009: 254-5).  
Table 4.16 below offers a list of terms and phrases that were used in the coverage of the 
war to describe the protagonists, fighters and civilians amidst the dust of war, as well as 
the locations of which attacks took place. Among the most basic, yet imperative, 
terminologies when reporting the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict are ‘Palestine’, ‘Israel’, 
‘Palestinians’ and ‘Israelis’. The analysis shows that all channels tended to avoid using the 
word Palestine and opted for the ‘Gaza Strip’ instead. However, Al-Jazeera Arabic was the 
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most television service to briefly mention Palestine, and BBC world was the only service 
to refrain from using the term at all. It is also statistically clear that BBC World was the 
channel with the most references to the word ‘Israel’ (26%). When compared with ‘Gaza’, 
interesting findings emerge –given that the war was seen to be proceeding in Gaza –all 
channels, but BBC World, dedicated greater references to the term ‘Gaza’ than to ‘Israel’. 
In this respect, another notable finding relates to the sharp variation in Al-Jazeera 
Arabic’s reporting, the term ‘Gaza’ occupied almost 40 percent of this section’s 
terminology, in comparison to the term ‘Israel’ which took up 13 percent. This is 
understandable, given the majority of the fighting took place in Gaza, but one is left to 
question BBC World’s reporting, and the reasons to why the words ‘Israel’ and ‘Israeli’ 
amounted to almost 50 percent of the lexicon employed and the words ‘Palestine’ and 
‘Palestinians’ accounted to less than 10 percent –even if the term ‘Gaza Strip’ is to be 
added to the figure, the percentage for Israel is still greater. However, it is, also, plausible 
to assume that the term ‘Israeli’ could act as a dependent variable. Given foreign 
journalists were banned from entering Gaza by Israeli authorities, BBC World had no 
choice but to report from Israeli locations, hence the term ‘Israeli’. In similar lines, Israeli 
sources, for one reason or another, were given more air space on BBC World, thus the 
acts of introducing Israeli actors or directly quoting Israeli sources alone, requires BBC 
World to incorporate several mentions of the term ‘Israeli’ or ‘Israel’.        
 
Table 4.16: use of Lexicon by broadcaster (%)  
Lexicon Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic Total Significant 
testing 
Palestine 
 
1% 2% 0% 1% 1% 0.002 
Israel 21% 
 
13% 26% 20% 19% 0.000 
Palestinian(s) 14% 
 
17% 9% 15% 15% 0.029 
Israeli(s) 17% 
 
22% 20% 18% 19% 0.335 
Occupied 
Territories  
0% 
 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0.533 
Disputed 
Territories 
0% 
 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0.673 
Palestinian 
Territories 
3% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0.022 
 
Gaza Strip 30% 39% 28% 26% 32% 0.115 
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Gazans 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.033 
 
Hamas 13% 7% 17% 16% 12% 0.000 
 
IDF –Israeli 
Defence Forces 
2% 0% 1% 3% 2% 0.000 
 
Note: Percentages are calculated within one another and not in relation to the whole sample. The number of times a given term is 
mentioned divided by the number of items all terms are mentioned multiplied by 100. Figures might not add up 100 due to rounding 
 
Controversial words as ‘terror’, ‘terrorist’, and ‘terrorism’ were more likely to be 
mentioned on the English-language channels, however, it is worth noting here that these 
terms never came from the journalists themselves but were always attributed. Gaber et 
al. quotes the BBC’s editorial guidelines in their article, which states that ‘The word 
“terrorist” itself can be a barrier rather than an aid to understanding. We should try to 
avoid the term without attribution. We should let other people characterize while we 
report the facts as we know them’ (BBC, 2006: 12 cited in Gaber et al. 2009: 254-5). 
However, as Table 4.17 explains, almost 82 percent of the times the words ‘militants’ and 
‘extremists’ referring to Palestinians, were mentioned on BBC –53% on BBC World alone. 
It is interesting to note that terms like ‘militants’ and ‘extremists’ referring to Israeli 
sources/actions were never mentioned on BBC World or any other network in this regard.   
One issue for news organisations relate to the issue of who holds power to make key 
decisions on questions like, which acts of extreme violence are to be represented as 
terrorism. In any war zone, what one party denounces as ‘terrorism’ is accepted by the 
other party as ‘freedom fighting’. What Western, especially US, media refer to as the ‘war 
on terror’ is often termed in Arab media, as the ‘US war against so-called terrorism’ 
(Hahn 2004: 44-7 cited in Hahn 2007: 22). In a similar token, several Arab media have in 
the past employed, and still employ, the Arab term for ‘freedom fighter’ namely shaheed 
(singular) or shuhada (plural). The term, in Hahn’s words, ‘derives from the verb to 
‘witness’ and also means ‘passed away’ but often translated as ‘martyr’, a term that is 
understood in the West as taking sides with the Palestinian case’ (Hahn 2007: 21). 
Unsurprisingly, the term ‘martyr’ –or Shaheed – as shown in Table 4.17 is very much 
associated with Al-Jazeera Arabic with more than 290 mentions, constituting 63 percent 
of this section’s terminology. Compared to BBC Arabic, the figure is drastic –also proved 
to be statistically significant in comparison to the sample. 
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Table 4.17: use of Lexicon by broadcaster (%) 
Lexicon Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic Total Significant 
testing 
Muslim(s) 
 
30% 25% 18% 29% 28% 0.088 
Jew(s) 
 
10% 7% 5% 7% 8% 0.938 
Christian(s) 
 
3% 2% 0% 0% 2% 0.309 
Terrorist/Terrorism 
(Palestinians) 
15% 2% 10% 12% 8% 0.082 
Terrorist/Terrorism 
(Israelis) 
2% 1% 0% 2% 1% 0.567 
Martyr(s) 
 
2% 63% 3% 16% 37% 0.000 
Suicide bomb/er 
 
0% 0% 2% 1% 0% 0.082 
Homicide Bomb/er 
 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% n/a 
Militant(s) 
(Palestinians) 
5% 0% 31% 16% 8% 0.000 
Militant(s) 
(Israelis) 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.503 
Extremist(s) 
(Palestinians) 
5% 0% 31% 16% 8% 0.000 
Extremist(s) 
(Israelis) 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% n/a 
Note: Percentages are calculated within one another and not in relation to the whole sample. The number of times a given term is 
mentioned divided by the number of items all terms are mentioned multiplied by 100. Figures might not add up 100 due to rounding 
 
Table 4.18 compares the different lexicon employed by the networks to describe the 
situation in the Gaza Strip. With no exceptions, ‘War’ was the most mentioned phrase to 
describe the situation, especially so with AJE (65%). The neutral ‘conflict’ dominated 17 
percent of BBC World’s terminology, and phrases such as ‘invasion’ ‘onslaught’ or 
‘massacre’ were rarely mentioned on BBC World. The word ‘Invasion’, specifically, 
accounted for 11 percent of Al-Jazeera Arabic’s lexicon and 0 percent of BBC World’s. 
Overall, similarities and differences were more visible on the basis of language rather 
than network –most notable are ‘Conflict’, ‘Assaults’ and ‘Offensive’. By spotting various 
disparities between BBC networks, it is valuable to quote Hosam El-Sokkari –Head of BBC 
Arabic –in an interview with Barkho, whom explained that the conflict is even more 
difficult to cover in Arabic where the selection of ‘a language that is comparable to what 
is meant by the English terms that are there’ is not easy (2010: 131). 
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Table 4.18: use of Lexicon by broadcaster (%) 
Lexicon Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic Total Significant 
testing 
Conflict 
 
11% 1% 17% 6% 5% 0.000 
War 
 
65% 47% 46% 43% 48% 0.003 
Massacre 
 
4% 5% 3% 5% 4% 0.285 
Onslaught 
 
7% 1% 2% 6% 3% 0.000 
Assaults 
 
5% 0% 8% 0% 2% 0.000 
Israeli aggression 
 
8% 0% 1% 8% 4% 0.000 
Invasion 
 
3% 11% 0% 4% 6% 0.000 
Palestinian 
aggression 
0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0.179 
Offensive 
 
18% 36% 23% 27% 27% 0.002 
Note: Percentages are calculated within one another and not in relation to the whole sample. The number of times a given term is 
mentioned divided by the number of items all terms are mentioned multiplied by 100. Figures might not add up 100 due to rounding 
 
Expressions such as ‘occupying army’, ‘Israeli troops’, ‘Israeli aggression’, ‘Zionists’ and 
‘massacre’ were only featured on Al-Jazeera networks (Table 4.19). The term ‘resistance’ 
was only germane with Al-Jazeera Arabic accounting for almost 370 mentions usually in 
reference to Hamas as a Resistance Movement.  The practice of ‘labelling’, or in 
Goffman’s terminology ‘framing’, ‘is well understood in sociology and social psychology 
and it can be shown that circumstances may be altered, behaviour reinforced and 
conditioned, attitudes affected and perceptions changed by the consistent application of 
labels (Eldridge 1995: 176). 
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Table 4.19: use of Lexicon by broadcaster (%) 
Lexicon Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera BBC World BBC Arabic Total Significant 
testing 
Israeli troops 
 
73% 17% 59% 56% 36% 0.232 
War crime 
 
17% 6% 13% 28% 12% 0.452 
Zionist 
 
4% 12% 2% 13% 10% 0.005 
Occupying army 
 
1% 9% 4% 2% 6% 0.000 
Settlers 
 
0% 2% 7% 2% 2% 0.195 
Resistance 
 
5% 54% 15% MISSING 35% 0.000 
Note: Percentages are calculated within one another and not in relation to the whole sample. The number of times a given term is 
mentioned divided by the number of items all terms are mentioned multiplied by 100. Figures might not add up 100 due to rounding 
 
Contextual Framework and Historical Background  
When considering the contextual contours of the war it is also essential to note issues of 
historical and political backgrounds. Previous research carried out on the news coverage 
of the Palestinian Israeli Conflict, indicates that the absence of ground contextual 
framework of the origins and underlying political dimensions of the conflict have 
confused an informed public debate. Philo and Berry (2006: 199) explained that ‘gaps in 
public knowledge were related to a lack of context and explanations of key issues in news 
bulletins’. The significance of such absences become particularly crucial when one 
considers the impact historical background has on audiences and the way they perceive 
and interpret news events. 
The events of 1948, when the Israeli state was created and many Palestinian civilians 
were forced out of their houses, and 1967 when Israel conquered the Occupied 
Territories, remain vastly contentious aspects of understanding the Middle East conflict. 
Part of the reason behind this contested historical record, argues Philo and Berry, ‘is 
because it is intimately linked to the justifications given by the Israelis and Palestinians for 
their actions’ (2006: 200). One of the most salient findings of their research looked at the 
almost total lack and absence of any form of knowledge or information within news 
bulletins on the region’s history. Their analysis reveals that out of more than 3,500 lines 
of transcribed news text only 17 mentioned any aspect of the conflict’s history (2006: 
200).  
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Table 4.20 provides similar findings and compares the frequencies of which each historic 
event appeared in the news across the selected four broadcast media. It is clear from the 
table below that 72 percent of historical context featured on Al-Jazeera. BBC World made 
16 references to historic events, and BBC Arabic had 26. Of BBC World’s contextual 
material, 69 percent (n=11) were on the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006, and looked at the 
military aspect of it –what they termed ‘the lessons of war’, which focused on the 
‘lessons’ the Israeli Army learnt from the war in Lebanon. Israeli settlements’ withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip –or what is known as the Gaza Disengagement Plan –received 31 
percent of BBC World’s contextual content, all of which had little relevance to reasons 
behind Israel’s offensive against the Gaza Strip. Decisive historical incidents such as the 
1948 War (or Naqaba), the 6-days war of 1967, the first Intifada, Al-Aqsa Intifada and the 
Siege of Gaza were not referenced on BBC World throughout the 18 days sample period. 
The Glasgow Media Group found similar patterns that suggest that this is a consistent 
feature of coverage across time on the BBC (Philo and Berry 2004: 202). This does not 
apply to BBC Arabic however, even though hardly any references were made to the 
origins and background of the conflict, the events mentioned took a different perspective 
and focused on more iconic and controversial incidents.  
Although almost three quarters of contextual background came from Al-Jazeera, very few 
references were made to elaborate on the origins and historical dimensions of the war. A 
total of 52 contextual mentions on AJE and 55 mentions on AJA were identified. And 
rarely did any of the channels present explanation about how the Palestinians became 
refugees, the strategic role of Israeli settlements or why water is a vital issue for example. 
Table 4.20 Contextual framework and background of the Middle East conflict by broadcaster                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Historical event Al-Jazeera 
English 
Al-Jazeera  BBC World BBC Arabic Total 
Balfour 
Declaration 
 
0 1 0 0 1 
Holocaust 
 
1 0 0 0 1 
Partition of 
Palestine (1947) 
1 0 0 0 1 
1948 War 
 
3 7 0 4 14 
Qibya massacre 
(1953) 
0 0 0 1 1 
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Six Day War (1967) 
 
14 5 0 3 22 
Camp David 
 
0 2 0 0 2 
Israel invades 
Lebanon (1982) 
2 1 1 1 5 
Intifada (1987) 
 
1 0 0 0 1 
Oslo Peace 
Process/Accords 
(1993-95) 
0 1 0 0 1 
Camp David 2 
(2000)  
0 1 0 0 1 
Al-Aqsa Intifada 
 
0 5 0 1 6  
Operation 
Defensive Shield 
(2002) 
1 0 0 0 1 
Yasser Arafat  dies 
(2004) 
0 1 0 0 1 
Gaza Pullout 
(2005) 
 
5 3 4 5 17 
Israel-Lebanon 
War (July-August 
2006) 
10 15 11 8 
 
44 
Hamas took over 
Gaza (2007) 
5 1 0 1 7 
Gaza Siege (2008) 
 
3 1 0 0 4 
Wadi Araba Peace 
Treaty –Jordan 
and Israel (1994) 
1 3 0 1 5 
Oil embargo by 
Arab countries on 
pro-Israeli 
Western countries 
1 0 0 0 1 
The Declaration of 
an Israeli State 
(1949)  
1 1 0 0 2 
Council resolution 
446 –stopping the 
building of Israeli 
settlements (1976) 
1 0 0 0 1 
Iraq Invasion 
(2003) 
2 5 0 0 7  
Wall declared 
illegal by UN 
(2004) 
0 0 0 1 1 
 
Jenin (2002) 
 
0 2 0 0 2 
 
Count 52 55 16 26 149 
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To reference Philo and Berry again, in their interviews with BBC Journalists, part of the 
reason for the lack of historical context, they assert, was that journalists were under 
pressure from news editors to produce dramatic reports with graphic visuals that would 
grab the attention of the audience. The BBC correspondent George Alagiah stated that he 
was continuously being reminded by his editors that the ‘attention span of [BBC’s] 
average viewer is about twenty seconds’ and that if they failed to ‘grab’ these viewers 
there was a chance that audiences would switch to one of the BCC’s competitors. 
Another BBC journalist also confirmed this view, proclaiming that ‘his editor has 
encouraged him to produce reports heavy on ‘bang bang’ and to avoid ‘explainers’’ (Philo 
and Berry 2006: 201). 
 
Deaths and casualties 
To many societies, and audiences alike, representations of death and casualties in the 
media ensued by major disasters, functions as a supreme indicator in displaying the 
degree of seriousness of the damage and destruction caused. It also acts as a vehicle for 
journalists to select news about deaths from abroad, in a way that suits the oft-cited 
comments made by US journalists suggesting that ‘one dead fireman in Brooklyn is worth 
five English bobbies, who are worth 50 Arabs, who are worth 500 Africans’ (Moeller, 1999 
cited in Hanusch 2008: 303). News coverage of natural disasters is a case in point; what 
makes an earthquake ‘breaking news’, for example, is not its scale-level nor its disaster 
type, but rather its death count. Death counts, in this respect, act as a benchmark 
measure of how particularly bad a situation is.  
With respect to this study, there was a disparity in the projection of how death and 
casualties were represented in the news, in terms of the framing of the overall coverage. 
This aspect of the chapter generates fruitful findings. The figures in Table 4.21 below are 
subdivided into three sections and compares percentages among themselves –namely 
between total ‘Palestinian’ and ‘Israeli’ deaths, ‘Palestinian’ and ‘Israeli’ civilians fatalities 
and finally ‘Palestinian’ and ‘Israeli’ casualties. Bearing in mind the unjust imbalance of 
casualties inflicted on both sides, an uneven 100 Palestinian deaths for every one Israeli 
fatality, BBC Arabic’s figures are probably the most striking. Not only did the service 
seldom report on the impact and despair of war, but also gave Israeli casualties great 
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prominence. On the other hand, AJE did not shy away from dedicating significantly more 
airtime to covering Palestinian casualties and injuries, shown in the table below. It is 
interesting to note that AJA made significant references to Israeli casualties which raises 
questions to whether these were deliberate mentions as acts of celebrating the 
‘resistance’s’ (as termed by AJA) strength of resilience thereby increasing the morale of 
the Palestinians, or as a way of portraying the other side of the story and reporting on the 
damages Palestinian fighter have caused. In view of the fact that BBC World followed a 
distant approach in covering Gaza, it is understandable why, in comparison to the sample, 
more efforts were put in reporting death tolls than personal stories and incidents.              
Table 4.21: References to death and casualties by broadcaster          
 Al-Jazeera English Al-Jazeera Arabic BBC World BBC Arabic 
Palestinian deaths 
total  
50 
88% 
34 
71% 
23 
72% 
19 
76% 
Israeli deaths total 7 
12% 
14 
29% 
9 
18% 
6 
24% 
Palestinian deaths 
civilians 
89 
90% 
71 
92% 
29 
94% 
42 
86% 
Israeli deaths 
civilians 
10 
10% 
6 
8% 
2 
6% 
7 
14% 
Palestinian Injuries 
 
39 
91% 
43 
59% 
15 
88% 
19 
66% 
Israeli Injuries 
 
4 
9% 
30 
41% 
2 
12% 
10 
34% 
Note: Percentages are calculated within one another and not in relation to the whole sample. Figures within each category must add 
up to 100. 
 
Whereas death, as a subject, is reasonably present in the media today, we perhaps need 
to be clear when defining what is meant by the ‘presence of death.’ This section of the 
thesis only referred to mentions of death, and not how death is presented and perhaps 
even problematised.  
Conclusion 
This study set out to examine the persistence of news reporting cross-nationally by 
analysing Western and Arab news agencies’ coverage of the Gaza War of 2008-09 over a 
period of 18 days. At first sight, the results suggest a congruency in international news 
agencies’ reporting, who mainly employ the ‘episodic frame’ and emphasise the ‘conflict’ 
nature of the issue (Camaj 2010: 635). However, some differences in reporting emerged 
across and within the English-language and the Arabic-language agencies, and their 
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respective networks themselves. In many instances, the news networks examined 
appeared to be static rather than dynamic, in terms of putting the conflict in its 
contextual framework and by rarely providing a comprehensive outline of it historical 
background. 
The results accumulated from the analysis revealed that, in general, Gaza was 
consistently ‘bigger’ news on Al-Jazeera than on BBC.  Two general points can be deduced 
from this; first, it suggests that the notion of cultural proximity played a chief role in 
setting the broadcasters’ news agendas in which, when compared to their respective 
networks, both Al-Jazeera Arabic and BBC Arabic dedicated more news items relating to 
the war during the sample period. This suggests that the content and the viewer exist in 
the same ‘cultural linguistic’ (Straubhaar, 2003 cited in Ksiazek and Webster 2008: 486) or 
‘geo-linguistic’ (Cunningham, Jacka, & Sinclair, 1998; Straubhaar, 2003 cited in ibid.) 
space, thereby producing a content that best resonates with the cultural dispositions of 
the audience (ibid.). In the case of Al-Jazeera, cultural proximity is seen as an important 
‘news factor’ in influencing journalists’ decisions on what is considered newsworthy 
(Galtung and Ruge 1965), and the emergence of regional media production, such as BBC 
Arabic, is also consistent with the process of cultural proximity. 
Taking that into consideration, AJE still dedicated more reports on the war in Gaza than 
did BBC Arabic. This raises the second point; as much as cultural proximity had an 
influence on the way news reports are constructed, let alone selected, news agencies’ 
editorial policies and strategies are key factors in determining which events gain status 
(and effectively become news) and which are left in the shadows. The results from this 
study suggest that the amount and the length of news items dedicated to the conflict is 
better understood as an illustration of the battle between the BBC and Al-Jazeera in 
terms of news branding. Thus, the reasons behind this disparity in reporting mainly 
involve practices of journalistic professionalism, which include journalists’ ‘individual 
characteristics, ideological or political orientations, professional values, journalistic 
routines, and organizational constraints’ (Zhou and Moy 2007: 81). In effect, Al-Jazeera’s 
cultural and political orientations, for the most part being head-quartered in Doha and 
owned by the Emir of Qatar, had supremacy on the way the war received substantial 
prominence both locally and internationally.      
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Along the same lines, these journalistic norms, embedded in the news agencies’ culture 
of reporting war, had obvious preferences in regards to news access and news presence. 
While Al-Jazeera had more references to Palestinian voices, BBC gave Israeli voices more 
significance. However, this was more perceptible with Al-Jazeera Arabic and BBC World; 
the glocalised channels had a relatively similar distribution in terms of reporting actors. 
This suggests that even within the same newsroom environment, when catering for a 
certain audience, differences can emerge –in other words, audiences have power in 
directing the production of news frames and actors.  
As mentioned earlier, there was a clear distinctive operational competency between the 
civilian and the military sector in terms of accessed voices. It suggested that when 
military voices are given appropriate credence, they are also being given unique 
opportunities to defend themselves and explain their actions, portraying an image of 
vulnerability and desperate need to defend their people from ‘terrorists’ and ‘militants’ in 
order to achieve a more secure nation. Thus the disproportionate distribution of sources 
in reporting the Gaza War presents fruitful analysis and suggests that BBC reporting 
focused on such justification lines and validations by the Israeli military, as opposed to 
that of the Palestinians. And although acknowledged that BBC World devoted nearly 45 
percent of its reporting to cover Hamas sources, less than 10 percent were of direct 
quotations, in which the narrative it created was very symbolic, representing the war as 
necessary and for the most part, as Gazan civilians having to bear the brunt of war, that 
they are the victims of Hamas’s atrocities. 
In terms of themes, Al-Jazeera took a ‘heroic’ ‘villainous’ approach in reporting Gaza, 
featuring more reports on Palestinian civilians’ deaths and causalities. They also 
continued to blame Israeli forces for the suffering in the Strip, adopted similar accounts in 
terms of ‘who started it’ and ‘who is to blame for the destruction’, presenting the war as 
unjust, irrational and intolerable. Generally, the analysis revealed that Al-Jazeera Arabic 
and Al-Jazeera English had almost identical patterns in reporting the Gaza conflict, 
however, a critical study based merely on the analysis of texts, despite its importance and 
usefulness, will not provide good answers for why and how these ‘particular structures 
are chosen and whether the selection is part of an overall discursive strategy that places 
special constraints on reporters, and editors’ (Barkho 2010: 128) 
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Gamson and Modigliani (1989) disclosed that along with journalists’ working norms and 
practices, external factors such as ‘cultural resonances and sponsor activities help shape 
media discourse’ (Zhou and Moy 2007: 81). Therefore, in terms of proportionality, more 
obvious comparisons can be made on a cultural basis. News agencies targeting an 
international (remote) audience – those perceiving the War on Gaza as foreign– focused 
on the conflict nature of the war and detached its journalists from the regional political 
arena –especially the case with the Saudi Arabic/Egypt and Qatar/Syria clash. Of course, 
news agencies catering for an Arab audience dedicated more airtime to covering these 
aspects of the conflict.  
In terms of the categorization, or the choice of labels to describe acts and actors, the 
construction of words, phrases and sentences are able to create and reinforce some 
ideological perceptions by placement or repetition, ‘or by associating them with culturally 
familiar symbols’ (Entman 1993: 53). Results from this study suggest that ‘descriptive 
terms’ used to explain locations and actors such as ‘Israeli’ or ‘Palestinian’ are best 
treated as dependent variables consistent (fluctuating up and down) with the location of 
reporting and news access. Thus regardless of the findings it generates, it cannot be 
taken as a touchstone measure of reporting. On the other hand, ‘proactive terms’ 
provided interesting results and confirmed findings produced by previous studies (Brakho 
2011; Barkho 2010; Barkho and Richardson 2010; Richardson and Barkho 2009).  
Finally, one of the key roles news organizations should be undertaking is bringing to an 
audience not only an account of the day’s events but also putting these events into 
context. As has already been revealed, both Al-Jazeera and BBC fell short in reporting the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict as whole, more so with BBC networks however. In this regard, a 
general lack of contextual material, in terms of reporting the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 
was one of the key criticisms made by the independent report commissioned by the BBC 
Governors, and recognised by the BBC News management, and concluded that one of the 
roles of the new Middle East editor was to create greater context for audiences. But to 
what extent did the BBC succeed in achieving this greater context? And is this a problem 
solely germane to the BBC or is it a universally accepted journalistic setback? 
143 
 
Such questions and matters of culpability, casualties, war crimes and diplomacy, among 
others are matters this thesis wishes to invite further. Media, political and social systems 
all affect the process of mediation of symbolic content. To this end, the following two 
chapters will systematically look at 2 recurring themes and scrutinize their discursive 
strategies and functions in the construction of meaning and ideology. These include 
Provocation, which examines questions of ‘who started it’, or ‘who is to blame’; and 
Proportionality this embraces issues of the humanitarian situation, casualties inflicted on 
both sides, and accusations of war crimes. 
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Chapter 5 
Provocation: who started it, who is to blame and why are ‘they’ fighting?  
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter offered a detailed content analysis of the media coverage of the 
Gaza conflict. Focusing primarily on Al-Jazeera and BBC’s reporting, it presented a 
thorough summary of patterns and regularities in the text, quantified the broadcaster’s 
textual features and provided some grounded findings that invite further interpretations 
and analysis. To this end, this chapter aims to discursively analyse the Provocation aspect 
of the Gaza war. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains one of the most heated and 
highly debated issues of modern history, it remains so not only in its origins, but in the 
goals and motivation of each side and the effects it has on Middle-Eastern politics. This 
chapter is particularly concerned with the portrayal of interpretations, motivations and 
rationale of conducting war. It examines how war is often depicted as a bargaining failure 
that misrepresents the problem at sake to serve the objectives of a certain side. Through 
representation and through discursively and semantically analysing the news text, it aims 
to answer the questions presented in the title of this chapter: who started the Gaza War, 
who is culpable for the destruction and violence, why are ‘they’ fighting and to whom is 
agency for these actions and events attributed? It then focuses on the role of language in 
social life, specifically in understanding the ideologies that underlay the prominent 
themes presented in this domain. Using the method of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
the chapter aims to present a comparative analysis across and within Arab and Western 
television, namely Al-Jazeera Arabic, Al-Jazeera English, BBC Arabic and BBC World.       
Representation in this chapter refers to the facilitation of language in a news text or talk 
in order to attribute meaning to actors, their social practices, actions/events, and their 
social and political implications. The visual dimensions of the reported conflict, however, 
will be examined in the following chapter on Proportionality. Implicit in this view of the 
role of language in representation is that meaning is not only embedded in the 
production and reflection of reality (how things are perceived) but also, and perhaps 
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more importantly, in the way reality is reproduced and construed by linguistic 
representation (to be a certain way) (Fairclough 2003; Wenden 2005; Richardson 2007).  
Given that this chapter focuses primarily on the provocative aspect of the war on Gaza, 
only excerpts germane to this facet of the conflict were incorporated. Thus, the analysis 
includes excerpts from the day before the start of the ground incursion (2nd Jan 2009), 
the first 3 days of the ground offensive (3rd-5th Jan 2009) and the last 3 days of the war 
(16th-18th Jan 2009). One reason for this is that these dates proved to be most fruitful in 
terms of explaining the causes of war, presented characterisations of actors and their 
actions and made various attributions of culpability and blame. It also provides common 
grounds to enable comparisons across and within channels. Excerpts are numbered 
throughout the analysis in order to facilitate cross referencing. Finally, the chapter tries 
to be careful in avoiding unwarranted generalisations; commentaries made on the news’ 
discursive procedures relate solely to the texts in question. 
 
Characterisation of the actors, their actions and the events that make up the conflict 
The identification of key lexical structures and terminology and their wider cultural and 
ideological frameworks is an important part of understanding a news corporation’s 
discursive strategy. Whether it signals an institutional culture of power and control, or 
whether such discursive strategies and practices are uniform across a corporation are 
tricky queries to untangle in a study based merely on the analysis of texts. However, the 
vocabulary used for representing a certain reality (or the characterisations of actors in a 
certain conflict, their actions and/or events that make up this conflict) is an essential 
dimension of the construction of meaning (Carvalho 2010: 17) in a news corporation’s 
journalistic practices. Throughout the duration of the Gaza Conflict, the kind of 
terminology used by the four selected networks (namely BBC World, Al-Jazeera English 
(AJE), BBC Arabic and Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA)), suggest that the channels hold certain 
stylistic ways of reporting the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, as well as certain sets of lexical 
categories used to describe its main participants, i.e. the Palestinians and the Israelis. The 
headlines, given below, offer an introductory structure of the differences represented 
across these media outlets.  
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(1) 
 
More than a thousand people now dead in Gaza and the fighting between Israel and Hamas 
militants is still escalating.  (BBC World 14th Jan 2009) 
 
 
(2) 
 
Its day 1 of Israel’s ground offensive, we’ll take a look at the kind of resistance they are facing 
from Palestinian fighters (AJE 4th Jan 2009) 
 
 
(3) Israeli aerial bombardment and artillery fire and clashes in the Gaza Strip between Israeli 
soldiers and Palestinian gunmen (BBC Arabic 4th Jan 2009) 
فصق يليئارسإ يوج و يعفدم و تاكابتشا يف عاطق ةزغ نيب دونجلا نييلئارسلإا و نوحلسم نيينيطسلف  
 
 
(4) Dozens of Martyrs and wounded in Gaza with the continuation of the Ground incursion and 
air barrage and artillery bombardment. The Palestinian resistance has also caused losses in 
the ranks of the Israeli army. (AJ 4th Jan 2009)   
تارشع ءادهشلا و ىحرجلا يف ةزغ عم رارمتسا ةيلمعلا هيربلا و تارغتسا ةيوج و فصق يعفدم و ةمواقملا هينيطسلفلا عقوت 
رئاسخ يف فوفص شيجلا يليئارسلإا  
 
Figure 5.1: Headlines from selected news networks (emphases, in italics, added throughout) 
 
1a.  heavy fighting between Israeli soldiers and Hamas militants (3rd Jan, 2009) 
1b. in the first gun-battle between Hamas militants and the Israeli Army (3rd Jan 2009)  
1c. Hamas the Palestinian militant group which still doesn’t officially recognise the 
existence of Israel (1st Jan 2009) 
1d. rockets fired by militants inside Gaza […] and the Israeli military have been carrying 
out dozens of air-strikes. (6th Jan 2009) 
1e.  Once again today Palestinian militants have been firing rockets to Israel (14th Jan 
2009) 
 
It is clear from the headlines above that the portrayal of the main participants in the 
conflict, and their relationship to one another set up an antagonistic relationship 
between the two parties involved –a hero-villain, occupied-occupier or victim-aggressor 
relationship. In headline (1), BBC World, present the fighting as between ‘Hamas 
militants’ and ‘Israel’. Throughout the duration of the conflict, Palestinian factions 
perpetually fell under the lexical category of ‘militancy’ in the BBC (ex. 1a-1e). The BBC’s 
reporting of the Gaza Conflict shows a substantial consistency in the syntactic position 
and semantic roles in the way both Palestinians and Israelis are represented as actors or 
participants. Examples 1a-1e reveals that the Israeli Army is continuously being described 
as ‘Israeli soldiers’ (ex. 1a), ‘Israeli Army’ (ex. 1b), ‘Israeli Military’ (ex. 1d) or simply 
‘Israel’ (ex. 1e) –standard terminology free of any connotations or labels. Palestinian 
groups, on the other hand, are almost always accompanied with epithets and labels to 
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remind the audience of their ‘militancy’: ‘Hamas militants’ (ex. 1a, 1b), ‘militants inside 
Gaza’ (ex. 1d) and ‘Palestinian militants’, among others. Excerpt 1c provides a unique 
example of The BBC’s reporting; not only were Hamas labelled a ‘Palestinian militant 
group’, but it was also emphasised that they still don’t ‘officially recognise the existence 
of Israel’. Statements like these, especially those targeted at foreign audiences, bring 
along tags and categorisations, which, according to Tuchman, have ‘the power to shape 
news consumers’ opinions on topics on which they are ignorant’ (1978: 2).              
It is important to note, however, that although BBC World persistently used the word 
‘militant(s)’ when discussing various ‘Palestinian armed factions’, other negative lexical 
items such as ‘extremists’, ‘fundamentalists’, ‘Islamists’ and ‘terrorists’ were excluded 
from the coverage, unless attributed. Having said that, the examples above demonstrate 
that the BBC tends to only “re-lexicalize” and “over-lexicalize” its terminology when 
referring to Palestinian actors (Barkho 2010: 132). 
2a.  Israeli ground troops are also reported to have moved deeper…meeting resistance 
from Palestinian fighters (12th Jan 2009) 
2b. Israeli troops are pushing deeper into Gaza and as they do that they are facing some 
fierce resistance (4th Jan 2009) 
2c. On Tuesday Israeli forces moved to major population centres across the Gaza Strip 
(6th Jan 2009) 
2d. Israeli aggressors…against those fighting the occupation (4th Jan 2009) 
2e. Israeli soldiers raided their homes (12th Jan 2009) 
2f. Israel maintains that it only targets Hamas fighters (7th Jan 2009) 
 
In headline (2), taken from Al-Jazeera English (AJE), Israel is held accountable for the war 
(‘Israel’s ground offensive’), whose soldiers are facing ‘resistance’ from ‘Palestinian 
fighters’. It is thus clear that there are striking differences at the level of lexical structures 
in the way the Palestinians and the Israeli are depicted in BBC World and AJE. There are 
also notable differences in the way Hamas and the Israeli Army are portrayed. Hamas 
operators are not militants but ‘fighters’ (ex. 2f), or ‘Palestinian fighters’ (ex. 2a). They are 
not attacking but resisting (ex. 2a and 2b). Israelis, conversely, fit in various lexical 
categories from as simple as ‘Israeli soldiers’ (ex. 2c) to more callous expressions such as 
‘Israeli aggressors’ (ex. 2d). It is worth mentioning that the predominant term used by AJE 
to describe Israeli soldiers is ‘Israeli troops’ (ex. 2a and 2b).                     
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The use of different levels of vocabularies in reporting disputes has a “categorizing 
function” (Barkho 2010: 132). Words, phrases or expressions used in a text or talk in 
order to differentiate people, groups, social relations, actions or circumstances that 
shape and formulate a conflict are selected from an ample variety of options to underpin 
and legitimate the ‘ideology communicated through the discourse themes’ (Wenden 
2005: 94). Having spotted the variations in reporting across BBC World and AJE, one is left 
to question whether such discrepancies in lexical categorization are a result of an 
institutional culture; whether BBC’s and Al-Jazeera’s guidelines, as news corporations, 
completely dictate coverage or do their journalists have some autonomy, to abide by the 
rules or to break them. Therefore, it is useful to examine those discursive strategies 
within these news corporations themselves. More explicitly it is important to examine the 
extent to which Arabic versions of the Gaza Conflict echo those of their English 
counterparts. 
3a. areas used by Palestinian armed men to launch rockets at Southern Israeli cities (BBC 
Arabic 4th Jan 2009) 
3b.  and from supporters of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas (BBC Arabic 16th 
Jan 2009) 
3c.  The Israeli Army said it attacked seventy locations in the Strip during the day (BBC 
Arabic 17th Jan 2009) 
3d.  Palestinian gunmen were sheltering (BBC Arabic 16th Jan 2009) 
3e.  Israeli forces left the area but also left behind 23 deaths (BBC Arabic 16th Jan 2009) 
 
In regards to language, there seems to be some degree of freedom in BBC Arabic’s 
reporting in comparison to that of BBC World. For example, the Arabic version of the 
same stories detaches themselves from the “militancy” approach which the English 
network tags along with Palestinians. However, as shown above (examples 3a-3e), the 
lexical item “militant(s)” is given an alternative lexicon in Arabic: “Musallahoun نوحلسم 
(armed men)”; and occasionally “Qanas Filisteini ينيطسيلف صانق (Palestinian sniper). Names 
of Palestinian factions appear as they are without any supplements or modifications that 
build certain militaristic associations amongst their audience, the way its English version 
does. Headline 3, portrays the conflict as ‘just’, implying that there are ‘clashes’ between 
‘Israeli soldiers’ and ‘Palestinian gunmen’. This suggests a balance between the parties 
involved, in which they both acquire similar military power and resources. Excerpt 3b is a 
rare incident, and only a few times did a BBC Arabic journalist or correspondent refer to 
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Hamas as a Resistance Movement –a term favoured by the Palestinian side. Most of the 
times, however, as is evident from the examples above, Palestinian fighters are depicted 
as ‘armed men’, ‘snipers’ or ‘gunmen’. BBC Arabic’s lexical structures in regard to Israel, 
its leaders and its Army are similar to that of BBC World; mostly straightforward succinct 
terminology: ‘Israeli Army’ ( يليئارسلاا شيجلا ), ‘Israeli Forces’( تاوق ةيليئارسا ) and ‘Israeli 
Military’ ( يليئارسلاا شيجلا ). They are never referred to as a Defence Force but are also never 
affiliated with negative connotations.           
4a.  the Palestinian resistance remains and has rained [bombarded/peppered] Israeli 
towns with rockets and the Israeli Army admits injuries amongst its soldiers (AJ 4th 
Jan 2009)     
4b.  Tel-Aviv has confirmed the death of one of its soldiers through the clash of its 
militants with Hamas fighters (AJ 4th Jan 2009) 
4c.  tens of martyrs on the 21st day of the war on Gaza and more resistance missiles 
targeting Israel (AJ 16th Jan 2009) 
4d.  The Palestinian resistance continued its artillery barrages on Israelis towns firing tens 
of rockets that left several wounded (AJ 16th Jan 2009)  
4e.  The scenes of destruction and devastation caused by the occupation forces in Tal Al-
Hawa neighbourhood southwest of Gaza are still evident and visible (AJ 16th Jan 
2009) 
 
Whereas all examined news stations treat the Israeli side of the dispute with a degree of 
admiration, Al-Jazeera Arabic’s lexical structures with regards to Israel and its policies 
took a different stance. Expressions, such as ‘occupying army’, ‘militants’ and ‘Zionists’, 
referring to Israelis were only heard on Al-Jazeera. Headline 4, from Al-Jazeera Arabic, 
suggests that the Israeli ‘incursion and air barrages and bombardment’ resulted in the 
death (or the martyring) of dozens of Palestinians. The ‘Palestinian Resistance’ in 
response has caused ‘losses’ in the ‘ranks of the Israeli Army’. Headlines like this speak of 
Palestinian civilians being martyred as a result of Israeli aggression and the Palestinian 
Resistance being able to respond. Palestinians are always resisting the occupation. 
Favourable epithets to describe Hamas and other Palestinian factions are almost uniform 
across Al-Jazeera Arabic’s reporting: ‘Palestinian resistance’ (Ex. 4, 4a and 4d), ‘Hamas 
Resistance Movement’, ‘resistance fighters’, ‘resistance leaders’ or simply ‘resistance’ (ex 
4c). Israel is described as an occupying force causing nothing but ‘destruction’ and 
‘devastation’ (ex. 4e), and only on AJA are Israelis soldiers depicted as ‘militants’ (ex 4b).   
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Aside from the participants involved in military operations, another important aspect of 
war is the human suffering. Given the disparity in casualties – a rough 100 Palestinian 
casualties for every Israeli casualty –the reporting, across all 4 channels, mainly focused 
on Palestinian casualties. Both BBC networks and AJE adopted similar vocabulary to 
report Palestinian deaths. The verb ‘to die’ and its verbal forms and conjugations (dies, 
dead, dying, death etc.) were the predominant terms employed by the networks. Less 
common were the verb ‘to kill’ along with its forms and conjugations (kills, killed, killing, 
etc.). Although such lexical structures produce a minimal understanding of the channel’s 
discursive strategies in reporting the ‘death’ and violence inflicted on civilian populations, 
the third section of this chapter (To whom is agency for these actions and events 
attributed and how?) offers a close attention to issues of pragmatics, semantics and 
syntax in discourse in a detailed manner (Fowler, 1991). Analysing syntactic word orders 
and clause structures generates more fruitful results in relation to the way casualties and 
human suffering are reported in the news.    
What is worth noting however, is the terminology utilised by AJA in describing the 
casualties inflicted – precisely Palestinian casualties. Whereas Hamas and other 
Palestinian groups are always presented as resisting, Palestinian civilians lost in the war 
are depicted as ‘martyrs’ (shuhada). This military metaphor is linked and reconstructed 
from symbols drawn from Islam. The word derives from the verb to ‘witness’ and also 
means ‘one who suffers for the sake of principle’ but often translated as ‘holy martyr’, a 
term that is understood in the West as taking sides with the Palestinian case. Palestinians 
killed in the conflict are almost uniformly described as ‘martyrs’, this is demonstrated in 
headline (4) figure 5.1: ‘Dozens of martyrs and wounded in Gaza’. Other examples 
include: ‘Dozens of martyrs in Gaza today’ (5th Jan 2009), ‘Most of the martyrs today are 
civilians’ (5th Jan 2009), ‘Tens of martyrs on the 21st day of the war on Gaza’ (16th Jan 
2009), etc. Sometimes the term is followed by –ed to suggest that not only did a 
Palestinian suffer in the sake of her/his country, but also the suffering has been inflicted 
on her/him by a perpetrator –that s/he was made to suffer. These include: ‘In the Tufah 
neighbourhood a mother was martyred with 4 of her children (4th Jan 2009), ‘Dozens 
were martyred and wounded in Rafah’ (4th Jan 2009). Other times the conduct of war, or 
more specifically the actions of the Israelis, resulted in the martyring of Palestinians –for 
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example, ‘this resulted in martyring some and wounding some’ (5th Jan 2009). In some 
cases those being martyred are also given identification and recognition, as in this 
example: ‘6 martyrs of the Batran family’ (16th Jan 2009).  
The representation of war and violence in various media (as well as their relationship to 
one another) is best understood through the cultural and cognitive shaping of political 
conflict which is communicated through a ‘process of semiotic interaction’ (Lewis 2005: 
31). This interaction is in itself translated through the notion of ‘representation’ –that is, 
‘the process by which the experimental or phenomenal world is transformed as text’ 
(ibid.). In this respect, the semiotic values of war and politics ‘impregnate the episteme 
which governs public perceptions and public opinion’ (Lewis 2005: 33). One way of 
grasping a better sense of a news corporation’s semiotic values is through the 
terminology and vocabulary it uses to define a war and its actions.  
Terms and metaphors selected to refer to the Gaza Conflict are selected to represent the 
war from certain socio-political, cultural and ideological perspectives. Figure 5.2 below 
illustrates a selection of the various terminology used by the selected news networks to 
portray the war –and its brutality in the case of Al-Jazeera. Comparisons can be made 
within and across the networks as demonstrated in the figure below. Within the BBC, 
notable differences can be detected. Unlike BBC World, BBC Arabic gave Israelis a degree 
of accountability to the attacks happening in Gaza. For example, attacks are on Gaza (4th 
Jan 2009) and not merely in Gaza as verified by BBC World (15th Jan 2209). It is Israel’s 
assaults (4th Jan 2009) and their incursion (4th Jan 2009) that are causing the deaths in 
Gaza. In short, Israeli actors were represented as the main participants behind the war –it 
is their war, their attacks, and they are the ones to blame for the destruction. BBC World 
on the other hand, depicted the war as ‘just’ between two equal powers. No accusations 
are made at either ends of the parties involved, but suggest that both parties hold equal 
amounts of responsibility. It is portrayed as a military operation happening in Gaza, and 
refrains from mentioning that the conflict is in itself imbalanced. This is clearly at odds 
with the Sir Quentin Thomas report (May 2nd, 2006) which makes clear that the conflict 
should at all times reflect the disparities on the ground, regardless of the idea of fairness 
or neutrality (cited in Barkho and Richardson 2010). Thus if the conflict is sensed to be 
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‘just’, argues Taylor, then fatalities are unfortunate but ‘justified’. This, he explains, 
relates to civilian causalities too (1997: 134).          
 
BBC World 
 
‘Military Operation’ (15th Jan 2009); ‘Conflict’ 
(16th Jan 2009); ‘The conflict in Gaza’ (16th Jan 
2009) 
 
 
BBC Arabic 
 
‘attacks on Gaza’ (4th Jan 2009); ‘Israel’s assaults 
on Gaza’ (4th Jan 2009); ‘Israeli incursion (4th Jan 
2009) 
 
 
Al-Jazeera English 
 
 
 
‘Israeli assaults’ (2nd Jan 2009); ‘Israeli 
aggression’ (2nd Jan 2009); ‘the war on Gaza’ (3rd 
Jan 2009); ‘Israel as an occupying power’ (3rd Jan 
2009); ‘Israel as an Incursion power’ (3rd Jan 
2009); this brutal war’ (3rd Jan 2009), ‘Israel’s 
ground offensive’(16th Jan 2009); ‘the open-air 
prison we call Gaza’ (17th Jan 2009) 
 
Al-Jazeera Arabic 
 
‘Gaza where the skies are ablaze and the ground 
is in flames’ (4th Jan 2009); ‘the war on and in 
Gaza’ (4th Jan 2009); ‘the Israeli war machine’ 
(4th Jan 2009); ‘this asymmetrical warfare’ (4th 
Jan 2009); ‘Gaza is in an open wake’ (4th Jan 
2009); ‘the battle of bone fracture’ (4th Jan 2009); 
‘a bombardment that is described by the 
Palestinians as indiscriminate’ (5th Jan 2009); ‘the 
aggression on Gaza’ (16th Jan 2009); ‘Israel’s 
continued brutal aggression’ (16th Jan 2009); 
Gaza, three weeks of death (16th Jan 2009) 
 
Figure 5.2: Lexicon used to refer to the war  
In contrast, as shown in the figure above, Al-Jazeera utilised remarkably expressive and 
explanatory metaphors and phrases to describe the conflict and its consequences – less 
so with AJE. Like BBC Arabic, AJE attributed actions of the war to Israeli actors but 
employed harsher terms to describe the actions; it spoke of: ‘Israeli assaults’ (2nd Jan 
2009), ‘Israeli aggression’ (2nd Jan 2009) and of the ‘Israeli ground offensive’ (16th Jan 
2009). It also described Israel as an ‘occupying power’ and as an ‘incursion power’ (3rd Jan 
2009) in an interview directed at an Israeli official. Finally, the war is not only reported to 
be on Gaza and its civilians (3rd Jan 2009), but it was also depicted as a ‘brutal war’ (3rd 
Jan 2009). The conflict is exposed as an ‘asymmetrical warfare’ (4th Jan 2009), on Al-
Jazeera Arabic. The ‘Israeli war machine’ is ‘in and on Gaza’ (4th Jan 2009). ‘Israel’s 
continued brutal aggression’ (16th Jan 2009) is a ‘bombardment that is described by 
Palestinians as indiscriminate’ (5th Jan 2009). And the ‘aggression’ (16th Jan 2009) on the 
Strip has left ‘Gaza in an open wake’ (4th Jan 2009). Besides such emotive expressions, 
AJA did also over-lexicalise its terminology when talking about the Gaza conflict and went 
even further to refer to it as ‘the battle of bone fracture’ –a literal translation from the 
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Arabic language which conveys the extent of violence inflicted on the people of Gaza. 
Interestingly, both Al-Jazeera channels employed metaphors when referring to the Gaza 
Strip. One headline on AJA read ‘Gaza where the skies are ablaze and the ground is in 
flames’ (4th Jan 2009), another, on a later date, alleged ‘Gaza, three weeks of death (16th 
Jan 2009). AJE also described the Gaza Strip as ‘an open-air prison’ (17th Jan 2009). The 
first two metaphors, from AJA, evoke images of destruction and violence, that the Strip is 
burning or on fire and that people are constantly dying. The metaphor, by AJE, connotes 
ideas of detention, of constraint, of being locked-up, being in a cage or being put behind 
bars. It reflects the Gaza Strip as a place of confinement or forcible restraint –as being 
imprisoned or captivated.               
 
Was it a war against Hamas or the Palestinian population? Was it to secure Israeli 
security or to maintain Palestinian suffering? 
It is fundamental to examine the actors’ perceived influence in shaping the overall 
meaning of a text. In this respect questions such as, whose perspective seems to 
dominate, and do these actors possess the capacity to have their viewpoints represented 
by the journalist either in the form of quote or regular text are important for 
understanding the way discourse acts in constructing and deconstructing meaning in the 
media. Accordingly, the representation of actors in the media is best understood through 
analysing their discursive and semantic strategies. 
 
‘Israel had simply no choice it had to stop the rocket attacks against Southern Israel’ 
(Presenter -BBC World 3rd Jan 2009’) 
In the excerpt above, BBC World adopted statements issued by Israeli officials. The Israeli 
position that they were forced to respond to unwarranted rocket attacks by the 
Palestinian group Hamas, which had taken control of Gaza, was constantly emphasised on 
BBC World. Of all the examined networks, it was the only channel to highlight these 
objectives. On the 3rd of January alone, such statements and validations were mentioned 
at least 10 times by presenters and correspondents verifying Israel’s decision to carry out 
a ground incursion. Below are a few examples.  
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(5). Israeli infantry and tanks have now entered the Gaza Strip, Israel says it wants to control 
the launching sites used by militants in Gaza to launch rockets. Israel’s Defence Minister 
Ehud Barak says Israel is determined to save its citizens (BBC World 3rd of Jan, 2009) 
 
(6). Some 900,000 Israelis across Southern Israel will be spending another night in re-enforced 
shelters fearing more attacks from the Gaza Strip. Ehud Barak said that Israel is 
determined to protect its citizens, he said that they had no choice but to launch those 
operations (BBC World 3rd of Jan, 2009) 
 
(7). Earlier tonight the Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak reiterated that Israel simply had 
no choice it had to stop the rocket attacks against Southern Israel  (BBC World 3rd of Jan 
2009) 
 
(8). Israel wants to take control of the sites used to fire rockets (BBC World 3rd Jan 2009) 
 
(9).  Israel says it will do whatever it takes to stop the rocket fire (BBC World 3rd Jan 2009) 
 
(10). So Israel is very much defending an operation, it said that it had no choice but to 
launch. (BBC World 3rd of Jan, 2009) 
Examples (5)-(9) indicate that on the day of the ground incursion (3rd Jan 2009), Israeli 
statements were the predominant perspective adopted by BBC journalists. There is a 
clear evidence here of what Wodak and Fairclough call recontexualisation –in particular 
terms, how Israeli voices/statements/facts were taken from one context and textured 
and reformulated together into a new context (Fairclough 2003: 52). Take excerpt (5) for 
example, it suggests that Israel is under attack from militants in Gaza –whom are firing 
rockets at Israeli towns – but wants to control those launching sites because it is 
‘determined to save its citizens’. Not only are Israeli citizens under attack, but 900,000 of 
them across Southern Israel are also under threat, so will have to spend ‘another night in 
re-enforced shelters fearing more attacks from the Gaza Strip’ (ex. (6)). Once more, BBC 
journalists insist that ‘Ehud Barak’, Israel’s Defence Minister, ‘is determined to protect its 
citizens’ (ex. (6)), and ‘will do whatever it takes to stop the rocket fire’ (ex. (9)). Ehud 
Barak was reported promoting his opinions (‘Ehud Barak says’, ‘Ehud Barak said’), 
reiterating them (‘the Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak reiterated’) and was shown to 
be ‘determined’ to save his citizens. Israeli statements, in this respect, are first reported 
but are then recontexualised as a reporting clause and paraphrase (e.g. Israel says, Israel 
wants, Ehud Barak said, reiterated etc.). Notice the use of the terms ‘another night’ and 
‘more rockets’ which imply that it is not the first time Israeli citizens hide in re-enforced 
shelters and that rockets are being continuously fired at Israeli towns. Interestingly, later 
on in the programme, Israeli accounts were being endorsed by the journalists; the 
reporting then becomes presented using existential verbs (‘Israel is…’) and strong modal 
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claims (‘Israel had to…’). Excerpt (10) illustrates that BBC World journalists repeated 
Israeli claims with strength and transparency confirming that ‘Israel is very much 
defending an operation’. It then continues to confer, ‘[Israel] said it had no choice but to 
launch’. Claims alleging that Israel had no choice but to launch proved to be repetitive 
across BBC World’s coverage (see ex, (6), (7) and (10)).        
(11). Israel’s main targets the last 24 hours have included the houses of Hamas leaders, 
most of them have been phoned by the Israelis and warn to get out. (BBC World 2nd Jan 
2009) 
(12). Eye witnesses say that Israel is mainly targeting the homes of senior Hamas leaders 
(BBC World 2nd Jan 2009) 
Such a perspective was assumed in their headlines and commentaries and also presented 
Israeli attacks as being directed only at Hamas. In a similar way, the examples above 
signify that ‘Israel mainly targets the houses of Hamas leaders’. In the first excerpt, the 
journalists endorsed such claims and reported that ‘Israel’s main target the last 24 hours 
have included the houses of Hamas leaders’ (ex. (11)). In the second example, it 
presented these perspectives in the conniving voice of the ‘Eye witness’, which 
necessitates trustworthiness from the receivers’ end.    
What the BBC lacked in essence is explanation. Reasons to why Hamas and the 
Palestinians are firing rocket at Israeli towns were never touched upon, nor did they 
report on the perspective of the Palestinians. The Palestinian narrative which focused on 
the loss of their homes and land to Israel in previous wars, Israel’s military occupation of 
Palestinian land, and more recently the siege of Gaza were also absent from the 
coverage. The lack of sufficient explanations on cause is critical given that it can have 
stern impact on audience belief and judgements (Philo and Berry 2011: 341). 
  
‘Despite Israeli claims that this war is against Hamas, here its civilians fighting for their 
lives’ (AJE 3rd Jan 2009) 
Al-Jazeera English adopts a different style of reporting the provocative aspect of the war. 
The journalist holds the predominant voice in this regard. Statements from both parties 
are present but rarely ever highlighted.  
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(13). So 11 people possibly killed in this mosque attack, this is clearly at odds with Israeli 
statements saying they’re only using surgical strikes (AJE 3rd Jan 2009) 
(14). Israel’s war against Hamas, once again claiming civilian lives. (AJE 17th Jan 2009) 
(15). Time and time again we hear the Israeli military make this point that it is not 
targeting civilians, that civilians are not the intended target of this military operation, 
and that they have no problem with the people of Gaza. The end result, and we keep 
saying this they may not be the intended targets but the reality on the ground is, they 
are the ones who end up being targeted. Every time there’s an Israeli target in a place 
like Gaza, the civilian population bears the brunt of that. (AJE 4th Jan 2009) 
Unlike BBC World, Israeli statements are reported as claims –and not facts. Examples 
(13)-(15) below indicate that AJE discredits statements issued by Israelis, also indicated by 
the excerpt above. Their reporting, they maintain, is based on the reality on the ground. 
Palestinian civilian deaths, AJE reiterates, are ‘clearly at odds with Israeli statements 
saying they’re only using surgical strikes’. These statements are interesting because of 
what they presuppose, the reporter in this regard, undermines Israeli statements by 
prefiguring them –the statements are never reported as such but are continuously 
presupposed. Excerpts (14) and (15) are worth examining in detail. Excerpt (14) which 
reads: ‘Israel’s war against Hamas, once again claiming civilian lives’, suggests that 
Israel’s so-called war against Hamas, is continuously targeting civilian lives – that what 
they claim is a war against Hamas is in essence a war against Gaza’s civilian population. In 
a similar vein, excerpt (15) challenges and rejects statements by the Israeli military. It 
implies that ‘time and time again’ Israeli claims that they are ‘not targeting civilians, that 
civilians are not the intended target of this military operation, and that they have no 
problem with the people of Gaza’, ‘they are the ones who end up being targeted’. This 
presents a remarkable example and begs for further analysis: how can anyone end up 
being ‘targeted’? It is assumed that to target is to act in a premeditated way; perhaps this 
was a slip of the tongue on behalf of the journalist and instead he meant to say ‘end up 
being hit/injured/killed’. However, such slips of the tongue are mostly revealing, it 
suggests that the reporter clearly believes that Israel is intentionally targeting; she/he 
tries to pull back from this accusation, but then goes on to restate it. To this end, Israeli’s 
are being held culpable; Every time they have a target in Gaza, the Gazan civilian 
population ‘bears the brunt of that’. The utilisation of terms as ‘once again’, ‘time and 
time again’, ‘Every time’, and ‘we keep saying this’ entail connotations of consistency, 
frequency and regularity.   
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In this manner, AJE persistently presented the war as one against Gaza, its civilians and 
often against its children and not, as Israelis claim, against Hamas and its infrastructure. 
Headlines and commentaries like these employed emotive and symptomatic 
terminologies to express the danger Gazan civilians are being put under. Children, AJE 
reports, are ‘once again among the dead’ (6th Jan 2009) and while ‘Israel presses its 
offensive’ ‘civilians both women and children’ are also ‘again caught in the middle’ (16th 
Jan 2009).  
AJE Presenter (16). Can you just clarify for us what’s the military aim of the incursion 
that we have been hearing about across the border into Gaza  
 
Gendelman (17). The aim is to take out Hamas’s rocket launchers that have been 
firing at Israel for the past 8 years. There’s a ground incursion going on 
at the moment. The idea is not to take the Gaza Strip all back again, 
there’s no talk about re-occupation we are there in order to provide a 
better life a normal life for the people in the Southern part of Israel 
 
AJE Presenter (18). What are Israel’s obligations now? A) As an occupying power, and 
b) as an incursion power going in, fighting amongst a civilian 
population, the UN says many have died, what is Israel’s obligation to 
protect those civilians 
 
Gendelman (19). We will avoid civilian casualties we will do our utmost in order to 
avoid hitting civilians. It is very clear that it is very very difficult, we’ve 
seen it in Iraq and in Afghanistan and it’s almost impossible to avoid 
civilian casualties in areas that are so crowded with people and it is very 
very difficult to differentiate between terrorists and regular citizens but 
we are doing our utmost whenever there is a doubt, there is no doubt. If 
there is a doubt that the target is a civilian no one would fire a shot from 
our end. 
 
AJE Presenter (20). But nonetheless those casualties do take place, but let’s just move 
on to the issue of humanitarian crisis that is emerging in Gaza… 
 
Figure 5.3: AJE Interview with Ofer Gendelman –Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
 
On the day of the ground offensive (3rd Jan 2009), AJE interviewed Ofer Gendelman –the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesperson –with the purpose of questioning Israel’s military 
objectives of launching the ground incursion. Figure 5.3 above, presents a detailed 
account of the conversational encounter between AJE’s presenter and Gendelman. This 
encounter is worth examining in full as it illustrates the manner in which AJE continuously 
rejects Israeli statements and highlights that Gaza’s civilian population are the ones 
‘bearing the brunt’. Excerpt (18) depicts Israel a) ‘an occupying power’ and b) ‘an 
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incursion power’ that is ‘fighting amongst a civilian population’. Excerpt (20) offers a 
fascinating example (one that is hard to ignore) of Israel’s defensive techniques in 
responding to accusation directed at them by the media. The first clause ‘we will avoid 
civilian casualties…’ reflects a categorical modal claim that Israel will avoid unnecessary 
casualties; second it presents an immediate downgrading of obligation by claiming that 
‘we will do our utmost to avoid civilian casualties’: here Israel is planning on doing 
whatever it takes to avoid civilian deaths. Later on, Gendelman presents a second 
downgrading of obligation but now stresses that ‘it’s almost impossible to avoid civilian 
casualties in areas that are so crowded with people’. This is followed by a supporting 
clause explaining why it is almost impossible to avoid civilian deaths: ‘it is very very 
difficult to differentiate between terrorists and regular citizens’ –to put it crudely because 
‘they all look the same’. Gendelman then restates that Israel is doing its utmost. Finally, 
he explained that ‘If there is a doubt that the target is a civilian no one would fire a shot 
from our end’; this is a statement of principle which the reporter could have argued 
against, given by this stage of the war, multiple cases of Palestinian deaths were reported 
where it was clear that they could only have been considered civilians –an obvious 
example would be children deaths. However AJE’s presenter refrains from challenging 
him but automatically rejects his claim, affirming that ‘nonetheless those casualties do 
take place’. 
             
‘Israeli incursion…failed to stop the rocket fire from Gaza…and did not provide the 
promised security for its citizens’ (BBC Arabic 4th Jan 2009) 
Again BBC Arabic and BBC World’s discursive strategies and practices diverge across the 
two services. In regards to the provocative aspect of reporting, the Arabic service 
demonstrates patterns which present Israeli and Palestinian statements equally while the 
English service, as indicated above, opts for patterns that report Israeli statements as 
facts.  
(21). But the Israeli incursion, and the intensive air strikes before it, failed to stop the 
rocket fire from Gaza into Israeli towns and did not provide the security it promised its 
citizens, but rather continued to increase the number of Palestinian deaths and 
wounded who were killed by the continuous shelling (BBC Arabic 4th Jan 2009)      
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 هاجتاب عاطقلا نم خيراوصلا قلاطإ فقو يف حلفي مل فثكملا يوجلا فصقلا هلبق ام و يليئارسلإا يربلا لغوتلا نكل
 نيينيطسلفلا ىحرجلا و ىلتقلا دادعأ هليصح عفر يف مهاس لب دوعوملا نملأا اهناكسل رفوي مل و ةيليئارسلإا تادلبلا
ةزغ ىلع لصاوتملا فصقلا ءارج اوطقس نيذلا  
(22). Israel says the main reasons of its incursion on several axes, is to control as much as 
possible of the areas used by Palestinian gunmen to launch rockets at Southern Israeli 
cities (BBC Arabic 4th Jan 2009) 
دع ىلع يربلا لغوتلا نم يسيئرلا ببسلا نأ ليئارسإ لوقت اهمدختسي يذلا قطانملا نم نكمم ردق ربكأ ىلع ةرطيسلا وه رواحم ة
يليئارسلإا بونجلا ندم ىلع خيراوصلا قلاطإ يف نوينيطسلف نوحلسم 
BBC Arabic highlights that Israel is fighting a war against Hamas, in order to stop the 
rockets fired at Israeli towns by Palestinian gunmen in attempting to ‘provide security for 
its citizens’. But it simultaneously emphasised that Israel’s incursion has ‘failed’ to do just 
that. Excerpt (21) above provides an example of the manner in which BBC Arabic went 
about covering this aspect of the war. Unlike BBC World it also stresses that rather than 
‘[stopping] the rocket fire from Gaza into Israeli towns, Israel continued to increase the 
number of Palestinian deaths and wounded who were killed by the continuous shelling’. 
Two counter arguments can be deduced. Like AJE, it suggests that the only ones fighting 
for their lives are the Palestinian population. However, it does so covertly. The excerpt 
does not mention at any point that those dead and wounded are a result of Israeli 
shelling; it only suggests that Israel has increased the number of casualties ‘who were 
killed by the continuous shelling’. Excerpt (22) reveals that statements beginning with 
‘Israel says’ were also included in BBC Arabic’s reporting. Although similar statements are 
paraphrased quotations that portray the actor’s (Israeli) own outlook to the conflict, and 
not that of the service itself; yet if we look at the text in terms of recontextualization, and 
in particular terms of how the different voices are textured in the text, it seems more 
problematic, and less favourable to the Palestinian cause (Fairclough 2003).  
 
‘Israel can’t resist the temptation of war even if the only way to do it is through the 
extermination of 1.5 million Palestinian’ (AJA 4th Jan 2009) 
In the case of Al-Jazeera Arabic, texts almost inevitably assume certain unspoken 
utterances to be known to its audience. What is ‘said’ in a text, argues Fairclough, ‘is 
‘said’ against a background of what is ‘unsaid’, but taken as given’ (Fairclough 2003: 40). 
It is a matter of a relationship between a certain text and what has been said or made 
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known elsewhere, ‘with the ‘elsewhere’ left vague’ (ibid.). In a similar sense, Bakhtin 
argues that such ‘utterances to others may be a matter of ‘building on’ them, 
‘polemicizing with’ them, or simply ‘presuming that they are already known to the 
listener’ (1986: 69). In this regard, explanations on the reasons to why this operation took 
place, and who is to blame for it are ‘known’ factors needless to be proclaimed –such 
‘known’ explanations adopt the Palestinian perspective.  
(23). Despite the ground incursion by Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian 
resistance remains and has rained [bombarded/peppered] Israeli towns with rockets 
and the Israeli Army admits injuries amongst its soldiers (AJA 4th Jan 2009)  
  ةيلئارسلإا ةدلبلا رطمت هينيطسلفلا ةمواقملا ةزغ عاطق قمع يف ةيلئارسلإا ةيربلا تاوقلا لغوت نم مغرلا ىلع
ةزغ يف هدونج فوفص يف تاباصإ عوقوب فرتعي يليئارسلإا شيجلا و خيراوصب 
(24). Perhaps the most prominent news today is that Palestinian rockets continued to fall 
on Israeli towns despite the military operation, which means that 24 hours into the 
ground incursion. At least one of this operation’s stated objectives, to stop the rocket 
fire, has not been achieved yet (AJ 4th Jan 2009)   
خيراوصلا طوقس رارمتسا ةيركسعلا ةيلمعلا هذه مغر وه مويلا زربلأا ناونعلا امبر  يذلا و ةيلئارسلإا تادلبلا ىلع
 رورم مغر ققحتي مل خيراوصلا قلاطإ فقو وه ةنلعملا ةيلمعلا هذه فادهأ دحأ نأ لقلأا ىلع ينعي٤٢  ىلع ةعاس
ةيربلا ةيلمعلا هذه ءدب 
Under the ideology of struggle, AJA reported the continuation of the rockets fired by 
Hamas at Israeli towns as resistance. In AJA’s terms, being able to respond by launching 
rockets from Gaza is defined as resisting the occupation –especially astonishing is the fact 
that the Israeli incursion was not able to stop it. Excerpts (23) and (24) above explain that 
‘despite the ground incursion by Israeli forces’, ‘Palestinian rockets continued to fall on 
Israeli towns’. Such news is described as ‘the most prominent news of the day’. Not only 
did the ‘Palestinian resistance remain’ but it also ‘rained Israeli towns with rockets’. The 
metaphor ‘rained Israeli towns with rockets’ suggests that Palestinian groups have 
bombarded or peppered Israeli towns with missiles; an expression used to convey the 
strength/frequency and intensity of resistance. Terms such as ‘continued to fall’ and 
‘remains’ suggest that the Palestinian resistance is still firm and determined to fire back –
to respond or resist. Excerpt (23) also suggests that the ‘Palestinian resistance’ have 
caused injuries in the ranks of the Israeli soldiers, which portrays Hamas and other 
Palestinian groups in good light. Being able to cause deaths and injuries and consequently 
having the Israeli Army admit to them, suggests that those Palestinian groups are in the 
process of defeating the occupation. In a similar manner, excerpt (24) also confirms that 
‘one of this operation’s stated objectives, to stop the rocket fire, has not been achieved 
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yet’. This again entails connotations of power, resistance and firmness. It is important to 
note here that the consequences of the bombing –on civilians in Israel and Gaza –are 
unexamined. Excerpts like these suggest that the AJA is essentially a mirror image of BBC 
World –in other words, BBC World contains claims from Israeli officials regarding Hamas 
rocket attacks which are identical to those presented on AJA. The only difference is that 
while such violent actions are presented as being ‘good’ on AJA (conveying strength and 
occupation), they are presented as being essentially ‘bad’ on BBC World (portrayed as 
militaristic and aggressive).         
(25). Khalid Mishaal: “As for you, the Army of the enemy while you are being trained by 
your leaders I should warn you that if you commit the stupidity of launching a ground 
offensive then a black destiny awaits you” Mishaal warns Israel that a "black destiny" 
awaits the Jewish state if it launches a ground offensive into the Gaza Strip. (AJ 2nd Jan 
2009)  
"مكرظتني دوسأ اريصم نأ اوكردت نأ مكيلع يرب حايتجاب ةزغ ولخدت مكزيهجتيب مكتدايق يلإ ودعلا دونج اي متنأ امأ "
ةيلئارسا ةباقر بلطتي قافتإ همكحي حفر ربعم نأ لوقي كرابم و ةزغل يرب حايتجا نم ليئارسإ رذحي لعشم 
(26). The political Bureau chairman of Hamas, Khalid Mishaal had also asked all 
Palestinians to mobilise until the aggression is over and the blockade is lifted. (AJ 2nd Jan 
2009) 
 ينطولا فافطصلاا ىلإ نيينيطسلفلا عيمج ىعد دق لعشم دلاخ سامح ةكرحل يسايسلا بتكملا سيئر ناك دق و اذه
هيليئارسلإا تامجهلا دض فوقولل داجلا 
(27). Khaled Mishaal, Hamas’s Political Bureau Chairman also warned Israel that a 
"black destiny" awaits the Jewish state if it launches what he termed a “foolish ground 
offensive” into the Gaza Strip. Mishaal also stressed that Hamas will not surrender or 
bow to the conditions of the enemy (AJ 2nd Jan 2009)  
 ام باكتراب يليئارسلإا شيجلا رذح ةليللا ةملك للاخ لعشم دلاخ سامح ةكرحل يسايسلا بتكملا سيئر رذح دق و اذه
 اهفصو"يربلا حايتجلاا ةقامحب "يليئارسلاا موجهلا اذهل ملستست نل سامح نا كلذك لاق لعشم زةزغل  
 
It has already been shown how BBC World adopted, and occasionally endorsed, Israeli 
statements and continuously reiterated parts of Ehud Barak’s speech. Similarly, AJA was 
shown to adopt and incorporate Khalid Mishaal’s –the Political Bureau chairman of 
Hamas –voice into their coverage. Al-Jazeera’s Hasad Al-Youm (Harvest of the Day) 
started its programme on the day before the ground incursion (2nd Jan 2009) with short 
direct segments of Mishaal’s speech (see Ex. (25)). Portrayed from a Palestinian point of 
view, the speech was directed at Israel ‘warning’ its leader that ‘if [they] commit the 
stupidity of launching a ground offensive, a black destiny awaits [them]’ (Ex. (25) and 
(27)). He also asked for Palestinian unity and invited them ‘to mobilise until the 
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aggression is over and the blockade is lifted’ (Ex. (26))–i.e. until Hamas achieves some of 
its stated objectives. Palestinian statements were continuously incorporated into the text 
but were never endorsed by AJ journalists or correspondents.  
(28). In general, today was violent. Targeting houses or [correspondent corrects himself] 
the continuation of targeting houses was what made today very violent. More than 17 
homes were directly targeted with shells landing on whole families. This resulted in 
martyring some and wounding some in various contact areas, especially in Zaitoun 
area, Jabalya and Beit Layha, in addition to the continuation or [correspondent corrects 
himself] the targeting of mosques and ambulances.  (Jan 5th Jan 2009)        
 نم رثكأ ،لزانملا فادهتسا يف رارمتسلإا وأ لزانملا فادهتسا وه هزيم ام مهأ ناك ماع لكشب افينع ناك مويلا٧١ 
 قطانم فلتخم يف حيرج و ديهش نيب ام اهلمكأب رسأ ىلع ىتأ ام يعفدملا فصقلاب رشابم لكشب مهفادهتسا مت لازنم
ايهلا تيب و ايلابج و نوتيزلا يف اميس لا سامتلا .اب فادهتسا اضيأ و دجاسملا فادهتسا وأ رارمتسا ىلإ ةفاضلإ
فاعسلإا تارايس 
(29). Most of the martyrs today are civilians, mostly children and also those injured. 
Entire families lost some of their members and a large number were wounded in this 
bombardment that reached many houses. A bombardment that is being described by 
many Palestinians as indiscriminate that left an impact on every house and an 
increasingly substantial tragedy in every neighbourhood, one that the Palestinians have 
not experienced in decades (AJ 5th Jan 2009)      
نيباصملا نم اضيأ لافطلأا نم مه نييندملا نم مه مويلا ءادهش مظعم . ددع بيصأ و اهنم دارفأ تدقف اهلمكأب تلائاع
لزانملا نم ريثكلا لاط يذلا فصقلا اذه يف اهنم ريبك . لك يف رثأ كرت يذلا يئاوشعلاب نونيتسليفلا هفصو دصاق
 مل ةديازتم ةريبك هانعم و ةاسأم ةراح لك يف و تيبةليوط دوقع ذنم نوينيطسلفلا اهدهشي  
Finally, in contrast to BBC World, the Israeli aggression was pictured to be targeting 
civilian houses and not those of Hamas. Excerpt (28) explains that the reason why ‘today 
was very violent’ is because Israel ‘continued’ to target ‘houses, mosques and 
ambulances’. Such issues of proportionality will be dealt with extensively in the following 
chapter, however, the excerpts above raises concerns about the provocative aspect of 
the coverage. Reporting from Gaza, AJA’s correspondent had to correct himself twice in 
excerpt (28) first to include the phrase ‘the continuation of targeting houses’ rather than 
just ‘targeting houses’ –which suggests that this act is not new but consistent. Second, 
mosques and ambulances not only ‘continued’ to get hit by Israeli fire, they were also 
‘targeted’. ‘Homes were directly targeted with shells landing on whole families’ which 
‘resulted in martyring some and wounding some’. The incursion was described to have 
had ‘an impact on every house and an increasingly substantial tragedy in every 
neighbourhood, one that the Palestinians have not experienced in decades’ (Ex. (29)).  
What proved to be noteworthy in AJA’s reporting is that there does not seem to be as 
much discussion of the provocative aspect of the conflict (especially the case when 
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compared to BBC World who seem to be preoccupied with ‘why this is happening?’). This, 
of course again reveals cultural presuppositions on the audiences’ behalf –that this is 
simply what Israel does to Gaza/Palestine. Hence the focus is on what is being done and 
not on the reasons to why such actions take place.   
To whom is agency for these actions and events attributed and how? 
One way of examining a news text’s syntactic features, is through syntactic 
transformations –that is through nominalizations, transitivity and/or active/passive 
sentences (Carvalho 2010: 17). Pragmatics, syntactic word order and clause structure are 
used to represent events, situations and interpretations in a certain way. Like vocabulary, 
the choices made in regards of transitivity or normal patterns represent events and 
narratives in certain ways desired by a given news corporation (ibid.).   
(30). Civilians not connected with Hamas continued to die as well. The UN says that the 
people are in fear and panic and that the hospitals are overwhelmed. 3 boys including 2 
brothers all from the Al-Astal family killed in a raid.  (BBC World 2nd of Jan, 2009) 
(31). Hamas is still launching rockets to Israel, despite 6 days of air-raid reaching deeper 
than ever into the country. One struck Ashdod Israel’s biggest port, and after an empty 
school was hit in the desert Beersheba some residents are getting out of rage. (BBC 
World 1st Jan, 2009) 
The above examples are provided in order to compare the way attacks on and by both 
Palestinians and Israelis were reported on BBC World. As one can see from the examples 
above, excerpt (30) portrays the death of Palestinian civilians in Gaza; and excerpt (31) 
reports on rockets launched by Hamas at Israeli towns. It is worth analysing one excerpt 
at a time. When the casualties are Palestinians, the subject (agency or perpetrator of the 
action) is often not in its “normal” place at the beginning of the sentence, or in the case 
of excerpt (31) is completely excluded. Palestinian casualties are foregrounded being 
positioned at the beginning of the clause: ‘Civilians not connected with Hamas’. In 
contrast, the Israelis, who caused the casualties, are not mentioned at all. Those civilians 
–perhaps even innocent civilians – were reported as ‘continuing to die’. The use of the 
intransitive verb ‘to die’ proceeded by ‘continued’ (present continuous) does not 
attribute their deaths to agency and hence can be the result of anything, from a deadly 
earthquake to extreme poverty and hunger. In the case of this sentence, none of the 
process nouns are the agent of action –the grammatical subject is absent in the clause. 
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Later in the same excerpt, other casualties were, again, reported to have been ‘killed in a 
raid’. The employment of nominalisation in news discourse involves the ‘loss’ of certain 
semantic elements of the clause (Fairclough 2003: 143) –in the case of this example: the 
perpetrator who caused the deaths, or the party involved in the killing. When there is 
uncertainty about agency there is vagueness about ‘who does what and to whom’ 
(Barkho 2010: 135). The practice is reversed when attacks reported are committed by 
Hamas on Israeli towns. Excerpt (31) provides all necessary explanations to answer the 
three vital Ws: who does what to whom (ibid: 136). Who: Hamas, does what: is still 
launching rockets and to whom: Israel. The information in the sentence is also arranged 
in its “normal” order.   
(32). Hello and welcome to Jerusalem it’s the evening of the Jewish Sabbath. Israel says 
900,000 of its citizens are living in bomb shelters tonight in fear of rockets launched by 
Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip. Israel says as long as those attacks continue so 
will its attacks against the Gaza Strip. Those bombardments by air and attacks by navy 
ships of the coast of the Gaza Strip have continued for a 7th day. (BBC World 2nd of Jan, 
2009) 
The use of emotive language in reporting a dispute creates easy gateways for audiences 
to attribute agency to the party they consider holds more responsibility. Associations and 
familiarity are crucial aspects in determining culpability. The excerpt above adopts Jewish 
sentiments and reports: on ‘the evening of the Jewish Sabbath, 900,000 Israeli citizens are 
living in bomb shelters in fear of rockets launched by Palestinian militants in the Gaza 
Strip’. It is suggested that when perpetrators appear at the end of a clause, they 
automatically ‘lose’ the focus or “thematic prominence”…as the ones who are 
responsible’ (Barkho 2010: 135). However, the example above illustrates that Israeli 
civilians are ‘in fear’ of those rockets launched by ‘militants’. So rather than downgrading 
the level of attribution, Hamas are being presented as causing fear amongst the Israeli 
civilian population and are –as already established –being depicted as militants. It then 
adopts the ‘as long as those attacks continue so will its attacks against the Gaza Strip’ 
which suggests that Israeli attacks are acts of retaliation. Similar patterns in reporting 
Israeli attacks against Gaza are evident in excerpt (32). Israeli bombardments by air and 
attacks by navy ships are reported to ‘have continued for a 7th day’ with references to the 
perpetrator being omitted entirely. The use of nominalisation, in this respect, generalises 
events and abstracts those involved from agency.           
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Interestingly, on the same day of BBC World’s report on the Jewish Sabbath, Al-Jazeera 
English reported, 
(33). Friday is a day of devotion in the Muslim world, this Friday it’s been a day of prayer 
and protest and of grief compounded by even more grief (AJE 2nd 2009) 
These examples shed light on the very notion of selectivity. As Richardson explicates ‘We 
assume that every aspect of textual content is the result of a ‘choice’ –the choice to use 
one way of describing a person, an action or a process over another; the choice to use 
one way of constructing a sentence over an alternative; the choice to include a particular 
fact or opinion or argument over another, etc.’ (Richardson 2007: 38). Such sentiments 
provide affectionate language that helps build relationships and associations with 
audiences. Do such examples tell us anything about the news corporations or their target 
audience? Answers to these questions are clearly essential to understanding how a news 
network functions, however, a detailed analysis of this kind is beyond the scope of this 
study.     
(34). Issan, Islam, Bilal, Ezzeldin and Wala’a, brothers and sisters aged between 7 and 12 
killed in an Israeli air-strike along with their mother just about 2 hours ago in the Bureij 
Refugee Camp in Gaza (AJE 16th Jan 2009) 
(35). The signs and signals more death and destruction for the people of Gaza, Israel calls 
this achieving success in its war (AJE 13th Jan 2009) 
(36). As Israel pounds Gaza and sheds the blood of hundreds of Palestinians, their 
brothers here in the West Bank are expressing outrage telling the International 
Community they should be ashamed for preaching human rights and not protecting those 
of the Palestinians (AJE 3rd Jan 2009)  
The deleted perpetrator in BBC World is present in AJE’s reporting. The three examples 
above succeed in providing answers to the three Ws; however they do so in varying 
patterns. Excerpt (36) provides the most straightforward (or normal) clause structure and 
caters to answer the, who what and whom, questions consequently. Israel is the 
perpetrator; its actions are also being lexically articulated: ‘it pounds’ and ‘sheds the 
blood’, and finally, it is clear that what is being pounded is Gaza and those blood being 
shed are ‘hundreds of Palestinians’. Excerpt (35) on the other hand, is rather ambiguous, 
mainly due to its complex supposition and nominalisation. The excerpt can be divided 
into two parts each understood differently if analysed separately. The first part of the 
clause is only attributed agency when anticipated as a whole. It reports ‘more death and 
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destruction for the people of Gaza’ and refrains from including an agent or a perpetrator; 
however the underlying sarcasm involved in the second part of the clause shift the blame 
directly at Israel –In other words it suggests that Israel calls the death and destruction of 
the people of Gaza achieving success in its war. Yet, it is important to point out that it did 
so covertly and is cautious of accusing Israel directly. Reasons for this include objectivity 
in reporting and perhaps even stylistic motives. The last example (Ex. (36)) also functions 
under a “normal patterned” clause. The victims, who are given names and recognition, 
were killed by Israel in an air-strike that also killed their mother in the Bureij Refugee 
Camp in Gaza. However, agency to the action is relegated to the syntactic circumstances 
of the event (killed in an Israeli air-strike). 
(37). Presenter: how concerned is Israel about hitting innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip 
(AJE 3rd Jan 2009) 
(38). Presenter: what is Israel’s obligation under occupation? Do you care about the 
Palestinian population? (AJE 3rd Jan 2009) 
(39). Israel says its enemy is Hamas but while it fights its battle, it keeps a million and a 
half people trapped inside the warzone it created (AJE 5th Jan 2009) 
AJE journalists were also seen to accuse Israelis of disregarding Palestinian lives. This is 
demonstrated in examples (37)-(39) above. In the first 2 examples, these accusations are 
posed as questions to Israeli officials. The first clause, ‘how concerned is Israel about 
hitting innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip’, suggests that the journalist doubts Israel’s 
claims that it cares for civilian lives. This is later emphasised and directly put across to an 
Israeli spokesperson: ‘what is Israel’s obligation under occupation? Do you care about the 
Palestinian population?’ First, it refers to it as an occupation then it disregards Israeli 
statements that its strikes are surgical. Example (39) also rejects Israeli claims. The 
sentence structure, ‘Israel says’ followed by the conjunctive ‘but’ indicates mistrust and 
suspicion. Also, its metaphorical approach in saying ‘it keeps a million and a half people 
trapped’ reflects images of ambush and restriction. In addition, the phrase ‘inside the 
warzone it created’ suggests that the war was, in essence, an Israeli creation.   
(40). It’s the second phase of Israel’s assaults on Gaza. A ground incursion across four 
axes following 8 days of intensive aerial bombardment transmitted a large sector of 
Gaza’s infrastructure into rubble and a significant number of Gazans into dead and 
wounded that overwhelmed Gaza’s hospitals (BBC Arabic 4th Jan 2009) 
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 فصق نم مايأ ةينامث تلت رواحم ةعبرأ ربع يرب لغوت ةزغ عاطق ىلع يليئارسلإا موجهلا نم ةيناثلا ةلحرملا يه
 تصاغ نيباصم و ثثج ىلإ نيزاغلا نم هب ناهتسي ام اددع و ماكر ىلإ عاطقلا ةينب نم ريبك مسق لاحأ فثكم يوج
تايفشتسملا مهب   
Excerpts from BBC Arabic follow almost similar discursive practices pursued by its World 
Service (BBC World Service) when covering attacks and casualties inflicted on 
Palestinians. Palestinian victims are not always brought to the beginning, like on BBC 
World, but the agents are, mostly, deleted. The transformation is done through 
transitivity. The patterned ordering of words and phrases and the position and sequence 
of elements are important factors in the analysis of BBC Arabic’s syntactic features. 
Especially significant is alternative phrasing. The first sentence of Excerpt (40), above, is 
understandable in explaining the participants (of who did what to whom). The second 
sentence proves to be more problematic. Employing cohesive reference relations 
between sentences assumes a level of knowledge on behalf of its audience. The marker 
reference ‘a’ –in ‘a ground incursion’ in Excerpt (40) –refers to entities or objects outside 
of the text that have not been identified. The wording of the sentence implies that ‘the 
ground incursion and the intensive aerial bombardment before it’ are the reason a large 
sector of Gaza’s infrastructure has been reduced to rubble and a number of Gazans were 
transmitted into dead and wounded –the use of passive transformations allows parts of 
the clause to be deleted leaving responsibility unspecified. Compare this with its active 
equivalence: the Israeli ground incursion across four axes following 8 days of intensive 
Israeli aerial bombardment destroyed a large sector of Gaza’s infrastructure and killed 
and wounded a number of Gazans –both noun phrases and agent are made obvious.         
(41). Israeli forces left the area but also left behind 23 deaths. (BBC Arabic 16th Jan 2009)  
 فلخ عجارت هنكل اهنم تعجارت ةيليئارسلإا تاوقلا٤٢ لايتق .  
In Excerpt (41) only the subject (noun) phrase –Israeli Forces –and the transitive verb 
phrase –left behind 23 deaths –are made clear. The object or affected participants 
(Palestinians) are made ambiguous –referred to as 23 deaths. The use of the passive verb 
‘left behind’ entails various interpretations: Israeli forces left the area but also killed 23 
Palestinians (like the intended meaning of this excerpt); Israeli forces left the area but 
also left behind 23 dead Israeli soldiers; or those deaths can also be the result of external 
factors.   
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(42). Despite the operation entering its 4th week of trying to prevent rocket fire on the 
South rockets fired by Palestinian gunmen continued and at least 12 rockets fell at 
Southern Israeli areas (BBC Arabic 17th Jan 2009) 
هعوبسأ ةيليئارسلإا ةيلمعلا لوخد مغر و نيلتاقملا خيراوص نأ لاإ بونجلا ىلع خيراوصلا قلاطإ فقول عبارلا ا
 نع لقي لا ام طقس ثيح فقوتت مل نيينيطسلفلا٧٤ هيبونجلا ةيليئارسلإا قطانملا ىلع اخوراص   
Reporting attacks on Israel took a different syntactic style. In Excerpt (42) above, the 
what (rockets fired) and who (Palestinian gunmen) of the three Ws are clearly explained. 
The object or affected participants (Israeli towns and/or civilians) are vague. Palestinian 
rockets ‘fell at Southern Israeli areas’, however, the clause does not mention that those 
rockets were intended to fall on Israeli towns –in short, attention to Palestinian actions 
and circumstances were deemphasised. From the outset, it is clear that BBC Arabic’s 
discursive features follow greater editorial freedom when compared to BBC World. Yet, if 
we look at the text in terms of propositional meanings and functions –in particular the 
way the text confirms that Israel’s operation aimed ‘to prevent rocket fire on the South’, 
as well as its terminology in referring to Palestinians as ‘Palestinian gunmen’ –such 
proposals seem problematic and less favourable to the Palestinians.         
Attribution to agency on Al-Jazeera Arabic is mostly absent. Nominalisation is a common 
factor on AJA, and regards agency as irrelevant and somewhat always predictable. 
Adopting passivity and transitivity makes strong assumptions about the audience. AJA’s 
audience are homogeneous in terms of their acknowledgement that the Israelis are 
always at fault.  
(43). The raids and the shelling continue and the appalling of Palestinian blood continues 
in Gaza. The cries and pleas of those displaced also continue in a period of time where 
standing against such carnage seems irreversible. Day 21 of the aggression on Gaza has 
seen an intensification of Israeli shelling that targeted North of Rafah and the town of 
Jabalya. 6 martyrs from the Batran family, a mother and her 5 children fell dead after 
the bombing of Israeli warplanes targeted their house in the Breij Refugee Camp in 
central Gaza Strip. Medical sources at Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital confirmed that separate 
remains of the bodies have arrived to the hospitals stressing that the eldest among the 
children did not exceed 12 years old. In an air raid on another house in the same camp 3 
Palestinians were martyred and 3 others were wounded. And in an artillery shelling of 
the eastern part of Jablya a shell landed on one of the houses leaving 4 martyrs of the 
same family to join the tens of martyrs who were killed during the 21st day and more 
than 1130 since day 1 of the Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip non-inclusive of those 
found under the rubble in the area of Tal al-Hawa. The Palestinian resistance continued 
its artillery barrages on Israeli towns firing tens of rockets that left several wounded. 
One of which fell on a factory which caused significant damage and another landed in 
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the Kadrim village and Netivot and the areas of Kissufim and Eshkol in the North 
Western Negev desert (AJA 16th Jan 2009)   
 دق و نييزانلا تادشانم و تاخرص رمتست و ةزغ يف مدلا قفص رمتسي و فصقلا و تاراغلا رمتست و نمز يلو
ةينمزلا ةبقحلا هذه يف لقلأا ىلع ةعجر ريغ ىلإ مصتعملا . فيثكت دهش ةزغ ىلع ناودعلل نيرشعلا و يداحلا مويلا
ايلابج ةدلب لاط و حفر ةقطنم فدهتسا يذلا يلئارسلإا يعفدملا فصقلل .٦ ءادهش   و مأ نارطبلا هلئاع نم٥  نم
يلئارسلإا يبرحلا ناريطلل فصق يف اوطقس اهئانبأ ةزغ عاطق طسو جيربلا ميخم يف مهلزنم فادهتسا . هيبط رداصم
رشع يناثلا زواجتي مل مهربكأ و ءلاشأ مهلوصو تدكأ ىصقلأا ءادهش ىفشتسم يف . رخأ لزنم ىلع ةيوج ةراغ يف و
 دهشتسا هتاذ ميخملا يف٢  حرج و٢ نورخأ . لزانملا دحأ ىلع ةفيذق تطقس ايلابج قرش ىلع يعفدم فصق يف و
فلخم ة٢  فلأ نم رثكأ و نيرشعلا و يداحلا مويلا يف اوطقس نيذلا ءادهشلا تارشع ىلإ مضنت هدحاو هلئاع نم ءادهش
 مقاوط مهتلشتنا نيذلا نع كيهان ةزغ عاطق ىلع ةيلئارسلإا تامجهلا نم لولأا نيلأ ذنم اودهشتسا نيثلاث و ةئم و
ىوهلا لت ةقطنم يف ضاقنلأا تحت نم فاعسلإا .ا ةمواقملا ةيلئارسلإا تادلبلا ىلع يعفدملا اهفصق تلصاو ةينيطسلفل
 داك هيرق يف ىرخلأا تطقس و عناصملا دحأب ةريبك رارضأ اهدحأ قحلا و ىحرج ةدع تفلخ يتلا خيراوصلا ةرشعب
يبرغلا قفنلاب لوكش و ميفشوك قطانم و توفيتان و 
Again, it is important to stress that there is almost no discussion of the provocative 
aspect of the war (reasons to ‘why’ the war started) in AJA, but emphasis is dedicated to 
what has happened –no context like BBC World. What makes AJA special, however, is its 
use of emotive lexical in explaining Palestinian suffering. Excerpt (43) is taken from an AJA 
report just a few days before the end of the war. The first sentence speaks of Israeli 
actions but only highlights its consequences. This nominal form diverts agency but puts 
emphasis on shelling, raids and the appalling of Palestinian blood it continued to inflict. 
Deleted in the second sentence are the affected participants, those displaced who’s cries 
and pleas continue; even the agent responsible for those cries and please is marginalised. 
As shown, the few clauses that follow opt for “normal” patterns of reporting in defining 
who did what to whom. Israeli actions and processes are said to be aggressive, its shelling 
is portrayed as intensifying and it is reported to target towns in Gaza. Palestinian civilians 
–especially children –are being martyred, arriving to hospitals in pieces. Palestinian 
casualties are presented in an articulate and touchy manner. When it comes to reporting 
the actions of the Palestinian Resistance, AJA does not shy away from admitting 
‘Palestinian artillery barrages on Israeli towns’ are continuous which left ‘several 
wounded’ and caused ‘significant damage’ to a factory it targeted –however those 
wounded are unidentified. 
(44). The scenes of destruction and devastation caused by the occupation forces in Tal al-
Hawa neighbourhood southwest of Gaza are still evident and visible. This neighbourhood 
which comprises tens of residential towers and high buildings was the theatre of the 
Israeli operations that haven’t left a single human being or a single stone but caused 
some damage to it (AJA 16th Jan 2009)   
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 ةيداب تلاز ام ةزغ يبرغ بونج ىوهلا لت يح يف ةيلئارسلإا للاتحلاا تاوق اهتفلخ يذلا بارخلا و رامدلا دهاشم
 مل يتلا ةيلئارسلإا ةيلمعلل احرسم ناك ةعفترملا لزانملا و ةينكسلا جاربلأا نم تارشعلا مودي يذلا يحلا و نايعلل
هتفدهتسا و لاإ ارجح وأ ارشب قيرتت 
(45). The scenes of devastation in Gaza during the past 22 days of the war are hard to 
bypass the human consciousness from the horror inflicted, the amounts of bloodshed 
from Palestinians, tears and the immense destruction is an evidence of the lack of 
consciousness. Instead time was only given for killing (AJA 18th Jan 2009)  
 للاخ ةزغ دهشم نأ ودبي لا٤٤  ةريثك هينيطسلف ءامد ،عقو ام لوهل يناسنلإا ريمضلا نم اعيرس نايسنل اضرعم اموي
لتقلل ناك تقولاف ريمضلا كلذ تمص ىلع دهاش لئاه رامد و عومد و تلاس. 
(46). ..and those children still alive in Gaza will only drink milk when the hearts of Israel’s 
European brothers ache (AJA 18th Jan 2009) 
ةيبوروا ةقيقش ةيلئارسا ةدئفأ نحت امدنع ابيلح برشيس هايحلا ديق ىلع ةزغ لافطأ نم ىقب نم و 
 
In Excerpt (44) attribution is clearly directed at Israel –or ‘occupation forces’ as termed by 
AJA. The actions caused are destruction and devastation. The scene of this destruction 
and devastation is described as ‘the theatre of the Israeli aggression’. AJA’s lexical 
structure then amplifies the extent of the horror by stating that ‘Israel’s aggression’ 
haven’t left a single human being or a single stone but caused some damage to it’. Such 
statements elicit metaphorical connotations; in which even a single stone which is 
unlikely to change form has been said to be damaged. The devastation was later 
portrayed as inflicting horror, tears, immense destruction, and has caused the shedding of 
[large] amounts of Palestinian blood (Ex. (45)). The metaphor in excerpt (46) evokes 
images of agony, pain and torture. The adjective ‘alive’ proceeded with yet another 
adjective ‘still’ implies that other children are not alive –that children had been one of 
Israel’s targets. As a whole the metaphor explains that those children who survived 
Israel’s indiscriminate aggression (those children still alive) will only continue to survive 
(drinking milk is metaphorically translated as staying alive) when the EU (or International 
Community) allows them to do so.            
Ideologies underlying Provocation  
After understanding how texts work in characterising participants, directing culpability 
and attributing agency, it is worth expanding these insights in relation to the wider 
society. Two ideological aspects seem to surface in this respect, each from a different 
news institution. For this reason, only excerpts from BBC World and Al-Jazeera Arabic will 
be included in this section.    
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(47). Some government ministers here have expressed their concerns that the longer the 
conflict goes the more it will fuel the forces of alienation and extremism amongst 
Muslims in Britain (16th Jan 2009) 
As explained in the previous chapter, BBC World had the least amount of coverage 
dedicated to the Gaza Conflict. However it managed to discuss, on several occasions, the 
effects this war is having (will have) on British Muslims –one which is referred to as 
‘fuelling the forces of alienation and extremism amongst Muslims in Britain’ (Ex. (47)). The 
BBC presenter even conducted an interview with the Justice Minister Shahid Malik who is 
also a prominent British Muslim and was asked whether such concerns worry him. The 
war was seen as having the potential to radicalise some people. Senior Muslims were also 
reported to have warned ministers that some young people could turn to extremism and 
violence, rather than conventional protest and pressure, because of the Gaza war. Such 
militarist ideology advocates violent resistance and associates Muslims with alienation 
and extremism.       
(48). The Islamic Sheikh Dr. Ibrahim Dweish called for the Muslim Ummah (nations) to 
declare Jihad assuring that Palestine was taken by force and will only be taken back by 
force. The Islamic Preacher also said in his Friday sermon delivered in the Abdul-Aziz 
Mosque that self-defence is an international legitimate right and Palestine was taken by 
force and will only be given back by force and in this manner he expressed that Jihad in 
God’s will was legitimised (AJ 2nd Jan 2009)     
 اوفع شيودلا ادكؤم سفنلاب داهجلا ينلاعلإل نيملسملا رومأ تلاو يعد شيورد ميهاربإ روتكدلا خيشلا يملاسلإا ىعد
 ةبطخ يف يملاسلإا ةيعادلا لاق و ةوقلاب لاإ درت نل و ةوقلاب تذخأ نيطسلف نأ ادكؤم كلملا عماجب اهاقلأ يتلا ةعمجلا
زيزعلادبع... سفنلا نع عافدلا نأ  اقح  اذه لثميب و ةلوئسملا ةوقلاب لاإ درت نل و ةوقلاب تذخأ نيطسلف و عورشم ايلود
 داهجلا عرش الله ليبس يف  
Alternatively on AJA, ideology took an Islamic trend. Islamic Sheikh’s are quoted as 
credible sources mainly to promote unity and deliver hope and motivation amongst 
Muslim audiences. Such spiritual ideology was endorsed through the facilitation of terms 
as ‘the Muslim Ummah’, ‘declare Jihad’, and ‘Jihad in God’s will’. In a way it advocates 
violent resistance– [declaring] Jihad by assuring that Palestine was taken by force and will 
only be taken back by force –and legitimises it –‘self-defence is an international legitimate 
right’,’ in this manner he expressed that Jihad in God’s will was legitimised’ – but is 
perceived as both acceptable and rational by AJA and its audience.        
To this end, again it is clear from the examples above that AJA’s Islamic trend is a mirror 
image of the questions raised on BBC World. So while BBC World questions whether the 
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war is able to ‘radicalise’ British Muslims and how such radicalisation relate to the 
‘Muslimness’ of British Muslims, AJA provided adequate answers suggesting that Muslims 
around the world should declare Jihad in which it makes clear that ‘self-defence is an 
international legitimate right’.  
 
Conclusion  
The discussion above illustrates that both networks –BBC and Al-Jazeera –lack a coherent 
discursive strategy at the level of the lexical in its reporting of the conflict. Their lexical 
discursive and semantic practices are not consistent within their networks. Most 
strikingly, in terms of categorisations, is BBC World’s consistent use of the term “militant” 
to accompany different Palestinian factions and that of BBC Arabic’s less stark 
equivalences. Also significant are Al-Jazeera’s (less so with AJE) regular adaptation of 
resembling terminology of resistance and martyrdom. The practice of ‘labelling’, or in 
Goffman’s terminology ‘framing’, ‘is well understood in sociology and social psychology 
and it can be shown that circumstances may be altered, behaviour reinforced and 
conditioned, attitudes affected and perceptions changed by the consistent application of 
labels’ (Eldridge 1995: 176). 
Provided that institutions of news reporting and presentation are ‘socially, economically 
and politically situated, all news is always reported from some particular angle’ (Fowler 
1991: 10). In relation to the reasons, provided by the broadcasters, to why the war took 
place all four channels had a different narrative to present. BBC World and Al-Jazeera 
Arabic adopted, and to an extent endorsed, the Israeli and the Palestinian perspectives 
respectively. Al-Jazeera English continued to disclaim Israeli statements and accused the 
Israeli Army of targeting the civilian population of Gaza and not Hamas. BBC Arabic 
presented both perspectives confirming that one of Israel’s main objectives is to stop the 
rocket launch from Gaza but also highlighted that it has failed to do so. This chapter also 
discussed the way news discourse can be semantically transformed to cater for different 
news corporations’ discursive practices and strategies. It provided thorough examples of 
how certain news networks nominalise and passivise their text to highlight and 
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marginalise certain perspectives and voices in terms of attributing agency to violence and 
destruction.  
Finally, it was demonstrated that BBC World holds certain ‘militancy ideology’ in putting 
the conflict beyond its warzone and explaining it in relation to potential extremism and 
alienation on behalf of British Muslims. In a similar manner, Al-Jazeera Arabic took an 
Islamic approach in promoting and legitimising violence to which it referred to as 
resistance. This suggests that BBC World is essentially a mirror image of AJA. The only 
difference is that whereas it presented to be ‘bad’ on BBC World, it is presented to be 
‘good’ on AJA. The following chapter will discursively and visually analyse the 
humanitarian aspect of war. By looking at Proportionality it aims to distinguish the way 
Al-Jazeera and BBC portrayed the suffering of both the Palestinians and the Israelis.        
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Chapter 6 
Proportionality –war crimes, casualties and humanitarian suffering: a 
discursive and visual analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
Drawing on verbal and visual analysis of BBC and Al-Jazeera television journalism, this 
chapter aims to investigate the ways in which the corporations represented the 
humanitarian aspect of the Gaza War. It covers a broad range of subject matter and shifts 
attention between a number of themes. It looks at the proportionality of the casualties 
inflicted, the humanitarian crisis and accusations of war crimes. It also examines the 
extent to which the actions of the protagonist were portrayed as being justified, 
proportionate and legitimate. Chapter 5 suggests that it may well be the case that, in 
some instances, the actions of the protagonist may be deemed legitimate with regard to 
provocation, similarly, through looking at the textual anchoring of imagery within the 
contours of discourse this chapter aims to examine the extent to which the actions and 
events of the Gaza War were represented as proportional.        
Certain images of human suffering throughout the 64 year-old Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
have become imprinted icons, accredited with causing collective outrage and frustration 
amongst Arab citizens. One scene caught in camera was the twelve-year-old Muhammad 
al-Durra and his father, both crouching against a wall in Gaza, hiding from the fighting. 
Mohammad was then fatally shot, falling dead against his father who was injured soon 
after. Other images picture the lifeless corpus of an Israeli soldier as it is thrown from a 
police station window in Ramallah, which is then further beaten and paraded by the 
angry protest below. Likewise, during the Gaza War multiple images of death and anguish 
were transmitted across Arab Television and through most Western broadcasters. Images 
of dead children in news reports, especially, have caused the International Community 
and the United Nations to publicly criticise Israeli tactics accusing them of violating 
International Law and of committing war crimes; similarly, images of crying children at 
Sderot have also attracted extensive media attention accusing Hamas of committing 
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crimes against humanity. For that reason this chapter aims to visually and linguistically 
analyse selected multi-modal texts of the many journalistic items produced and 
broadcast by BBC and Al-Jazeera during the war. The texts were selected as indicative 
examples of the channel’s portrayal of humanitarian reporting. Through exploring three 
major news stories, central to understanding the Gaza War in terms of proportionality, it 
focuses on the ‘Who’ (who was affected?) and ‘How’ (How were they affected? ) scopes 
of the coverage. These stories simultaneously include: The Samouni family incident, the 
attacks on the UNRWA school, and Israel’s use of illegal weaponry. It is worth noting 
here, that due to the lack of full length items reporting Israel’s use of white phosphorus 
bombs by BBC World, the chapter will only provide linguistic analysis of its coverage.       
Overall, the transcripts provided below include both visual and verbal excerpts from the 
coverage. Adopting Richardson and Barkho’s (2009) analysis, the visual dimensions are 
more generalised, providing a screen image for the selected clips in the edited sequence 
(Richardson and Barkho 2009: 595). As suggested by Richardson and Barkho (2009) the 
analysis looks solely on the media representations of the protagonists’ arguments and 
not how they are presented by the protagonists’ themselves. The reason for this is that 
‘While the protagonist may have little restriction on how to express their own verbal and 
visual representations, it is important to see how far the carriers of their own 
arguments…are bounded in the coverage of their argumentation’ (Richardson and Barkho 
2009: 594). Finally, like the previous chapter, this chapter demonstrates caution in 
offering generalised conclusions applicable to the news corporations as a whole, as 
commentaries made on the news’ discursive and visual procedures relate solely to the 
selected texts in question. 
 
Commission: 5th Jan 2009 – Bombing the house of the Al-Samouni Family  
According to accounts by the Al-Samouni family members, on January 4th 2009, the first 
day of the Israeli incursion in the Zeitoun district, the Samouni clan were evacuated by 
Israeli soldiers from their houses and were assembled into a nearby home for their 
safety. They were then forced by the Israeli army to move again to another building, 
massing a number of 100 members of the same family in a single home. On January 5th, 
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Israelis began demolishing a wall of the house. According to eyewitness accounts, when 
one of the occupants went to alert the Israeli soldiers that Palestinian civilians were 
inside, the soldiers began to shoot at the house. After a short lull, the house was shelled 
and hit by rockets, severely damaging the building and killing and injuring many of its 
occupants. A total of 30 members of the Samouni family were killed. With regards to this 
incident, the United Nations Fact Finding Mission report on the Gaza Conflict, calling it a 
‘deliberate attack against the civilian population’, stated that, 
From the facts ascertained […], the Mission finds that the conduct of the Israeli 
armed forces constitute grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention in 
respect of wilful killings and wilfully causing great suffering to protected persons 
and as such give rise to individual criminal responsibility. It also finds that the 
direct targeting and arbitrary killing of Palestinian civilians is a violation of the 
right to life (2009: 16) 
In relation to this study, the only network to report the story of the Samouni family on 
the day the incident took place was Al-Jazeera Arabic. Al-Jazeera English and BBC Arabic 
revealed the realities of the incident at later dates. Strikingly, BBC World was the only 
network to refrain from dedicating special reports on the story – civilians killed in this 
tragedy were mentioned only in passing. The analysis below discusses and analyses the 
main and first reports broadcast by the networks on the Samouni attacks. Three 
noteworthy aspects of the reports will be the focus of this section: first, the way the 
incident is described; second, the extent to which there is an attempt to personalise the 
victims; and third, the level of emotionalism and/or dramatisation attributed to the news 
story. 
Al-Jazeera English 
 
Extract 6.1: AJE’s report on the Samouni family incident – 12
th
 Jan 2009  
[Studio Presenter] 
 
The Samouni family had a similar but much more devastating experience and move. Their tragedy 
began to unfold last Sunday in Zeitoun, an area in the outskirts of Gaza Strip. Israeli troops reportedly 
ordered around 100 members of the Samouni family into a single building nearby for their own safety, 
just 24 hrs later the building was shelled. The UN said at least 30 people were killed. People who were 
there tell Al-Jazeera the death toll is much higher. It was two days before the medical officials could 
enter to collect the wounded and dead. (AJE 12th Jan 2009) 
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Time  
Start: 
05.21 
 
Image 
 
 
Sound 
[Journalist voice-over]  
He witnessed what many are calling a massacre and 
then was left for days amidst the dead bodies of his 
mother and 4 brothers. 
 
 
 
The horror 16 year old Ahmad Samouni has seen was 
hard for him to put into words but the effects are 
written all over his face. 
 
 
 
[Source 1: Ahmad –a victim of the Samouni incident] 
It was the third missile I remember, the other ones had 
killed my elder brother and injured people, they kept 
bleeding. But the third missile that killed them all 
 
 
 
[crying] 
My brother was bleeding so much and right in front of 
my eyes he died. My other brother Ismail he also bled 
to death. And my mother and my youngest brother 
they are gone. 4 brothers and my mother dead, may 
god give them peace. 
 
 
These are the scenes from last Wednesday when 
paramedics brought back the dead and injured from 
the Samouni and other houses nearby after they have 
spent 4 days trapped in a house. 
 
 
 
 
According to their accounts heartily corroborated with 
the Red Cross and the United Nations, Israeli soldiers 
raided their homes and then huddled the extended 
family together into one house they then shelled and 
dropped missiles on and around the house. 
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30 members of the Samouni family were killed. 
 
 
We tracked down the ambulance driver who rescued 
Ahmad, the Red Cross were denied access by the Israeli 
army to the area for 4 days 
 
 
[Source 2: Ambulance driver] 
On the day we got permission the army told us to leave 
the ambulances around 2 km from the house so we 
walked and all around us we can see they had 
bulldozed the area. The houses we passed had Israeli 
soldiers standing on the roof. We went inside and 
heard screams coming from one room, there were 
about 15 people inside 2 were dead and the rest were 
sitting around them, that was just one room. 
 
 
[Piece to camera] 
We tried to get to the family’s house but it wasn’t safe. 
Okay so this is really the closest we can get to the 
Samouni house it’s about one km that way in an area 
called Zeitoun but it’s really not safe to go there in fact 
medics, humanitarians and journalists cannot get to 
that area without special permission from the Israeli 
Army. 
 
 
Now Zeitoun the neighbourhood were the Samouni 
house is, is just one neighbourhood were Israeli troops 
are operating and according to the Red Cross there are 
many more houses in different neighbourhoods which 
could potentially have injured and dead people still 
inside. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The United Nations said the Samouni family story 
appears to have all the elements of war crimes. The 
Israeli army told Al-Jazeera they have no 
documentation of this event. 
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End: 
08.45 
 
Humanitarian organisations have asked for an 
investigation. But while those processes get underway 
Israel is denying access to the areas where worst 
affected by its ongoing war. Shirin Tadros Al-Jazeera 
Gaza 
 
In the studio introduction, Al-Jazeera English’s presenter described the Samouni family 
incident as a ‘much more devastating experience and move’; a ‘tragedy’, he explained, 
that according to the UN killed at least 30 people. It was then indicated that the ‘people 
who were there’ claimed that ‘the death toll is much higher’. At this point, AJE refrained 
from presenting an Israeli perspective on this matter. However, when the anchor pointed 
out that ‘it was two days before the medical officials could enter to collect the wounded 
and the dead’, he did not elaborate on, let alone mention, the reasons as to why this was 
the case – the fact that Israeli soldiers prevented paramedics from evacuating the dead 
and rescuing the wounded is blurred. 
The most emotional element in this report relates to the way the victims are portrayed. 
The news report begins with a picture of one of the victims, who is said to have witnessed 
‘what many are calling a massacre’. The level of emotionalism was then compounded 
when the journalist adds that he was ‘left for days amidst the dead bodies of his mother 
and four brothers’. The audience are also told his name (Ahmad Samouni), age (16 years 
old) and the number of his family members affected by the attacks (his mother and four 
brothers). And if Ahmad cannot put in words the horror he witnessed, the journalist 
expresses, ‘the effects are written all over his face’. Ahmad is then made to detail what 
happened to him and his family. As the topic of the death of his mother and four brothers 
comes up he breaks into tears and AJE transmits a close-up of his face reflecting pain and 
grief.  
The Samouni narrative is accounted for from a Palestinian perspective –that is provided 
by eye-witness accounts and from the Samouni family themselves. However, such 
accounts are also confirmed by the Red Cross and the United Nations. The journalist 
explains: 
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According to their accounts heartily corroborated with the Red Cross and the United Nations, 
Israeli soldiers raided their homes and then huddled the extended family together into one 
house they then shelled and dropped missiles on and around the house. 30 members of the 
Samouni family were killed                
The subject or the perpetrator of the action is in its “normal” place at the beginning of 
the sentence clarifying who does what to whom (Fowler et ., 1979: 30 cited in Barkho 
2010: 135). It explains that ‘Israeli soldiers are responsible for raiding [the Samouni] 
homes and then huddle[ing] the extended family together into one house and shell[ing] 
and dropp[ing] missiles on and around the house’. AJE’s selection of this particular 
syntactic pattern made it clear to the audience that ‘Israeli soldiers raided, shelled and 
dropped missile on and around the [Samouni] house’. Using transitive voice constructed in 
the passive voice, the journalist then recaps the story, stating that ‘30 members of the 
Samouni family were killed’. 
Up to the point where the ambulance driver, who rescued Ahmad, was interviewed, AJE 
has not clarified why Ahmad and other dead and wounded Palestinian civilians were 
‘trapped in a house’ for four days. It reports that the Red Cross were denied access to the 
Zeitoun neighbourhood by the Israeli army for four days. The ambulance driver –again a 
Palestinian source –described the tragedy of collecting the dead and wounded. The 
report also explains that four days into the attack, ‘medics, humanitarians and journalists 
cannot get to the area without special permission from the Israeli Army’. Zeitoun 
neighbourhood, is depicted as one neighbourhood of the otherwise many 
neighbourhoods were ‘Israeli troops are operating’. This statement is then confirmed by 
asserting that ‘according to the Red Cross there are many more houses in different 
neighbourhoods which could potentially have injured and dead people still inside’. 
The last few seconds of the broadcast proved to be the most critical for many reasons. 
First, it reveals, for the first time, that the United Nations declares that ‘the Samouni 
family story appears to have all the elements of war crimes’. Such statements threaten 
Israel’s credibility and provide –what later became the case –the possibility of 
questioning Israeli tactics on an International level. Following this, it reports on the Israeli 
perspective. The Israeli army is indirectly quoted (or paraphrased) denying the incident 
and confirming that ‘they had no documentation of [it]’. It is important to note here that 
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the Israeli perspective is reported once and Israeli sources are not given news access. 
Finally, it emphasises the level of dramatisation by indicating that while humanitarian 
organisations and the UN are investigating what they believe to be signs of a war crime, 
Israel ‘is denying access to the areas where worst affected by its ongoing war’. The use of 
images to accompany the last few seconds of the text is also emblematic. Although AJE 
opted for arguably less graphic and horrific images than its mother network Al-Jazeera 
Arabic throughout the report, it focused on the emotional portrayal of the ‘tragedy’. It 
presents an image of a baby lying on a hospital bed but with no signs of blood or injury. 
Other images include a child being taken to a hospital, a man on a hospital bed and a 
child being treated by paramedics. The Israeli destruction and demolition of the Zeitoun 
neighbourhood is also documented.                                  
Al-Jazeera Arabic 
 
Extract 6.2: AJA’s report on the Samouni family incident – 5
th
 Jan 2009  
Time  
 
Image 
 
Sound 
 
[Start: 
03.04] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over]  
Israeli rocket-propelled grenades are still relentlessly 
falling on cities in the Gaza Strip 
فئاذقلا ةيخوراصلا لإاةيلئارس ام لازت طقاستت ىلع ندم عاطق ةزغ لاب 
ةداوه 
 
 
Israeli shelling intensified and expanded to include 
many parts of the Eastern part of Gaza city. 
فصقلا يليئارسلإا دتشإ يف تاعاسلا ةريخلأا و عسوت ىلإ رثكأ نم 
ناكم قرش هنيدم ةزغ  
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[Man weeping and screaming] 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
This man did not find one single member of his family 
alive 
ايح هترسا دارفأ نم دحأ دجي مل لجرلا اذه.  
 
 
 
A rocket targeted his home in Eastern Gaza killing a 
pregnant woman and four of her children 
تسا ةيخوراص ةفيذق و لماح ةديس هاحيب تدوأ ةزغ قرش هلزنم تفده
اهلافطأ نم ةعبرأ 
 
 
 
[Piece to camera] 
Gaza in the heart of Israeli fire, fire which hasn’t 
spared a single Palestinian. The reality remains as the 
daily scenes of killing and destruction in their lives 
without a deterrent from this fire 
ةزغ يف بلق رانلا ،ةيلئارسلإا ران مل ينثتست دحأ نم نيينيطسلفلا .عقاو 
ىقبي وه دهشملا يمويلا نم لتقلا و رامدلا يف مهتايح نود عدار كلتل 
رانلا 
 
 
 
Palestinian Citizen: all of my family died my Mom and 
my wife and my Dad and my son. And my son is dead 
and my brother and his children and my cousins  
نطاوم :ينبإ و يوبأ و يترم و يمأ ،وتام يتليع لك . و تام ينبإ و
يمع دلاوأ و مهدلاوأ و يوخأ 
 
 
 
This man was also left alone after missiles landed on 
the house of the Samouni family in Al-Zeitoun 
neighbourhood 
اذهف لجرلا اضيأ يقب اديحو دعب نأ تلاوت خيراوصلا ىلع لزنم هلئاع 
ينومسلا يف يح نوتيزلا.  
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…leaving its inhabitants as either martyrs or wounded. 
The Israeli war-machine targeted whole families, 
including women and children, in the Gaza Strip. 
لكف نم هيف اوطقس ءادهش و ىحرج .لافطأ و ،ءاسن هلآ فصقلا 
ةيلئارسلإا تلاط رسأ اهلمكأب يف عاطق ةزغ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The smell of death is everywhere, as well as the 
destruction. 
هحئار توملا يف لك ناكم و كلذك رامدلا.  
 
The Abu-Eisheh family lived in this house, the house 
was bombed with the family in it. 7 martyrs fell dead 
in minutes in front of the eyes of the people in the 
neighbourhood. The father is gone and the mother 
and the children.  
يف اذه لزنملا تناك هلئاع ،هشيعوبأ فصق لزنملا ىلع نم هيف .١ 
ءادهش اوطقس يف قئاقد مامأ ةمدص لهأ يحلا .حار وبلأا و ملأا و 
ءانبلأا 
 
  
 
Mother’s sister: since the morning I’ve been shocked 
about what happened. I wouldn’t have imagined that 
by 2 in the afternoon she’d be in my house and then 
to be martyred at 2 in the morning. I am crying like a 
child I’m distressed, everyone here is distressed. 
تخأ ملأا :نم حبصلا و انأ ةمودصم ىلع اذه فقوملا .ام تليخت فيك 
نوكتا ةعاسلا ٤ رصعلا يدنع ةعاسلا ٤ نوكتا هدهشتسم يف ليللا ىتح 
لثم هلفطلا ماع يكبب هرثأتم لكلا رثأتم لاب تيب  
  
 
 
In the light of this aggressive Israeli bombardment, 
hundreds of families are now homeless. 
يف لظ اذه فصقلا يليئارسلإا فينعلا تتاب تائم تلائاعلا لاب ىوأم.  
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[End: 
05.34] 
 
 
The Families of Gaza are trapped here. The 
bombardment is continuous and the borders are 
closed   
يلاهأ ةزغ نورصاحم انه .فصقلا رمتسم و دودحلا ةقلغم  
 
The first three screen images in Extract 6.2 present the various scenes of Israeli aerial-
bombardment on Gaza. Along with the images the journalist explains that such ‘Israeli 
rocket-propelled grenades are continuing, intensifying, expanding and relentlessly falling 
on cities in the Gaza Strip’. The images and sounds from the scene that follows convey the 
horror and scale of the event. In the initial scene, one hears the wailing and weeping of a 
man screaming the names of his children. The journalist then explains that ‘this man did 
not find one single member of his family alive’. It is reported that a rocket ‘targeted’ his 
home ‘killing a pregnant woman and four of her children’. The most dramatic and difficult 
images are those of the dead. There are both long shots and close-ups of nine dead 
children. One also sees, albeit for a brief moment, footage of a dead young girl; as they 
pulled back the sheet to reveal the young girl, her body toppled from the mattress onto 
the floor resting face down. Another difficult picture is provided of two dead children, 
both very young, and both wrapped in white sheets/shrouds with only their faces 
(partially) shown with their corpses lying on the same morgue. The headline of the 
incident – ‘Tenth day of fire and children are under the occupier’s murderous attacks’ (AJA 
5th Jan 2009) –in itself connotes notions of brutality, occupation and cruelty, which in 
return intensifies the level of victimisation brought forward by AJA. In general, the report 
presents an overall continuing narrative into which this single, latest event is placed, 
rather than the exclusive focus of AJE on the suffering of the family.   
This emotional and dramatic mood is then cut and a journalist’s piece to camera is 
inserted. The journalist continues to explain that ‘Gaza is in the heart of Israeli fire…which 
hasn’t spared a single Palestinian’ –a more definitive claim than that presented in AJE’s 
report with regards to Israeli intentions and culpability. It again highlights that scenes of 
killing and destruction are continuous and indiscriminate. To confirm this, another man is 
shown to be crying and wailing, unable to stand on his feet. Such images and sounds 
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coming from the scene are presented to ‘provide graphic ‘proof’ of the enemy’s evil’ 
(Wolsfeld et al. 2008: 404). One hears the panic and grief from the man’s voice claiming 
that his whole family is gone (his mother, father, son, brother, nephews, and cousins). 
AJA here unfolds the tragedy of the Samouni family. The images presented, at this point, 
are perhaps best described by the adage ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’, making it 
possible for the audience to absorb the extent of violence inflicted on the civilian 
population, or as the pictures imply on children.  
The rhythm of the cuts used when showing the pictures of the dead children, each 
featuring for a second on the screen, portrayed the Samouni incident in pictures. These 
pictures included a dead infant, possibly less than a year old and three dead siblings, all 
children lying in a row on the floor. Such images are accompanied with captions such as 
‘The Israeli war-machine targeted whole families, including women and children in the 
Gaza Strip’ implying that Israel’s war-machine did deliberately target the civilian 
population of Gaza. The journalist also explains that ‘the smell of death [and destruction] 
is everywhere’. Alongside the graphic visual presentation of the tragedy, the commentary 
adds reference to the olfactory dimension of death and destruction to provide a 
complete picture for its audience. 
Another story is then presented of another family (Abu-Eisheh) losing seven of its 
members. AJA attempts to personalise the victims by referring to their roles in the family, 
the journalist expresses: ‘the father is gone, and the mother and the children’. The 
package concludes that as a result of this ‘aggressive Israeli bombardment, hundreds of 
families are now homeless’ –implying that as a result of Israel’s ‘aggressive 
bombardment’, the Samouni and Abu-Eisheh incidents are just two examples of the many 
more displaced families. Such bombardment is said to be ‘continuous’ and the families of 
Gaza are said to be ‘trapped’ as the borders in and out of Gaza are closed.  
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BBC Arabic 
Extract 6.3: BBC Arabic’s report on the Samouni family incident- 9
th
 Jan 2009  
[Studio Presenter] 
 
A matter of deep concern, this is how the United Nations described the accident of killing 30 
Palestinian civilians in al-Zeitoun neighbourhood east of Gaza City on the fourth of this month. The 
United Nations Office for Coordination and Human Affairs referenced eye witnesses claiming that 
Israeli forces gathered more than 100 Palestinians, half of them children, in a house in the 
neighbourhood to shelter in to then bomb the house in the 24 hours that followed (BBC Arabic 9th Jan 
2009)  
رمأ ريثم قلقلل ،قيمع اذكه تافصو مملأا هدحتملا ثداح لتق ٢٣ يندم ينيطسلف يف يح نوتيزلا يقرش هنيدم ةزغ يف عبارلا نم اذه 
رهشلا .دقف لقن بتكم مملأا هدحتملا قيسنتل نوؤشلا اهيناسنلإ نع دوهش نايعأ مهلوق نإ تاوقلا ةيلئارسلإا ةعماج رثكأ نم ةئم ينيطسلف 
مهفصن نم لافطلأا يف لزنم يحلاب ءامتحلال هيف مث تفصق لزنملا للاخ تاعاسلا ةعبرلأا و نيرشعلا ةيلاتلا  
   
Time  
[Start: 
39.43] 
 
Image 
 
 
Sound 
[Journalist voice-over]  
Such was the case of the al-Zeitoun neighbourhood 
when it was subjected to Israeli aerial bombardment 
اذكه ناك لاح يح نوتيزلا ءانثأ هضرعت فصقل تارئاطلا ةيلئارسلإا  
 
 
…and this is the picture when rescue teams arrived to 
retrieve the dead and evacuate the wounded, but this 
was after 4 days of the bombing because Israeli forces 
prevented medical teams from doing their job. 
و هذه يه ةروصلا امدنع تلصو قرف ذاقنلإا لاشتنلا ىلتقلا و ءلاخإ 
ىحرجلا و نكل دعب ٢ مايأ نم عوقو فصقلا ببسب عنم تاوقلا 
ةيلئارسلإا ميقاوطيل ةيبطلا نم مايقلا اهماهمب.  
 
 
The United Nations information indicated that 
تامولعم مملأا ةدحتملا تراشأ ىلإ  
 
 
The United Nations information indicated that Israeli 
soldiers ordered more than 100 civilians to shelter in a 
house for their safety from the fire of incurring battles 
to be bombed by Israeli aircrafts the next day     
نأ دونج نييلئارسا ورمأ رثكأ نم ٧٣٣ يندم ءامتحلاب لزنمب نم نارين 
كراعملا ةرئادلا فصقتل تارئاطلا ةيلئارسلإا لزنملا يف مويلا يلاتلا  
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[Source 1: Navi Pillay (United Nations High 
Commissioners for Human Rights)] 
Israel had ordered about 100 people to take shelter 
inside and bombed it the next day, killing at least 30 
people. This acts as an example to show us that we 
don’t really know what is happening in Gaza and 
evidence that Gaza is in need for media and human 
rights monitors to investigate such acts 
يفان يلاب (ةضوفم مملأا هدحتملا قوقحل ناسنلإا :)ليئارسإ ترمأ وحن 
٧٣٣ صخش ءامتحلاب لخاد دحأ لزانملا و يف مويلا يلاتلا تفصق اذه 
لزنملا ام ىدأ ىلإ لتقم وحن ٢٣ اصخش ىلع لقلأا و اذه لاثم ىلع 
اننأ لهجن ام يرجي لخاد ةزغ و ليلد ىلع ةرورض دوجو لئاسو ملاعإ 
و نيبقارم قوقحل ناسنلإا قيقحتل يف لثم هذه لاعفلأا  
 
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
Pillay pointed out that there’s a lot of evidence which 
requires the perpetrators of this disaster to be held 
accountable for causing harm to civilians and killing 
many of them. 
يلاب اشأتر ىلإ دوجو ريثك نم لئلادلا يتلا يعدتست هبساحم 
نيببستملا هذهب ةثراكلا مهقاحللإ ىذلأا نييندملاب و لتق ديدعلا مهنم  
 
 
 
This she claims is enough evidence to open an 
investigation into the possibility of war crimes 
هلدأ اهيأرب دق نوكت ةيفاك حتفل قيقحت متحابلا عوقو مئارج برح  
 
 
 
[Source 1 (again): Pillay] 
This is one of the points I proposed to the Human 
Rights Council, and so did other member countries in 
which figures and statistics of deaths and accidents are 
important matters in need of a proper investigation 
يلاب :هذه ىدحإ طاقنلا يتلا اهتحرتقا مامأ سلجم قوقح ناسنلإا و 
كلذك تلاعاف لاودلا ءاضعلأا ثيح مت ميدقت تايئاصحإ دادعلإ ىلتقلا و 
ثداوح تعقو لعفلاب و يه رومأ وعدت ةرورضل حتف قيقحت  
 
 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross accused 
Israel of dismissing injured civilians and not providing 
them with the medical care needed under 
International law  
ةنجللا ةيلودلا بيلصلل رمحلأا تمهتإ ليئارسإ اهنأب مل ىعرت نيباصملا 
و مل مهفعست قفو نوناقلا يلودلا  
 
 
[Source 2: Red Cross spokesperson] 
what shocked us the most is that the Israeli Army were 
aware of the existence of civilian casualties but did not 
provide them with any form of assistance and did not 
help us in evacuating the injured 
يلاب :رثكأ ام انمدص وه نإ شيجلا يليئارسلإا ناك ىلع ملع دوجوب 
نييندم هنكل مل مدقي ةدعاسملا مهل يأب لكش امك مل اندعاسي يف ءلاخإ 
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 نيباصملا 
 
 
 
Although the Security Council called for an immediate 
ceasefire, Israel insisted on ignoring it and decided to 
go on with its military operations to weaken the power 
of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, 
حيحص نأ سلجم نملأا ىعد ىلإ فقو يروف ىلإ قلاطإ رانلا نكل 
ليئارسإ ترصأ ىلع هلهاجت و تررق يضملا امداق يف اهتايلمع 
ةيركسعلا رسكل ةكوش سامح يف عاطقلا  
End: 
41.52 
 
 
 
 
  
…even if it is at the expense of the civilians   
و ول ناك اذه ىلع باسح نييندملا  
 
The studio introduction of Extract 6.3 presents an interesting opportunity for analysis. 
The incident is referred to as ‘a matter of deep concern’; although BBC Arabic presenter 
highlights that he is adopting the UN’s description of the event. However, although 
acknowledged that those ‘killed’ are ‘Palestinian civilians’ (not gunmen or armed men), 
yet the act of ‘killing 30 Palestinian civilians’ is illustrated as an ‘accident’ –unlike Al-
Jazeera networks who depicted the story as a deliberate attack, on behalf of the Israeli 
army, on the Palestinian civilian population. The report relies on the visuals to report on 
the events of the Samouni incident. The audience are first made to see for themselves 
the effects the ‘Israeli aerial bombardment’ had on the Zeitoun neighbourhood. Then, 
they are shown images of the dead and wounded as they arrived to hospitals. It is worth 
noting that such images are neither graphic nor horrific but provide sufficient emotion 
and drama to produce stimulating news without crossing the line of taste and decency. 
Unlike AJE, BBC Arabic stressed that pictures of the bodies were taken 4 days after the 
bombing ‘because Israeli forces prevented medical teams from doing their job’.  
The Samouni incident was portrayed on BBC Arabic, from the start to the end, through 
accounts issued by the United Nations. It reports, 
The United Nations information indicated that Israeli soldiers ordered more than 100 
civilians to shelter in a house for their safety from the fire of incurring battles to be 
bombed by Israeli aircrafts the next day     
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In the clause above, the phrase ‘the United Nations information’ indicates that the UN 
have done the necessary investigation regarding this matter and can assure us that Israeli 
soldiers ‘did order’ civilians to shelter in a house and ‘did bomb’ the house the next day. 
Note the use of the word ‘ordered’; although this discursive verb might not have been 
intended by the journalist, it is still one of several available (Richardson and Barkho 2009: 
598) –such as asked, assembled, etc. To confirm this statement, Navi Pillay (UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights) is directly quoted reiterating the journalist’s 
explanation. However, she also adds that it is necessary for the media and Human Rights 
monitors to investigate such acts, expressing that ‘the perpetrators of this disaster [must] 
be held accountable for causing harm to civilians and killing many of them’. Finally, she 
articulates that there is enough evidence present to investigate into the possibility of war 
crimes. As explained with the AJE analysis above, such accusations posed a threat to 
Israeli policies and strategies. If Pillay’s examination of the incident is not sufficient, BBC 
Arabic went further to report on the International Community and the Red Cross’s 
accusations of Israel violating International Law. Again, a Red Cross spokesperson was 
directly interviewed expressing that the fact that the Israeli army were aware of the 
existence of civilian casualties in the building and still prevented the Red Cross from 
evacuating them is ‘shocking’. It is interesting to note that neither of the AJ reports 
required the corroboration of third parties to define the event as a war crime. However, 
it is equally interesting to note the fundamental mismatch between the quoted opinions 
of the UN and the summary of their positions provided in the studio introduction. There’s 
a considerable difference between ‘Israel had ordered […]’ (Pillay’s claim), and ‘the 
United Nations Office for Coordination and Human Affairs referenced eye witnesses 
claiming […]’ (studio introduction). Moreover, in its studio introduction, BBC Arabic 
implies that the UN label the event as an accident –they do not do it explicitly by stating 
that ‘the UN label the attack as an accident’, but implies that ‘this is how they UN 
described the accident of killing 30 Palestinian civilians […]’. Such official short interview 
inserts, although evocative, are also capable of lowering the emotional impact of the 
incident.    
As explained in the previous chapter, BBC Arabic took an Israeli perspective in terms of 
provocation and reported the Israeli war on Gaza as against Hamas and not the 
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Palestinian population as a whole. Similarly, although this report harshly concludes that 
Israel ‘insists on ignoring’ any call for an immediate ceasefire, it does justify its military 
operation by suggesting that it does so to ‘weaken the power of Hamas in the Gaza Strip’. 
Yet, through facilitating images of dead children wrapped up in green during a funeral, it 
states that Israel will continue to do that ‘even if it is at the expense of civilians’. 
Although the event is significant enough to have created International waves, the 
Samouni incident still received minimal coverage on BBC World.         
 
Omission: 6th Jan 2009 – UNRWA school attacks 
This section looks at a second example involving civilian casualties described as an 
‘Indiscriminate attack by Israeli forces resulting in the loss of life and injury of civilians’ 
(OHCHR, 2009: 14). In short, the section above discussed the ‘commission’ targeting of 
civilians in war; this section will look at the so-called ‘omission’ targeting of civilians.  
The following analyses the mortar shelling of al-Fakhura junction in Jabalya next to a UN 
run school on the 6th of January 2009. At the time, the school was used as a shelter, 
housing more than 1,300 Palestinian civilians seeking refuge from the fighting. The Israeli 
forces launched at least four mortar shells. One landed in the courtyard of a family home, 
killing eleven people assembled there. Three other shells landed on al-Fakhura Street, 
killing at least a further 24 people and injuring as many as 40. Israeli Government 
representatives alleged that the attack was launched in response to a mortar attack from 
an armed Palestinian group beside the UNRWA school. The attack was widely criticised by 
the International Community and condemned by the UN who asked for an immediate 
investigation. With regards to this incident, the Office of High Commissioners for Human 
Rights report indicated that ‘it considers the credibility of Israel’s position damaged by 
the series of inconsistencies, contradictions and factual inaccuracies in the statements 
justifying the attack’ (2009: 14). It concluded that,   
The firing of at least four mortar shells to attempt to kill a small number of specified 
individuals in a setting where large numbers of civilians were going about their daily 
business and 1,368 people were sheltering nearby cannot meet the test of what a 
reasonable commander would have determined to be an acceptable loss of civilian life for 
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the military advantage sought. The Mission considers thus the attack to have been 
indiscriminate in violation of international law, and to have violated the right to life of the 
Palestinian civilians killed in these incidents (ibid: 14-15)  
Footage of the aftermath of the attacks was provided to all channels but were employed 
differently and of course, accompanied by conflicting –or relatively differing – verbal 
narratives. Although it is acknowledged that the choice of words selected to linguistically 
frame the visuals are crucial, one should also look closely at compositional elements 
within the images, as they are also key features in the construction of news discourse. 
Such elements include the analysis of the graphic nature of the images selected, who is 
pictured and the level of emotionalism they entail. Through examining war imagery, 
interpretations, claims and counter-claims, the following will visually and linguistically 
analyse the first report broadcast by each of the four examined networks in an attempt 
to place a common framework to enable comparisons across and within the news 
corporations. It also aims to investigate whether such incidents are presented as tactical 
errors and accidents or as indicative of the war itself being ‘wrong’. All extracts include 
the studio introduction of the attack by the presenter followed by a special report 
dedicated to the events of the incident.  
Al-Jazeera English 
Extract 6.4: AJE’s report on attacks on UNRWA schools - 6
th
 Jan 2009 
[Studio Presenter] 
 
It’s just gone 9 o’clock local time in the Gaza Strip towards the end of one of the bloodiest days yet of 
Israel’s war on Gaza. We’re in the latest violence at least 40 Palestinians killed after an Israeli strike at 
the gates of a UN-run school. The school was being used as a shelter by civilians in Jabalya and within 
the last few minutes the carnage has forced the US president-elect to break his long held silence on 
the war. Well, Barak Obama is saying he is deeply concerned about civilian casualties in Gaza. Let’s get 
the latest    
  
Time  
[Start: 
01.54] 
 
Image 
 
 
 
Sound 
 
[Journalist voice-over]  
[Man crying over dead body] 
Fresh carnage on the 11th day…  
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….of Israel’s war on Gaza 
 
 
 
…victims of an attack outside a UN school at the 
Jabaliya refugee camp, were more than a thousand 
civilian has been seeking refuge from the Israeli 
offensive. 
 
 
 
Dozens died many more injured as a shell exploded 
just meters away from the school. More evidence 
nowhere is safe in Gaza. 
 
 
 
 
 
Children were once again among the dead and the UN 
is now calling for an investigation. 
 
 
 
 
[Source 1: John Ging (Head of UNRWA)] 
We gave, long before this conflict, all the GPS 
coordinates of all the UN installations in Gaza to the 
Israelis. Our installations are clearly marked as 
UNRWA installations. What we want is a full 
investigation and imparted investigation into these 
killings. We want to see if there have been violations 
of International Humanitarian Law. 
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
Hamas has condemned the attack. 
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[Source 2: Osama Hamdan (Hamas senior leader] 
I think it’s a new massacre in this Holocaust in Gaza. 
The schools are well known for the Israelis that are 
places for the UN and they are hitting them. 
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
Just hours earlier, another attack on another UN 
school killing 3 members of the same Palestinian 
family, but Israel insists Hamas is to blame for the 
civilian deaths not Israeli fire. 
 
 
 
[Source 3: Avital Leiborich (IDF spokeswoman)] 
Any terror organisation that chooses to booby-trap its 
own people, I think it’s in-despicable, I think that it is 
not moral and I think that Hamas does not really care 
for its own people. 
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
The UN said its schools were the last place for refuge 
for civilians trying to flee the fighting… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…and it estimates that at least 13,000 have left their 
homes but they have nowhere to go as all the 
crossings out of Gaza remain closed. 
 
  
 
 
On Tuesday Israeli forces moved to major population 
centres across the Gaza Strip including the second 
largest city of Khan Younis in the south bringing more 
destruction, panic and grief. 
 
  Across the Strip, Israeli forces kept shelling what they 
said were Hamas affiliated buildings, but once again 
residential areas were hit in what is the most crowded 
place on earth. 
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[End: 
04.43] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Israel insists it’s not targeting civilians and its strikes 
are accurate but as the death toll rises and schools get 
hit, Israel will find it that much harder to explain its 
actions and defend its offensive to the outside world. 
 
     
When analysing news reports it is important to account for the sources interviewed to 
elaborate on the event in question. Unlike AJE’s first report, where it only interviewed 
Palestinian civilians, this time it gave news access to three different parties. First it 
interviewed (voice only) John Ging (Head of UNRWA in the Gaza Strip) who fiercely 
indicated that the Israeli army had the exact GPS coordinates of all UNRWA installations 
in the Gaza Strip, explaining that all ‘installations are clearly marked as UNRWA 
installations’. He then demands a proper investigation into these killings suspecting a 
possibility of ‘violation of International Humanitarian Law’. Second, the journalist asserts 
that ‘Hamas has condemned the attack’. It is understood that ‘weaker antagonists who 
have been victimized will talk about ‘massacres’ and ‘war crimes’ (Wolsfeld et al. 2008: 
404) when they are made to comment on events. It is also suggested that the political 
leadership usually acts as the most prominent source for such messages, ‘employing 
dramatic terminology to describe the attack and the perpetrator’ (ibid.). In AJE’s 
reporting, Osama Hamdan –a Hamas senior leader –is then interviewed talking about ‘a 
new massacre in this Holocaust in Gaza’. Although to some the act of shelling a school 
filled with civilian refugees is considered a massacre, AJE doesn’t confirm or dismiss such 
allegations. Rather it highlights that ‘just hours earlier’ another UN school was attacked, 
killing 3 member of the same family ‘but Israel insists Hamas is to blame for the civilian 
deaths not Israeli fire’. The use of ‘but’ as a conjugation implies that while Israel ‘insists’ 
that Hamas is to blame for civilian deaths, it is ‘still’ targeting civilian installations –two 
195 
 
schools in one day is in itself indicative. The use of the speech reporting verb ‘insists’ 
entails an ongoing debate, in which Israel’s viewpoint that ‘Hamas is to blame for civilian 
deaths not Israel’ has been brought into doubt, after which Israel restates its position. 
The Israeli army spokesperson, Avital Leiborich, finally blames Hamas for being ‘immoral’ 
and ‘despicable’. She explains that the ‘terror organisation’ –Hamas –booby-traps the 
Palestinian civilians and is consequently held responsible for the killings.  
Extract 6.4 treats the event with high levels of emotionalism, by highlighting the shock, 
grief and anger that accompanied the victims’ experiences. As the start time of the item 
indicates, the incident was placed on the top of the line-up and was granted a significant 
amount of air-time (more so than any of the other examined channels). Extensive 
coverage of hysterical reactions of bystanders and graphic close-ups of the wounded and 
dead were the predominant images in this report. In the early scenes, one hears the 
frantic weeping of the victims’ families and friends, and the wailing of ambulances trying 
to clear the wounded to be taken to hospitals. The most difficult images to watch in the 
report involve graphic visualisation of dead bodies and blood spattered pavements. One 
picture depicts what looks like a man with missing limbs, the body is covered which 
lessens its horrific magnitude. Another graphic image presents a close-up of a man’s 
severely injured upper leg.       
The presenter’s studio introduction to the event presents notable patterns in itself. The 
opening sentence – ‘it’s just gone 9 o’clock local time in the Gaza Strip’ –depicts 
associations with the Gaza Strip and its people. AJE builds a connection between its 
audience and Gaza –not Israel; given, of course, both Gaza and Israel have geographically 
identical time zones. It suggests that it is ‘good news’ that we are approaching the ‘end of 
one of the bloodiest days yet of Israel’s war on Gaza’. The use of the idiom ‘yet’ in this 
sentence entails that there are potentially more bloody days to come. This is, then, 
reasserted when the journalist adds ‘we’re in the latest violence’ –also implying that not 
only is there more violence to come but it also suggests that such acts are not new. This is 
further illustrated in the report, such as ‘Fresh carnage on the 11th day of Israel’s war on 
Gaza’, ‘More evidence nowhere is now safe in Gaza’ and ‘children were once again among 
the dead’.  
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The reporter, indirectly quoting the UN, confirms that the people of Gaza have nowhere 
to go, stressing that all the crossings out of Gaza ‘remain’ closed while simultaneously 
undermining the claims made by the IDF spokesperson. It reports that Israeli forces have 
moved to major populated areas ‘bringing more destruction, panic and grief’. And while it 
‘kept shelling what they said were Hamas affiliated buildings’, residential areas were hit –
which also mean that innocent civilians were being hit. Israel consistently emphasised 
that it deployed precision-guided missiles, and repeatedly described its strikes as 
‘surgical’. AJE argues that while Israel insists its strikes are accurate and it is not targeting 
the civilian population, schools have been hit and the death toll is on the rise. AJE 
suggests that in doing so Israel attempts to obscure its deliberate targeting by 
highlighting that its military machine supposedly minimises civilian casualties.  
BBC World 
Extract 6.5: BBC World’s report on attacks on UNRWA schools - 6
th
 Jan 2009  
[Studio Presenter] 
 
Hello and welcome, the Israeli government says it doesn’t deliberately target civilians and blames 
Hamas for putting the people of Gaza in harm’s way but an Israeli act today at the gates of UN-run 
school spread a wide range outrage. The UN’s relief agencies calling for an investigation into the strike 
in which 30 people taking refuge in this school were killed. The US president-elect Barak Obama has 
broken his silence and expressed deep concern at the mounting civilian casualties. Our correspondent 
Ben Brown is on the Israel-Gaza border. (BBC World 6th Jan 2009) 
  
Time  
[Start: 
02.05] 
 
Image 
 
 
 
Sound 
 
[Air-strikes and bombs] 
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over]  
When people live t his close together… 
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…the front line is everywhere. 
 
 
 
Gaza’s population has nowhere to run or hide. 
 
 
 
 
 
Some went to a UN school building to find refuge, it 
was hit by a tank fire or air strike it’s not clear which. 
 
 
 
 
Many children are said to be among the dead. Much 
of what was filmed here was too graphic, too horrific 
to show. The UN says Israel must have known what it 
was hitting. 
 
 
 
[Source 1: John Ging (Head of UNRWA)] 
It’s a horrific situation; a huge military operation 
going on a densely populated area of course there’s 
going to be a very huge number of casualties, and 
very horrific casualties. 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
This may be the single most deadly incident involving 
civilians in Gaza it could add critical mass into the 
international demand for a ceasefire. 
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Gaza’s hospitals are again overwhelmed. 
 
 
 
 [Man Shaking – background noise] 
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
Pointing at the casualties, the man declares Israel calls 
itself a great nation; this is the measure of its 
greatness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Israel says Hamas is to blame for launching rockets 
from civilian areas. 
 
  
 
 
[Source 2: Emmanue Nahshon (Israeli Foreign 
Minister)] 
It reflects the general policy of Hamas to use public 
buildings and particularly schools and hospitals in 
order to hide and launch terror attacks. Hamas has 
been using the Palestinian civilian population as a 
human shield and we believe that this is a callus and 
cynical policy of Hamas and it reflects the very nature 
of this organisation. 
 
  
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
Israel moved into Gaza with relative ease but now 
there is street fighting, the aim of this is not to 
remove Hamas from power, says Israel, but to destroy 
it as a military force. The Israeli Army claims that it 
had killed 130 Hamas fighters since the ground 
offensive began. 
 
[End:   
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04.44] 
 
 
[Piece to camera] 
There’s little pressure that the sign of a ceasefire 
emerging just yet, although international demands for 
one are growing, that though could just intensify the 
violence as both sides try to get something they can 
call victory before the diplomacy takes over. 
 
Even though the images obtained in Extract 6.5 are very powerful, BBC World narrated 
them in such a way that alleviated their tragic message. In the presenter’s studio 
introduction, the message was clear: ‘the Israeli government says it does not deliberately 
targets civilians and blames Hamas for putting the people of Gaza in harm’s way’; but it 
asserts, ‘Israel’s act today at the gates of UN-run school spread a wide range outrage’. 
What we get from this introductory piece, is that Israel says that Hamas is to blame for 
civilian casualties and not the Israeli army and that Israel is responsible for an act that 
took place at the gates of UN-run school today. What kind of act, who is involved and 
whom did it affect are all imperative questions that the BBC fails to address. However, 
the use of the word ‘but’ in this context undermines Israel’s claims and calls them into 
doubt, implying that Israel says it does (x) ‘but’ the end result is (y).  
Like AJE, John Ging (Head of UNRWA) was the first source directly quoted on BBC World, 
confirming that the situation is ‘horrific’ and the casualties are too ‘very horrific’. 
Representing a different perspective, BBC World included an excerpt taken from an 
interview conducted with Emmanue Nahshon (Israel’s Foreign Minister), who explained 
that Israel’s attacks on the school are retaliatory. Using terminology that demonises the 
‘enemy’, Nahshon illustrated that the attacks reflects Hamas’s ‘callous’ and ‘cynical’ 
polices in using ‘public building and particularly schools and hospitals in order to hide and 
launch terror attacks’. The positioning of such defence statement of Israeli actions also 
implies that schools and hospitals are legitimate targets. Palestinian sources are not given 
news access. In one instance the journalist, paraphrasing an aggravated man, says 
‘pointing at the casualties, this man declares Israel calls itself a great nations, this is the 
measure of its greatness’ –this is the closet Palestinian actors attained in the report. It is 
understandable that the length allocated to any news report is limited and thus is 
impossible to include a full range of opinions (Richardson and Barkho 2009: 601); 
however, when reporting controversial conflicts, it is crucial to account for actors from 
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both sides. The absence of Hamas’s voice in this report results in an imbalance of access 
which, in Fowler words, ‘results in partiality’ (1991: 23). Fowler argues that the practice of 
reporting one’s assertions is not merely a matter of content but also a matter of form and 
style presenting an ideological perspective (ibid.).   
Unlike AJE, the tone of the report that followed is relatively calm and analytical. Images 
and sounds from the scene itself are very much subdued and the voice-over 
accompanying those images allowed the journalist to lower the dramatic impact of the 
incident. The use of certain syntactic word orders and clause structures proved to 
generate important techniques in the way casualties and human suffering are reported in 
the news. Consider the following example, 
When people live this close together, the front line is everywhere. Gaza’s population has 
nowhere to run or hide. Some went to a UN school building to find refuge, it was hit by a 
tank fire or airstrike it’s not clear which.   
To understand what is meant by this, one has to already be equipped with contextual 
knowledge. It is not clear, from the above, why it is the case that Gaza’s population has 
nowhere to run or hide or why they are running and hiding in the first place. The last 
sentence is also problematic. The transitivity used in the construction of the sentence 
reduces the victims to a situation of triviality. The passive verb ‘was hit’ followed the 
ambiguous ‘by a tank fire or airstrike’ can lead one to mistakenly surmise that the act in 
itself is an accident. ‘Many children’, are then reported to be among the dead, which 
suggests that this act has caused some casualties. The BBC later reveals that ‘much of 
what was filmed here was too graphic, too horrific to show’. It finally admits that these 
acts were committed by Israel when it quotes the UN saying ‘Israel must have known 
what it was hitting’.            
Whilst displaying footage of chaotic scenes of injured children rushed to hospitals by their 
relatives, children in hospitals being treated and a man crying over his dead son’s body, 
BBC World journalist added that ‘this may be the single most deadly incident involving 
civilians in Gaza’. One disturbing image to watch is of a man screaming with his body 
rhythmically shaking, which are possibly symptoms of panic attacks and anxiety. Despite 
the level of sensationalism encompassed in the spoken narrative, shocking images like 
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the ones portrayed in the above report are capable of increasing the emotional impact of 
the incident. That said, BBC World did not mention that the UN has demanded an 
immediate investigation in what they suppose is a violation of International Humanitarian 
Law but declares that this ‘could add critical mass into the international demand for a 
ceasefire’.  
Notably, the item’s studio introduction and the report itself do not report on the 
outcome of the attacks. The fact that 30 Palestinian civilians were killed and at least 45 
others were wounded as a result was completely absent from the coverage. However, 
Israeli claims that its aim ‘is not to remove Hamas from power…but to destroy it as a 
military force’ were highlighted; especially so, when the journalist adds: ‘the Israeli army 
claims that it had killed 130 Hamas fighters since the ground offensive began’. This 
implies that when journalists report on civilian casualties, they are in effect balanced with 
Israeli accounts suggesting that while the war have caused unfortunate civilian casualties, 
it had also met its target and managed to kill 130 Hamas fighters. Ben Brown, BBC 
World’s correspondent on the Israel-Gaza border also reported on the day of the attacks,    
We’ve been speaking to the IDF, the Israeli military, they say that Hamas militants were 
using that school to fire rockets from, in fact they say they killed 2 named Hamas 
militants who were part of a rocket team at the school. (BBC World 6th Jan 2009) 
So while images of civilian casualties are indeed terrible they are also being explained as 
retaliatory. In part, the inclusion of photographic images representing death, harm, 
suffering and material damage is buttered with a prevailing rhetoric of a war fought with 
a ‘legitimate’ purpose. This is also evident in the manner in which even the UN source 
appears to have been co-opted into this understanding of the event: that civilian deaths 
are appalling; that Hamas fighters are located (perhaps even hiding) in civilian areas; that 
Israel is targeting Hamas; and therefore, civilian deaths, while awful, are unavoidable –
but had Hamas hidden elsewhere then civilians casualties would have been reduced. 
Such claims represent a causal framework that fits the Israeli frame.     
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Al-Jazeera Arabic 
Extract 6.6: AJA’s report on attacks on UNRWA schools - 6
th
 Jan 2009  
[Studio Presenter] 
 
Gaza, escaping from death to death…Israeli fire is now targeting schools (6th Jan 2009) 
ةزغ ثيح بورهلا نم توملا ىلإ توملا...سرادملا فدهتست ليئارسإ نارين  
 
The bombing of Palestinian civilians who took refuge in 2 UNRWA schools comes as a continuation of 
targeting civilian facilities in Israel’s war on Gaza. But Israel insists Hamas is to blame and said it was 
responding to what they called the “rocket launchers” (AJA 6th Jan 2006). 
اذه و دق يتأي فصق نييندملا نيينيطسلفلا نيذلا اوئجل ىلإ يتسردم اورنولأا ءاكرارمتس فادهتسلا تائشنم هيندم يف هبرح ىلع ةزغ .
و دق ىقلأ شيجلا يليئارسلإا ةملأاب ىلع سامح و لاق هنإ ناك دري ىلع نم مهامس يقلطم خيراوصلا  
 
  
Time  
[Start: 
02.11] 
 
Image 
 
 
 
Sound 
 
[Journalist voice-over]  
Israeli missiles followed those Palestinian civilians 
even after they have taken refuge in one of the 
UNRWA schools in Jabalya refugee camp 
 وئجل نأ دعب ىتح نينيطسلفلا نييندملا ءلاؤه تقحلا هيليئارسلإا فئاذقلا
ايلابج ميخم يف اورنولأا سرادم ىدحإ ىلإ 
 
 
 
The most densely populated camp in the Strip. They 
fled their houses after they had been destroyed to 
find security but Israeli missiles have killed and 
wounded dozens of them including those still in the 
camp 
ناكسلاب اظاظتكا عاطقلا تاميخم ربكأ . ترمد نأ دعب نملأا هوبلط
ارشعلا تباصأ و تلتق دق فئاذقلا نكل مهلزانم نم اضيأ و مهنم ت
ميخملا ناكس 
 
 
 
[Palestinian man crying and shouting: “My brother is 
dead…my brother is dead”] 
ينيطسلف لجر :تام يوخأ تام يوخأ  
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over]  
A tragedy that has reflected the reality of what has 
been going on in Gaza. Every site is now a target 
without limits or restrictions 
 و تامرحم لاب افدهتسم ادب عقوم لكف ةزغ يف ثدحي ام تسكع هاسأم
دودح لا 
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[Source 1: John Ging (Head of UNRWA)] 
There’s nowhere safe in Gaza, people in Gaza are 
entitled to protection they’re entitled to be safe 
 اورنولأا يف لوؤسم جنيج نوج : أ ةزغ يف نيمأ ناكم كانه سيل
ناميلإا و ةيامحلا يف قحلا مهل ةزغ بعش 
 
 
 
 
[Background voices: there’s no god but god there’s no 
god but god] 
هيفلخ ءاضوض :لا هلإ لاإ الله لا هلإ لاإ الله  
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
Scenes of bloodshed are continuing with the increase 
of indiscriminate bombardment from land and air 
resulting in the death of many civilian mostly women 
and children 
 و يوجلا و يربلا فصقلا ةيئاوشع لصاوت عم عطقنت مل ءامدلا دهاشم
نلا و لافطلأا نم اياحضلا ةرثكءاس  
 
 
 
 
Those are members of the Al-Daya family. Missiles hit 
one of their homes killing 13 of them and leaving 
others missing   
 تلتقف مهلزانم ىدحإ فئاذقلا ترمد ةيادلا هلئاع نم دارفأ ءلاؤه٧٢ 
نيدوقفملا دادع يف نيرخأ تقبأ و مهنم 
 
 
 
 
[Source 2: Palestinian civilian] 
They targeted my brother’s house, 3 rockets 
destroyed it into ruins, ruins. 4 floors are now ashes. 
Almost 35 people, young men, children all martyrs. 
The father the son and the children, their mothers and 
the girls everyone all dead. Go see for yourself. And 
may god be with us   
ينيطسلف لجر : وبرض٢  اي دامر دامر اهتلزن يوخأ راد ىلع خيراوص
 ،يمع٢ لمر وراص قباوط . يلاوح٢٥  ءادهش مهلك لافطأ بابش رفن
 يمع اي مهلك أ تانبلا و نييانكلا و دلاولأا و نبلاا و بلأا يمع اي
وجرفت هحور .ليكولا معن و الله يبسح و  
 
 
 
[Source 3: Palestinian civilian] 
We can’t move or go anywhere, for god’s sake for 
god’s sake help us. We want security we want 
freedom. Just like you have freedom we want it too. 
What is this?   
هينيطسلف هباش : اندب انودجنت الله ناشم الله ناشم كرحتن نيردق شم انحإ
ام يز هيرحلا اندب ةحارلا هيرح اندب هيرح مكدنع تنإ .اذه شيإ  
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[Journalist voice-over] 
So the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have woken up to 
the bloodiest day yet since the start of the ground 
incursion   
اذإ ىسمأ نوينيطسلفلا يف عاطق ةزغ ىلع موي وه رثكلأا هيومد ذنم 
لوخد ةلحرم لغوتلا يربلا  
 
[End: 
04.14] 
 
 
 
 
  
In the light of all these tragedies, the Palestinians ask 
the world, at point are they going to seriously 
intervene in stopping what they term ‘the series of 
Israeli massacres against them’  
سل ىقبي يسآملا هذه لك ءوض يف و رظتني اذام لوقي نيينيطسلفلا لح نا
 هنوفصي ام فقول يدج لكشب لخدتي ىتح ملاعلا  رزاجملا لسلسمب
مهقحب هيليئارسلإا 
 
 
 
From the beginning of the war AJA continuously played and replayed some of the most 
graphic and gruesome images from Gaza. Such images included: dead toddlers between 
the rubble, infants sharing metal shelves in a morgue, men and children with missing 
body parts, missiles being constantly dropped on buildings, and phosphorus bombs 
continuously glowing in the skies of Gaza. Along with such horrific images of death and 
suffering, Extract 6.6 presents a great deal of mourning and wailing which also provides 
increased amounts of emotion and drama. Such images included a man despairingly 
crying and screaming ‘my brother is dead…my brother is dead’. Others pictured a man 
looking at the dead and hysterically declaring that ‘there’s no god but god, there’s no god 
but god’. The UNRWA school incident is presented as a shocking tragedy carried out by a 
vicious aggressor.  
On Al-Jazeera Arabic, the UNRWA school incident comes as a ‘continuation of targeting 
civilian facilities, but this time it is targeting schools’. Gaza is depicted as a devastating 
scene where civilians are ‘escaping from death’ to find even more ‘death’. This headline 
connotes images of distress, suffering and downfall and presents every part of Gaza as a 
death zone or, as AJE describes it, a ‘killing ground’. Similar lines are also depicted 
throughout the broadcast stating that this tragedy unfolds the reality of what is going on 
in Gaza: ‘Every site is now a target without limits or restrictions; scenes of bloodshed are 
continuing with the increase of indiscriminate bombardment from land and air resulting in 
the death of many civilians mostly women and children’. Other times, Israeli fire is 
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reported to have followed ‘Palestinian civilians even after they have taken refuge in one 
of the UNRWA schools’ in Gaza’s most densely populated camp. It explains that 
Palestinian civilians who have fled their homes after they had been destroyed by the 
Israeli army were then targeted with Israeli missiles that killed and wounded dozens of 
them. This depicts Israel as deliberately targeting civilians and will even follow them 
wherever they go, even if it requires attacking some UN installations. Similarly, the attack 
is described as ‘the bombing of Palestinian civilians who took refuge in 2 UNRWA schools’.  
The studio introduction mentions Israel’s claim that it was responding to what they called 
the “rocket launchers”. But as with AJE, the way it is syntactically patterned and the use 
of certain words discredits Israeli statements that it is responding, but rather (as already 
established) it claims that Israel is targeting the civilian population of Gaza. Israeli 
statements, AJA claims, are used by the army in an attempt to ‘justify those tragic scenes 
of blood in the Gaza Strip’ (Elias Karam AJA 6th Jan 2009). In line with the other examined 
channels, John Ging (Head of UNRWA in Gaza) is directly quoted in the broadcast, this 
time confirming that ‘there is nowhere safe in Gaza’ and declaring that like everyone else, 
the people of Gaza ‘are entitled to protection, they’re entitled to be safe’. One particularly 
emotional item centres on interviewing civilians affected by the incident. Such sentiments 
offer an encompassing embrace which can only be read as poignant and hopeless.  
Besides AJA’s regular adaption of terminology resembling resistance and martyrdom, it 
linguistically narrates its graphic imagery with emotive and symptomatic expressions. 
Again, like on AJE and BBC World, the 6th of January is seen by AJA as the ‘bloodiest day 
yet since the start of the ground incursion’. Incidents are depicted as tragedies and the 
war is described by Palestinians as ‘the series of Israeli massacres against them’. On a 
later date (11th Jan 2009), AJA recapped the UNRWA incident describing Israelis as ones 
who do not ‘recognise the value of human life nor evaluate its significance to its creator’. 
Palestinian civilians, on the other hand, are portrayed ‘as searching for a safe haven to 
keep them away from Israel’s desire to kill their children’. It expresses that,  
Since Israelis have no problem killing Palestinians in their homes, they’ve escaped their 
homes seeking refuge in the schools of the United Nations to be killed by accident. And if 
they were killed in their homes, they are to blame for not reading the leaflets. Israel have 
been killing and destroying since the first day of its war on Gaza and images that were 
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captured by camera lenses are justified by statements like ‘by mistake’, and those 
tragedies not transferred through the cameras are kept silent (AJA 11th Jan 2009)   
يأ لا فاخي مهيلع نييلئارسلإا نم لتقلا يف مهتويب ؤاجليل ىلإ سردم مملأا هدحتملا مهلتقل نع قيرط أطخلا .و اذإ ولتق 
يف مهتويب مهف ببسلا مهنلأ مل اوأرقي تاروشنملا .ليئارسإ لتقت و رمدت ذنم مويلا لولأا اهبرحل ىلع ةزغ و ام هبصت 
تاسدع اريماكلا هرربت  هرابعب نع قيرط أطخلا امأ يذلا لا لقني نع قيرط تاريماكلا لاف نوثدحتي هنع  
Given Al-Jazeera’s audience is culturally attentive of the situation, we can argue that such 
images are not always effectively engaged by AJA to seriously question the legality, 
proportionality or morality in the conduct of the war. It is a taken-for-granted assumption 
that Israel is always ‘in the wrong’, that the war is immoral and that the casualties and 
destruction inflicted are not proportional. Therefore, it openly suggests that Israel has ‘no 
problem killing Palestinian in their homes’ or in schools affiliated with the UN. Because, it 
reports, Israel will always claim that ‘if [Palestinians] were killed in their homes they are to 
blame for not reading the leaflets’ (leaflets dropped by Israeli airplanes asking Gazan 
residents to leave their houses) and if they were killed in the schools of the United 
Nations they were killed ‘by mistake’ or ‘by accident’.   
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BBC Arabic 
Extract 6.7: BBC Arabic’s report on attacks on UNRWA schools - 6
th
 Jan 2009  
[Studio Presenter] 
 
At least 44 Palestinians were killed after the bombing of 3 UNRWA schools, and 45 others were 
wounded. 13 Palestinians from the same family were also killed after a bomb fell on their house in 
Gaza city, bringing the number of victims since the beginning of Israel’s ongoing assaults on Gaza to 
632 martyrs or dead, with more than 2800 wounded. Israel admitted that 6 of its soldiers were killed 
last night but explained they that were killed through friendly fire (BBC Arabic 6th Jan 2009) 
 نع لقي لا امع لتق٢٢  تفصق نأ دعب اننيطسلف٢  نم رثكأ طقس و اورنولأل ةعبات سرادم٢٥ حيرج . لتق امك٧٢  ةلئاع نم اينيطسلف
 ةزغ ىلع لصاوتملا يليئارسلإا ءادتعلاا ةيادب ذنم اياحضلا ددع عفري ام ةزغ ةنيدم يف لزانملا دحلأ فصق يف ةدحاو٦٢٤  وأ اديهش
لايتق  نم رثكأ و٤٠٣٣ حيرج . لتقمب ليئارسإ تفرتعا دق و اذه٦  قيرط نع اولتق مهنإ تلاق اهنكل ةيضاملا ةليللا اهل نيعبات دونج
أطخلا 
  
Time  
[Start: 
02.15] 
 
Image 
 
 
 
Sound 
 
[Journalist voice-over]  
What made the 11th day of the Gaza Invasion 
significant is… 
مهأ ام زيم مويلا يداحلا رشع حايتجلا ةزغ وه  
 
 
…the Israeli attack on the schools 
ضرعت سرادملا فصقل يليئارسإ   
 
 
 
 
…which resulted in the death of dozens of Palestinians 
and in clashes between Hamas and Israel. Nowhere is 
now safe in Gaza after the Israeli attack on 3 UNRWA 
schools  
هتجيتن لتقم تارشعلا نم نينيطسلفلا يف تاهجاوم نيب سامح و ليئرسإ .
لا ناكم نمأ نلآا يف ،ةزغ ضعب برض ثلاث سرادم عبتت هلاكو 
اورنولأا 
 
 
 
According to the UN, two of its schools were used as 
shelters by hundreds of Palestinians who fled their 
houses after being subjected to direct Israeli 
bombardment. 
بسحب ةلاكولا نإف نيتسردم مهنم تناك يوحت تائم نينيطسلفلا نيذلا 
ورجاه مهلزانم دعب مهضرعت فصقل يليئارسإ رشابم  
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UNRWA flags were waving on top of the schools and 
the agency confirmed that it had informed Israel of 
the coordinates of all its UNRWA installations, 
especially those where many Palestinian families are 
sheltering.  
ملاعأ ةلاكولا تناك فرفرت قوف نيتسردملا و لوقت ةلاكولا اهنإ تغلبأ 
ليئارسإ نم لبق عقومب سرادملا يتلا يوتحت ديدعلا نم تلائاعلا 
طسلفلاهيني  
 
 
 
 
[Source 1: John Ging (Head of UNRWA)] 
We had the tragedy of deaths last night in our schools. 
Where people have fled their houses hoping for safety 
and now they’re dead 
نوج جنيج )اورنوأ :(نحن مامأ ،ةاسأم سانأ ولتق ةليللا ةيضاملا يف 
،انسرادم ثيح ورف نم لاتقلا ىلع لمأ هاجنلا و اه مه ىتوم نلآا  
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
In the Southern part of the Strip, the continuation of 
random and indiscriminate shelling was the dominant 
scene. Smoke screens where escalating as Israeli 
troops tried to separate Khan Younis from Rafah. 
امأ يف بونج ،عاطقلا ناك رارمتسا فصقلا يف نكامأ ةقرفتم نود ديدحت 
افادهأ وه اميسلا ةبلاغلا .بحس ناخدلا تدهش دعاصتت عم ةلواحم تاوقلا 
هيليئارسلإا لصف ناخ سنوي نع حفر  
 
 
 
Until this moment, the Israeli bombardment was not 
able to 
ىتح ةظحللا مل عيطتسي صاصرلا بوبصملا  
 
 
 
…stop Hamas rockets fired into Israel which for the 
first time since the start of the Israeli Operation have 
reached a range 45KM deep into Israel 
رهص خيراوص سامح يتلا لصو اهادم ةرملل ىلولأا ذنم ءدب هيلمعلا 
يليئارسلإاه يف ةزغ ىلإ ٢٥ وليك ارتيم  
 
 
 
At least 7 Palestinian rockets have landed in Ashkelon 
and Beersheba. Missiles were even seen in the town 
of Deira north-east of Ashdod   
ام لا لقي نع ١ خيراوص هينيطسلف تطقس ىلع نلاقسع أ رئب عبسلا امك 
تلصو خيراوصلا ىلإ ةدلب ةريد لامش قرش دودشا  
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The Israeli Army declared 6 of its soldiers dead and 24 
others wounded in violent clashes with Hamas 
fighters. 
 لتقمب رقأ يليئارسلإا شيجلا٦  ةباصإ و هدونج نم٤٢  ةليللا نيرخأ
سامح يلتاقم عم ةفينع تاهجاوم للاخ ةيضاملا 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However the Israeli Army said that 3 of its soldiers 
were killed by friendly fire after an Israeli tank shelled 
a building occupied by Israelis in Northern Gaza 
 نأ لاق هنكلو٢ عب أطخلا قيرط نع ولتق دونجلا نمد  ةبابد تفصق نأ
اطقلا لامشب نيليئارسإ دونج هلخد ىنبملاع .  
 
  
 
 
An unconfirmed report indicates that Colonel 
Avi Peled, commander of the Special Infantry Brigade 
known as the Golani, was among the injured in the 
operation.  
 يفأ ديقعلا هيلمعلا يف نيباصملا نيب نم نأ ةدكؤم ريغ ءابنأ ديفت و
اول دوقي يذلا ينلاييبينلاوج مسإب فورعملا صاخلا هاشملا ء  
 
[End: 
04.32] 
 
 
 
 
Up until the point of preparing this report, at least 630 
Palestinians have been killed and no less than 2700 
have been wounded since the Operation started 11 
days ago.  
ىتح  لتق ريرقتلا اذه دادعإ ةظحل نع لقي لا ام٦٢٣  ءدب ذنم اينيطسلف
 لبق هيليئارسلإا هيلمعلا٧٧  نع لقي لا ام حرج و اموي٤١٣٣ حيرج  
 
 
Unlike the previous reports of Al-Jazeera and BBC World, Extract 6.7 does not provide 
reasons to why the attack took place –it is not presented as a response to Hamas fire, as 
a mistake in judgement on Israel’s behalf, or as a deliberate attack against Palestinian 
civilians. Instead, the broadcast explains that ‘hundreds of Palestinians […] fled their 
houses’ to seek refuge in 2 UNRWA schools ‘after being subjected to direct Israeli 
bombardment’ but were affected by ‘Israeli attacks on [those] schools’. It then expounds 
that ‘the continuation of random and indiscriminate shelling was the dominant scene’ in 
the southern part of the Strip. Although Israeli attacks are portrayed as indeed terrible 
resulting in the death of many Palestinians, they are explained as being the result of a 
conflict sustained by Israel to stop Hamas rockets. It reports, that ‘until this moment, the 
Israeli bombardment was not able to stop Hamas rockets fired into Israel’. These rockets 
210 
 
are shown to have reached ‘deep into Israel’ for the first time since the start of the Israeli 
operation. These statements entail undeclared connotations which suggest that until 
Hamas stops firing rockets into Israel, the Israeli army will maintain its attacks. Yet it 
remarks that while Israel engages ‘in violent clashes with Hamas fighters’, it lost 6 of its 
soldiers and wounded 24 others. This highlights the way BBC Arabic reported the 
provocation aspect of the war (explained in the previous chapter) proclaiming, that 
Israel’s main reason for its incursion is to stop the rocket fire from Hamas, but it also 
admits that it had failed to do just that. The fact that an unconfirmed report indicated 
that Colonel Avi Peled (Commander of Golani Brigade) is among the injured proves that 
the Israeli army is failing ‘to provide the security it promised its citizens’ (BBC Arabic 4th 
January).  
In terms of sources, like all other examined networks, it directly quotes John Ging (Head 
of UNRWA). The journalist confirms that the UN has provided Israeli army with its precise 
details of all its buildings in Gaza, especially those where many Palestinian families were 
sheltering. Ging explains that people who ‘fled their houses hoping for safety’ were met 
with ‘tragic deaths’ in UNRWA schools. Both Hamas and the Israeli army are denied 
access. The act of presenting ‘two different texts, two different voices…and potentially 
two different perspectives’ (Volosinov 1973 cited in Fairclough 2003: 48) is absent on BBC 
Arabic. Nonetheless, after the main report, BBC Arabic’s correspondent on the Israel-
Gaza border was asked, by the presenter, to explain the Israeli army’s perspective on the 
matter. He confers that,             
[The Israeli Army’s spokesperson] said that the Israeli Army after preliminary 
investigation concluded that mortar shells were fired at Israeli soldiers from these schools 
which necessitated striking these schools with Israeli missiles (BBC World 6th Jan 2009). 
ثدحتت عم شيجلا يلئارسلإا عم قطانلا مسأب شيجلا يلئارسلإا و هتلأس نع اذه عوضوملا لاق نأب شيجلا يلئارسلإا 
دعب ءارجإ قيقحت يلوأ لوقي ناب هذه سرادملا مت قلاطإ فئاذق نواه اهنم هاجتب دونجلا نييلئارسلإا و اذه يذلا 
ىعدتسا برض هذه سرادملا خيراوصب ةيلئارسا   
Israeli claims are, therefore, neither confirmed nor dismissed by BBC journalists. Like BBC 
World, the tone of the report was calm and the background sound of the scene itself was 
lowered by the journalist’s contextualised voice-over which consequently reduced the 
amount of emotional impact. Especially relevant in Extract 6.7 is the manner in which BBC 
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Arabic equates the suffering on one side with the suffering on the other. The studio 
introduction indicates that on the one hand, ‘44 Palestinians were killed after the 
bombing of 3 UNRWA schools’, and on the other, ‘Israel admitted that 6 of its soldiers 
were killed last night’. Although it acknowledges that Palestinian deaths are caused by 
‘Israel’s ongoing assaults on Gaza’, it admits that Israeli soldiers were killed through 
friendly fire. This means that while it balances the suffering, it does not suggest that one 
is caused by the other. This is also evident in the report itself. BBC Arabic dedicates the 
first minute of its broadcast to report on the UNRWA school incident, followed by 
another minute which covers Hamas rockets fired into Southern Israel and the remaining 
17 seconds reported the number of casualties on the Palestinian side.  
In terms of the news corporation’s discursive strategies and practices, the studio 
introduction presented in Extract 6.7 embodies one remarkable example. The presenter, 
reporting live on the number of casualties, mistakenly refers to the Palestinians killed as 
‘martyrs’ but immediately and hesitantly corrects himself by saying ‘or dead’. This could 
be interpreted as a ‘slip of the tongue’ but certainly reflects the BBC’s journalistic 
practices and guidelines in terms of language and vocabulary. The factor of cultural 
proximity is also at work here, highlighting the journalist’s culturally embedded linguistic 
correlations between Palestinian casualties and ‘martyrs’. The structure of sentences 
throughout the report also provides a very interesting reporting clause. The 44 
Palestinians referred to in the report were not simply ‘killed after the bombing’ they were 
killed by the Israeli army. The prepositional phrases ‘after the bombing of 3 UNRWA 
schools’ or ‘after a bomb fell’ in the report ‘acts to provide context to the reported event, 
rather than an explicit ascription of agency’: the preposition ‘after’ entails that the events 
occurred respectively (this occurred then this occurred) rather than one being the direct 
result of the other (Richardson 2007: 206). Therefore, while this construction does 
suggest that Israeli soldiers did kill those Palestinians, ‘it simultaneously structures our 
comprehension of the event’ (ibid.): that it was an unexpected regrettable accident, as if 
the soldiers involved did not know that bombing 3 schools where civilians were sheltering 
would bring about death.  
BBC Arabic is the only network that does not present any graphic images of the dead and 
wounded. It transmitted emotional and sensational footage of the aftermath of the 
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attacks which depicted Palestinian civilians running, some hoping to escape the fighting, 
others rushing to rescue the wounded and evacuate them to hospitals. Other images also 
portray the crowded situation of the schools used by Palestinian civilians as shelters. The 
remaining visuals depict scenes of Israeli missiles and bombs as they fall from the skies of 
Gaza. On the Israeli side, BBC Arabic presents more emotional and particularly 
personalised images. One hears the wailing of an old Israeli woman being supported to 
walk by paramedics until they reach an ambulance. Another scene pictures a partially 
destructed house as a result of Hamas rockets. 
‘Rain of fire’: the use of illegal weapons against civilian populations 
Stimulated by allegations made by Human Rights Watch, a wide-reaching controversy 
developed concerning the use of white phosphorus munitions by Israeli forces during its 
assaults on Gaza in January 2009. The use of white phosphorus on populated areas in the 
Strip has necessitated many human rights organisations to accuse Israel of violating 
International Law and violating the Geneva Conventions. Based on its investigation of 
incidents involving the use of white phosphorus and other illegally used weapons in the 
course of the war, the United Nations Fact Finding Mission concluded that,      
While accepting that white phosphorous is not at this stage proscribed under 
international law…the Israeli armed forces were systematically reckless in determining its 
use in built-up areas. Moreover, doctors who treated patients with white phosphorous 
wounds spoke about the severity and sometimes untreatable nature of the burns caused 
by the substance (OHCHR 2009: 16-17) 
Human Rights Watch, in a report specifically dedicated to ‘Israel’s unlawful use of white 
phosphorus in Gaza’ (HRW 2009) titled Rain of Fire –hence the title of this section –
accused the Israeli army of committing war crimes by indicating that,  
The unlawful use of white phosphorus was neither incidental nor accidental.  It was 
repeated over time and in different locations, with the IDF “air-bursting” the munitions in 
populated areas up to the last days of its military operation.  Even if intended as an 
obscurant rather than as a weapon, the IDF’s repeated firing of air-burst white 
phosphorus shells from 155mm artillery into densely populated areas was indiscriminate 
and indicates the commission of war crimes (ibid: 1). 
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The following section will linguistically and semantically analyse the way Israel’s use of 
white phosphorus was reported in the four examined channels. By transcribing the text 
and providing screen images of the visuals employed to report Israel’s use of illegal 
weapons, the following examines whether such use is rationalised or deemed acceptable 
in the media (given its legal use as a flare to light up the battlefield, or to produce smoke 
screen to hide troop movements from the enemy). To this end, this section seeks to 
distinguish between narratives that focused on the use of white phosphorus and the 
controversy it created and those centred on the effects it had/having on the Palestinian 
population. It also aims to differentiate between the concept of ‘intellectualisation’ and 
that of ‘emotionalism’ in reporting Israel’s deployment of munitions in Gaza. 
Intellectualisation in this context refers to what Wolsfeld et al. (2008) describe as the 
routine of employing analytical perspectives in conflicts which ‘usually involves extensive 
military sources and perspectives’ (ibid: 405). Alternatively, emotionalism incorporates 
humanising and empathising with the victims. Such terminology is often extremely 
emotional and dramatic in nature and may also include graphic images of the dead and 
wounded.      
Al-Jazeera English 
Extract 6.8: AJE’s report on the use of white phosphorus – 12
th
 Jan 2009  
[Studio Presenter] 
 
Among the allegations, in a war like this, that always arise, are the improper use of weapons and one 
of those weapons that we’ve been looking into is the use of white phosphorus munitions and I had the 
chance to go and speak to some of those who  have been victims of that particular component. (AJE 
11th Jan 2009) 
 
Time  
Start: 
04.25 
 
Image 
 
 
Sound 
[Journalist voice-over]  
Burning bright above the skies of Gaza, Israeli 
munitions that Human Rights groups say is white 
phosphorus. A deadly weapon illegal to use against 
civilians now it appears landing on the people of Gaza. 
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These pictures show what is believed to be white 
phosphorus in the hearts of Gaza’s neighbourhoods. 
 
 
 
[Source 1: Palestinian civilian] 
We saw a bright flash of light in the evening and then 
saw all these sparks fall near us. The sparks were 
landing all around us and in our homes our mattresses 
caught on fire. 
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
On the ground in Jabalya, home to more than 100,000 
Palestinians, 
 
 
…children unaware of the deadly toxin dropped on 
them naively playing with the munitions. As adults 
look on describing the poisonous effects it has had on 
them  
 
 
 
 
[Source 2: Palestinian civilian] 
it’s the first time we see this type of weapon, it must 
be new and it seems like phosphorus its suffocating 
and has a deadly poisonous smell that I am sure will 
cause a lot of sickness and disease on all the civilians 
here 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
Now those who’ve witnessed the attacks 
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…are calling on Israel to halt the use of white 
phosphorus 
 
 
[Source 3: Palestinian doctor] 
Those people must be brought to justice because they 
are just killing children and they are just killing women 
who are innocent they have done nothing. This assault 
is a humiliation of all the international humanitarian 
law and is a sort of humiliation of the Geneva 
Convention I mean there is no way unless these 
people stop this crime immediately in Gaza and they 
must be brought to justice 
 
 
 
[Source 4: Mar Garlasco (Human Rights Watch –
Military analyst)] 
I’ve stood on the borders of Gaza watching Jabalya as 
it was being hammered by white phosphorus over the 
past few days it is very clear as you walk by the Israeli 
155 mm artillery battles that they’re handling 
American manufactured white phosphorus rounds. 
They are fused you don’t fuse them unless you want 
to use it 
 
 
 
[Source 4: Mar Garlasco (Human Rights Watch –
Military analyst)] 
…and I’m watching as the white phosphorus explodes 
in there in an air-burst situation and comes down and 
covers the area of the refugee camp. It is not an illegal 
weapon so why is Israel not saying that they are using 
it, I don’t get it. The problem of course is that while it 
is not illegal to use to cause smoke and create a smoke 
screen it is illegal to use if you are going to harm a 
civilian population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
And in Israel’s war on the densely populated Gaza 
Strip it is the civilian population that once again seems 
to be affected by these munitions that 
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…are extremely flammable and can cause life 
threatening burns when coming in contact with 
human skin. 
[End: 
07.37] 
 
 
 
The Israeli military says the weapons it is using against 
Gaza comply with International Law but while the 
claim and counterclaim goes on, one thing is clear the 
civilian population is suffering and that suffering 
shows no signs of abating.                  
 
 
Extract 6.8 signifies and communicates Israel’s exploitation of white phosphorus through 
visual images, but presents minimal statements supporting the Israeli agenda in 
explaining its use. It does so through employing both dimensions of ‘intellectualisation’ 
and ‘emotionalism’. The substance of white phosphorus is introduced by the journalist, 
described by civilians in neighbourhoods, visually portrayed and accused by Human 
Rights Watch of being unlawfully used in built-up areas. Victims who have witnessed the 
attacks are then visually presented and the substance’s hazardous effects on civilians are 
also explained.      
Firstly, the use of white phosphorus is depicted as a ‘deadly weapon’ that is ‘suffocating 
and has a deadly poisonous smell’ which is capable of causing ‘sickness and disease’ to 
the civilians of Gaza. Such munitions are also reported to be ‘extremely flammable’ and 
capable of ‘causing life threatening burns’. In short Israel’s use of white phosphorus in 
Gaza is portrayed as ‘improper’ –Israeli munitions, illegal to use against civilians, are 
reported to now be appearing to land on the people of Gaza. It confirms that these 
allegations are expressed by Human Rights organisations but later portrays images 
depicting the flammable toxin in ‘the hearts of Gaza’s neighbourhoods’ explaining that 
‘these pictures show what is believed to be white phosphorus’. Presenting pictures and 
close-ups of burning pieces of phosphorus fires from the bombs, it explains that children 
in Jabalya ‘unaware of the deadly toxin dropped on them naively play with the munitions’.  
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Secondly, graphic images of ‘those who have witnessed the attacks’ are represented. 
Such visualisations include a medium-shot image of a man’s partially burnt face resting 
on a hospital bed. Another image depicts a man, possibly in his early twenties, lying on a 
hospital bed suffering from what is said to be severe burns caused by white phosphorus. 
Graphic imagery of severe wounds and suffering, amplifies the dramatic and emotional 
impacts of the incident. Employing sensational sentiments from Palestinian civilians, also, 
supplements the level emotionalism communicated through AJE. AJE also directly quotes 
a Palestinian doctor, frustratingly condemning Israeli actions and accusing them of 
committing a crime in continuously killing innocent women and children and violating 
International Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Convention. 
Marc Garlasco, a military analyst from Human Rights Watch, is also directly quoted 
confirming that he has ‘stood on the borders of Gaza watching Jabalya as it was being 
hammered by white phosphorus over the past few days’. He added that he witnessed 
‘white phosphorus exploding in an air-burst situation and coming down and covering the 
area of the camp’. It is acknowledged that in combat areas white phosphorus can be 
deployed for military purposes free from the use of its toxic chemical properties 
(Monbiot 2005: 2). Interestingly, Garlasco illustrated that white phosphorus bombs ‘were 
fused, you don’t fuse them’, he explains, ‘unless you want to use them’. Here, Garlasco, 
speaking with an authoritative voice marked by a credible point view, claims that he has 
not seen the phosphorus bombs being launched by Israel; instead he saw burst in the sky 
which suggests the second best thing: that he has seen the bombs ready to be used. Of 
course, as mentioned earlier, as soon as WP munitions are directly used against civilians, 
it becomes a chemical weapon. Again, Garlasco asserted that Israel’s use of white 
phosphorus is considered unlawful because it is used to ‘harm a civilian population’. 
Like all other incidents reported on AJE, Gaza’s civilian population is ‘once again’ shown 
to be the number one victims of Israel’s use of such incendiary munitions. Finally, the 
Israeli military’s perspective is conversed claiming that their use of weapons against Gaza 
‘complies with International Law’. While AJE cannot confirm Israeli claims and 
counterclaims it verifies that one thing is clear: ‘the civilian population is suffering and 
that suffering shows no signs of abating’. Similar examples can be noted across AJE’s 
coverage. Employing graphic pictures of injured children, one headline read: ‘And paying 
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the biggest price, those who struggle to comprehend why anyone would even wage for’ 
(15th Jan 2009). Such a headline is not by itself; even before the ground Incursion, AJE 
reported, 
War through the eyes of a child: Al-Jazeera asks what the Israeli offensive is doing to a 
generation of Palestinians (AJE 2nd Jan 2009) 
And just one day before Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire, AJE confirmed, 
After 22 days of the war, Palestinian civilians especially children have paid the heavy price 
(17th Jan 2009) 
The excerpt above establishes that Palestinian civilians have paid the heavy price. The use 
of verb phrases such as ‘have paid’ indicates that something happened and might be 
continuing to happen. As an affirmative statement, auxiliary verbs such as to have, 
expresses how certain the journalist is that Palestinian civilians did pay the heavy price.  
BBC World 
BBC World’s discursive strategy in covering Israel’s use of white phosphorus implies a 
rather different stance than AJ. Such an anomaly in BBC’s reporting reflects the network’s 
inconsistency in justifying yet attributing blame to the Israeli army’s deployment of 
prohibited munitions in its war on Gaza. Since the BBC first reported Israel’s use of white 
phosphorus almost a week after Israel’s ground incursion, BBC World shifted their public 
position on the issue from justifying and rationalising its use, to openly accusing Israel of 
violating International Law. BBC World failed to produce a special report to account for 
the uses and corollaries of white phosphorus, in addition to simultaneously provide 
visuals to suffice the purpose of this study. Therefore, the analysis provided below only 
examines the verbal dimension of television news reporting.         
In one of the first instances in which WP was reported on BBC World, Ben Brown, one of 
the networks leading correspondents, maintained that Israel’s use of white phosphorus 
comply with International law. White phosphorus is not banned per se, but rather like all 
other weapons its use is ‘restricted by the fundamental principles of international 
humanitarian law: it must be used in a manner that adequately distinguishes between 
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combatants and civilians, and it may never target the latter’ (HRW 2009: 3). Brown 
reports,         
As darkness fell this evening, the artillery were firing white phosphorus shells into Gaza to 
provide smokescreen for ground troops to carry out operations there under cover of 
darkness. We’ve also seen tanks advancing in certain positions and firing above us. We’ve 
had Israeli apache helicopters opening fire with their 30 mm cannon (BBC World 9th Jan 
2009) 
The use of white phosphorus in this domain is justified, rationalised and deemed 
acceptable. The correspondent does not adopt clauses that reads; ‘Israel said’, ‘Israel 
claims’ or ‘according to Israeli sources’; rather it firmly reports that Israel’s use of white 
phosphorus is ‘to provide smokescreen for ground troops to carry out operations there 
[Gaza] under cover of darkness’. Here, BBC World admits Israel is using white phosphorus 
in Gaza but its use is deemed legitimate and obligatory for the military to carry out its 
operation and, furthermore, that the use of WP in this context has no bearing on the 
civilian population of Gaza.  
On the 15th of January, BBC World’s position regarding Israel’s legitimacy of its use of 
weapons began to shift. On that day, the United Nations headquarters was hit by two 
artillery shells in a crowded urban area, injuring three civilians and leaving the 
compound’s main warehouse burned to the ground (McCarthy 2010). In a report 
dedicated to the incident, a BBC journalist explained,   
The UN has condemned the shelling of a UN compound in Gaza city; the attack left 
desperately needed food and medicine ablaze. The UN relief agency in Gaza said it 
believes the compound was hit by white phosphorus shells: incendiary weapons used to 
create smoke screens which mustn’t be used in civilian areas... Israel says it uses this 
weapon legally, Human Rights campaigners disagree 
For the first time, BBC World acknowledges that Israel’s use of white phosphorus could 
be improper. It claims that the deployment of incendiary weapons, like white 
phosphorus, ‘mustn’t be used in civilian areas’. It explains that Israel maintains that it 
uses this weapon ‘legally’, but immediately dismisses this claim by indicating that ‘Human 
Rights campaigners disagree’.  
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Hall et al.’s model of ‘primary definition’ (1978), assumes that the viewpoints of those in 
powerful positions in society – primary definers – Israel in the case of this study, are 
accepted and to a certain extent endorsed by the media. Such a structured relationship 
between the media and the primary institutional definers, ‘permits the institutional 
definers to establish the initial definition or primary interpretation of the topic in 
question’ (Hall et al. 1978: 58). After such a framework of interpretation is established, it 
effectively frames the problem at stake. The media –acting as secondary definers –then, 
do not simply transmit the ideology of the powerful, but play a crucial but secondary role 
in reproducing these definitions and in evaluating such interpretations. This conflicts with   
findings drawn from the analysis and suggests a more radical pluralist approach, which 
argues that a more processual model is needed to understand the dynamics of news 
creation. The analysis shows that when the controversy of the unlawful use of white 
phosphorus is highlighted and the proportionality of suffering and despair is reported the 
legitimacy attributed to Israeli policies is shown to be eroded. The tools employed to 
portray the suffering inflicted on civilian casualties, shift attention away from the initial 
interpretive framework of “what is at issue” and begin to emphasise on the significance 
and legitimacy of such definitions.                        
Following the report, BBC World’s correspondent at the Israel-Gaza border conducted a 
face-to-face interview with Marc Garlasco from Human Rights Watch. Figure 6.1 presents 
a detailed transcription of the encounter.  
 
Correspondent Marc Garlasco […] the Israeli government they say they are using it within the scope 
of the International Law and we do see many militaries worldwide using white 
phosphorus 
Marc  Garlasco That’s correct but what we are seeing in Gaza right now is the use of white 
phosphorus in densely populated areas which is a violation of the Geneva 
Convention. I stand everyday on the border watching as dozens upon dozens of 
white phosphorus artillery in an air-burst situation falling at the Jabalya Refugee 
Camp and Gaza city raining down fire on the civilians there. We, Human Rights 
Watch, consider this to be a violation of the Geneva Convention. 
Correspondent And why is that what damage does it do to civilians, what’s the harm caused? 
Marc Garlasco well when the flames come out of the white phosphorus shells and descend over 
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250 meters radius area they ignite and they can cause severe burns 3rd degree they 
also can light homes on fire and as we’ve seen today at the United Nations was 
burnt by the White phosphorus. So we are calling on Israel to cease the use of white 
phosphorus in these densely populated areas of Gaza 
Correspondent Marc Garlasco, Human Rights Watch thank you very much for joining us here. 
Figure 6.1: Interview with Marc Garlasco (Human Rights Watch – Weapons expert) - 15
th
 Jan 2011 
 
Firstly, the correspondent’s initial question highlights the Israeli government’s statement 
that ‘they are using [white phosphorus] within the scope of the International Law’, and 
secondly, such use is rationalised and justified by the correspondent as being used 
worldwide by many militaries. The use of the phrase ‘we do see’ confirms such a 
statement which connotes notions of factuality and truthfulness to the matter. It also 
includes Garlasco himself and the audience and suggests that they all have seen ‘many 
militaries worldwide using white phosphorus’ –implying that Israel’s use of phosphorus 
bombs is ‘legitimate’. Garlasco explains that what has been said is correct but indicates 
that ‘what we are seeing in Gaza right now is the use of white phosphorus in densely 
populated areas which is a violation of the Geneva Convention’. He adopts similar 
strategies to those of the correspondent and asserts that his statements are based on 
direct observation and scrutiny. Garlasco not only has stood on the borders ‘everyday 
watching as dozens upon dozens of white phosphorus artillery round burst of the Jabalya 
Refugee Camp and Gaza city’, but he also witnessed phosphorus shells ‘raining down fire 
on the civilians there’. This, regardless of Israeli claims is considered ‘a violation of the 
Geneva Convention’ with accordance to Human Rights Watch.         
Seen from an ‘emotionalism’ perspective, Garalsco is made to signify the ‘damage’ and 
‘harm’ white phosphorus munitions have on civilians. From this, it is clear that the 
correspondent accepts Garlasco’s claims that it is affecting the civilian population. White 
phosphorus shells are thus reported to form flames that ‘descends over 250 meters radius 
area they ignite and they can cause severe burns third degree’ and are also capable of 
‘lighting homes on fire’ as was the case at the United Nations headquarters. To get an 
alternative perspective, BBC World also conducts a face-to –face interview with Yigal 
Palmor, the Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesperson. A detailed transcription of the 
interview is provided in Figure 6.2 below.        
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Presenter: Let’s now talk to the Israeli government about these comments, we are joined here by 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor, Yigal I’ll first start with Human Rights Watch 
it says that it is a violation of the Geneva Convention to use white phosphorus in built-
up areas, is that something you as diplomat recognise? 
Yigal: I think what I would like to quote now is what the ICRC said yesterday or the day before 
Peter Herbly who is responsible for the ICRC for arms control said clearly and in public 
that he had no evidence whatsoever of any illegal use by Israel of white phosphorus. I 
think that is quite clear, he made some more comments to elaborate on that but I think 
that those words are very clear and they need to be carried to the Human Rights Watch 
and to the other Human Rights organisations because they need to take heat of what 
the ICRC have said        
Presenter: Perhaps they were speaking before the Israeli forces moved so deep into crowded 
areas like Gaza city. I know you used white phosphorus when you first went in to the 
Gaza Strip two and a half weeks ago in open areas but now that civilians are being put 
in harms-way Human Rights Watch and others say this is a violation it is bringing harm 
to civilians 
Yigal: again everything the IDF does is under International Law, we don’t use any munitions 
we don’t use any weapons that are not used by any other Western democratic 
countries and we use them in exactly the same way or to put it more simply everything 
that the international law allows is what we do, everything that international law 
prohibits we don’t do. 
Figure 6.2: Interview with Yigal Palmor (Foreign Ministry Spokesman) - 15
th
 Jan 2011 
 
Although the exchange presented in Figure 6.2 above is identical in structure to the two-
way interview with the source from HRW, there are two apparent differences in the 
encounters presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. First, Yigal, the Israeli Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson, appears to dodge the question asked to him both times in which the 
journalist formulates the opinion of the interviewee’s opponent. Such approach implies 
evasiveness and ambiguity on Yigal’s behalf, allowing him to surpass and overlook the 
matter in question. Second, the journalist arguably challenges Yigal’s argument, accusing 
him of being selective –only referencing sources that are in line with their own claims. 
Yigal’s response to accusations directed at Israel of violating the Geneva Convention 
assumes a defensive approach. Rather than justifying Israeli actions by providing concrete 
evidence proving that Israel is not at fault, Yigal instead cites the ICRC (International 
Committee of the Red Cross) declaring Israel innocent. Yigal’s utter confidence in the 
ICRC’s statements is only granted given it supports the Israeli claim. This is highlighted 
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when Yigal explains that ‘those words are very clear and […] need to be carried to the 
Human Rights Watch and to the other Human Rights organisations’, which suggests that 
although Human Rights organisations are equally trusted as the ICRC yet Yigal only quotes 
organisations that place Israel in good light. Interestingly, the BBC World’s journalist 
offers reasons to why the ICRC would issue such statements; she questioned: ‘Perhaps 
they were speaking before the Israeli forces moved so deep into crowded areas like Gaza 
city’. The journalist, here, presents an explanation regarding the difference between the 
information provided by HRW and ICRC and therefore, implicitly, accuses Yigal of being 
selective with evidence. She then elaborated saying ‘I know you used white phosphorus 
when you first went in to the Gaza Strip two and a half weeks ago in open areas’ which of 
course, as already established, is a legitimate use. However, she explains, ‘now that 
civilians are being put in harms-way, Human Rights Watch and others say this is a 
violation it is bringing harm to civilians’. Yigal’s assertion that ‘everything the IDF does is 
under International Law’ is a statement of principle indicating that Israel ‘doesn’t use any 
munitions that are not used by other Western democratic countries’. Again, Yigal justifies 
Israel’s actions by comparing them to that of ‘Western democratic’ countries. It suggests 
that whatever is acceptable for the US and UK must also be deemed legitimate to Israel.                
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Al-Jazeera Arabic 
Extract 6.9: AJA’s report on the use of white phosphorus – 11
th
 Jan 2009 (emphases, in italics, added 
throughout) 
[Studio Presenter] 
 
The civilian population seems to be the number one victim of this war in which Israel is using 
internationally banned weapons such as phosphorus bombs containing the substance of white 
phosphorus which is also being fired by the army upon populated areas. It causes severe burns when it 
touches the skin and transmits smoke that Palestinians say causes suffocation and nausea (AJA 11th 
Jan 2009)   
 
ناكسلا نييندملا ودبي مهنإ ةيحضلا زربلأا كلتل براحأ يتلا مدختست اهللاخ ليئارسإ ةحلسأ ةمرحم ايلود لثم لبانقلا هيروفسفلا يتلا 
يوتحت ىلع ةدام روفسفلا ضيبلأا و اهقلطي شيجلا يلئارسلإا قوف قطانملا ةلهلأا ناكسلاب و ببست قورح ةديدش يف لح اهتسملام 
دلجلل امك ثعبي هنما ةنخدأ لوقي نونطاوملا اهنإ ببست مهل قانتخا و نايثغ  
 
Time  
Start: 
15.40 
 
Image 
 
 
Sound 
[Journalist voice-over]  
Regardless of her injury, she is lucky. Jamila Al-Hayaj 
from the Toufah neighbourhood East Gaza was 
answering the questions posed to her by Al-Jazeera’s 
reporter with a smile on her face. 
ةظوظحم مغر اهباصم .ةليمج جايهلا نم يح حافتلا قرش ةزغ تناك 
بيجت ىلع ةلئسأ لسارم ةريزجلا نود نأ قرافت ةماستبلاا اههجو  
 
 
[Source 1: Palestinian civilian affected by WP] 
We were playing on the roof of our house, me and my 
cousins and siblings. Suddenly a rocket landed on us, I 
then passed out I don’t know what happened 
afterwards 
ةليمج :ةنج بعلن ىلع حطسلا انأ و دلاوأ يمع و يتاوخأ ةأجف ىجيإ 
انيلع خوراص نيدعب راص اياعم ةبوبيغ ام، تفرع وش يلإ راص نيدعب  
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
Amputation of both legs as a result of severe and deep 
burns.  
ارتب لماك نييقاسليل هجيتن قورح ةديدش و ةقيمع ادج.  
 
 
Palestinian medical crew have been, for a while, 
questioning Israel’s use of what they termed 
mysterious weapons. 
تناك لاكوكش موحت ىدل مقاوطلا هيبطلا هينيطسلفلا ذنم هرتف نع مادختسا 
ليئارسإ ام اهامس ضعبلا ةحلسأ ةضماغ.  
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The results are written all over this picture despite Al-
Jazeera’s best attempts to mitigate it’s horror. Severe 
and deep burns reaching to the bones; 
لاخماهتف يف هذه ةروصلا يتلا تدمع ةريزجلا فيفختب اهتعاذف و قورح 
ةديدش و ةقيمع لصت ىلإ ماظعلا  
 
 
 
…amputated body parts which look like they’ve been 
run over by a ripsaw. 
ءاضعأ ةروتبم و نأك راشنم رم اهيلع  
 
 
As for the martyrs, high precision holes penetrated 
their bodies, holes which are not only invisible to the 
naked eye, but also through X-rays.   
امأ ءادهشلا مهقرتخثف بوقث ةديدش ةقدلا لا نكمي اهتيؤر ىتح ةعشأب سكا  
 
 
 
 
[Source 2: Palestinian doctor] 
X-ray images appear to be clear then we are surprised 
to find out that the patients suffer from internal 
bleeding. Doctors in operating rooms are also shocked 
to find intra-abdominal bleeding from the veins and 
arteries. This only suggests that there are materials 
being used that can’t be seen with the naked eye that 
burns these arteries and veins, which leads to the 
patient passing away, and the doctors can’t do 
anything  
روتكد دئار نيرعلا :لا دجن يأ ءيش يف هذه روصلا ةعشلأا و ضعب 
ليلق أجافتن دوجوب فيزن يلخاد ضيرملل .لخدي ءابطلأا ىلإ ةفرغ 
تايلمعلا لاو ودجي ائيش طقف ودجي يف لخاد نطبلا فيزن نم ةدرولأا و 
نم نييارشلا .يأ كانه داوم مدختست لا ىرت نيعلاب ةدرجملا قيرحت هذه 
نييارشلا و هذه ةدرولأا و يدؤت ىلإ هافاو ضيرملا و عيطتسي بيبطلا 
نأ لعفي يأ ءيش  
 
 
 
[Journalist voice-over]  
Nothing has been confirmed yet, but all indicators 
point towards the possibility that Israel is using DIME 
weapons or what can be translated into Dense Inert 
Metal Explosive weapons.  
ا ءيش دكأت  دعب ىلإ نإ لك تارشؤملا بصت يف هيناكمإ مادختسا 
ليئارسإ مياد حلاسل وأ ام نكمي هتمجرت تارجفتمب ندعملا فيثكلا 
لماخلا 
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It is an American manufactured weapon which is still 
being experimented. It is also considered by experts to 
be the best weapon for the so-called surgical strikes 
and to avoid collateral damage. 
وه حلاس يكيرمأ لا لزي تحت ةبرجتلا و هربتعي ءاربخلا حلاسلا لثملأا 
امل ىمست تامجهلا ةيحارجلا و يدافتل يأ رامد بناج.  
 
 
So mysterious weapons in the skies of Gaza, and others 
prohibited from use for offensive purposes especially 
in populated areas; 
ةحلسأ ةضماغ اذإ يف ءامس ةزغ و ىرخأ روظحم اهمادختسا ضارغلأ 
ةيموجه يف قطانم ةلوهأم  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…white phosphorus bombs which are only supposed to 
be used to cover troop movements were also seen in 
the skies of Gaza.   
لبانق روفسفلا ضيبلأا كلت يتلا ضرتفي لاأ مدختست لاإ هيطغتل تاكرحت 
دونجلا تدهش اضيأ يف ءامس ةزغ  
 
[Source 3: John Bayk Weapon Analyst] 
It is clear and obvious that the Israelis are using white 
phosphorus bombs. There’s no other weapon launched 
in this manner  
ريبخ ةحلسأ :اذه حضاو و يهيدب .نييلئارسلإا نومدختسي لبانق روفسفلا 
ضيبلأا سيل كانه حلاس رخآ اهنشي اذكه  
  
 
 
[Journalist voice-over] 
White phosphorus is usually used to destroy a target by 
burning it. It was shown to be used in Iraq in the city of 
Fallujah. Israel, who still hasn’t submitted an account 
of the weapons used in Gaza, denied this claim. 
مدختسي روفسفلا ضيبلأا اتداع ريمدتل افاده ام هقارحإب .تبث همادختسا 
يف قارعلا ىلع هنيدم ةجولفلا لاإ نأ ليئارسإ يتلا مل مدقت افشاك 
ةحلسلااب ةلمعتسملا ىتح نلآا يف ةزغ تفن كلذ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jamila might not be entirely convinced with this denial, 
but she is also well aware that she survived what could 
have been even worse and more horrific and that she 
is still able to achieve her dreams 
 .دق لا عنقت ةليمج اريثك اذهب يفنلا لاإ اهنإ يعات اهنإ تجن نم أوسلأا و 
عظفلاا و لا لزي يف اهناكمإ قيقحت اهلمأ  
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End: 
18.20 
 
[Source 4: Jamila –Palestinian child] 
My dream is to become a news presenter, a journalist 
ةليمج :يتينمأ لطأع ةعيذم ،رابخأ هيفحص  
   
                    
Through the medium of visual rhetoric AJA managed to put across three crucial aspects, 
presented in Extract 6.9, which are worthy of note: first, the personalisation of victims it 
entails; second, Al-Jazeera’s openness in presenting graphic imagery; and finally, its 
emotionalism in centring its coverage on the human-suffering.  
The media often when personalising with the victims, provide names, areas of residence 
and even pictures of the victims. Jamila al-Hayaj from the Toufah neighbourhood was the 
main actor of AJA’s broadcast. The young girl who described to Al-Jazeera what has 
happened to her is shown to have lost both her limbs as a result of severe and deep 
burns caused by Israeli attacks. The sympathetic tone of the narrative –‘Jamila al-
Hayaj…was answering questions posed to her by Al-Jazeera’s reporter with a constant 
smile on her face’ – also amplifies the amount of emotion and empathy the news item 
entails. Jamila is considered to be ‘lucky regardless of her injury’. Such an ironic 
description elicits notions of survival and endurance –it suggests that unlike the many 
children who were killed by Israeli fire, Jamila ‘is well aware that she survived what could 
have been even worse and more horrific’. Employing expressive terminology accompanied 
with sensationalist imagery, AJA highlighted the suffering of the casualties by providing 
sufficient emotion and drama in producing stimulating news. Interestingly, Extract 6.9 
also illustrates, that a close-up of Jamila’s bandaged amputated limbs obtained 3 screen 
images of the 16 provided.         
Al-Jazeera Arabic tends to relay visual messages of human suffering – especially prevalent 
since its first coverage of the second Intifada in 2000 (Fahmy and Johnson, 2007). AJA’s 
broadcasts emphasise the suffering brought upon civilians in periods of war, often with 
pictures of corpses of children and images of infants and toddlers with burns and missing 
body parts (ibid.). The images provided in Extract 6.9 can only be described as gruesome 
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images of severe burns, regardless of AJA’s claims that it deliberately mitigated their 
horror. According to Palestinian medics, mysterious weapons were the result of many 
critical wounds during the war on Gaza. Such gruesome images highlighted the terrible 
victimisation of Gaza’s civilian population with shocking photos of exaggerated burns 
down to the bones, amputated body parts which, according to AJA ‘look like they’ve been 
run over by a ripsaw’. The multiple segments presented in the broadcast reaffirmed the 
horror of the consequences white phosphorus have on the human body. As for the 
‘martyrs’, AJA explained ‘high precision holes penetrated their bodies’. These holes are 
described by doctors as invisible through X-rays, let alone to the naked eye. A Palestinian 
doctor expressed outrage and shock to find out that some patients, as a result of 
phosphorus shells, are suffering from internal bleeding. He stressed that ‘this leads to 
patients passing away and the doctors can’t do anything’. 
It is in this respect that Al-Jazeera is often indicted with sensationalism. However, Al-
Jazeera officials do not shy away from admitting that the station ‘broadcasts the horror of 
the bombing campaign, the blown-out brains, the blood-spattered pavements, the 
screaming infants and the corpses’ (Seib 2004 cited in Fahmy and Johnson, 2007: 249). As 
a pro-Arab slant (Hickey, 2002 cited in Fahmy and Johnson, 2007), Officials also argue 
that such coverage depicting gruesome scenes of dead and wounded civilians convey the 
realities of war (Ward 2009; Fahmy and Johnson 2007; Seib 2004), and by doing 
otherwise audiences are denied real knowledge (Campbell, 2004; Taylor, 1998). Al-
Jazeera also claims that its audience expect to see blood on its screens in times of war 
(Seib, 2004).  
The substance of white phosphorus is then described as an ‘American manufactured 
weapon’, also depicted as ‘prohibited from use for offensive purposes in populated areas’. 
Like AJE, a weapon analyst was also given news access to discredit Israeli claims and 
confirm that ‘it is clear and obvious that Israel is using white phosphorus bombs’. AJA’s 
intellectualisation technique of presenting military and experts’ perspectives is then 
diverted to amplify the level of emotionalism and sympathy to those worst affected. It 
suggests that not only do Human Rights organisations and weapons experts reject Israeli 
claims –which, as first-hand sources, are absent from this report –that it is not using 
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white phosphorus, but so does Jamila. And it concludes that Jamila is also ‘well aware 
that […] she is still able to achieve her dreams’ of becoming a journalist.                  
 
BBC Arabic 
Like BBC World, BBC Arabic did not dedicate a special report pertaining to white 
phosphorus, its uses and the effects it can have on civilians or combatants for that 
matter. However, although BBC Arabic’s coverage of Israel’s use of white phosphorus is 
succinct, it is also precise and straightforward. Israel’s use of incendiary munitions is not 
justified as a military rationale, nor are its effects on civilians humanised and 
sympathised. In short, it does not follow an ‘intellectualisation’ approach which lowers 
the level of anxiety associated with such incidents by rationalising what happened 
(Wolsfeld et al. 2008: 415), nor does it adopt an emotionalism approach in highlighting 
the extent of the suffering inflicted on civilians. In a studio introduction explaining the 
day’s most prominent news, BBC Arabic reports 
Starting with our breaking news in ‘The World this Evening’ where Human Rights Watch 
have announced that the Israeli Army during its military campaign on the Gaza Strip, have 
used bombs loaded with the incendiary chemical of white phosphorus in bombing 
populated areas including refugee camps. The Al-Nasr hospital in Khan Younis is packed 
with a number of casualties who suffer from severe burns as a result of injuries caused by 
what they described as white gas emitted from the bombs that were dropped nearby and 
this is what has been termed as the chemical of white phosphorus, also confirmed by 
specialists. The Israeli Army has also announced that three rockets and two mortar shells 
were fired into Southern Israel today, causing no injuries. One rocket fell on a house in 
the city of Ashkelon causing substantial material damage. Medical staff has confirmed 
that a number of citizens were treated from the shock (BBC Arabic 12th Jan 2009).      
اءدب انربخب سيئرلا ملاعلاب اذه ءاسملا ثيح تلاق ةمظنم نامويه زتير شتاو نأ شيجلا يلئارسلإا و للاخ هتلمح 
ةيركسعلا ىلع عاطق ةزغ مدختسا لبانق ةلمحم ةدامب روفسفلا ضيبلأا ةقراحلا يف فصق قطانم هلهأ ناكسلاب امب يف 
كلذ تاميخم نيئجلالا .و دق ظتكا ىفشتسم رصنلا يف ةنيدم ناخ سنوي ددعب نم ىحرجلا نيذلا نوناعي نم قورح 
ةريطخ ءارج مهتباصإ امب هوفصو زاغب ضيبأ ثعبنا نم لبانقلا يتلا تطقسأ برقلاب هنمم و وه ام قلطي هيلع هدامب 
روفسفلا ضيبلأا امك دكؤي نويئاصخلأا اذه .و دق نلعأ شيجلا يلئارسلإا نأ ٢ خيراوص و نيتفيذق نواه تقلطأ مويلا 
ىلع بونج ليئارسإ نكل يأ اهنم مل مل عقي يأ تاباصإ و طقس دحأ خيراوصلا ىلع لزنم يف هنيدم نلاقسع ةببسم 
رارضأ هيدام ةغلاب يف دحأ الزانمل و لاق نولماع يف لاجملا يبطلا نأ ددع نم ناكسلا جلوع نم ةمدصلا  
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The text indicates that Human Rights Watch have made clear that the Israeli army have 
used ‘bombs loaded with the incendiary chemical of white phosphorus’ to bomb 
‘populated areas including refugee camps’. It also explains that those affected have 
suffered ‘from severe burns as a result of injuries caused by […] white gas emitted from 
the bombs that were dropped’. The text above also indicates that the number of victims 
from white phosphorus is huge, given they have crowded the Al-Nasr hospital. In line 
with reporting these allegations, BBC Arabic simultaneously transmitted images depicting 
white phosphorus munitions in the skies of Gaza. Images 6.1 and 6.2, below, portrays 
white phosphorus shells as they burn spontaneously when they come in contact with air. 
In comparison to ‘on the ground’ images obtained from Al-Jazeera, such images convey 
the range and indiscriminate nature of the attacks. However, Images of phosphorus 
bombs illuminating the skies of Gaza, or close-ups of the incendiary substance it contains 
are rarely featured on BBC Arabic.        
                                     
 
 
Although BBC Arabic did include footage of severely burnt Palestinians receiving 
treatment in hospitals throughout the course of the war, it did not report that such burns 
were caused by white phosphorus. The audience is made aware that the casualties, 
regardless of the severity of their injuries, are the result of Israeli attacks, but the type of 
munitions used is rarely touched upon. Image 6.3 illustrates the picture transmitted by 
BBC Arabic when the journalist mentioned that victims of white phosphorus are being 
treated from severe burns ensued by the chemicals emitted from the bombs. It depicts 
an unconscious man receiving treatment at a hospital. The images can be, at best, 
described as neutral, possessing minimal emotions and unrepresentative of the reality of 
the suffering inflicted.         
Image 6.1: White phosphorus shells Image 6.2: white phosphorus shells falling 
on built-up areas in the Gaza Strip 
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Conclusion 
This chapter argues that visual representations of war deserves to be at the forefront of 
analysis in understanding how certain realities, narratives and ideologies are constructed 
in news discourse. It does not follow, however, that the visual is a mere substitute of the 
verbal. Rather it suggests that although the spoken word can have a supplementary, 
dramatic and more compelling effect on audiences than the written word, the visual 
brings a completely different dimension (Blair 2004). It adds sympathy and emotion to a 
news story and holds some kind of symbolism and narrative that is capable of making a 
powerful compelling case for its conclusion (ibid: 59). News coverage of casualties and 
human suffering is also an important area in war reporting, and one in which Israeli 
actions has received clear criticisms and scrutiny during the war (Philo and Berry 2011: 
362). 
One crucial point of contestation in the coverage of the proportionality of Israeli military 
action is whether there was deemed to be any intentionality behind the deaths of 
civilians in Gaza at the hands of the IDF. There is no question that all channels recognised 
the deaths of civilians as a regrettable and tragic consequence of the military incursion in 
Gaza, but the key point of contestation rested on whether these were sins of commission 
–the deliberate targeting of civilians –or omission –the collateral consequences of 
conducting intensive military action in highly populated urban environments. The last 
section, of the chapter, examined the manner in which such attacks were perpetrated. By 
exploring the types of weapons used in Israel’s war on Gaza, the chapter, managed to 
evaluate the extent to which putting civilians in harm’s way is a legitimate outcome of 
warfare.  
Image 6.3: Palestinian victim of WP shells 
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In terms of visual representation, the key message that came across all examined 
networks was that Palestinian civilians were paying the heaviest price of war. Al-Jazeera 
especially focused on children as the victims of the violence and continuously employed 
Palestinian civilians’ bewildered and hopeless voices to highlight the prevailing rhetoric of 
a war fought against civilians. AJE differentiated between incidents of ‘commission’ and 
those of ‘omission’, with its reporting aligned with statements issued by the International 
Community, often accusing Israel of violating International Humanitarian Law. However, 
it notes that when an Israeli attack against civilians is considered an ‘error’ or a ‘mistake’, 
it is usually the result of recklessness and irresponsibility. AJA, on the other hand, 
reported both incidents as deliberate attacks against the civilian population of Gaza and 
employed harsh terminology to describe Israeli actions. Its coverage categorised both the 
Samouni incident and that of the UNRWA school under ‘commission’ attacks claiming 
that such attacks intentionally targeted civilian installations. Both Al-Jazeera networks –
more so with AJA – incorporated graphic images to report on the use and effects of white 
phosphorus and explained that by deploying phosphorus bombs, Israel is in breach of the 
International Humanitarian Law and that of the Geneva Convention.       
Alternatively, BBC’s coverage although less explicit, demonstrates that images of civilian 
casualties are capable of dismantling a prevailing discourse of a war fought with an 
identified purpose against an identified enemy. BBC World’s coverage, in particular, 
proved to be the most interesting. Although BBC journalists were very critical and quite 
open in relation to civilian casualties, such criticisms were normally accompanied by 
Israeli accounts on the matter; and it usually concludes that all incidents involving civilian 
fatalities are unintended but rather retaliatory. It admits that some deaths are 
unfortunate but are the result of a mistake in judgement. Remarkably, when the 
proportionality of suffering and despair is compounded, the legitimacy attributed by BBC 
World to the Israeli army is eroded. It shifts from undoubtedly rationalising Israeli tactics 
to publicly and overtly condemning them. BBC Arabic continuously equated the suffering 
and damage inflicted on both sides of the conflict, yet generally acknowledged that the 
human and material harm induced on Palestinians is far more comprehensible than that 
induced on Israelis. The Samouni and UNRWA school incidents are reported as 
‘accidents’, yet Israeli tactics are all the same criticised. Because Israeli accounts are 
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rarely challenged on BBC, the focus of the criticism is on the manner in which the Israeli 
army have conducted their attacks or on whether or not such attacks are 
disproportionate or unwarranted (Philo and Berry 2011). 
In general, across AJ, it is apparent that one single event is presented as simply the latest 
moment in an on-going, repetitive conflict. This schematic understanding –in which the 
Israelis and Palestinians are acting in habitual ways –perhaps goes some way to explain a 
‘bias’ towards a Palestinian understanding of the conflict represented in AJ (most notably 
AJA). In AJA’s case, it suggests that Israeli acts (or ‘aggression’) are firmly embedded 
within its audience; therefore, there’s a reduced need for corroborating evidence. The 
journalistic evidential support for arguing that Israel is the ‘aggressor’ is built up over 
successive reports. The BBC, on the other hand, seem to report each event as an enclosed 
story, decontextualised through ongoing legal positions (aggressor, defender) and the 
overall schematic understanding of the conflict –related to a wider conflict, but still 
discrete, with participants, a start and a finish. In short, there is no evidence of any 
entailment of ongoing contestation or conflict over meanings and interpretations. This 
claim is signalled linguistically in varying positions of single/continuation of state nouns, 
verbs and adverbs; such as ‘once again’, ‘comes as a continuation’, and ‘one of the 
bloodiest days yet’ on AJ as opposed to distinct stories on the BBC. 
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Chapter 7 
‘Public recollections of Gaza’: a comparative study of Jordanian and British 
audiences 
 
Introduction 
The previous empirical chapters have provided a detailed content analysis of the media 
coverage of the Gaza conflict which consisted of a thorough assessment of the dominant 
themes, prominent actors and lexicons used during a succession of new reports across Al-
Jazeera and the BBC. These chapters also presented a close analysis of the talk and visuals 
employed by the examined networks. The intention was to study how key themes surface 
in news reporting and subsequently to discover how such ‘themes relate to processes of 
understanding and belief in audiences’ (Philo 1990: 171). They also aimed to investigate 
how media messages are further processed to shape and develop news stories. From this 
it was possible to pinpoint the dominant readings and understandings of the Gaza War in 
news accounts and to ‘make some predictions about audience understanding and the 
power of different messages’ (Philo et al. 1999: 214).  With this in mind, this chapter 
presents a detailed account of audiences’ beliefs and perceptions of the war.    
The Glasgow Media Group, in a series of studies, have argued that focus groups can make 
known the key themes of the social ideologies that audiences attain and understand from 
news messages (Philo 1990; Eldridge 1995; Philo and Berry 2004). It is claimed that a 
clear correlation exists between some themes as they develop in the news and what 
information is understood and retained by the audience. Clearly, not all news reports 
present ‘a single, coherent way of interpreting events and not all audiences would accept 
the preferred interpretations. The news may offer contradictory accounts, or be 
confusing or simply irrelevant to the audience’ (Philo 1990: 162). Therefore, it is 
important to acknowledge that differences in political culture and class experience 
amongst audiences often have a substantial influence on the manner in which news texts 
are interpreted and evaluated (Philo 1990:  133). The analysis, in this respect, takes into 
consideration the social, cognitive and political contexts of public understanding.  
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Morley (1981) argues that ‘members of a given subculture will tend to shape a cultural 
orientation towards decoding messages in particular ways. Their individual “readings” of 
messages will be framed by shared cultural formations and practices’ (1981: 51). He 
categorised such audiences’ decoding into three crucial readings: Oppositional (counter-
hegemonic) reading, Negotiated reading, and Dominant (hegemonic) reading. In a similar 
manner, and in relation to the war on Gaza, the focus groups that were conducted can be 
classified under three main categories: participants with pre-existing beliefs or ‘political 
biases’, participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict and participants with a 
cultural awareness of the conflict (see figure 7.1). Adopting Morley’s ‘hypothetical 
positions’ with minor adaptations, the following chapter makes clear that the 
participants’ individual readings of news texts implemented an oppositional reading, a 
dominant reading (Morley, 1981) and, what  I refer to as, a subliminal reading.  
In simple terms the ‘ways of understanding’ or the interpretive frameworks of audiences 
are seen as relating to varying perspectives and practices in the society as a whole. It is 
assumed that while this chapter holds constant the variable of ethnicity by placing 
comparisons between Jordan and the UK, different groups within the same audience 
(Jordanian or British) also have varying interpretations of media messages analogous with 
their class positions, cultural assumptions (Philo 1990: 7) and proximity to the conflict. In 
this manner, diversity acts as a crucial vehicle in augmenting understandings of 
audiences’ associations with the media. Diversity here – does not solely relate to 
differences in media consumption, reader ‘selectivity’ and conflicting information from 
various news networks – it relates to ‘people’s social, political and personal positions and 
identifications’ (Kitzinger 1999: 13). 
The theoretical sampling adopted by this study in selecting the research participants for 
the focus group data, introduced in Chapter 3, placed a priori-assumptions on the likely 
positions of the divergent groups in relation to the Gaza war. It mapped participants’ 
mediated proximities to the conflict against their social class positions (see figure 3.1). 
Such approach in sampling is able to distinguish the extent to which oppositional, 
subliminal or dominant readings of news reports were evident in the reception of the 
various news content.   
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1. Oppositional (Counter-hegemonic) reading: readers (or participants) with pre-existing 
beliefs and political biases of the Gaza war. Participants come from both Jordan and the 
UK. Firsthand experience, personal political orientations and cultural proximity are 
imperative factors in defining dynamics of media perception and belief. In this case, the 
reader rejects the dominant preferred reading of media messages bringing to bear an 
alternative frame of interpretation (Morley 1981). 
Focus group participants include: Jews Against Zionism (JAZ) organisation (UK), 
Loughborough University Jewish Society (UK), Gaza Refugee Camp university students 
(Jordan), and Gaza Refugee Camp (age group 35 – 50) 
2. Subliminal/subconscious reading: this included participants with no-prior knowledge to 
the conflict. All participants come from the UK. Perceptions and ideologies are 
subconsciously formed by the media in which analogies are informed by stereotyped 
supposition towards people and organisations (Kitzinger 2000: 78)  
Focus group participants include: Loughborough University undergraduate students (UK) 
and a group of cleaning staff (UK) 
3. Dominant (hegemonic) reading: this included participants with cultural awareness of the 
conflict. All participants come from Jordan. Participants relied on media that confirmed 
their beliefs and opinions and provided them with information that they felt should be 
prioritised. Such groups were ready to accept the (certain) media’s preferred readings, its 
meaning system of values, attitudes, beliefs and assumptions (Morley 1981). 
Focus group participants include: a group of school teachers (Jordan), a group of under-
privileged university students (Jordan), a group of upper/middle class university student 
(Jordan), and a group of cleaning staff (Jordan). 
  
Figure 7.1: a summary of the participants’ readings of the Gaza conflict 
 
Oppositional (Counter-hegemonic) reading: participants with pre-existing beliefs or 
political ‘biases’  
There is of course a cultural basis to perception in the sense that what people see and 
understand in media messages depend upon their pre-existing beliefs or political ‘bias’ 
(Philo 1990: 6). It is problematic to assume that audiences’ beliefs and understandings of 
global issues are simply the result of what they are told by the media. That said, it is 
equally simplistic to believe that audiences’ understanding of new information is directly 
and solely related to pre-existing cultural and political assumptions (Philo 1990: 6-7).This 
reflects one of the key findings here, that firsthand experience can have a crucial 
influence on how new information from the media is digested. Such direct experience, 
along with political orientation, class, and cultural proximity, were imperative factors in 
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differentiating dynamics of perception and belief (Philo 1990: 154). Thus it is important to 
distinguish between what is taken from the media as opposed to what is thought to be 
pre-existing systems of belief. Group interactions and conversations can operate in what 
Philo describes as a ‘projective set’ or a as a ‘re-enactment test’, by which he means  
…projective set (i.e. reproducing the beliefs of the group members about events in 
the [war]) or as a re-enactment test (i.e. representing what they believed the 
television account would be) (Philo 1990: 12). 
In a focus group with the organisation ‘Jews against Zionism’ (JAZ) in London, participants 
employed a sense of sarcasm when discussing the media coverage of the Gaza conflict, as 
one participant elaborated “I find I have to be really satirical and ironic because the 
alternative is to be so angry and despairing” (P1 JAZ, UK). Take the following exchange for 
example: 
P1: it is very difficult to understand how a cow threatens Israel’s security but… 
P4: a Palestinian cow can 
P2: [Laughs] they’ve been called Muslim cows 
P1: well yes! 
P4: There are Christians in Gaza 
P2: Christian cows then [laughs] 
P1: yeah, there you go! (Inaudible) 
P4: probably they said it was a regretful accident 
P1: yes absolutely! 
 
The key term here is ‘regretful accidents’, in which the same group expressed that Israeli 
attacks on Gaza are continuously justified as the collateral consequence of conducting 
intensive military action in highly populated urban environments. On the topic of white 
phosphorus, for example, the participants concluded that Israel’s position regarding any 
incident is rationalised as ‘either [they] didn’t use it, or [they] didn’t mean to do it, or it 
was an accident (P3, JAZ): 
 
P3: so what sanctions can there be against countries who use power to destroy civilians, or is 
it just war? Is this what war is? 
P2: NO no, they just said they didn’t do it! 
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P4: they didn’t say we didn’t do it, they said we didn’t use weapons inappropriately. They said 
they only used white phosphorus in areas where it was allowed. They said they didn’t use it 
intentionally on civilians. 
P3: but they did also use it in Beirut! 
P4: they claim the reason they did use it is to create smokes screen to allow them to operate 
P3: Oh my God! 
P5: but that’s what they say all the time even when bombing a school run by the United 
Nations. IT WAS A MISTAKE!!  
 
Other groups, including the Jewish Society at Loughborough University, explained that 
their personal accounts and experiences with the conflict showed that ‘people can’t really 
form their own opinion unless they’ve been given the actual facts and the media don’t 
actually allow people to come up with their own conclusions’. Another participant 
anticipated that ‘there is much more happening than what is being told to us by the 
media, A LOT MORE, I’ve been speaking to my friends in Israel’, this is echoed by a further 
participant who questions the media’s credibility by saying: ‘I don’t understand how the 
BBC can give media coverage about something very specific when they don’t even have 
access to the area when they are not allowed into the area, you just see them standing 
on a mountain like in Jerusalem with a camera that doesn’t help anything of course they 
are talking about something that they don’t even know about and they can’t get in to 
know more about it’. Crucial information that some members of the group claim to be 
missing from the coverage includes Hamas’s ‘misfortunate use of civilians as human 
shields’ (Loughborough University Jewish Society, UK): 
P2: Israel fired into Gaza and that’s unfortunately the one thing that Israel should not have 
done 
P4: but the reason Israel did that is because the Palestinian side refused to renew the 
ceasefire 
P1: well that claim that Israel broke the ceasefire umm I don’t know, Israel claims the 
opposite but in my opinion there never actually was a ceasefire in the first place because part 
of the agreement of the ceasefire was that Hamas should stop firing rockets which they never 
did. Stopping the rearmament for Hamas was also part of the agreement but Israel discovered 
tunnels that has been done […] and I am completely sure that that’s what made them go in 
and completely destroy the ceasefire which started the whole massive conflict 
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P3: but you do know that those tunnels are not just for weapons? They are also used to 
import essential goods into Gaza 
P1: it doesn’t really matter who broke the ceasefire what matters is that when you have an 
organisation like Hamas that have a political agenda or structure who can hide in civilian 
neighbourhoods, they just don’t give a crap! 
P5: exactly, and the issue about the number of dead. The reason behind it is because Israel 
takes care of its people […] whereas the Palestinians or Hamas use civilians as human shields. 
P1: certainly, and what Hamas does to its people doesn’t really get into the news. But what 
gets to the news is Israel using white phosphorus bombs but the fact that it is used to create 
smoke screens which actually doesn’t break any warfare agreements.   
 
One participant with opposing political ideologies similarly argued: ‘I can assume because 
I have a conspiracy theory mentality that there were loads of statements that I wasn’t 
allowed to see’ (JAZ, UK). She added, 
What I have to say is that we have been talking about what we know but I haven’t got this 
from the BBC or from ITV or from most of the press which is timid or frightened. I go to 
meetings, I listen to witnesses and I read the internet and if we’re looking at media or what 
the media are telling us; this isn’t what the media are telling me, WHAT THE MEDIA IS 
TELLING ME IS MARC REGEV um and I want to throttle that man 
Doubting television news was apparent in almost all groups with direct involvement or 
close sympathy with the dispute. JAZ participants explained that it is not surprising that 
Israel has strategic plans and ‘a manipulative propaganda in justifying its militaristic 
aggression against the Gaza population’. One participant satirically argued: ‘if I was a 
military society and the whole of my culture and morality and power was based on the 
military society I WOULD HAVE PLANS ready to swing into action’ (JAZ, UK). And while 
this was followed by a general chorus of approval from the group, they were astonished 
with the role the media played in reporting the assaults against Gaza. In that they argued 
that any criticism at Israel is directly silenced by the media as an act of anti-Semitism: 
P3: but what was surprising was the media accepting the rubbish that Israel…  
P1: but why did they media accept without WITHOUT any equivocation the lies that Israel 
prompts? 
P2: I am pretty sure its racism, I certainly see it as racism! 
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The notion of racism was further contested by the participants who explained that it is 
‘absolutely necessary that Israel should be seen to be shining white and Hamas should be 
painted in the most terrible colours because they have absolutely continued to create or 
continued to recreate a situation where no resolution can happen because Hamas are the 
terrorists that nobody is prepared to talk to’ (JAZ, UK). The participants also spoke about, 
what they termed, ‘a white mentality’: 
P3: you see this is why it’s quite racism to me which is why would they believe Israel? Because 
Israel is shinning white, Israel is a European country 
Everyone: Yes 
P3: right? And why would they believe Arabs, who are not white they are much darker brown 
than anybody else they are presumably they would know no truth. I mean I hope the tape 
would get that I am being satirical 
P2: so to support Israel now because they are slightly whiter than some Arab communities 
seem to be quite reasonable for people who’s got a white mentality 
The participants continued to criticise the media and explained that it is not only that 
‘Israel is shining white’ but ‘they are at least not as bad as Hamas’ (JAZ, UK). Images of 
corpses covered with Hamas’s political agenda colours, the participants explained, are 
employed by the media in order to portray Palestine as a country ‘full of very political 
fanatical Arab Islamists’, and that people with white mentalities ‘should be careful of 
them and shouldn’t trust them even, as they all look like terrorists’ (JAZ, UK). On the 
other hand, groups with different political ideologies see the conflict as ‘over reported’ 
(Jewish Society, UK). They claim that ‘there are a lot of conflicts going on around the 
world that are probably in a more serious and terrible condition and there’s absolutely 
nothing about that on the news’ (Jewish Society, UK): 
P1: like how many times was it front page news when there is I mean Israel has got the 
precedence when is all these other things happening no other country has gone through like 
what Israel is going through but all the things that Israel has been called like the massacre and 
Palestinians calling it names there are a lot of things going on all over the world that are 
probably in a more serious or terrible condition and there’s absolutely nothing about that on 
the news.  
P3: yeah like the Congo 
P1: it’s just ridiculously over the top because 
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P3: no body values killing innocent people as well it’s more of why show it and how you show 
it  
P4: it would be interesting to find out how Israel at the moment in all conflict zones in the 
world how Israel relates how that comes up I would think it would be one of the safest 
conflict zones to go into at the moment considering you know you have absolute chaos in 
Africa where no reporter would dare to go there 
 
The group indicated that despite this over-saturation of news on the conflict, the media is 
rather low on facts and provides minimal justifications to elaborate Israeli actions. They 
explained that there was no reasoning behind Israel’s attack on the UNRWA school in 
Jabalya, with one participant commenting, ‘yeah there’s no reasoning behind it it’s like it 
blew up a school or it blew up a UN building using white phosphorous on civilians its 
seems to me there’s more to it than that’, and another suggesting that ‘It might be what 
actually happened but there’s always a justified reason to [Israel’s] actions’ (Jewish 
society, UK). Such consensus among the group was developed after one member stated 
that the ‘BBC was supposed to have a better coverage than it did’: 
 P2: it was pretty bad, wasn’t it? 
 P3: pretty awful 
P2: it is really like more emotional they bring more emotional arguments that don’t appeal to 
people’s intelligence, it is just like okay fair enough maybe that’s what the media needs to do 
to pull this thing and capture and make you cry okay. But how are we going to solve it? It is 
not going to come from people crying and you know fighting it is going to come from 
intelligence, building up some kind of infrastructure and seeing its future. In achieving that, 
the media is really bad. It is doing the complete opposite. 
 
Generally, groups with pre-existing political biases and cultural orientations disregarded 
mainstream TV and opted for alternative means of information such as emails, blogs (and 
the internet generally), radio, and ‘trusted’ information from friends and family. This is 
also evident in the questionnaire analysis (provided in Appendix D) in which group 
members in this category were the least likely to select television news as their main 
source of information during the conflict. According to the participants in focus groups 
conducted in Jordan, Al-Jazeera, Al-Aqsa and Al-Manar television stations were also 
considered reliable sources of information.      
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Audiences with political ideologies or preferences derive meanings from what Fiske calls 
the ‘discourse of the reader’. By that he means ‘a language or system of representation 
that has developed socially in order to make and circulate a coherent set of meanings, 
which serve the interests of a section of society’ (1987: 14 cited in Philo 1990: 192). When 
asked about whether the participants thought Gaza was undergoing a humanitarian 
crisis, a JAZ member not only accused the media of creating uncertainty and distortion, 
but argued that the use of the term itself held ideological implications: 
I have difficulty with the term, I mean there’s a huge crisis of means of existence in a sense 
humanitarian crisis almost equates it to the natural disasters that happens elsewhere but this 
is entirely human caused and I don’t really like to call it humanitarian crisis it’s almost 
genocide, it’s an act of deliberate aggression against a population that I just don’t think 
humanitarian crisis is the right term really!   
He explained that ‘there is a huge lack of resources, lack of means of existence’, that ‘it’s 
man-made’. Humanitarian crisis, he illustrated, cannot be resolved ‘by bringing more and 
more money in and food and tell [Gazans] things will go back to normal. The term 
humanitarian crisis suggests that all the things happening are money resolvable’. ‘It 
implies something that has suddenly happened when the oppression has been going on 
for so long’. One participant expressed that the best word to use is ‘appeasement’ 
because she clarified: ‘the expression humanitarian makes it seem like an act of God, 
that’s what you do after fire, after floods’ (JAZ, UK). Similarly, in one of the groups at the 
Gaza Refugee camp a participant indicated that the phrase ‘crisis’ is an understatement 
and explained that Arabs and Palestinians would prefer the term ‘humanitarian 
catastrophe’. In justifying this stance he argued, 
as we have seen through the media and through television screens, millions have seen the 
situation in Gaza how people were being displaced from their homes...children…women…old 
people… these sectors were the target of this war although the Israeli army announced that 
its war is against Hamas. But the reality is different. We have seen through the media houses 
being demolished over its inhabitants…we’ve seen women children and old men dead or let’s 
say martyred and wounded to an extent that made them flee and seek refuge in the UNRWA 
schools provided in the Gaza Strip. Even the latter, those UNRWA schools didn’t escape the 
Israeli aggression. Israel followed civilians even to those schools (Gaza Refugee Camp students 
–Jordan)      
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Another participant explained that to him ‘it’s not a crisis nor a catastrophe’ since such 
descriptions act ‘in Israel’s favour, they circumvent Israel from responsibility or blame, 
they will justify this by saying ‘it’s a battlefield, it’s a combat area and losses are 
unfortunate but expected, it’s the cost of war’. On a different level, expressions such as 
‘shaheed’ (martyr) also suggest a readers’ discourse approach –in which the news 
discourse is tailored to match the expectations of the audience. Not only did all 
participant groups in Jordan disregard television channels that referred to Palestinian 
victims as ‘dead’ rather than ‘martyrs’, but they also refrained from using any phrase 
other than martyr within the group discussions. One participant accused BBC Arabic of 
being ant-Palestinian: ‘it was clear from its coverage, I mean the average person would 
say shaheed and they say dead’ (Gaza Refugee Camp – Jordan). BBC Arabic, they claimed, 
‘didn’t portray the death inflicted or the martyrs and of course they refer to the martyrs 
as dead unlike Al-Jazeera who refers to them as martyrs’ (Gaza Refugee Camp, Jordan). 
Participants explained that BBC Arabic’s coverage ‘didn’t satisfy the Arab or Muslim 
consciousnesses’. Participants also indicated that Arab media should be synonymous in 
its struggle to convey cultural unity in its coverage:    
I don’t know how but Al-Jazeera used to say ‘shaheed (martyr)’ and Al-Arabiya used to say 
‘dead’ this is unbelievable, as Arabs these television stations should agree on one term. Al-
Jazeera crew and the Al-Arabiya crew have different opinions even when reporting on the role 
of Hamas in Gaza (Gaza Refugee Camp Students, Jordan).    
The fact that victims are labelled shaheeds transforms them into a national or a cultural 
symbol. Audiences with counter-hegemonic readings of media texts view the media as a 
single site in this struggle of establishing dominance of varying ways of understanding. 
Such groups appear to judge the news media without nuance –reports and reporters are 
not viewed as good or bad, and distressing stories are not judged by how well they are 
told by a reporter; instead, they allege to a uniformity of coverage and in turn a 
uniformity of ideological messages. This is evident in how controversial terms are defined 
in the media. One example is, ‘martyr’ as opposed to ‘dead’, other more controversial 
terminology includes whether a ‘suicide bomber’ is to be called a ‘terrorist’ or a ‘freedom 
fighter’. In a ‘word association’ group exercise designed to tape participants 
understandings of certain terminology used by the media in covering the Arab-Israeli 
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conflict, participants with up-held political biases provided a reader’s discourse 
interpretation of certain acts and actors –associating the term Palestine/Palestinian, for 
example, with political, ideological and cultural terminology; these included: ‘motherland 
of martyrs’, ‘heroes’, and ‘innocent civilians’ ‘robbed of their lands’. The ‘1967’and ‘1948’ 
wars were referred to as disastrous, catastrophic, and delusional. Terms such as ‘Israeli 
settlers’ and ‘Zionists’ attracted negative connotations from the participants – those 
included ‘criminals’, ‘racist violent thieves’, ‘colonists’ and ‘Nazis’ (to name a few). 
‘Suicide bomber’, on the other hand received both positive and negative connotations by 
the participants; seen as a ‘heroic act’ on one end and a ‘fundamentalist’ act on the other 
(see Appendix E for a list of terms defined by the participants).     
To conclude, participants with existing political biases have their beliefs produced and 
contested in the conflict between politics, culture and technology (be it mainstream 
media or alternative media). It is, therefore, important to understand that non-television 
meanings are dominant enough and in some cases predominant enough to replace media 
messages (Hodge and Tripp 1986). However, although a clear cultural and political 
dimension to perception and belief exists, media messages are still capable of forming 
certain lines of interpretations amongst audiences. 
 
Subliminal (subconscious) readings: Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Social historians argue that it is important to understand that records of historical events 
are not simply ‘innocent acts of memory’, but are rather ‘attempts to persuade, [and] to 
shape the memory of others’ (Burke, 1997: 47 cited in Kitzinger 2000: 78). Historians and 
political scientists also note that history should in itself be processed more reflectively. It 
is also advised that audiences should systematically separate the ‘‘known’ from the 
‘unclear’ from the ‘presumed’’ and routinely differentiate between retrospective 
historical events and prospective events (Neustadt and May, 1988: 40 cited in Kitzinger 
2000: 78). McQuail also explains that the effect of the media on individuals is not 
necessarily a direct one but may have certainly been imprinted in their conscious in the 
past. He adds that ‘the media provide the materials for responding to experience and 
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these accumulate over time in a long-term process of socialisation’ (1977: 76 cited in 
Philo 1990:  5).  
While the previous section illustrated that audiences with held political biases are almost 
always ready to oppose dominant media messages, it is important to note that texts are 
read differently by ‘differently situated social audiences’ (Fiske 1987: 64). In some 
situations, as is evident in this study’s UK participants, ‘the dominant ideology exerts 
considerable, if not total, influence over its ideological structure and therefore over its 
reader’ (ibid: 50). In a similar manner, Morley also points that differently situated 
audiences experience varying reading from a text, in which he explains that ‘the reader 
produces meanings that derive from the intersection of his/her social history with the 
social forces structured into the text’ (1987a: 82 cited in Philo 1990:  191). Participants 
with no prior knowledge to the conflict had their beliefs and perceptions framed by 
subliminal ‘media templates’ (Kitzinger 2000) and/or ‘news icons’ (Bennett and Lawrence 
1995). 
When television received no criticism, participants were more accepting of its accounts. 
Groups with no prior knowledge to the conflict had their ideas and understandings 
formed by the news media they watched. Despite the fact that the participants were 
unaware that the conflict took place, they were able to apply their pre-existing 
knowledge, mainly from news media, of previous conflicts in the Middle East to form 
their own dynamics of events. One participant, in a group of students from Loughborough 
University, asked if ‘Gaza [is] in Russia’ to then be interrupted by another participant who 
said ‘in Russia, no Gaza is in Israel’ (University students, UK). Other groups suspected 
Gaza is ‘a country that borders Pakistan that is just out of Afghanistan’ (Cleaning staff, 
UK). Such a lack of understanding was the general trend in those groups. During a session 
with a group of cleaning staff in the UK, one Participant articulated ‘I remember it on the 
news, they were always fighting…the Gaza Strip is fighting…but I didn’t know exactly 
whether Gaza is a place a person I don’t know’ (Cleaning staff, UK). Another participant, 
from the same group, while discussing Al-Jazeera suggested: ‘I’m sure I’ve heard about it 
[Al-Jazeera] but I don’t know what it is…is it like another terrorist group’ (Cleaning staff, 
UK). Of note here, the participant confused Al-Jazeera with Al-Qaeda, so when asked why 
she thought so, she replied ‘they all sound the same, Al-Jazeera Al-Qaeda frightening 
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names I don’t know could it be a religion’ (Cleaning staff, UK). This suggests that despite 
the vast amount of coverage identified in this study, participants in this category have 
very little knowledge of events or interest in them. One way of interpreting this, is by 
acknowledging Hass’s (1996) argument that the nations we live in have become a two-
media system:  
Our society is awash in specialized information (including foreign news) available 
to those who have the time, interest, money, and education to take advantage of 
it. The other society encompasses the vast majority of […], who devote limited 
attention to subjects far removed from their necessary concerns (again foreign 
news). They are content to turn to the top stories of television networks’ evening 
news programs and their community’s daily newspapers for the information 
(1996: 8 cited in Hachten and Scotton 2006: 10). 
In addition, van Ginneken’s (1998) cognitive theory for the ‘creation of the world’ suggest 
that audiences tend to expose themselves by perceiving, retaining and reproducing 
information about ‘other’ cultures and social systems to which they make sense of. 
Second, they tend to ‘fit this information about other people and groups into 
configurations which are meaningful in [their] own group’ (van Ginneken 1998:  197). 
Thus the power of the media is able to place people and events into existing categories of 
hero, villain, good and bad, by investing their stories with the authority of mythological 
truth (Bird et al. 1997: 345). Hall (1975) argues that news writing is a “social transaction” 
that picks up on existing cultural conventions (cited in Bird et al. 1997: 345). Even groups 
with deeper understanding of the conflict and its contextual background saw the media 
as reflecting complex issues about the politics of representation, identifications and 
categorisations. As one JAZ member put it, 
So we’re talking about what we know and I am putting myself in a position of somebody who 
sees (pointing at one of the pictures) lots of corpses covered in what I think what the media 
are trying to tell me are Hamas political agenda colours….[and] that this country is full of very 
political fanatical Arab Islamists who don’t look ordinary, they don’t look like us 
This claim was demonstrated in the very next focus group that was conducted, during 
which a less informed group on the conflict was provided with the same pictures, and 
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participants were asked to tell between Palestinians and Israelis. This generated an 
interesting dialogue with one participant commenting, ‘well I think I wouldn’t be able to 
say which are the Palestinians and which are the Israelis but looking at this picture I 
would think they are Muslim, but there I’m being racist, I don’t know’. Similarly, 
participants in a separate group saw Muslims as ‘always fighting, always shooting always 
in trouble’ (Cleaning staff, UK).   
One explanation for this, as was discussed by the participants, is the potential difference 
in the manner in which British audiences relate to foreign news, as opposed to news 
directly linked to them. Philo, in his study on the miner’s strike, gives the example of 
testing American audiences, who had not been in Britain at the time of the strike, he 
asserts, 
They attempted the news-writing exercise using the same pictures. Only one of 
twenty-eight people could identify a picture of Arthur Scargill and in general they 
had very little prior knowledge of the issues involved…All that they could 
remember were scenes of violence, and they said that this would have been the 
content of the story or it would not be shown in the US. (Philo 1990: 134) 
Participants, in this study, had similar views and stated that if the news did not affect 
them or their nation on a personal level, it was of no significance to them.   
P1: …unless someone from Britain is directly involved in it, unless someone from our country 
have been harmed or hurt. [Laughs] l know this quite bad but say if a soldier from England is 
taken as a prisoner we would hear loads about it but that’s it really, we don’t get much about 
other issues 
P1: well if it is only in the background it is in the background 
P4: you don’t really feel engaged unless it’s affecting you personally; it doesn’t really get you 
involved or gets you engaged. It gives you a sense of foreignness 
P3: and it depends on how they put it on the news as well like if they portray it to be as a 
really really big thing, like the main headline then the news forces you to pay attention to 
it. It would have a bigger impact I would think.  
P2: it surprises me that this is really going on. It’s so sad (Loughborough University students, 
UK)  
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Although participants in this category acknowledge their lack of understanding and 
knowledge on the conflict (demonstrated in the questionnaire analysis in Appendix D, in 
which almost half of the participants admitted they have never heard about the conflict 
before), they still praise the role the British media plays in covering foreign and current 
affair news: ‘the British media covers a lot, I would say the coverage is excellent, they do 
put a lot of effort to cover international news’ (Cleaning staff, UK). The reason 
participants have minimal or no understanding of the war, they claim, is because they 
‘don’t tend to watch it’ (Cleaning staff, UK). One perspective critic, Trevor Pateman, 
indicated that whereas British audiences have no trouble accepting that foreign news 
services are ‘faulty, biased or distorted’, the same judgment is not mirrored to ‘our’ news 
stations. He elaborates that this privileged assumption that British news is the best and is 
credible, ‘rests upon an unstated nationalism which historically is only made credible by 
the BBC’s role during World War II (1974 cited in Eldridge 1995: 42). 
In short, the manner in which the participants processed these media messages mirrored 
what Kitzinger (2000) terms ‘media templates’. Templates, Kitzinger explains, serve as 
‘rhetorical shorthand’ to make sense of prospective news stories. They act as a crucial 
site for media power, helping audiences make sense of the world and providing context 
for past, present and future events. The paradigmatic examples and categorisations 
which accompany any particular news story – in the case of this study associating Islam 
with terrorism, September 11 and 7/7 (see Appendix E) for example – can come to seem 
ordinary and predictable. It appeared like every new conflict might be more readily 
received by passive audiences since the images ‘fitted’ their existing perceptions and 
beliefs. Focus groups in this category explored people’s memories and spontaneous 
associations in relation to retrospective events and conflicts. The process in which media 
messages are subliminally engraved into people’s consciousness promotes one tail of the 
narrative, filtering out other dissenting accounts and obscuring contradictory facts (ibid: 
76).           
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Dominant (Hegemonic) readings: Participants with cultural awareness of the conflict 
As the previous section implied, ‘differently situated social audiences’ can have different 
interpretations of the same media text. Participants, displaying a dominant reading can 
be best described as sharing a cultural proximity in the sources consumed and the ones 
considered most reliable, as well as a joint understanding of the events in question. 
Participants classified as having a hegemonic reading of news texts come from Jordanian 
nationalities. This suggests that the content and the viewer exist in the same “cultural 
linguistic" (Straubhaar, 2003 cited in Ksiazek and Webster 2008: 486) or “geo-linguistic” 
(Cunningham, Jacka, & Sinclair, 1998; Straubhaar, 2003 cited in Ksiazek and Webster 
2008: 486) space, thereby producing a content that best resonates with the cultural 
dispositions of the audience (Ksiazek and Webster 2008: 486). These audiences mainly 
opt for broadcasters that reaffirm their beliefs and opinions and provide them with 
information that they feel should be prioritised. Therefore the term ‘dominant reading’, 
in this respect, does not explicitly imply that audiences are passive, –‘empty vessels’ 
waiting to be fed by the communicator’s reflection of reality. Rather, participants share 
certain networks’ (namely Al-Jazeera, Al-Manar and Al-Aqsa television stations) systems 
of beliefs, values and assumptions and fully accept these (particular) networks’ ‘preferred 
readings’ (Morley, 1981). In short, texts only function in a one-dimensional process when 
the viewers develop a trustworthy relationship with a given network. Al-Jazeera has, for 
example, created a form of ‘cohesiveness’ amongst its audiences –in which its audience 
relies heavily on its coverage of both regional and international news (Fahmy and 
Johnson 2011: 248). 
Participants belonging to this category implemented three crucial standpoints on which 
they based their discussions. First, audiences expressed support for the use of graphic 
visuals depicting human suffering and death. Second, participants saw the war as 
‘religious’ rather than ‘political’ –a war they contend is between Muslims and Jews. 
Finally, away from the happenings of the conflict, the participants shared anecdotes of 
historical BBC radio or what they termed the ‘Huna London’ (this is London) days.         
The debate about where to draw the line, whether to show graphic imagery, or what type 
of graphic scenes from the frontlines are deemed acceptable (or ethical) – in daily 
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television coverage – is at the forefront of media studies. Whilst several scholars and 
governments have criticised the graphic nature of some pan-Arab news content (Fahmy 
and Johnson 2011) suggesting it defies issues of taste and decency, it is also claimed that 
different nationalities have different sensibilities about showing death. This study found 
that the Jordanian participants interviewed, overwhelmingly support Al-Jazeera’s strategy 
of broadcasting graphic imagery. Participants argued that graphic images of the dead are 
crucial to reflect reality and to bring home to the audience how particularly bad a 
situation is, believing that not doing so would be an interference with reality. This 
supports Taylor’s argument that ‘the absence of horror in the representation of real 
events indicates not propriety so much as a potentially dangerous poverty of knowledge 
among news readers’ (1998: 11). One participant said: 
I mean this is reality isn’t it, this is what war is isn’t it? Wars are not just about crying, wars are 
about blood, corpses and torn bodies about wounded people and corpses under the rubble 
isn’t this what war is? Isn’t this what phosphorus shells are capable of doing or what airplanes 
do or what the destruction does, this is the reality of war (Cleaning staff, Jordan)?       
Similarly university students explained that ‘graphic imagery reflects a true picture of the 
reality on the ground’ (middle/upper class university students, Jordan). They also argued 
that it is ‘the best means to convey to the audience what is actually happening in Gaza’. 
The images in themselves, they claim, ‘are self explanatory’. The most effective technique 
generating sympathy from the audience, the participants explained, is through the 
representation of children as ‘the victims of war’. One participant indicated that ‘the 
media mostly focused on children which left a huge impact […] watching the children 
suffer [was] very painful’ (under-privileged university students, Jordan). One teacher 
praised Arab media networks by indicating that it has done a ‘superb job’ in the portrayal 
of victimised children in the war. She asserted, 
The most obvious advantage the Arab media had in its coverage is the portrayal of children 
they transmitted stories about their lives and the realities they lived in. This indeed had a 
great impact on people’s emotions around the world. I mean everyone sympathised with 
Gaza based on those real-life stories those children narrated which reflected the extent of 
those children’s national patriotism and belonging to the region. This was reflected through 
the terminology they used, through self-confidence, bravery and challenge. This aspect of the 
coverage, I mean children, was wonderful. 
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Ayish (2001) in a study of transnational media of the Arab world concluded that the 
portrayal of graphic images depicting human suffering aroused a national sentiment of 
issues related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Participants found themselves recalling 
the events of the war through the images that were transmitted to them in their living 
rooms. One participant recalled, ‘the young boy that was blinded by phosphorus bombs 
when shells fell on his eyes and brunt his face’ (cleaning staff, Jordan) whist another 
participant remembered ‘the girl [whose] body was stuck under the rubble and her 
innocent face had dried blood all over it’ (teachers, Jordan). The results also support the 
claim that audience members ‘seek out displays of violence even though they expect to 
be shocked or disgusted because it serves a socially valuable function’ (Zillmann 1998 
cited in Fahmy and Johnson 2011: 258). For example, the participants believed that if 
they were denied access to such images they ‘won’t be able to feel and sympathise with 
their brothers and sisters in Palestine’ (under-privileged university students, Jordan). The 
same participant explained, 
The graphic images are hugely effective I mean when I see an image of a young boy burnt as a 
result of white phosphorus bombs I lose my temper it makes me angry, everyone gets furious. 
It was also noted that although graphic images might have a disturbing effect on viewers, 
the participants believed that graphic images are an important factor in communicating 
the viciousness of war and in helping those who are far removed from the conflict to 
understand the nature of it. University students articulated that ‘there are a lot of people 
who have no clue of what is happening and such images are the best way to reflect a 
complete picture and also have an impact on them. It might actually drive them to act 
and do something’. Given that, the participants also argue that ‘we as Arabs essentially 
sympathise with the Palestinians because it is also ‘our cause’. They explain that, 
We need to remember that for us Jordanians we are very patriotic and especially to Palestine. 
If we are talking about a different war then I would say seeing graphic images on TV would 
develop a sense of over nominalisation in which case you never want to watch these pictures 
on TV and you might want to know more about it but not necessarily look at such images. But 
of course our sense of belonging makes us always glued to our television screens 
(middle/upper class university students, Jordan). 
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The use of ‘We’ and ‘Us’ in this domain signals national, cultural, ethnic and religious 
commonalities that were invoked regularly by group members to express a sense of 
patriotism and belonging. Although, at times this resulted in some members implicitly 
controlling the views of others, the majority of participants believe that ‘We’ feel more 
sympathetic about ‘our people’, but ‘They’ don’t care about ‘others’. This is 
demonstrated in the following example,   
Americans for example […] won’t bother doing anything if they have no sense of connection 
to it. During the invasion of Iraq, for instance, their kids were involved, their kids were the 
ones fighting so of course they would want to act. I mean every individual sympathises with 
ones that are related to him personally (middle/upper class university students, Jordan).  
On a different note, regardless of this established cultural unity within group members, 
they understand that their role in interacting with the media is in one way or another 
irrelevant –they viewed themselves as passive citizens in society. In relation to this, the 
participants concluded,  
What, really what can we do? We just sit watch the news and cry then we need to get back 
prepare dinner for our children sit with them then go to bed. We cry for a bit and then go 
back to reality and perform our roles as housewives and mothers. What can we do this is life. 
Even if we try no one listens to us (cleaning staff, Jordan).     
To move on to the second standpoint, Jordanian groups perceived the conflict as a 
Muslim-Jewish dispute and persistently labelled Israelis as ‘Jews’ or ‘Jewish’. Comparable 
strands surfaced within the Jewish Society Group, while explaining that ‘Jewish people’ 
and ‘Muslim people’ have different understandings of the conflict. Jordanian participants 
referred to themselves as ‘Muslim audiences’ whose ‘brothers and sisters’ are being 
attacked by ‘the Jews’. Similarly, this study proves that the Jordanian participants 
interviewed have no trouble depicting ‘Jews’ as ‘Zionists’, ‘cowards’ and ‘criminals’. 
Participants also employed verses from the Quran which highlighted such Muslim 
patriotism: 
[Prophet Muhammad] may Allah bless him and grant him peace said “the example of the 
faithful in their mutual empathy, mercy and sympathy is like the single body, when one organ 
complains [from injury] the rest of the brogans empathise through sleeplessness and fever”. 
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So how do you think we feel about the people of Gaza when they’re our own people, our 
brothers and families (teachers, Jordan). 
The rhetorical implication of such labelling is based on the assumption that all Jews are 
Zionists and all Palestinians are Muslim. Given both Jordanian groups and the Jewish 
Society group are opposite sides of the same prejudicial coin, homogenising the ‘Other’, 
in this manner is in essence a reductive approach in viewing the conflict. As Richardson 
and Barkho (2009: 602) argue, it is simplistic to assume that ‘the political divisions 
regarding Israel and the occupation of Palestine lie […] along purely religious lines –that is 
between Jew and Muslim, or even Jew and gentile –but between Zionists and anti-
Zionists’.  
Not only were Israelis thought of as anti-Muslim but so is the BBC. BBC’s reporting 
throughout the conflict was said to be biased towards Israel and so, by default, against 
(assumedly Muslim) Palestinians. One participant declared: ‘BBC Arabic was the channel 
with the least coverage in the world of the events in Gaza, regardless of the fact that it 
used to be the number one service in the Arab World in the 90’s and 80’s. In this war, 
however, it played a very negative role; it even portrayed a pro-Israeli stance and an anti-
Arab or anti-Islam standpoint. I was very shocked’ (under-privileged students, Jordan). In 
a separate group, participants agreed that the enduring reputation the BBC has earned 
from its Radio Service was challenged by the introduction of its television service. The 
same point was also raised among the Jordanian cleaning staff group in which 
participants spoke about the “Huna London” days (this is London) as they termed them: 
We used to listen to it all the time, I remember. It had an excellent reputation in the Arab 
world it was very reliable, everyone used to listen to it. Huna London, I miss those days’. 
In this view, shared narratives among certain groups, with established mutual 
characteristics, help us understand certain views of the world, ‘by allowing us to share 
stories within culturally and socially explicit codes of meaning’ (Barthes, 1977, 1979 cited 
in Zelizer 1997: 26). Such narratives also function in establishing national and cultural 
bonds between participants, thereby encouraging participants to reiterate pervious 
comments made by group members in order to achieve a general chorus of approval. In 
some cases, stressing on an approved group consensus may result in some participants 
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amplifying or overstating a certain argument. In this light, one participant went even 
further to accuse the network of being ‘provoking and frustrating’ (cleaning staff, Jordan): 
I sometimes watch BBC Arabic but not very often, because I wasn’t comfortable with its 
coverage and sometimes it is provoking and frustrating I mean we’re stressed and furious 
enough with the events themselves. I mean it might be more familiar with the events than 
many other Arab channels that we followed but just because of the psychological state I was 
in I wanted to watch something more comforting and more inclined to the Palestinian 
perspective.     
In conclusion, cultural proximity is the defining variable of participants belonging to this 
category. Participants’ characteristics were predominately reflected by national or local 
domains sharing and reinforcing traditional identities and demonstrating unity and 
patriotic symbolism. As the participant in the latter quote explained, audiences were 
already frustrated with the war per se, therefore networks that validated their pre-
existing perceptions on the war were considered the most reliable. To this end, messages 
produced by such ‘reliable’ networks were fully accepted by their audience and were 
further processed to shape and develop their perceptions on the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict as a whole.            
The Israeli attacks on the UNRWA school in Gaza: a news practice  
The final section of this chapter examines the news practice utilised by this study (see 
Chapter 3) to further establish participants’ perspectives of and perceptions on the 
examined networks’ impartiality in news reporting and values. The aim is to map possible 
similarities between the news items produced by the participants –in terms of what they 
truly deem as factual – and the extent to which their readings are reflective of the 
original reports. It also hopes to investigate why news accounts are in some instances 
deemed acceptable by participants and are firmly rejected in others. Rather than 
examining audience understandings of the UNRWA incident through the three audience 
positions categorised and identified in this chapter (oppositional, subliminal and 
dominant readings), this section will provide a detailed assessment of such perceptions 
across all the focus groups with some emphasis placed across national borders. This is 
mainly to provide a firm foundation in which audiences process information and the 
manner to which they retain and reproduce media texts across varying political, cultural, 
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educational and ideological dimensions; it will also avoid repetition as similar 
interpretations were produced by varying group members and allow for inter and intra-
comparisons between participants. Finally, combing groups together, enables us to 
furnish a practical framework for analysing focus group, given it incorporates a diverse 
group of participants bringing various perspectives en masse. 
Participants’ presumptions regarding the examined networks’ ‘biases’ and/or objectivity, 
provide significant data. It was clear that predictions made by the Jordanian groups held 
pre-existing cultural conventions in which they were fully accepting of Al-Jazeera’s 
accounts and almost continuously suspicious of media texts produced by the BBC. For 
example university students in under-privileged areas in Jordan indicated: ‘We imagined 
that rather than the BBC saying Israel attacked… no it says “the UNRWA school was 
attacked” without specifying who caused the attack. And in terms of victims BBC 
mentions Arab and Palestinian victims in passing with minimum video shots or coverage 
just the headlines and it doesn’t go into details. And it only focuses on the event when it 
takes place then forgets about it’. Here, the participants assumed that the BBC will 
transform active verbs to passivized forms (and delete agents) and employ 
nominalisation in its reporting. Similarly, other groups commented, 
If I was the BBC I would produce my report unwillingly if I was the BBC I would take long shot 
images and general pictures of the event, if I was the BBC I would interview Israeli sources 
and ask them about what happened knowing they would respond saying there were militants 
in the school therefore we attacked them. If I was the BBC I would also interview Palestinians 
but from outside Gaza I won’t be reporting from the immediate event itself (cleaning staff, 
Jordan). 
The same group, producing Al-Jazeera’s report wrote: 
If I was Al-Jazeera channel I would go to the scenes of the incident go inside the school report 
from there, show the dead I would show footage of children and their plight I would ask 
people, that were directly involved in the incident, what happened and how they were 
attacked by the Jews. I mean I would try and move the world’s feelings on the matter and the 
Palestinian struggle that took place in Gaza. I would also show its medical consequences on 
people, the diseases and wounds it left on the people and also the filthy water where 
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Palestinians used to live before they were forced to leave their houses and seek refuge in 
these schools in hope of a safe haven but were hit (cleaning staff, Jordan). 
All Jordanian participant groups rated Al-Jazeera as highly credible on all measures. The 
channel was seen to have ‘widely covered the events in Gaza’ (Gaza Refugee Camp, 
Jordan) and to have had ‘a very sympathetic and real tone in covering the events’, ‘the 
reporters’ were also said to be ‘screaming from outrage’ (under-privileged university 
students, Jordan). Al-Jazeera they argued focused on the ‘specifics’: 
I believe Al-Jazeera Arabic would portray the events it reported with specifics. It will provide 
accurate numbers of the people who were killed all in the same building from what families 
and they will also provide names if they have them. I find it amusing how they cover the 
events in such short span of time (upper/middle class university students, Jordan).        
On viewing the news reports, Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the attacks on the UNRWA school 
was perceived by Jordanian participants as credible, objective and undistorted. BBC 
Arabic, on the other hand received a less affectionate response, the channel was said to 
have ‘distorted and manipulated’ the events. Its coverage, it was claimed, reduced the 
degree of ‘calamity and catastrophe’ the Palestinians were enduring. Take this detailed 
description for example: 
Al-Jazeera rushed to the site and transmitted the images; rarely does Al-Jazeera distort its 
images to make them less graphic and horrific but it does so sometimes when picturing those 
of torn body pieces. Other than that it presents raw footage and transmits them without any 
form of editing or dubbing and without any deduction of major events. The BBC, however, like 
we saw have distorted and manipulated many of its images and presented  very few 
emotional pictures which have no impact or are unrepresentative of the existing calamity and 
catastrophe. Al-Jazeera immediately rushed to filming the relatives of those affected and the 
impact it had on them inside the school and also rushed to hospital doors to speak to those 
capable of expressing their feelings to Al-Jazeera in an attempt to portray the immediacy of 
the attacks. It also interviewed UNRWA officials since the attacks took place in the school. It 
then portrayed white phosphorus bombs and presented some of the destruction it caused 
(Gaza Refugee Camp university students, Jordan).     
Al-Jazeera was especially praised for ‘immediately speaking with the people in the school, 
those directly involved or affected by the attacks and with UNRWA officials’ (cleaning 
staff, Jordan). BBC Arabic, however, was said to be ‘different, it reported on the school 
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then went to cover Israeli houses and what is happening to [Israelis]’ (cleaning staff, 
Jordan). ‘The events were marginalised’, the ‘pictures were completely irrelevant and 
they all come from outside of Gaza’, and ‘the report itself is on the Jews and not the 
Palestinians’ (teachers, Jordan). One participant asserted: ‘in reality I mean it’s as if each 
channel was covering a different event I mean Al-Jazeera filmed the events in Gaza while 
BBC’s footage were from outside Gaza, in fact it didn’t even seem like it was happening in 
Gaza’ (teachers, Jordan). What Jordanian participants found most amusing about BBC 
Arabic’s coverage is the manner in which the network depicted an Israeli woman crying 
and simultaneously being escorted by ambulance workers: 
The BBC, however, depicted an Israeli woman who is shown to be crying in an attempt to 
show evidence of the difficult psychological state Israelis are experiencing (Gaza Refugee 
Camp, Jordan) 
I don’t understand how BBC Arabic can present a Jewish woman crying just because a missile 
landed on a village nearby. People [in Israel] are scared of their shadows. Representing her 
like that implies that BBC Arabic is trying to justify Israel’s attacks on children in the school. 
The media is directed to serve the Israeli enemy and not the Palestinian cause, at least not so 
far (Under-Privileged university students, Jordan).   
Other criticism centred on BBC Arabic’s attempt to equate between the Palestinian and 
the Israeli struggle. ‘In general terms BBC Arabic’, one participant explained, ‘equates the 
victim with the offender’ (Gaza Refugee Camp, Jordan). This finding is analogous with the 
analysis provided in Chapter 6 regarding BBC Arabic’s coverage of the UNRWA school 
attacks. BBC’s coverage was also described as ‘ridiculous’: 
What I found about the BBC I couldn’t it was ridiculous they have a man in a flak jacket when 
there was no danger I mean it was absolutely ridiculous and they had to talk about all the 
rockets they had to make that balance about the rockets. When 40 people had just been 
killed I mean you know as if there was an equivalence (JAZ, UK).  
It was also highlighted that BBC Arabic has a strategy in its reporting in which it ‘blamed 
Hamas for the attacks that, it reported that Hamas initiated [the attack] then Israel had to 
hit back’ (Under-Privileged university students, Jordan). They acknowledged that BBC 
Arabic does report on the attacks on Gaza but equally ‘highlights that Hamas is doing the 
same’ (Under-Privileged university students, Jordan). The participants suspected that the 
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BBC’s intention is to present an objective report dedicating equal coverage to both 
parties but explained that if ‘the BBC is trying to say we are right down the middle, […] it’s 
not working. Objectivity is not about giving equal coverage to the parties involved, it’s 
about portraying an accurate reflection of reality’ (Upper/Middle-Class University 
students, Jordan). 
Participants in groups conducted in the UK produced slightly varying predictions about 
the networks’ journalistic norms and strategies. Group members representing Al-Jazeera 
presented their reports in points: 
 Biased against Israelis 
 Interviews with Palestinian civilians 
 Footage of event 
 Graphic images 
 Possibly interview a UN’s spokesperson (Cleaning staff, UK) 
The same group speculated that the BBC report would ‘speak to the victims’, present the 
‘UN’s views and positions’ on the matter, ‘portray images of the event’, present both the 
‘Israeli and the Palestinian points of view’ and finally provide comments issued by ‘the 
British government on the attack’. Loughborough University students suggested that both 
networks would interview ‘innocent victims’ but highlighted that BBC journalists would 
have to speak to ‘other news reporters’, to ‘the police’ and ‘other governments’ in order 
to obtain a better understanding of the event given they were denied access to the Strip. 
Al-Jazeera they explained would have more coverage but would dedicate ‘its efforts to 
reporting the Palestinian view’.     
Participants in groups conducted in the UK also stressed that after watching the reports, 
it was clear that ‘the BBC looks at the situation as a whole, more about the conflict, 
whereas Al-Jazeera comes straight to one event, exactly what happened in that one 
event rather than what is happening generally there’ (Loughborough University students, 
UK). Surprisingly, although the groups agreed that both reports were representative of 
the events on the ground, some members expressed that ‘they still prefer Al-Jazeera’ 
(Loughborough University students, UK). They explained that the Al-Jazeera report is 
‘more graphic and real but the BBC one kind of stood back. It is like saying there is a lot 
going on, but we’re not going to show you because we are not allowed in’ (Loughborough 
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University students, UK). Another participant from the same group added: ‘I think the [Al-
Jazeera] one is better to make people feel how the situation was but I think the BBC I 
mean the fact that they seem to look at both sides gives them credit’. They concluded 
that if we ‘combine the two [we’ll] have just the right mix. Both reports combined 
together make perfect sense’.    
The general consensus within the groups agreed that ‘BBC’s reporting was unbelievably 
bad’. They explained that ‘Israel’s actions were highlighted but Hamas’s terrorism was 
nowhere to be found on the BBC’ (Loughborough University Jewish Society, UK). The 
following is what the group predicted BBC’s account on the attacks on the UNRWA school 
would look like: 
UN building was attacked today by an Israeli air-strike. 40 civilians were killed 55 injured. 1000 
Palestinians were taking refuge there. Lots of aid given was destroyed including the medical 
supplies so injured people cannot be treated now. Israel claims Hamas militants were 
shooting at Israeli soldiers from here but UN delegates say they never saw any shooters.  
Although they accused the BBC of ‘continuously criticising Israel’, they argue that it’s not 
entirely the media’s fault that Israel receives such negative coverage; instead Israel is 
partly to blame for this. The problem one participant explained is that ‘Israel don’t really 
have any sort of their own major people speaking on the news they always have like a 
Canadian or a South African, somebody that might be Jewish somebody that might be 
Israeli but not actually a proper Israeli that people don’t get the impression that proper 
Israelis could explain themselves in the media’. This point was reaffirmed by the same 
participant after watching the report in which he insisted that ‘the senior Hamas 
spokesperson from Al-Jazeera regardless of his accent came across well […] whereas 
when you listen to the Israelis oh my god they just sound like a mess’. Participants’ 
predictions regarding Al-Jazeera’s report were positive. The group explained that the 
reason this was the case is because one member of the group expressed his interest in 
the channel, explaining: ‘I’ve always thought Al-Jazeera oh the name is a bit scary not 
until I watched it and thought oh it’s actually pretty good. It’s more like a documentary 
than it is of news’. The group presumed Al-Jazeera’s coverage would be ‘extensive’ 
presenting both sides of the dispute, detailing events of the incident and speaking to 
representatives of the UNRWA. They also stressed that horrific and graphic images will be 
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incorporated to the report. Interestingly enough, after watching Al-Jazeera’s report, the 
Jewish participants expressed some sense of disappointment of the coverage, with one 
participant indicating: 
It’s much more biased than I thought but it still gives us some facts. I thought the BBC was 
quite low on facts, it was vague.         
Generally, various participants from different national groups noted the networks’ 
inconsistency in their selection of captions to describe the attacks: 
Al-Jazeera referred to [the attacks] as “escaping from death to death”, it spoke about people 
fleeing their homes to find death in the schools. While BBC called it “the attacks on Gaza” 
saying the attacks on Gaza doesn’t reflect the extent of injustice that took place in Gaza. 
There’s no comparison. The BBC generally, equates between the victim and the offender, this 
is evident in all of its reports. If people relied on the BBC for news they won’t feel the intensity 
of the war on Gaza or the extent of crimes carried out on the people of Gaza. It didn’t portray 
the death inflicted or the martyrs and of course they refer to the martyrs as dead unlike Al-
Jazeera who refers to them as martyrs. This is a cultural gap, it seems like the BBC are 
reporting in the name of Jews, this to Arabs or advocates of the issue or simply to people 
experiencing the injustice is unreasonable and inappropriate (Gaza Refugee Camp, Jordan).    
On a similar note, some British participants with pre-existing political biases expressed 
concern regarding the use of the phrase “according to Palestinian sources” in BBC’s 
report when referring to the number of fatalities. They indicated that the BBC’s report 
that ‘10 people have been killed 10 Israelis have been killed and PALESTINIAN SOURCES 
say’ this they affirm discredits the Palestinian claim. ‘It is like saying that the BBC is saying 
we can confirm that 10 Israelis were killed but we can’t confirm claims made by the 
Palestinian medical sources’ (JAZ, UK).  
Although differences in class, political culture, and social experience resulted in 
differences in social consciousness, and consequently in news interpretations of 
dominant ideological perspectives in the general discussions of the focus groups, the 
news practice found that when participants are made to provide interpretations of news 
texts directly after watching a news item, culture connotations were the only variable 
that impacted the way participants processed the news. It was also clear that Jordanian 
participants shared similar perceptions of the way certain satellite television stations 
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report. While they were ready to accept Al-Jazeera’s preferred ideological readings, they 
were cautious and more opposing to accounts issued by the BBC. Alternatively, British 
participants were to a certain extent accepting of BBC’s dominant readings but also 
indicated that Al-Jazeera’s coverage was ‘surprisingly acceptable’ (Loughborough 
University students, UK). They clarified that they ‘didn’t think any of the reports were 
more objective than other’ but rather ‘they were both trying to make something 
different. The BBC was trying to speak about what is going to happen to the ceasefire and 
Al-Jazeera was looking at what has happened in the school’ (JAZ, UK).  
 
Conclusion 
Philo (1990:1) has argued that it is difficult to illustrate how or, even, prove that media 
content determines public belief. The meanings of texts are always constructed 
differently according to the discourses (knowledge, prejudices, resistances, etc.) accepted 
and exercised by different audiences. Individuals in conflicting positions in the social 
formation of society defined in terms of cultural, political, and educational structures 
tend to digest and produce varying codes and consequently a range of varying readings. 
The extent to which television succeeds in transmitting dominant ideological meanings 
depends on audiences’ pre-existing knowledge and perception of the matter in question. 
While a text may have an immediate and necessary effect on certain audiences, it might 
have no impact on others. To some sections of the audience, a programme’s preferred 
readings contradict their pre-existing institutional, political, cultural and educational 
engagements. To others, like those with no prior knowledge of the conflict, the dominant 
readings of a news item may well ‘fit’ in with their subliminal understandings of conflicts 
and the way they are reported. For those audiences culturally and regionally engaged in 
the conflict, media messages produced by certain patriotic television stations are fully 
taken and entirely accepted. Figure 7.2 below diagrammatically illustrates the three 
positions examined at length in this chapter by indicating and locating the relevant focus 
groups in each category (for a detailed analysis of the participants’ knowledge and 
understanding of the conflict and their media habits see Appendix D). 
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Figure 7.2: Participants’ readings of the Gaza war media messages frames by shared cultural and political 
formations and practices  
 
This study also found that participants with pre-existing frames of belief tuned into the 
news media they thought would further confirm their opinions regarding the conflict and 
provide them with information and perspectives that they felt should be highlighted. 
While groups belonging to organisations that share strongly held political biases opted for 
blogs, the internet and attended meeting and conferences for alternative means of 
understanding the events of the conflict, groups that are culturally intertwined with the 
conflict employed Al-Jazeera, Al-Manar and Al-Aqsa television stations to provide them 
with a pro-Palestinian perspective.           
Culturally attached audiences were satisfied with the amount of information they 
obtained from their ‘preferred set of media stations’ but were mostly concerned about 
Western audiences who as this study also confirms had their ideas formed by the media. 
The latter brought to the focus group discussion cultural conventions that were formerly 
influenced by the media. Such audiences gauged their understandings of retrospective 
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conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan to cater their perceptions and beliefs. In 
practice, their responses triggered and revealed ‘systems of belief which were already in 
existence’ (Philo 1990: 156).   
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: towards a new form of mediated conflict 
 
Studies have repeatedly expressed growing concern that audiences lack sufficient 
information to digest and comprehend the complexities and often troubling realities of 
the world we live in. In effect, audiences lack a sense of major political and economic 
events, let alone foreign social, cultural or scientific issues, occurring beyond the shores 
of their own national cultural and social existence –unless their country is directly and/or 
militarily involved. The consensus, therefore, has been that the Western news media, 
especially in the United States, have failed to provide this understanding –one that is 
essentially guided by the journalist’s ability and duty to inform. 
For decades, war and conflict have shaped and fortified nations through a particular 
culture of national propinquity. Volkmer, rephrasing Dayan and Katz, argues that media – 
in particular television –has the power to influence public knowledge and understanding 
of events through the selection and national distribution of ‘real life’ events ‘which ‘re-
unite’ a nation through mediated forms of ‘conquest’ and ‘coronation’’ (Volkmer 2008: 
91). In a globalised and interdependent world, however, more attention is needed in 
generating efficient means of informing politics, economics, and social and everyday 
realities across national and cultural borders. 
As such, this thesis has embraced a cross-cultural dimension to analysis in order to 
provide an empirical understanding of the media coverage of the Gaza conflict of 2008-
09, by investigating how certain realities, narratives and ideologies are produced and 
contested in varying news discourses across and within national borders. This 
comparative approach of the research rested on three distinct yet complementary 
mechanisms within the sociology of journalism: the global and the local, the English and 
the Arabic, the episodic and the ongoing. By employing an inter-disciplinary approach it 
integrated content and discourse analysis methods to examine an ideological, 
institutional or a political understanding of war reporting.  
At first, this study examined the persistence of news reporting cross-nationally and across 
linguistic localities by analysing the Arabic and English language services of BBC and Al-
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Jazeera. The Gaza War was taken as a case study, in which a consecutive period of 18 
days was thoroughly examined. At first sight, the results suggests a congruency in 
international news agencies’ reporting –thereby confirming the prevailing consensus of 
the Western media as failing to inform –who mainly employ the ‘episodic frame’ and 
emphasise the ‘conflict’ nature of the issue. However, differences in reporting emerged 
across and within the English-language and the Arabic-language agencies, and their 
respective networks themselves. In general terms, the results generated from the 
analysis revealed that Gaza was consistently ‘bigger’ news on Al-Jazeera than on BBC. 
Compared to their respective networks, both Al-Jazeera Arabic and BBC Arabic dedicated 
more news items relating to the war during the sample period. This suggests that 
perceptions by news producers of cultural (and spatial) proximity can be a major 
stimulant of news coverage, thereby producing content that best resonates with the 
cultural dispositions of the audience.  
Seen from a different perspective, as much as cultural proximity played a role in the way 
news reports were constructed, the news agencies’ editorial policies and strategies are 
also factors in determining which events gain status and effectively become news and 
which are marginalised and even dismissed. In broad terms, Al-Jazeera English still 
dedicated more reports on the war in Gaza than did BBC Arabic. Such findings indicate 
that news agencies’ journalistic norms, embedded in an organisation’s culture of 
reporting, still play a crucial role in the production of news. This is further confirmed 
when considering the distribution of sources within the channels; with Al-Jazeera 
allocating more news access and presence to Palestinian sources and BBC granting Israeli 
perspectives more significance. There was a clear distinctive operational competency 
between the civilian and the military sector in terms of accessed voices, on the BBC and 
to a lesser extent on Al-Jazeera, giving Israeli military some credence in putting across a 
certain ideological interpretation to the provocative nature of the war. On the contrary, 
Al-Jazeera took a ‘heroic’ ‘villainous’ approach in reporting Gaza. It featured more reports 
on Palestinian civilians’ deaths and causalities, continued to blame Israeli forces for the 
suffering in the Strip, and adopted similar accounts in terms of responsibility and 
culpability, presenting the war as unjust, irrational and intolerable.  
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To allow for a comparative dimension, the thesis developed two ‘frames’ of analysis that 
were bound by the events of the Gaza conflict. It systematically looked at two recurring 
themes and scrutinized their discursive strategies and functions in the construction of 
meaning and ideology. These included Provocation, which examined questions of 
responsibility and culpability; and Proportionality which embraced matters of legitimacy 
and authority with regards to the humanitarian aspect of the war. 
The two ‘frames’ of analysis represent two distinctive yet interrelated forms of war 
reporting at a single point in time, each depicting a critical mode of examining media 
structures. Taking an interpretative and evaluative standpoints, these structures reveal 
moments of junction and deviation, commission and omission, consensus and dissensus 
that help inform our understanding of the relationship between journalism as a 
profession (with its ideal objective of reflecting reality) and journalism as a passive vehicle 
at the mercy of official sources (reflecting the ideologies, positions and voices of those in 
power). This study shows that media discourses on the war acquired a dynamic 
relationship, as a result of the prosecution and mediation of the war.         
The first ‘frame’ of analysis –the interpretive structure of analysis –examined the media’s 
portrayal of Palestinian and Israeli interpretations, motivations and rationale of 
conducting war. The discursive analyses of this research suggest that both Al-Jazeera and 
the BBC lack a coherent discursive strategy at the level of the lexical in their reporting of 
the conflict. Their lexical discursive and semantic practices are not consistent within their 
networks, which reveal instances of divergence and convergence in the analysis. In terms 
of categorisations, BBC World’s consistent use of militaristic connotations to accompany 
different Palestinian factions and, BBC Arabic’s less stark equivalences is equated with Al-
Jazeera’s (less so with AJE) regular adaptation of resembling terminology of resistance 
and martyrdom.  
This interpretive aspect of war reporting produced imperative findings suggesting a 
degree of deviation across the examined networks. BBC World and Al-Jazeera Arabic are 
two ends of the same spectrum, adopting, and to some extent endorsing, the Israeli and 
the Palestinian perspectives respectively. Al-Jazeera English consistently discredited 
Israeli statements and, rather, accused the latter of targeting the civilian population of 
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Gaza, not Hamas. By presenting both perspectives, BBC Arabic confirmed the Israeli line 
that one of its main objectives is to prevent the rocket launch from Gaza but 
simultaneously conveyed that it has failed to do just that. Such streams of reporting 
revealed the ways in which news discourses can be semantically transformed to cater for 
different news corporations’ discursive practices and strategies.   
Another finding to emerge from this study indicated that BBC World holds certain 
‘militancy ideology’ by putting the conflict beyond its warzone and explaining it in 
relation to potential extremism and alienation on behalf of British Muslims. Similarly, Al-
Jazeera Arabic adopted a religious approach in promoting and legitimising violence to 
which it referred to as resistance.       
Following this rationale, the second ‘frame’ of analysis explored the evaluative dimension 
of war reporting in order to distinguish the way Al-Jazeera and BBC portrayed the 
proportionality and legitimacy behind the suffering endured by both the Palestinians and 
the Israelis. One crucial point of contestation in the coverage of the proportionality of 
Israeli military action was the degree of intentionality, if any, behind the deaths of 
civilians in Gaza at the hands of the IDF. There is no doubt that all four channels identified 
the deaths of civilians as regrettable and tragic consequences of the military incursion in 
Gaza, but the key point of contestation rested on whether they collated sins of 
commission –the deliberate targeting of civilians –or omission –the collateral 
consequences of conducting intensive military action in highly populated urban 
environments.  
The predominant narrative apparent across all examined networks depicted Palestinian 
civilians as paying the heaviest price of war. Al-Jazeera especially focused on Palestinian 
children as the victims of a war relentlessly fought against a civilian population. In 
Comparison, BBC’s coverage although less explicit, reveals that hopeless images of civilian 
casualties are capable of dismantling a prevailing rhetoric of a war fought with a purpose 
against an identified enemy –Hamas. The analysis of BBC World’s coverage provides an 
illustration of this point. Although the actions of the Israeli military against Gazan civilian 
received high levels of criticism and condemnation by BBC World’s journalists, such 
criticisms were inevitably accompanied and countered by Israeli accounts, often to 
268 
 
provide justification to their actions; thereby concluding that all incidents involving 
civilian fatalities are unintended, retaliatory or the result of a mistake in judgement –i.e. 
merely accidents. However, as the casualties mounted up and evidence became available 
about the scale and violence of military actions by the IDF, the ‘omission’ scenario 
became increasingly unsustainable, and the legitimacy attributed by BBC World to the 
Israeli military was abraded; it drifts away from unquestionably justifying and 
rationalising Israeli actions to explicitly and overtly condemning them.  
Findings from AJA suggest that Israeli ‘aggression’ is firmly entrenched within the cultural 
commonality of its audience; therefore, there’s a reduced need for the corroboration of 
evidence. An evidential support, institutionalised and informed by certain journalistic 
practices, for arguing that Israel is the ‘aggressor’ is developed and processed over 
successive reports. Such schematic understanding is perhaps constitutive to explaining a 
‘bias’ towards a Palestinian understanding of the conflict represented on AJ (most 
notably AJA). The episodic nature of BBC reports, on the other hand, was shown to report 
each event as an individual story, decontextualised through ongoing legal positions 
(aggressor, defender). Although framed within a wider conceptualisation of the conflict, 
reports are still discrete, with participants, a start and a finish. This static nature of 
reporting provides no evidence of any entailment of ongoing contestation or conflict over 
the definition of meanings and interpretations.  
Considered alongside each other, the frames of analysis reveal the ways through which 
news reporting constitutive to war reporting generally, and foreign corresponding more 
specifically, intersect and cut across moments of commission and omission, consensus 
and dissensus, support and alienation. One particularly significant finding that emerged 
from the analysis, suggests that while the provocative aspect of the war formulated 
interpretations and explanations as to why the war took place, who provoked it and 
whose fault it was, which consequently developed a basic awareness and understanding, 
placing the conflict within a contextual framework; analysing the humanitarian aspect of 
the war provided evaluations to whether such acts are deemed legitimate –to whether 
civilian suffering is a ‘legitimate’ outcome of war. After examining the results gathered 
from the previous empirical chapters it became clear that it may well be the case that, in 
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some instances, the actions of a protagonist may be deemed legitimate with regard to 
provocation, but illegitimate with regard to their proportionality.  
Given the interpretive structure of the analysis has charted the problem at stake and 
generated understandings of culpability and blame, the evaluative structure initially 
suggests that the media did play a primary role in evaluating those dominant frames. 
Unlike with provocation, legitimacy attributed to Israeli policies is shown to be eroded 
when the proportionality of suffering and despair is reported. The verbal and the visual 
drift away from the initial interpretive framework of “what is at stake” and start to 
highlight the implications and legitimacy of such meanings and ideologies. Al-Jazeera’s 
coverage of the Gaza War was consistent across the two ‘frames’ of analysis, in which 
evaluations of the conduct of war supported interpretations of its provocation. It can also 
be argued that Al-Jazeera even went further to suggest that Israeli actions were intended 
acts of commission. Such a dynamic relationship is most apparent with regards to the 
BBC. It presents a contradiction between structures of interpretation and those of 
evaluation. As the war progressed, the Israeli army began to lose credibility on issues of 
proportionality. By evaluating blame and justice, the BBC highlighted questions of 
legitimacy, warranty, intention and fairness, whereby it became extremely difficult to 
translate Israeli actions as merely acts of omission.                              
The provocation data suggests that the BBC broadly bought the Israeli argument that 
they were forced to respond to unwarranted rocket attacks by Hamas. However, as the 
scale of the violence became more evident, this interpretation became vulnerable at an 
evaluative level. In other words, the Israeli actions came to be seen as disproportionate in 
their violence. Israel may have set the terms of the argument at the outset, but as the 
war progressed, such argument started to lose credibility. These findings urge us to look 
beyond an overview analysis of war reporting, necessitating the need for comprehensive 
context-related evaluations.  
But if media accounts are manifold, with discourses being modified and adjusted across 
and within the global and the local, the English and the Arabic, the static and the ongoing, 
do they simultaneously alter audiences’ perceptions and beliefs towards a given matter? 
This study does not suggest that the relationship between media content and media 
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reception is causal. In fact, it claims that meanings and interpretations produced from 
texts are continuously shifting along the lines of varying discourses (including knowledge, 
prejudices, resistances, and so on). It suggests that cultural, political, and educational 
structures of audience formation produce polseymic understandings of the same media 
text. That is not to say that the mass media is not a vital medium in this communicative 
process. Not least because the influence of the media is often found in how it affects the 
immediate responses and actions of political military elites. This ‘short circuit’ of 
communication is often based on untested assumption about how media coverage may 
impact upon public opinion, especially, in a fast moving world, where many elites tend to 
assume that the media are public opinion. The mechanism of mediation, however, should 
at all times be tested, but should not come to constitute the only mean of informing 
audiences.  
This conceptualisation formulated three idiosyncratic ‘readings’ shaped by political, 
cultural and social formations: an oppositional (counter-hegemonic) reading, a dominant 
reading and a subliminal (sub-conscious) reading. Such readings grouped participants into 
three varying categories correspondingly: participants with pre-existing beliefs or political 
‘biases’, participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict, and participants with 
cultural awareness of the conflict.    
The study has shown that the ability of television messages to transmit dominant 
ideological meanings depends, for the most part, on audiences’ pre-existing knowledge 
and understanding of the matter in question. While certain messages may have 
immediate and necessary effects on some audiences, they may have no effects on others. 
Media messages that contradict with audiences’ pre-existing institutional, political, 
cultural and educational engagements may have little impact on their understanding of 
the conflict. However, the encoding of dominant readings of media texts may well ‘fit’ in 
within the subliminal decoding of audiences with no prior knowledge to the conflict. 
Finally, media messages produced and constructed by certain patriotic television stations 
(such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Aqsa and Al-Manar) are fully engaged with and entirely accepted 
by those culturally and linguistically aware of the situation –audiences that grew up with 
conflict.  
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Culturally attached audiences and those with pre-existing frames of belief were shown to 
opt for news media they felt would further confirm their opinions regarding the conflict 
and provide them with information and perspectives they felt should be prioritised. 
Audiences with no prior knowledge of the conflict utilised their understandings of 
retrospective conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan to inform their perceptions and 
beliefs on Gaza. To some extent, their responses triggered and revealed pre-existing 
systems of belief that rested on stereotypical familiarities with Arabs and Muslims. Such 
systems of belief were shown, for the most part, to be influenced by the media. This 
shows that media power tends to reside in the interpretative rather than the evaluative 
level. In other words, it has a greater impact on the cognitive level (what audiences think 
about the conflict), rather than the behavioural level (whether audiences support or 
oppose the war). This assumes that the media are influential in structuring the way 
audiences understand and interpret certain messages. It is clear that Israel’s efforts in 
capitalising its role as part of the ‘war against terror’ were reflected in the participants’ 
understanding of the war. When asked to speak about the conflict, they did not speak of 
the brutalisation or the inheritance of the Palestinians; instead they utilised their pre-
existing systems of belief to draw associations between Hamas and Al-Jazeera with 
terrorism and al-Qaeda.   
Although the intention was not to reveal a hermeneutic understanding of media texts, 
one particularly striking conclusion rests on the historical conceptualisation of the media 
effects –of audiences as mere spectators. The findings discussed above revealed that BBC 
World did report on the events of the Gaza conflict throughout the 18-day examined 
period, however a section of this study’s UK participants had no idea the conflict took 
place; in what circumstances; or how and where it was located. Given that this study 
acknowledges that the analysis of how texts are meaningful to various audiences does 
not imply that texts have an effect on their readers or viewers, the empirical findings 
from this thesis confirms that meanings devised by viewers are pertinent to their 
behaviours, attitudes and beliefs. Rather than seeking to prioritise the exteriority of 
audiences to specific media texts in terms of media effect and meanings which are 
particularly ones of judgement and evaluation, it is more helpful to appreciate these 
readings as concrete manifestations of broader cultural, political and social phenomena.  
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Assuming media reception studies as a source of causality, one conclusion to emerge 
from the study is relatively straightforward: audiences informed by Al-Jazeera exhibit a 
greater knowledge and understanding of the conflict than those claiming to be attuned 
with BBC. But to take this as a given, is to underestimate the complexities surrounding 
the matter. Regardless of Al-Jazeera’s determination and efforts in reporting Gaza, the 
audiences it commands are culturally accustomed to the prolonged intricacies of the 
Palestinian struggle. So to assume that Al-Jazeera is more capable in influencing and 
altering its audiences’ perceptions and beliefs is problematic. Instead it facilitated in 
aggravating their levels of anger and grief towards a conflict that is culturally and 
traditionally rooted within a regional sense of commonality and belonging.   
So how does a comparative analysis of such nature contribute to the array of scholarly 
research invested in examining the media during wartime? The empirical pursuit 
embarked on in this thesis informs a theoretical conceptualisation of the politics of media 
access that diverges from current understanding. First, it recognises the ways in which 
the mediation of conflict allows for alternative models in understanding the sociology of 
journalism. By identifying two ‘frames’ of analysis, which were not met by a causal 
relationship with audience reception, a crucial contestation rests on the role of the media 
in times of humanitarian crisis. The reliance of the media on elite sources does not 
necessarily imply that such sources have an influential power on news reporting or 
reception. 
As discussed in chapter 1, Hall et al.’s ‘primary definers’ conception assumes a taken-for-
granted approach of an elite consensus that is simply imposed on the audience as a 
whole. Similarly, Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model is too simplistic and 
deterministic in assuming a collective model as consistent throughout time, space and 
media. The empirical findings of this study suggest that war involves a different set of 
journalistic routines from those addressed in the sociology of journalism.  
The proportionality of violence perpetrated by the IDF along with the alarming 
humanitarian situation in Gaza pushed the media in the direction of greater separation 
from the predominant ideologies ensued by the Israeli Army. The peculiar circumstances 
of the war removed an important remnant of direct propaganda and control over the 
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media. This is not to suggest that the news coverage became actively critical of Israeli 
actions or to suggest that it suddenly embraced a Hamas template of interpreting events. 
For example, issues of occupation, Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlements remained 
unquestioned. Instead it became more sober, more sceptical in the sense that bombing a 
UN compound for the third time was no longer described as an ‘accident’. There were 
also greater emphasis on civilian casualties and the harm it is inflicting on Gazans and 
their infrastructure.       
Whereas studies suggest that the relative freedom and restrain of media systems are 
very much reliable on divisions within the political class (discussed at length in Chapter 1), 
this study reveals that an elite consensus, although very powerful in imposing some 
control over the media, is certainly not the only factor in determining the tone of the 
coverage in times of war. For the most part this is due to the fact that journalists, in the 
case of Gaza, were covering a foreign military, not one of their own. Also, in any situation, 
the public is not entirety unitary but is often divided into major groupings, with varying 
interpretative frameworks (as demonstrated in Chapter 7). Therefore, when international 
calls for ceasefire increase and the situation worsens, the media are consequently 
compelled to respond to emotive images of suffering and despair. The shift in tone with 
the news coverage throughout the duration of war across instances of provocation and 
those of proportionality is sketched in Figure 8.1 below.      
 
Figure 8.1: a theoretical conceptualisation determining the shift in media tone throughout the war 
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This theoretical conceptualisation forms the basis of the second point. A mere 
understanding of the portrayal of war in the news media per se is limiting and a topical or 
polemical analysis of war reporting only subjected to a pro or anti stance perspectives 
can lead to distortions –either of exaggeration or under-representativeness of media 
control –or to overlooking broader intellectual questions. Therefore, the findings collated 
by Philo and Berry (2011, introduced in Chapter 2) on the British broadcast media’s 
coverage of the Israeli military incursion in Gaza can be dogged by one-dimensional or 
dichotomous arguments. So, while BBC World’s news can be seen to confirm Israeli 
arguments, in some aspects, it is certainly not as bad as Philo and Berry suggest in their 
study.    
Although the analyses provided by this thesis are empirical in structure, it is hoped that 
the findings they generated can also contribute theoretically to our understanding of war 
reporting and foreign correspondence as distinct genres within the realm of journalism. 
Journalistic norms and practices are never static but always changing, in which varying 
media outlets are continuously being renewed and adjusted along the lines of ideology 
and prejudice. The audience is an equally significant factor in the formation and 
construction of media texts. The glocalisation of certain networks are not born out of thin 
air, they are developed and maintained to trigger certain schematic ideologies targeted at 
certain audiences, but are also made to readjust and reformulate their practices and 
strategies to come to grips with the audiences they wish to endow with. A cross-cultural 
analysis of this kind, advocates, even necessitates a new nuanced approach in examining 
media texts of war reporting. Hallin and Gitlin (1993) introduce a cultural understanding 
of war that does not necessarily present it as a political policy but rather as a form of 
individual and national self expression. Such understanding of war as a social activity is 
not primarily created by powerful institutions or media propaganda (ibid.). It is this 
conceptualisation of war reporting that needs to be the focal point of further scholarly 
research, wherein a broader intellectual cohesiveness of theory, coherence and 
multiplicity (in terms of conflicts and/or media) is crucial in order to produce a theoretical 
model of war reporting that is more sensitive and attuned with the fragmented 
manifestations of reality. 
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Appendix A – Coding Sheet   
Variable Code 
Case Number  
Date and Month  
Media  
Length of Item  
Name of Journalist  
Name of Journalist 2  
Name of Correspondent 1  
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The Lexicon of Israeli/ Palestinian coverage: 
Variable (Lexicon) code Number of times used 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
Me
nti
one
d 
by 
No. of 
P. 
dead 
(gener
al) 
No. of 
P. 
dead 
(incide
nt) 
Confi
rmed
? 
Sour
ce 
No. 
of I. 
dead 
(gen
eral) 
No. 
of I. 
dead 
(toda
y) 
Confir
med? 
Sou
rce 
         
         
         
         
         
No. of P. 
Injured 
Confirmed? Source No. of I injuring Confirmed? Source 
      
      
      
      
298 
 
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
 
Key Events: 
Variable Code Mentioned by journalist/actor 
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Appendix B –Coding Schedule  
Values, variables and coding notes 
1- Case Number: Each coded news item is to be assigned a unique code 
2- Date and Month 
3- Media: TV 
1 Al-Jazeera English 6 pm  
2 Al-Jazeera  8 pm 
3 BBC World 7 pm 
4 BBC Arabic 6 pm 
 
4- Length of Item 
 
5- Name of Presenter 
Al-Jazeera English 
1. Nick Clark 
2. Jane Dutton 
3. David Foster 
4. Imran Garda 
5. Shiulile Ghosh 
6. Darren Jordan 
7. Maryam Mernazee 
8. Sohail Rahman 
9. Kamal Santamaria 
10. Lauran Taylor 
11. Sami Zaidan 
12. Felicity Barr 
13. Stephan Cole 
14. Hamish Macdonald 
15. Barbra Serra 
16. Ghida Fakhry 
17. Kimberly Halkett 
18. Anand Nardoo 
19. Diyya Gopalan 
20. Laura Kyle 
21. Teymoor Nabili 
22. Veronica Pedroga 
40. Other 
Al-Jazeera Arabic: 
41. Ahmad Bishtu 
42. Ahmad Mansour 
43. Alssi Abi-Assi 
44. Al Habib Al- Ghrabi 
45. Al-muaz bu-Lehieh 
46. Twafiq Taha 
47. Gilnar Moussa 
48. Jamal Rayan 
49. Jummana Namour 
50. Jamal Azar 
51. Hassan Jamoul 
52. Hidar Abdul-Haq 
53. Khalid Saleh 
54. Khadija bin-Faneh 
55. Layla Al-Shakhili 
56. Eman Ayad 
57. Rawan Al-Damin 
58. Samir Samreen 
59. Suhaib Al-Malkaway 
60. Abdul-Samad Nasser 
61. Abdul-Athim Mohammad 
62. Ali Al-Thefeiri 
63. Ghada Ghwais 
64. Farah Al-Barqawi 
65. Fayrouz Zyani 
66. Faisal Al-Qassam 
67. Luna Al-Shibil 
68. Layla Al-Shayb 
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69. Leina Zahr Al-dein 
70. Mohammad Al-Naali 
71. Mohammad Al-Qwarly 
72. Mohammad Kheir Al-Bereini 
73. Mohammad Rajeib 
74. Mohammad Krishan 
75. Munquith Al Ali 
76. Muna Suiliman 
77. Naji Suiliman 
78. Nadim Al Malah 
79. Wahiebeh Bu- Slayes 
99. Other  
 
BBC Arabic: 
 
100. Hossam El-Sokkari 
101. Tareq Nasser 
102. Makki Helal 
103. Dima Izeddin 
104. Malak Jafaar 
105. Nouran Sallam 
106. Dina Waqaf 
107. Ali Yuja 
108. Rania Al-Attar 
109. Atwan Khoury 
129. Feda Bseel 
130. Othman Ayfarah 
 
BBC World: 
131. Complete 
 
6- Name of Correspondent 
 
Al-Jazeera English: 
1. Hoda Abdel-Hamid (Doha) 
2. Hashim Ahel-Barra (Doha) 
3. Rula Amin (Middle East) 
4. Zeina Awad (Doha) 
5. Neave Barker (Moscow) 
6. James Bayes (Doha) 
7. David Chatter (Jerusalem) 
8. Owen Fay (Doha) 
9. Alan Fisher (Israel) 
10. Mike Hanna (Doha) 
11. Jonah Hull (London) 
12. Kamal Hyder (Islamabad) 
13. Amr El-kahky (Cairo) 
14. Zein Khodor (Doha) 
15. 15. Ayman Mohyeldin (Gaza) 
16. Nazanine Moshini (London) 
17. Dan Nolan (Doha) 
18. Nour Odeh (Ramallah) 
19. Rob reynolds (Washington D.C) 
20. Bameby Phillips (Europe) 
21. Alireza Ronaghi (Tehran) 
22. Jacky Rowland (Jerusalem) 
23. Mohammad Val-Salem (Doha) 
24. Kristein Saloomy (NY) 
25. Mark Seddon (London) 
26. Nick Spicer (Washington D.C) 
27. Shireine Tadros (Gaza) 
28. Stap Hassan (Indonsia) 
29. Amran Khan 
30. Roger Wilkinson 
31. Nisreen Shamayleh 
50. Other 
Al-Jazeera Arabic: 
 
51. Ahmad Al-Zweini 
52. Ahamd Al-Shalfi 
 53. Ahmad Al-Hweini 
54. Ahmad Barakat 
55. Ahmad Bin-Ahmado Mamein 
56. Ahmad Zaidan 
57. Aktham Suliman 
58. Eqbal Al-Hami 
59. Elias Karam 
60. Bushra Abdul Samad 
61. Hussein Abdul-Ghani 
62. Khaild Al-Deib 
63. Deema Al-Khatib 
64. Raafat Mujini 
65. Zeinab Bint- Arineh 
66. Saad Al-Ghazeri 
67. Samir Abu- Shamaleh 
68. Samir Hassan 
69. Samir Omar 
70. Saleh Al-Qaq 
71. Suhain Al-Muhdawi 
72. Abbas Nasser 
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73. Ezzat Sahror 
74. Omar Khashram 
75. Ghassan Abu-Hussein 
76. Labeib Fahmi 
77. Lena Al-Ghadban 
78. Mohammad Al-Balak 
79. Mohammad Abdullah 
80. Murad Hashim 
81. Michel Al-Kusk 
82. Nasser Al-Budeirri 
83. Heba Akeileh 
84. Walid Al-Omari 
85. Yasser Abu-Hilalah 
86. Yusef Al-Sharif 
87. Tamer Mishal 
88. Jevara Budeiri 
89. Shireen Abu-Aqleh 
90. Wael Dahdooh 
91. Hassan Al-Shubaki 
92. Ali Al Theiferi 
109. Other 
 
BBC Arabic: 
 
110. Hyder Al-Khayer 
111. Ahmad Al-Budairi 
112. Shuhdi Kashif 
113. Hadeel Wajdi 
114. Shirin Younis 
115. Mohammad Taha 
116. Khloud Amr 
117. Dema Hamdan 
118. Aynas Sultan 
119. Yaser Bardeesi 
120. Bader el-Din Al-Sa’agh 
121. Asad Allah Al-Sawi 
122. Mohammad Noun 
123. Wafaa Jbaai 
124. Najlah Abu-Ghaibeh 
125. Hadeel Wahbeh 
126. Mohammad Abu il eneen 
127. Naser Shadeed 
128. Mohammad Saif 
131. Other 
132. Emad 
 
BBC World 
 
133. Jeremy Bown 
134. Christain Fraser 
135. Paul Wood 
136. Katya Adler 
137. Tim Franks 
138. Aleem Magbool 
139. Natalia Anteleva 
140. Continue 
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7- Type of Item 
 
1 ‘Hard’ News reporting (facts, events, developments) 
2 ‘Reportage’(i.e. Communicates fact and analysis, the journalist herself is ‘written into the 
story’ to a significant extent by the inclusion of eyewitness testimony) 
3 One-way address to camera by journalist (i.e. no additional footage shown) 
4 Two-way discussion between journalist and news anchor 
5 Two-way discussion between journalist and news anchor with reportage 
6  Two-way discussion between journalist and news anchor followed by interview studio 
based (with non journalist) 
7 Two-way discussion between journalist and news anchor followed by interview studio 
based (with journalist) 
8 Two-way discussion between journalist and news anchor followed by interview non 
studio based (with non journalist) 
9 Two-way discussion between journalist and news anchor followed by interview non 
studio based (with journalist) 
10 Commentary/Authored Piece 
11 Interview – studio based (with non journalist) 
12 Interview – studio based (with journalist) 
13 Interview – non studio based (with non journalist) 
14 Interview – non studio based (with journalist) 
15 ‘Hard’ News reporting (facts, events, developments) followed by reportage 
16 Clip package - promo 
17  Other 
 
8- Location of Item: 
 
1. Headlines and lead story 
2. Headlines and other stories 
3. Other location in a news bulletin 
4. Other item in a non-news item context 
 
9- Location of Reporting 
 
Israel 
1. West Jerusalem 
2. Tel Aviv – Yafo 
3. Haifa 
4. Holon 
5. Petah Tiqwa 
6. Be’er Sheva 
7. Netanya 
8. Bat Yam 
9. Bene Beraq 
10. Ramat Gan 
11. Ashdod 
12. Ashkelon 
13. Sderot 
14. Other Israeli territory 
66. Israeli-Gaza border 
 
Occupied Territories: 
West Bank 
 
15. East Jerusalem 
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16. Janin 
17. Tulkarm 
18. Qalqilyah 
19. Nablus 
20. Ramallah 
21. Jericho 
22. Bethlehem 
23. Hebron 
24. Other West bank area 
25. West Bank – area not specified 
 
Gaza 
 
26. Gaza city 
27. Dayr al Balah 
28. Khan Yunis 
29. Rafah 
30. Jabaliya 
31. Beit Hanon 
32. Beit Lahia 
33. Gaza- other 
67. Mixed Gaza/West Bank and Israel 
 
34. Lebanon 
35. Golan Heights 
36. Other Syria 
37. Jordan 
38. Egypt 
39. Qatar 
40. Saudi Arabia 
41. Turkey 
42. Iran 
43. Libya 
44. Other Middle East/ Mixed countries 
45. UK 
46. US 
47. Canada 
48. France 
49. Germany 
50. Italy 
51. Spain 
52. Australia 
53. Other European 
54. Kenya 
55. Zimbabwe 
56. South Africa 
57. Nigeria 
58. Other African Nation 
59. Mexico 
60. Brazil 
61. Columbia 
62. Argentina 
63. Venezuela 
64. Bolivia 
65. Other/ not clear 
68. Muslim countries (Mixe
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10- Conflict Themes 
 
International Community/ Diplomatic 
1. Peace talks / summits 
2. Peace proposals 
3. Ceasefires/ truces 
4. End of fighting 
107. Arab relations with the US 
108. Arab relations with Israel 
139. Western public opinion 
136. USA backing Israel (pro Israel) 
53. Role of US 
54. Role of UK 
55. Role of EU 
56. Role of Turkey 
57. Role of UN 
58. Role of Arab League 
59. Role of Others 
109. Egyptian stance on the war 
110. Saudi-Arabia stance on the war 
111. Qatar stance on the war 
112. Libya stance on the war 
 
Israeli/IDF Military Agency 
5. IDF actions against Schools/ Universities 
6. IDF actions agaisnt Hamas private property 
7. IDF actions against other private property 
8. IDF actions against mosque 
9. IDF actions against government building 
10. IDF actions against hospital/ambulance 
11. IDF actions against health center 
12. IDF actions against UN property 
13. IDF actions against Gaza/general 
14. IDF actions against media agencies 
15. IDF actions military stations 
16. IDF actions Persons/Hamas 
17. IDF actions against Persons 
18. IDF against Persons/other 
19. IDF against plants/animals (attacks on farms) 
82. IDF air-strikes 
25. IDF restrictions on movement (closing borders etc) 
26. IDF restrictions on movement (closing borders etc) 
27. IDF – propaganda war 
73. IDF use of weapons 
77. Assassinations – Israel 
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83. IDF ground troops/ incursion 
95. Israel initiating the violence 
106. Israeli resistance 
121. IDF using civilian infrastructure to fire rockets at Israel 
125. Israel – stop rockets from Gaza/ counter Hamas (retalilation) 
130. 3rd stage 
123. Israel avoids human casualties 
126. Israel against law (war crimes) 
127. Three hours corridor 
128. Flyers 
119. Palestinian-Israeli street fighting 
122. Israel-Gaza Conflict general 
 
Palestinian/Hamas Military Agency 
28. Hamas against Schools/Universities 
29. Hamas against IDF private property  
30. Hamas against other private property 
31. Hamas against religious temple 
32. Hamas against government building 
33. Hamas against hospital 
34. Hamas against health centre 
35. Hamas against UN building 
36. Hamas against property/ other/ all attacks on property 
37. Hamas against media agencies  
38. Hamas against military targets 
39. Hamas against persons/ soldiers 
40. Hamas against persons/ civilian 
41. Hamas against persons/ other 
42. Hamas propaganda war 
43. Bombs/ Mortar attacks in Israel 
44. Hamas against plants/ animals (attacks on farms) 
45. Other Palestinian attacks on Israel – persons 
46. Other Palestinian attacks on Israel – property 
74. Hamas use of weapons 
94. Hamas initiating the violence 
105. Palestinian resistance 
120. Hamas using civilian infrastructure to fire rockets at Israel 
124. Palestinians/Hamas avoids human casualties 
132. Jihad 
119. Palestinian-Israeli street fighting 
122. Israel-Gaza Conflict general 
 
Israeli/IDF Political Agency 
47. Intra- Israeli politics 
48. Intra- Israeli violence 
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61. Israeli foreign relations 
104. Security – Israel 
114. Democracy in Israel 
 
Palestinian/Hamas Political Agency 
49. Intra Palestinian politics 
50. Intra Palestinian violence 
62. Palestinian foreign relations 
103. Security – Palestine 
113. Democracy in Palestine 
 
 
Israeli/ IDF Experiences/ Conditions 
67. Israeli economy 
69. Humanitarian aid: Israeli 
71: Human crisis: Israeli 
80. Funeral: ordinary Israeli citizens 
81. Funeral: Israeli soldiers 
93. Children: Israel 
98. Israeli public opinion 
100. Israeli casualties 
97. Hospitals ‘conditions in Israel 
118. What’s life like in Israel 
135. Israeli prisoners 
 
Palestinian/Hamas Experiences/ Conditions 
68. Palestinian economy 
70. Humanitarian aid: Palestinians 
72: Human crisis: Palestinians 
78. Funeral: ordinary Palestinian citizens 
79. Funeral: Hamas officials 
20. Right of return of Palestinian refugees 
21. Israeli ‘Arabs’/ Palestinians living in Israel 
22. Palestinian Prisoners 
23. Blockades/ Siege 
24. Barriers/ ‘security fence’/ sea barrier 
92. Children: Palestine 
99. Palestinian public opinion 
96. Hospitals ‘conditions in Gaza/ ambulance 
101. Palestinian casualties 
115. Hamas’s role in Gaza 
117. What’s life like in Gaza 
75. Tunnel issue 
 
International Community/ Humanitarian 
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51. Peace activists 
52. Human Rights Groups 
64. UNRWA 
 
International Community/ Military 
129. International troops on borders 
133. Attacks on Israel (from lebanon, egypt, etc)  
134. Attacks by Israel (on lebanon.... etc) 
 
Other Theme 
84. Demonstrations – Palestine (anti-war) 
85. Demonstrations- Palestine (pro-war) 
86. Demonstrations – Israel (anti-war) 
87. Demonstrations – Israel (pro-war) 
88. Demonstrations – Muslim country (anti-war) 
89. Demonstrations – Muslim country (pro-war) 
90. Demonstrations – non Muslim country (anti-war) 
91. Demonstrations – non Muslim country (pro-war) 
102. Other Theme 
63. Boycott of Israel 
65. Role of Media 
66. Historical background to present conflict 
116. Recap of conflict 
131. Jerusalem 
137. Psychological effects on children 
138. What’s next (post war) 
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11- Actor codes 
 
British 
 
Labour 
1. Gordon Brown/Prime Minister 
2. Tony Blair /previous PM 
3. Named government Minister 
4. Named chief secretary 
5. Named government MP 
6. Other MP 
 
Conservative/oppositional party 
7. David Cameron 
8. Shadow Foreign Secretary 
9. Other leadership spokesperson 
 
Arbiters 
10. Pressure group 
11. Sectional interest 
12. Charity/voluntary sector 
13. Public sector 
14. Private sector 
15. Celebrity 
16. Other 
 
Religious spokesperson 
17. Christian 
18. Jewish 
19. Islamic 
20. Other 
 
British Board of Jewish Deputies 
21. Mike Whines 
22. Other 
 
Palestinian Solidarity Campaign 
23. Betty Hunter 
24. Other 
 
Jews for Justice for Palestine 
25. Michael Rosen 
26. Other 
 
Stop the War Coalition 
27. Tony Benn 
28. Other 
 
Human Rights 
29. Amnesty International 
30. Other Human rights oreganisatin 
 
Think Tanks 
31. Foreign Policy Centre 
32. Royal Institute for International 
Affairs 
33. Other 
 
Academic 
34. Robert Fisk 
35. Paul Rogers 
36. Mona Baker 
37. Sue Blackwell 
38. Tom Paulin 
39. Fred Halliday 
40. Greg Philo 
41. Mike Berry 
42. Jacqueline Rose 
43. Hilary Rose 
44. Steven Rose 
45. SOAS 
46. LSE 
47. Kings College 
48. Other 
 
 
Media 
BBC 
49. Jeremy Bowen 
50. Mark Byford 
51. 51. Orla Guerin 
52. Brian Hanrahan 
53. Peter Horrocks 
54. Ian Pannell 
55. Mathew Price 
56. James Reynolds 
57. James Robbins 
58. John Simpson 
59. Mark Thompson 
60. Simon Wilson 
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61. Other BBC / BBC researcher 
 
Channel 4 
62. Lindsey Hilsum 
63. Other channel 4 
 
ITV 
64. Julian Mannion 
65. Other ITV 
 
Sky 
66. Emma Hurd 
67. Other Sky 
 
Jewish Chronicle 
68. Jeff Barak 
69. Other 
 
Al Quds 
70. Abdel Bar Atwan 
71. Other 
 
Journalists 
72. Robert Fisk 
73. Jonathan Freedland 
74. Christopher Hitchens 
75. Tim Llewellyn 
76. James Miller 
77. Stephan Pollard 
78. Melanie Philips  
79. John Pilger 
80. Ned Temko 
81. Other 
Miscellaneous 
82. Other 
 
Israeli 
83. Israel 
84. Roni bar-On 
85. Gilad 
86. Arab MP 
87. Moshe Kahalon 
88. Moshe Katsav 
89. Yisrael Katz 
90. David Levy 
91. Lieberman 
92. Danny Naveh 
93. Benjamin Netanyahu 
94. Ehud Olmert 
95. Ehud Barak 
96. Tzipi Livini 
97. Michael Ratzon 
98. Silvan Shalom 
99. Gideon Sa’ar 
100. Natan Sharansky 
101. Shimon Peres 
102.  Ariel Sharon 
103.  Yuval Steinitz 
104. Other representative 
105. Mark Regev (spokesperson) / Ofeir 
106. Other governments spokesperson  
420. military leaders 
 
Generic party references 
107. ‘Religious’ 
108.  ‘Smaller’ 
109.  ‘Extremist’ 
110.  ‘Hardliners’ 
111.  ‘Moderates’ 
112.  Right/rightist 
113.  Left/ Leftist 
114.  Centrists 
115.  Other/ unclear 
 
116.  Politcian’s family member’ 
 
Past Presidents 
120. Chaim Weizmann 
121. Yitzhak Ben-Zvi 
122. Zalman Shazar 
123. Ephraim Katzir 
124. Yitzhak Navon 
125. Chaim Herzog 
126. Ezer Weizmann 
 
Israeli Defence Force 
127. Avital Leibovich (IDF spokesperson 
– English) 
129. Dan Halutz 
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130. Shalit 
131 IDF generic 
132. Other spokesperson/representative 
128.  يعردا ياخفا(IDF Spokesperson – 
Arabic(  
        Mossad 
        133. Meir Dagan 
        134. Other 
spokesperson/representative 
         
        Police 
        135. Moshe Karadi 
        136. Other 
spokesperson/representative 
 
        Shin Bet 
        137. Avi Ditcher 
        138. Other spokesperson/ 
representative 
 
        Other security forces 
        139. Spokesperson/representative 
 
        Ambassador to UN 
        140. Zvi Heifetz 
        141. Dan Gilleman 
        142. Other 
 
        Paramilitaries 
        143. Kahane Chai (Kach) 
        144. Other 
 
        Arbiters 
        145. Pressure group 
        146. Sectional interest 
        147. Charity/ volutary sector 
        148. Public Sector 
        149. Private Sector 
        150. Celebrity 
        151. Other 
 
        Arbiters 
        152. Benny Morris 
        153. Avi Shlaim 
      154. llan Pappé  
      155. Efraim Karsh 
      156. Other 
 
      Religious spokespersons 
      157. Christian 
      158. Islamic 
      159. Jewish 
      160. Other 
 
     Citizens 
     161. Israeli 
     162. Arab-Israeli 
     163. Unclear 
     164. Other 
 
     Media 
     165. Channel 1 
     166. Channel 2 
     167. Channel 10 
     168. Galei Zahal (IDF radio) 
     169. Ha’aretz 
     170. Jerusalem Post 
     171. Israeli Broadcasting  
     172. Ma’ariv 
     173. Yediot Aharonot 
     174. Other/ all / general 
 
    Miscellaneous 
    175. Settlers 
    176. peace Now / Rabbis for Human rights 
    177. B’teslem 
    178. Other 
 
Palestinians 
 
179. Palestinian factions 
180. Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
181. Yasser Arafat 
182. Other 
551. Palestinian fighters 
 
Palestinian Delegation to UN 
183. Riyad Mansour 
184. Other 
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Government 
185. fatah 
186. Mahmoud Abbas 
187. Hanan Ashrawi 
188. Mohammad Dahlan 
189. Saeb Erekat (Negotiator) 
190. Rawhi Fattouh (Speaker) 
191. Ahmad Queri (Abu Alaa’) 
192. Nabeel Shaath 
193. Yasser Abed Rabboh 
194. Other 
 
Oppositional 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 
195. Representative 
 
Al-Sa’iqah 
196. Isam Al-Qadi 
197. Other 
 
Asbat al-Ansar 
198. Representative 
 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DELP) 
199. Nayif Hawatmeh 
200. Other 
 
Fateh of the Uprising (Fateh al-intifada) 
201. Abu Musa 
202. Other 
 
203. Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) 
204. Shykh Ahmad Yasin 
205. Khaled Mashal 
206. Abd al Aziz Rantisi 
207. Ismail Hanyieh 
208. Nizar Rayan 
209. Abu Obeida 
210. Said Seyam 
211. Fawzi Barhoum 
212. Ghazi Hamad 
213. Osama Hamdan 
214. Other 
550. Qassam brigades 
 
215.Hizballah 
216. Hassan Nasrallah 
217. Other 
 
Independents 
218. Ziad Abu Amr 
219. Marwan Barghouti 
220. Mustafa Barghouti 
221. Other 
 
222.Islamic Jihad 
223. Ramdan Shallah 
224. Other 
 
Palestine Liberation Fdront (PLF) 
225. Abu Abbas 
226. Other 
 
Palestinian Liberation Front (Jabhat al –
Tahrir al-Filastiniyah) 
227. Abu Nidal al-Ashqar 
228. Other 
 
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (Jabhat 
al-Nidal al-Sha’bi al-Filastni) 
229. Khalid ‘Abd al-Mejid 
230. Ahmad Majdalani 
231. Other 
 
Alweit al-Nasser Sallah al-Din Al-Janah al-
askari lirijal al-Muqawma 
232. Abu Mujahid 
233. Other 
 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PELP) 
234. Taysir Khalid 
235. George Habash 
236. Abu Ali Mustafa 
237. Ahmed Saadat 
238. Other 
 
Generic party/group references 
239. ‘Religious/Islamist’ 
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240. ‘Smaller’ 
241. ‘Extremists’ 
242. ‘Hardlines’ 
243. ‘Moderates’ 
244. right/rightists 
245. Left/leftists 
246., Centrists 
247. Other/unclear 
 
248. Politician’s family memeber 
 
Revolutionary Communist Party (al-Hizb al-
Shuyu’i al-thawri) 
249. ‘Arabi’Awad 
250. Other 
 
Police 
251. Ghazi Al- Jabili 
252. Other sokesperson 
 
Arbiters 
253. Pressure group 
254. Sectional interest 
255. Charity/voluntary sector 
256. Public sector 
257. Private sector 
258. Celebrity 
259. Other 
 
Academics 
260. Mahmoud Darwish 
261. Muhammad Hussein Haykal 
262. Edward Said 
263. Other 
 
Religious spokespersons 
264. Christian 
265. Islamic 
266. Other 
 
Media 
267. Al-Quds 
268. Al Ayyam 
 269. Ramtan 
270. Palestine Satellite TV 
271. Palestine TV 
272. Voice of Palestine radio 
273. Wafa (Palestine news Agency) 
 
275.Civilians 
 
276. Injured civilian(s) 
277. Doctor 
278. Ambulance workers 
279. Ordinary citizen 
280. Member of family of injured citizen 
422. Protester(s) 
423. Children 
281. Other 
500. Stone-throwers 
 
Miscellaneous 
282. Other 
 
Regional 
 
435. Syria 
283. Bashar al-Assad 
284. Muhammad Naji Al-Utri (Prime 
Minister) 
285. Walid al-Muallim (Foreign Minister) 
286. Other 
 
436.Jordan 
287. King Abdullah bin al-Hussein 
288. King Hussein 
289. Prince Hasan bin Talal 
290. Queen Rania al-Abdulla 
291. Muslim brotherhood 
292. Nader Al dahabi (Prime Minister) 
293. Nasser Judeh (Foreign minister) 
294. Other 
 
437.Lebanon 
295. Michl Sulyman 
296. Emile Lahud 
297. Government 
298. Nabih Berri 
299. Michael Aoun 
300. Amin Gemayl 
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301. Rafik Hariri 
302. Walid Jumblatt 
303. Foad Sanyoura 
304. Other 
 
438.Egypt citizens 
305. Hosni (Muhammad) Mubarak 
306. Ahmed Aboul Gheit (Forign minister) 
307. Ahmed Mohammad Nazif (PM)/ 
government 
308. Other 
 
439. Saudi Arabia 
309. king Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz 
310. Other 
 
440.Iran 
311. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
312. Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i 
313. Mohammad Khatami 
314. Ayatollah Khomeini 
315. Other 
 
441. Al-Qa’ida 
316. Osama bin Ladin 
317. Ayman al-Zawahiri 
318. Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi 
319. Other 
 
452. Turkey 
453. Turkish citizens 
454. Turkish government 
455. Turkish PM 
456. Other 
 
457.India 
458. Indian citizens  
459. Indian government 
460. Indian PM 
461. Other 
 
Qatar 
501. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani 
502. Qatari government 
503. Qatari MP 
504. Qatari citizens  
505. Other 
 
Libya 
506. Al Qathafi 
507. Libyan government 
508. Medical assistant 
509. Libya 
510. Other/ Libyan delegate to the UN 
 
Miscellaneous 
320. Other 
 
American 
 
442. Republican 
321. George Bush 
322. Condoleeza Rice 
323. Colin Powell 
324. Robert Zoellick 
325. Stephen Hadley 
326. Scott McClellan 
327. Donald Rumsfeld 
431. White house spokesperson 
432. Gordon Johndroe (Press Secretary of 
the National Security Council) 
328. Other 
 
443.Democrats 
329. Barak Obama 
330. Hilary Clinton 
331. Joseph Lieberman 
332. John Edwards 
33. Jesse Jackson 
334. Richard Hass 
335. Other 
 
441. CIA 
336. George Tenet 
337. Other 
 
445. Think Tanks 
338. American Enterprse Institute  
339. American israeli Political Action 
Committee 
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340. Heritage Foundation 
341. Middle East Forum/Daniel Pipes 
342. Project for a New American Century 
343. Other 
 
344. Other (US department State) 
 
Academics 
345. Bernanrd Lewis 
346. Aalan Dershowitz 
347. Noam Chomsky 
348. Norman Finkelstein 
349. Other 
 
446. Anti-Defamation League 
350. Abraham Foxman 
351. Howard Berkowitz 
352. Other 
 
Lobbyists 
353. Zionist 
354. Israeli 
355. Jewish  
356. Arab 
357. Other 
 
Arbiters 
358. Pressure Group 
359. Sectional interest 
360. Charity/voluntary sector 
361. Public sector 
362. Private sector 
363. Celebrity 
364. Other 
 
Religious spokespersons 
365. Christian 
366. Islamic 
367. Other 
 
Media 
368. ABC 
369. CBS 
370. Fox 
371. NBC 
372. New Yrok Times 
373. Washington Post 
374. USA Today 
375. Other 
 
Miscellaneous 
376. Other 
 
International 
 
377. European Union 
378. Mirek Topolanek 
379. Solana 
380. Benita Ferraro-Waldner 
 
382. NATO 
383. George Robertson 
384. Javier Solana 
385. Other 
 
386. United Nations 
387. Ban Ki-Moon 
388. Karen Anu Zaid 
389. Relief and Works Agency 
390. John Ging (UNRWA Deputy Director – 
Gaza) 
430. Robert Serry (UN Middle East envoy) 
424. UNICEF 
391. Other 
 
600. US ambassador 
601. Human Rights 
602. Human Rights Watch 
603. Michele Abdel Maseeh (International 
Lawyer)/International Lawyer 
604. UK ambassador 
605. Christopher Genus (UNRWA 
spokesperson) 
606. Weapons expert 
607. Richard Goldstone 
 
392.Arab League 
393. Amr Moussa 
394. Other 
395. World Jewish Congress 
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396. Stephen Herbits 
397. Other 
 
398.Relief Agencies 
399. Red Cross 
400. Red Crescent 
401. Other 
 
402. International Solidarity Movement 
403. Rachel Corrie 
404. Jeremy Hardy 
405. Tom Hurndall 
406. Other 
 
Media/Experts 
407. Al Jazeera 
408. Al Jazeera English 
470. Azmi Bishara (AL-jazeera senior analyst) 
409. Associated Press 
410. CNN 
411. Reuters 
412. Other 
 
Other International leaders 
413. Nicolas Sarkozy (France) 
447. French citizens/ government 
414. Angela Merkel (Germany) 
448. German citizens/government 
415. Giorgio Napolitano (Italy) 
449. Italian citizens/ government 
416. Hugo Chavez (Venezuela) 
450. Venezuelan citizens/ government 
417. Boliva President 
451. Bolivian citizens/government 
418. Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
316 
 
12- Gender of Actor 
 
1. ‘Not relevant – unclear’ 
2. ‘Female’ 
3. ‘Male’ 
 
13- How the Actor Appears 
 
1. ‘Visuals only no direct quotation’ 
2. ‘Voice only no visuals’ 
3. ‘Visuals only’ 
4. ‘mentioned only’ 
5. ‘Directly quoted (not own voice)’ 
6. ‘Directly quoted’ 
7. Indirectly quoted/ paraphrased 
8. Interview 
 
14- Length of Quotation (Numeric – 4 digits) 
 
15- Attack/Defence Adjectival Codes 
1. ‘presentin g own policy’ 
2. ‘defending own policy against attack from within party’ 
3. ‘defending own policy against attack from other party or non party individual’ 
4. ‘attacking other party sources or non party individuals 
5. ‘attacking own party policy’ 
6. Presented in good light 
7. Presented in bad light 
8. Actor attacked 
9. Actor defended 
10. ‘disposition unclear’ 
11. Explaining what happened 
 
16- Body Count 
 
Mentioned by: 
1. Presenter/news anchor 
2. Correspondent 1 
3. Correspondent 2 
4. Actor 
 
Number of Palestinian deaths reported  
Confirmed: 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not clear 
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Source: 
1. Palestinian source 
2. Israeli source 
3. UN sources 
4. Other sources 
5. Not clear 
 
Number of Israeli deaths reported 
Number of Palestinian injuries  
Number of Israeli injuries   
  
17- The Lexicon of Israeli/Palestinian coverage 
 
1) Palestine 
2) Israel 
3) Palestinian(s) 
4) Israeli(s) 
5) Occupied territories 
6) Disputed territries 
7) Palestinian territories 
8) Gaza Strip 
9) Gazans 
10) Hamas 
11) IDF 
12) Muslim(s) 
13) Jew(s) 
14) Christian(s) 
15) Terrorist/Terrorism (referring to Palestinians) 
16) Terrorist/Terrorism (referring to Israelis) 
17) Martyr(s) 
18) Suicide bomb/er 
19) Homicide bomb/er 
20) Militant(s) (referring to Palestinians) 
21) Militant(s) (referring to Israelis) 
22) Extremist(s) (referring to Palestinians) 
23) Extremist(s) (referring to Iraelis) 
24) Refugee(s) (referring to Palestinians) 
25) Refugees(s) (referring to Israelis) 
26) Peace Process 
27) War on terror 
28) Intifada 
29) Ocuupation 
30) Jihad 
31) Targeted Killing 
32) Assassination 
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33) Liquidation policy 
34) Collective punishment 
35) ‘illeagally occupied territories 
36) Islamic militants 
37) Conflict 
38) War 
39) Massacre 
40) Onslaught 
41) Assaults 
42) Israeli aggression 
43) Invasion 
44) Palestinian aggression 
45) Offensive 
46) Israeli troops 
47) War crime 
48) Zionist 
49) Occupying army 
50) Settlers 
51) Resistance 
 
18- Key Events 
 
1) Sykes-Picot Agreement 
2) Balfour Declaration 
3) British Mandate for Palestine 
4) Hebron massacre (1929) 
5) Great uprising (1936-39) 
6) Peal Commission (1937) 
7) Lehi (stern Gang) attacks (1940-49) 
8) Alexandria Protocol (1944) 
9) Holocaust 
10) Partition of Palestine (1947) 
11) 1948 war 
46) The declaration of an Israeli state (1949) 
12) Deir Yassin Massacre 
13) Nakba 
14) Qibya massacre (1953) 
15) Israel invades Egypt (1956) 
16) Israel withdraws from Sinai (1957)  
17) Founding of PLO (1964) 
18) Six day war (1967) 
43) Al-Karameh war (1968) 
19) Avivim school bus massacre (1970) 
20) Munich Massacre (1972) 
21) Operation Wrath of God (1972-) 
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22) Yom Kippur war (1973) 
45) Oil embargo by Arab countries on Pro-Israeli Western countries 
23) Entebbe (1976) 
47) Council resolution 446 – stopping the building of Israeli settlements (1976) 
24) Camp David (1978) 
25) Return of Sinai (1979) 
26) Israel invades Lebanon (1982) 
27) Sabra and Shatila 
28) Intifada (1987) 
29) Founding of Hamas (1988) 
30) Palestinian declaration of Independence (1988) 
31) Gulf war 1, Scud attacks (1991) 
32) Oslo Peace Process /Accords (1993-95) 
33) Nobel Peace Prize (Peres, rabin, Arafat) (1994) 
44) Wadi Araba Peace Treaty – Jordan and Israel (1994) 
34) Assassination of Yitzahk rabin (1995) 
35) Camp David 2 (2000) 
36) Al-Aqsa Intifada 
37) Operation defensive Shield (2002) 
49) Iraq Invasion (2003) 
38) Yasser Arafat dies (2004) 
50) Wall declared illegal by UN (2004) 
39) Gaza pullout (2005) 
40) Israel-Lebanon War (July-August 2006) 
41) Hamas took over Gaza (2007) 
42) Gaza Siege (2008) 
52) Jenin (2002) 
 
Code:  
1- Mentioned only by journalist 
2- Mentioned only by actor 
3- Mentioned by both 
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Appendix C – Questionnaire  
 
1) What caused the current conflict? Who broke the ceasefire? 
___________________________________________ 
2) Why was there a ceasefire in the first place? Why are they fighting? 
__________________________________________ 
3) What was the main source of which you heard about the conflict? 
___________________________________________ 
4) What was your main source of information during the conflict? TV, Radio, Newspapers, 
the internet, family…etc  
 ___________________________________________ 
5) Have you used other sources to find out more about the conflict? 
___________________________________________ 
6) How would you rate your level of news consumption? (on a scale of 1 (very high) -5 (very 
low))  
 ___________________________________________ 
7) a- Did you feel engaged/involved with the news you were getting?  
___________________________________________ 
b- Were you satisfied with the amount of information you were getting from the media? 
___________________________________________ 
8)  Please estimate the number of casualties on both sides? 
___________________________________________ 
 
9) Do you see the conflict as justified?  (yes, no) 
 ___________________________________________ 
 
10) How do you see the trouble as starting? Who initiates the attack and who retaliates? 
___________________________________________ 
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11) Do you know of any United Nations resolutions or any criticisms that have been made by 
the UN about the actions of anyone in the conflict? (if yes please state one) 
___________________________________________ 
 
 
12)  Word Association: Write down the first thing that comes to your mind when you hear the 
following words. 
Hamas                  IDF (Israeli Defense Forces)  
Palestinians  Gaza Strip  
Israelis  Occupied Territories  
Settlers  1948 
1967 Suicide Bombers  
Zionists  Muslims  
Jews  Refugees  
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Appendix D – Questionnaire Analysis 
Q1. What caused the current conflict? Who broke the ceasefire? 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
Israel Palestine Both sides I don’t know 
17 5 0 2 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Israel Palestine Both sides I don’t know 
2 1 1 5 
Participants with cultural awareness to the conflict 
Israel Palestine Both sides I don’t know 
6 0 1 11 
 
Q2. What was the main source of which you heard about the conflict? 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
Friends and Relatives Media New Media I didn’t hear of it 
7 20 3 0 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Friends and Relatives Media New Media I didn’t hear of it 
1 3 1 4 
Participants with cultural awareness to the conflict 
Friends and Relatives Media New Media I didn’t hear of it 
0 16 0 1 
 
Q3. What was your main source of information during the conflict? 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
TV Radio Newspapers Internet Friends/Relatives 
19 3 7 7 9 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
TV Radio Newspapers Internet Friends/Relatives 
9 2 1 0 1 
Participants with cultural awareness to the conflict 
TV Radio Newspapers Internet Friends/Relatives 
14 0 1 4 3 
 
Q.4 Have you used other sources to find out more about the conflict? 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
Yes No 
18 5 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Yes No 
1 7 
Participants with cultural awareness to the conflict 
Yes No 
11 6 
Q.5 How would you rate your level of news consumption (1= very high – 5= very low) 
323 
 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 4 7 2 0 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
1 2 3 4 5 
0 2 2 2 3 
Participants with cultural awareness to the conflict 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 5 5 3 0 
 
Q.6 did you feel engaged/involved with the news you were getting? 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
Yes No 
20 2 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Yes No 
3 6 
Participants with cultural awareness to the conflict 
Yes No 
14 3 
 
Q.7 Were you satisfied with the amount of information you were getting from the media? 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
Yes No 
3 20 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Yes No 
5 4 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Yes No 
10 6 
 
Q8. Please estimate the number of casualties on both sides? 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
More Israelis More Palestinians Equal I don’t know 
0 18 1 4 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
More Israelis More Palestinians Equal I don’t know 
0 0 5 3 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
More Israelis More Palestinians Equal I don’t know 
0 14 0 3 
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Q.9 Do you see the conflict as justified? 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
Yes No I don’t know  
3 13 0 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Yes No I don’t know  
1 3 5 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Yes No I don’t know  
3 11 3 
 
Q.10 how do you see the trouble as starting? Who initiates the attack? 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
Israelis Palestinians Both I don’t know 
11 4 3 4 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Israelis Palestinians Both I don’t know 
1 1 1 6 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Israelis Palestinians Both I don’t know 
15 0 0 2 
 
Q.11 Are you aware of any United Nations resolutions or criticisms about the actions of any of 
the parties in the conflict? (If yes, please state one) 
Participants with pre-existing political biases 
Yes No 
14 8 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Yes No 
1 8 
Participants with no prior knowledge to the conflict 
Yes No 
1 16 
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Appendix E – Word association exercise  
 
 Participants with pre-existing 
political biases 
Participants no-prior 
knowledge on the conflict 
Participants with cultural 
awareness of the conflict 
+ - neutral + - neutral + - Neutral 
Hamas 
 
Victory/ 
bravery/ 
struggle/ 
resistance/
pride/ 
Islamic 
Resistance 
Movement 
Terrorists/ 
troubled/ 
murderers  
Elected 
governm
ent/ 
Sheikh 
Yasin  
  Religion  Resistan
ce/ 
Optimis
m/ 
power/ 
brave 
men/ 
legal 
 Govern
ment  
Palesti
ne 
  
Forever 
homeland/ 
heroes/ 
motherland 
of martyrs/ 
solid 
people/ 
dispossesse
d/ conflict/ 
robbed of 
their land/ 
suffering/ 
innocent 
civilians 
 Family/ 
Arab 
land/ 
1948/ 
issues 
 Foreign  Religion  Resistan
t 
people/ 
Hope/ 
occupie
d land/ 
denied 
rights/ 
tree 
leaf/ 
victims/ 
struggle/ 
heroes/ 
patient/ 
brave/ 
fighters  
 Country
/ my 
people/ 
home 
Israel 
 
 Occupiers/ 
enemies/ 
Illegal/ god 
damn 
them/ 
deception/ 
offenders/ 
cancer/ 
colonists/ 
fragmented
/ weak  
Citizens/ 
bus 
queue/ 
Jews/ 
those 
who live 
in Israel 
 Foreign  Palestin
ians  
 Enemies/ 
Stubborn
ness/ 
Murderer
s/ 
offenders
/ 
cowards/ 
aggressor
s/ 
unfaithful 
Star of 
David 
Settlers 
 
 Must leave/ 
thieves/ 
violent 
thieves/ 
religious 
extremists/ 
racist 
thieves/ 
idiots/ 
Palestinians 
dislike 
them 
civilians Peace 
makers 
   Enemies/ 
criminals/ 
extremist
s/ vomit/ 
criminals/ 
may god 
take 
them/  
 
1967 
 
Misery for 
Gaza/ 
setback/ 
disaster/ 
fear/ 
delusion 
 War/ 
war 
against 
Arabs/ 
start of 
occupati
on/ war 
of 
   Setback/ 
disaster 
 War/ 
Dashed 
line 
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expansio
n/ six 
day war 
1948 
 
Catastroph
e/ war of 
displaceme
nt/ Nakba/ 
Independe
nce/ a 
good year/ 
birth of 
Israel 
 War/ 
green 
line/ 
partition 
/ 
mandate 
  War  Catastro
phe/ 
Tears 
 England 
Gaza 
Strip 
 
Under 
siege/ 
pride/ 
symbol of 
power and 
bravery/ 
displaced 
people/ 
victim/ 
largest 
prison in 
the world/ 
occupied/ 
refugees 
 My 
hometo
wn/ 
most 
overcro
wded 
place on 
Earth/ 
conflict 
 Trouble  Fighting
/ Israel 
Pride 
and 
victory/ 
solid 
fortress/ 
strong/ 
bravery/ 
patient/ 
massacr
e/ siege 
 Palestini
an 
city/Ho
me 
town/  
IDF 
 
Defence/ 
protection/ 
best in the 
world/ 
strong 
army 
Aggressors/ 
destruction 
machine/ 
destructive 
occupiers/ 
my 
enemy/def
eated/ 
hatred/ 
blood 
thirsty/ 
certainly 
not 
defence/ 
militants 
Israel  Restric
tion  
  Powerful 
Army 
Enemies/ 
Hatred/ 
collective 
damage/ 
massacre
s/ war/ 
Israeli 
Killing 
Force/ 
cowards/ 
weak/ 
terrorists
/ 
aggressor
s 
Force/  
Suicide 
Bombe
rs/ 
martyr
dom 
operati
on  
Heroic act/ 
freedom 
fighter/ in 
god’s will/ 
self 
defence 
mechanism
/ desperate 
Illegal/ 
killers/ 
fundament
alists/ 
abhorrent/ 
fanatics/ 
insane/ 
shameful 
People 
who 
blow 
themsel
ves up/ 
Samson 
 Terroris
ts/ 
death 
9/11-
7/1/ 
twin 
towers/ 
war 
against 
terror/ 
war 
 Heroic/ 
struggle/ 
freedom
/ 
happine
ss/ legal 
 Weapon 
Muslim
s 
 
Victims/ 
rightful 
people/ 
peaceful/ 
good 
Divided/ 
useless 
Our 
brothers
/ 
religion/ 
Mecca/ 
Quran  
 Slum 
dug 
Million
aire/ 
differen
t  
Religion
/ 
Indians  
Not 
terrorist
s/ 
peace/ 
peaceful
/ right/ 
holding 
on/ 
victory 
 People/ 
Arabs/ 
My 
brothers 
Jews United/ 
persecuted  
Treachery/ 
occupiers/ 
People/ 
religion/ 
Holoca
ust/ 
 Jewish 
hat/ 
Logical 
people/  
Occupati
on/ 
People/ 
Israel/ 
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 without 
mercy 
my 
people/ 
north 
London/  
me 
Germa
ny war 
religion Zionists/ 
cowards/ 
criminals 
Jerusale
m/ 
religious 
Refuge
es 
 
Rightful 
people/ 
struggle/ 
return/ 
homeless/ 
without 
hope 
Escaping 
bad 
Displace
d/ me 
Freedo
m  
 Need 
help/ 
refugee 
camps 
in war/ 
prisone
rs/ 
vulnera
ble / 
hostage
s 
Hope/ 
sympath
y/ 
victimise
d/ will 
return/ 
homeles
s 
 Me/us/ 
Palestini
ans/ me 
Zionist 
 
 Criminals/ 
enemies/ 
Nazis/ 
offenders/ 
people with 
the 
ideology of 
dominance/ 
apartheid / 
anti-
Semitic/ 
racist 
nationalists
/ colonists  
 
Israel/ 
me 
    Cruel/ 
occupatio
n/ 
hatred/ 
threat/ 
darkness/ 
occupier/ 
settlers/ 
murderer
s 
 
Occupi
ed 
territor
ies 
Should be 
given back/ 
hope/ 
longest 
occupation
/ settlers/ 
stolen/ 
illegal 
Israel I 
target 
Palestini
an land 
 Scary/ 
war 
 Victims/ 
holly 
land/ 
Palestin
e/ lost 
rights 
 Land/ 
Israel 
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